I poteri sostitutivi nel federalismo cooperativo: fisionomia e linee evolutive dell’esperienza tedesca

Substitutive Powers in a Cooperative Federal System: Defining Traits and Evolution of the German Case. The paper reconstructs the defining characters of substitutive powers in the legal system of the Federal Republic of Germany. The analysis focuses, first, on federal coercion as regulated in Article 37 of the Basic Law of 1949. In so doing, it highlights its roots in German constitutional history, the similarities and differences with its direct antecedents, and its limited practical relevance in a cooperative federal system that has benefited from remarkable political stability. After that, the paper deals with discussion about the possible resort to federal coercion to cope with the emergence of new crises, financial or political. This testifies to the vitality of this constitutional provision and to its potential role within an evolving legal order.