CENTRO STUDI SUL FEDERALISMO
RESEARCH PAPER

A CONTRIBUTION TO A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CHANGE*

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CENTRE FOR STUDIES ON FEDERALISM – TURIN

INTRODUCTION

1. The object of study: international systems change

This theoretical study deals with international change. This may seem a typical issue of International Relations[1]. However, there are not many IR monographic researches focused on the theoretical study of change. Many analyses are concerned with a given situation or a specific transition, but rarely they address the problem of identifying the proper analytical categories to understand international change.

Jones (1981: 18) points out that change is always present and that the first task of the scholar is to distinguish between different types of change. He identifies three types of change: insignificant, significant non-transformational, and significant transformational change. Gilpin's distinction is quite similar, but it is more precise and it is probably the best-known. He distinguishes between interaction, systemic and systems change (see Table 1).

Table 1. Types of international changes (taken from Gilpin 1981-1995[2]: 40)

Type	Factors that change
Systems change	Nature of actors (empires, nation-states, etc.)
Systemic change	Governance of system
Interaction change	Interstate processes

[1] I adopt the common use to indicate the academic discipline of "International Relations" with capitol letter, and the object of its study as "international relations".

[2] I indicate both the date of the first original publication and the date of the edition from which the references are taken. For the texts which have not been written in English the second date often refers to the English translation. When an English edition was not available I had to refer to editions in other languages.

This distinction has a fundamental theoretical value and will be applied throughout this research. Interaction change refers to normal events of international politics, that is to the continuous change involved in diplomatic interactions and change in alliances. Therefore it is a kind of change which is of little interest for the scholar, although it is the usual business of diplomats.

Systemic change regards the form of control or governance of the international system. Being the international system an anarchical one, systemic change is best exemplified by a change in the hegemon(s). Actually by "hegemon(s)" is meant here what are generally called "great powers", and after the Second World War, "superpowers". Within the classic realist tradition which dominates IR scholarship, great powers are considered the most relevant actors which provide some form of control to the international system (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 9; Gilpin 1981-1995: 27-38). History provides many examples of great powers diplomatic meetings to decide about international crises and also of other states destiny. Sometimes, for instance in the XIX century, this kind of governance of the systems has been somehow formalised under the name of the Concert of powers. The special position of great powers is often recognised within international organizations. For instance only five states are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and have a veto power on its decisions. This does not imply that if there is not a named institution, there is not the form of control or that this is always recognised within international organizations. An international system is considered unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar according to the number of great powers (Gilpin 1981-1995: 29-30). For example systemic change may involve a transformation of the system from multipolar to bipolar, as it happened after the Second World War. But a change of the great powers may occur while the system remains multipolar.

Systems change indicates a change in the nature of the actors or the units of the system. Gilpin suggests that "the rise and decline of the Greek city-state system, the decline of the medieval European state system, and the emergence of the modern European nation-state systems are examples of systems change" (Gilpin 1981-1995: 41). These examples refer to very significant, but very rare transformations of the international systems. The rise of one system is necessarily linked to the decline of the previous one. Furthermore, these processes generally include series of events which occurred over a long period. It is also difficult to indicate when the rise of a system is accomplished. The rise of the European state system provides a useful example. According to Dehio, the consolidation of the modern states in France, Spain, Austria and Britain can be considered as the start of the European state system. This process also implied the end of the Italian

state system: the small Italian city-states were just too small confronted with the new European powers (Dehio 1948-1963: 23, 28, 35-36). Machiavelli recognised this situation and called for Italian unity to maintain independence and avoid foreign rule (Machiavelli 1513-1998: ch. XXVI). However the Italian unification was achieved a few centuries later under very different conditions and pressures, but within the same state system. In other words, the international systems change which gave birth to the European state system occurred at a given time, but not everybody recognised it and draw the consequences of this change. For instance the Italian states preferred – or were forced - to be conquered divided rather than become a great power united. This means that the recognition of systems change is important also to choose a course of action in the face of such a dramatic change.

The name, and the examples, of international systems change suggest the historical significance of such a rare transformation which involves the transition from one international system to another. And this also suggests that they are probably the result of long-term processes. It is thus very difficult to study this type of international change, and there can be little wonder to find out that IR scholars have generally avoided this challenge. Gilpin regrets that "students of international relations have given little attention to this category of change and have left it (perhaps wisely) to the philosophers of history" and suggests that "it should be more central to their concerns" (Gilpin 1981-1995: 41). However, Gilpin himself just mentions that systems change is related to technological and economic changes and then explicitly focuses on systemic change (Gilpin 1981-1995: 43), like most IR scholars.

Gilpin proposes an essentially realist theory to study systemic change – complementary to Waltz's structural realism (Waltz 1979) – which is based on the changes in the distribution of power. The fact that different states generally have different growth of power produces continuous changes in the situation of power. The new distribution of power may produce a disequilibrium in the system, that is a systemic crisis. This can be overcome by the recognition of the new situation of power. This can happen peacefully, but more often it will require a hegemonic war (Gilpin 1981-1995: 33). The winner(s) will assert its/their position in the system. Thus a hegemonic war may confirm the status quo – if the previous hegemon(s) win – or may provide a change if the challenger(s) to the status quo win. Gilpin's theory of systemic change can thus be summarised in Table 2.

Table 2Dynamics of systemic change (taken from Gilpin 1981-1995: 12)

System in State of Equilibrium	Differential Growth of power →	Redistribution of Power in System
↑		↓
Resolution of Systemic Crisis	←	Disequilibrium of System

Even the attempts to examine international change from a long term perspective, such as those of long cycles theorists (Modelski 1987; Thompson 1992), remain within the limits of systemic change. And these theorists, like Gilpin, place great emphasis on the role of hegemonic wars as means to take fundamental decisions which shape the international system for a long period. They all accept the possibility of peaceful systemic change – the fall of the Soviet Union without a hegemonic war, may be taken as an example, when looked from this perspective (Clark 1997: ch. 8) – but as a rather unlikely possibility.

IR as an academic discipline is recent and was developed mainly after the Second World War in the Anglo-Saxon world (Schmidt 1998). Furthermore, the IR research agenda has always been influenced by the current international situation (Young 1986: 104; Nye 1988: 235-7) and by contemporary events which had not been predicted or which could not be explained by existing theories and to which the international community had to respond[1]. Thus IR scholars focused on international systemic change because this was considered the most important and relevant issue. During the Cold War the problem was to understand the mechanisms which determine a change of the hegemon. On the basis of such an understanding it should have been possible to identify the best foreign policy to avoid such a change.

Significantly, Gilpin does not include in his list of examples of international systems change the transition from the European to the world state system. Just like most IR scholars, he considers the impact of the Second World War on the international system as an example of systemic change. Indeed the war spelt the decline of some great powers - the defeated Germany, Japan and Italy, but also France and Britain - and the rise of the USA and USSR, and possibly of China (Bull 1977-1995: 197). It is generally accepted that the post-war order was fundamentally a bipolar one, and much attention was given to the issue of the stability or instability of such a system. However, some historians, economists and

[1] This should not be considered as necessarily a negative fact. As Lord Acton points out, political science has always a practical character, as a guide for action (Acton 1895-1967: 301).

philosophers noticed that also a systems change had taken place. The Second World War spelt the end of the European states system and the development of the world states system (Dehio 1948-1963: 23; 179-180, 262-267; and 1955-1959: 20-21, 34-35, 127-128, 138-141: but also Einaudi: 1945-1986, 1947a-1986 and 1947b-1986; Toynbee 1948: especially 114-121; Barraclough 1967-1990: especially 95-103). This may be considered as an international systems change. Before that war the European nation-states were great powers. After the war all observers described the world system as bipolar, that is characterised by the presence of only two great powers, which were emphatically called superpowers[2]. The superpowers were all continent-wide states. Their geographic and demographic size was significantly different from those of the former great powers, the declining European nation-states, especially after the start of de-colonisation (Einaudi 1943-1986: 75-79; 1945-1986: 41; 1947a-1986: 45-51; 1947b-1986: 163-165; Dehio 1948-1963: 23; Toynbee 1948: 104-125; Albertini 1961b-1999a, 1965c-1999a, and 1966-1999b; Barraclough 1967-1990: 24 and 29). Attempts to identify the possible emergence of other world level great powers generally looked at other continental states such as China and India, or at the eventual outcome of the European unification process (Galtung 1973). This international systems change was the result of a long-term process which had been identified much earlier, for instance by Seeley (1895-1911: especially 18-19 and 349-350). It is obviously very difficult to indicate a date to mark a change which is the result of a long-term process. However several historians consider the last part of the XIX and the first half of the XX century as the transition period from the European to the world state system (Dehio 1948-1963: 23; Toynbee 1948: 104-125; Barraclough 1967-1990: 24 and 29; Kennedy 1988-1989: ch. 5 and 6).

At this point the conceptualisation of this last systems change is still in static terms. It is the recognition of a new situation of power which requires a new amount of military and economic capacities to be a great power that only continent-wide states seem able to acquire. However this can also be seen as the start of a long-term process of international system change. Once this new situation is recognised, people in different areas of the world may decide to emulate the existing great power and to create continent-wide economic and political units. From this perspective the European unification process[3] can be considered

[2] Miller noticed the emergence of this new word, and suggests that the Second World War made the Westphalian system global, still he does not draw the consequence that a systems change has taken place with all its implications (Miller 1994: 52-58).

[3] Most academic studies use the expression "European integration process". I adopt Albertini's terminology which distinguish between integration, unification and construction to indicate specific aspects of the process. Integration refers to the economic aspect, construction to the institutional aspect, and unification to the political significance of the process which comprises both integration and construction (Albertini 1963-1999a, 1985-199a, 1986-1999a).

as part of the overall process of international system change, that is as a response to the birth of the world state system (Einaudi 1943-1986: 75-79; 1945-1986: 41; 1947a-1986: 45-51; 1947b-1986: 163-165; Toynbee 1948: 104-125; Albertini 1961b-1999a, 1965c-1999a, and 1966-1999b).

This introduces the problem that some changes may be classified differently according to the level of analysis at which they are studied. According to Gilpin "the unification of Germany in 1871 was an interaction change at the overall level of European politics, a systemic change at the level of central European politics, and a systems change at the level of intra-German politics" (Gilpin 1981-1995: 40). This interpretation may be challenged in relation to the meaning of the German national unification for the European state systems, since Germany was immediately a European great power, and thus its creation may be considered also as a systemic change. However, Gilpin's statement recognises that all unification processes can be considered as an example of systems change from a certain level of analysis. The link between these processes and overall international systems change is important since to study systems change is to investigate "why one or another type of entity is best suited for a particular historical environment", an issue which "has been inadequately addressed by students of international relations" (Gilpin 1981-1995: 41).

The birth of the European state system and of the world state system both implied the transition to greater political units. This does not mean that all political units increase their size, but only that a greater one is needed to be a great power in the new system[4]. The emergence of greater political units always implies the overcoming of international anarchy in a given area. The consolidation of the European states was the end of smaller polities which existed on their territories. Similarly, the emergence of continent-wide states where they did not – or do not – exist, requires the overcoming of smaller polities. While in the case of the coming about of the European state system this process happened mainly by force and conquest, in the contemporary world it is difficult to imagine one state conquering many others and becoming a continent-wide one. And also the two post-war superpowers acquired their size differently. Russia expanded by conquest in previous period, but was able to exploit its size to acquire another magnitude of power than the European nation-states only in this century. After the thirteen American colonies won their independence from Britain, the USA were created by a peaceful unification completed by

[4] For example those states, such as Russia and the USA which had acquired a continent-wide dimension in the past found themselves in a favourite position. The question is why their size was not so important in previous periods in which they were at most on equal footing with the European nation-states. This issue will be approached directly in chapter six.

the federal Constitution of 1787. The European unification process, and other similar processes elsewhere can be studied from this perspective: as a peaceful process to overcome international anarchy in a given area to create larger polities able to play an important role in the international system. From this point of view these processes can be considered as part of an overall process of change of the fundamental units of the international system, that is of international systems change.

The European Union is certainly not yet a state and has little powers in relation to foreign and security policy. And even if the member states delegate to the EU the exercise of a single foreign and security policy, this would be a change in just one part of the world, and may not be followed by similar processes elsewhere. The process is still under way and it is impossible to know when and where it will end. However it is possible to realise that it has gone very far away from its starting point, the European international anarchy and rivalries, and the catastrophe of the Second World War which they provoked (Dehio 1948-1963). Even if it is not a state, it is common to consider the EU as a polity in its own right (Hix 1999), and a specific terminology has been developed to study it within the academic debate. The growing tendency towards regionalism may be considered a sign of the possibility of similar developments elsewhere (Johnson 1991; Fawcett and Hurrell (eds.) 1995-1997; and Telò 2001). The nation-state itself took many centuries to impose itself first in Europe, and then throughout the world. The same may be true for continent-wide states, especially if they are to be established by peaceful means. Furthermore, the emergence of the world state system and the globalization process may be considered as signals of a tendency towards new forms of cosmopolitan governance on which also a wide academic debate has started.

Within this perspective it is important to study international systems change, to show that one occurred in the XX century, to draw the consequences from such a change, and to understand the new world state system. It is impossible to address all these issues satisfactorily in this research. The aim is thus more limited although still very ambitious. It is to offer a contribution to the development of a theory of international systems change. Since this issue has not been at the centre of the IR academic debate I will refer also to authors from other disciplines, especially philosophers, sociologists, and historians, to try to identify the analytical categories best suited to study international systems change. These authors have approached this issue directly, or indirectly, because international systems change relates to the nature and the proper or best dimension of the polities which compose the international system at different times (Montani 1999: 15). The debate about globalization, the crisis of the nation-state and European integration partly deals with

international systems change. From this perspective the main questions are: is globalization a process of international systems change? Is it making the nation-states too small to be great powers? Does it require the creation of larger economic and political units through regional integration? Does it demand new forms of global governance, and maybe a world polity? These issues are often at the centre of the academic debate, even if they are not considered from the perspective of international systems change. There are also many IR studies about the attenuation of international anarchy, and much theoretical emphasis is placed on international cooperation, international regimes, international organizations, and the concepts of international (anarchical) society, globalization, and global governance. To consider these issues from the perspective of international systems change is to look at the prospect of overcoming international anarchy at regional and global level, considered as a weak, but existing tendency.

2. International anarchy

The link between international systems change and the overcoming of international anarchy indicates the emphasis placed on this second concept, that is on the plurality of states, or on the absence of a supranational government. This places this study firmly within the IR third image[5] tradition, which focuses on the level of analysis of the international system itself to explain international politics (Waltz 1959: chs. VI-VIII). Starting from this perspective Waltz builds his own theory of neorealism (Waltz 1979) which ascribes an absolutely crucial role to the concept of international anarchy, coherently with the classic realist tradition (see Waltz 1986; Buzan, Jone and Little 1993; Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds) 1995; Hsiung 1997).

Many IR theories consider the two extremes of international anarchy and cosmopolitan order as insignificant. This is the case for the theories of the first and second images, which focus on the level of analysis of the individual and of the state to explain international politics. The first image includes all theories which explain international relations through human nature. There are optimistic and pessimistic views of human nature. It is possible to maintain the possibility or the impossibility of progress towards a perfect human nature. But it is impossible to justify such positions from a scientific perspective. As Kant (1798a-1991: especially 180-181) pointed out the history of mankind

[5] I am referring to Waltz's well-known terminology and distinction between the three images of IR theories (Waltz 1959). In the following analysis however, I will rather use the concept of level of analysis.

cannot tell us anything in this sense. Certainly, mankind cannot go against human nature – whatever it is. This is tautological. Still men can choose among different courses of action in different situations. This simple observation makes it clear the unsuitability of this level of analysis alone to explain the changing reality of international politics (Waltz 1959, chs. 1-2). Many theories have different assumptions and claims at different levels of analysis, including the one emphasised by the first image. For example, Morgenthau's realism is based on strong anthropological assumptions about the existence of objective laws rooted in human nature (Morgenthau 1948-1985: 4). Still the other realist assumptions focus more on other aspects, not directly related to human nature. The first level of analysis, that of the individual and inter-subjectivity, can be used in different ways. Rosenau's analysis focuses on this level, and provides useful insights about IR change (Rosenau 1997: 218-220, 446). But to overestimate its heuristic value and to adopt the first image, especially in relation to the causes of war is not very helpful. International politics cannot be explained without a careful consideration of other elements, which are at the centre of the second and third images.

The second image includes the theories which explain international relations through the characteristics of the units of the international system, the states. Although IR literature has been dominated by realist scholars, such a perspective - for example the theory of democratic peace (Doyle 1986 and 1995; Czempiel 1992; Russett 1993, MacMillan 1998) - is a powerful view in the contemporary world. From a theoretical perspective this theory is similar to other versions of internationalism. The claim that liberal, or democratic or socialist states do not go to war against each other simply means that ideological divisions are more important than any other factor, including international anarchy and the geopolitical situation, in determining the foreign policy of a country and ultimately international politics.

The success at the academic, political and popular level of the second image is partly due to the situation of power characteristic of the Cold War (Pistone 1973: 44). In the aftermath of the Second World War it was useful to both USA and Soviet Union to justify the allegedly imperialistic and expansionistic foreign policies of each other on the basis of their domestic regimes. This could strengthen their claim of promoting an ideological division of the world and not just a hegemonic struggle based on their respective *raison d'état* (Montani 1999: 5). It also sustained their ambition to present themselves as the champions of the best domestic regime, whose establishment would also bring international peace. This claim also allowed a higher degree of tolerance of their hegemony within their spheres of influence.

Waltz's analysis and criticism of the second image is very effective (1959: ch. IV; but see also Layne 1995). On the one hand the theories of the second image overestimate the perfectibility of domestic regimes - for example, Czempiel refers to the "perfect democracy" (1992: 265). Consequently, this view underestimates the possibility of incomplete or erroneous establishment and/or management of the perfect domestic regime and of the consequences of such "imperfect" applications. On the other hand the second image approach underestimates the possibility of change or of corruption of the domestic regime – also due to events on the international system. On the contrary, Dehio's historical analysis shows the role of international factors in the fall of the democratic system of the Weimar Republic and the coming about of the totalitarian nazi regime (Dehio 1948-1963: 247-260 and 1952-54). Furthermore, different versions of internationalism have been historically falsified. Soviet imperialism contradicts the idea, based on the second image perspective, that capitalism is the real cause of war and that peaceful relations between communist countries always apply. Similarly there is not sufficient evidence that democracies do not fight each other, as even a supporter of this theory, Czempiel, recognises (1992: 267).

Confronted with this kind of problems second image theories generally turn to the belief in the effectiveness of international organisations. This is the result of an incoherent application of the domestic analogy. The limits of such an application have been well described in many classic federalist works (n. 6-8 of the Federalist Papers; Einaudi 1918a-1986 and 1918b-1986; Lothian 1935-1990) and essentially consist in not questioning the dogma of national sovereignty and underestimating the significance of international anarchy. Second image theories are correct in emphasising that there are many specific causes of war. But they are causes of conflicts, which exist within the state too. However, within the state there are legal coercive means to solve conflicts and controversies, and the monopoly of force by the state apparatus. On the international level these means are lacking. Thus the factors which produce controversies within the state become causes of war only in the international arena because of international anarchy, that is the absence of a supranational government and of legal coercive instruments to solve controversies at the international level. On these grounds third image theories suggest that international anarchy is the condition of possibility of war. It is a necessary permissive condition of war, while the other causes are just one of the possible sparkles which may exploit this permissive condition[6].

[6] Actually, war is possible also within the state, as many civil wars show. They are due to a number of reasons and may take several forms. Sometimes a civil war is the result of a revolution to change the domestic order.

3. A framework of analysis

To consider the tendency towards the overcoming of international anarchy at European and world level may seem a purely normative choice. The purpose of this study is to show that by looking at reality from this perspective it is possible to identify a series of key variables to understand international systems change. This research does not propose a proper theory, but offers some indications towards its development.

I try to refine previous insights developed by many authors and traditions of thought and present them in a more systematic form in the attempt to employ them in a complementary way within a coherent framework of analysis. No theory can be discussed for a long time at the academic level, if it has no analytical value whatsoever. To improve our explanation and understanding of reality useful insights of different theories have to be taken into account. This does not imply an easy choice for eclecticism. It requires a clear indication of those aspects of existing theories which are retained, together with the changes and limitations attributed to them – otherwise they would not be part of a new framework.

I will try to use selectively the useful insights of realism, historical materialism and social constructivism[7]. Each of them emphasises unilaterally one aspect of reality, being it politics, economics and society, or culture. However, academic sophistication is now very high and many authors of each tradition recognise the existence of all these three elements. But, having paid this annoying tribute, they generally continue to study and analyse just one of them, on the basis that authors of other schools have already explored the other realms. Even Rosenau, who often hints at the explanatory framework proposed in this research, explicitly decides to focus on just one aspect (Rosenau 1997: 159). An artificial division of reality has thus been created which produces theories well suited to study one of those aspects, but leaving to the other, often opposed, theories to explain the other aspects of reality. Thus each tradition provides useful insights for the aspect of reality on which it focuses, but is unable to consider international reality in its complexity and to look at the interactions between different realms.

Often a civil war starts to change the borders of the community, if a certain group wishes to secede to create a new state, or to join another one. There are also other possibilities, but the issue of civil war is out of the scope of this study and will not be discussed any further.

[7] This is a recent school of thought both in IR and EU studies (Checkel 1998). I am aware that other authors prefer different divisions: Rosenau (1997: 31) identifies three world views: realism, liberalism and fragmegration (his own view). The latter is based on methodological premises, which strongly resemble social constructivism, which seems a better term to identify this school of thought.

Hence I favour the tendency, especially strong in the field of European studies, to develop so-called framework theories (Warleigh, 2000). Framework theories use different pre-existing theories and concepts to explain some limited and well-defined aspects of the complex reality they study. But they try to use them in a complementary way, thus making the framework theory more effective than each of its components (Warleigh 2000: 174). Still, I am aware of the problems of coherence they pose to the researcher. One of the main problems is that of hierarchy. Many theories can be criticised for their unilateral perspective. At the same time no researcher can grasp or describe the whole reality. It is necessary to make a selection and indicate the relevant aspects of reality to try to explain or understand a particular phenomenon or process. In other words, it requires imposing a hierarchy of causal factor on an event or process, which generally has many different causes. In order to retain the useful insights of different hierarchies of causal explanations there is the need either to present a new and more articulated hierarchy, or to indicate the interrelation between different variables, or finally to state clearly which aspect of the process the different categories are best suited to explain and how they can be used in a complementary way to provide a more effective understanding. However, even if a new framework theory may provide a more complex understanding of social reality, it will still be taking into account only a part of that reality.

Thus I will try to provide a systematic view of the insights developed by many authors by proposing a framework of analysis to study international systems change. This framework attempts to consider together politics, economics, and culture in their interaction as aspects of modern society and international order. It is an ambitious attempt, probably deemed to failure. However, it is based on the reflections of important authors, to whom the useful aspects of the proposed framework have to be ascribed. For this reason I will try to be as precise and detailed as possible in the reference to these authors in relation to the various analytical concepts I will employ in this attempt. Consequently the key elements of the following framework are not particularly original. Some authors such as Dehio, Polanyi, Albertini and the Italian federalist scholars after him, Rosenau and Gellner, got close to a proper definition of this framework or applied it without stating it clearly, or in relation to other object of study. However hints and useful insights are taken from many other authors too. If this research has any originality, this lies in the attempt to exploit those analitycal tools together in a complementary way to study international systems change. It exploits the theoretical results of many authors, but its many remaining shortcomings are due to my own efforts to provide a systematic version of their insights.

If I were to name the following framework, I would call it federalist, simply because the idea to try to develop it, came first from the insights grasped from federalist authors. Only a few of the main authors considered in this research were members of federalist movements, namely Robbins, Einaudi and Albertini. However, many non-federalist authors share the same view, and sometimes they develop it further and often use such a theory or its essential components. And significantly, from their analysis of the international situation also these authors often favoured a federalist normative proposal. Although the normative aspect is not their main concern, Seeley, Polanyi, Toynbee, Dehio, and Gellner suggest at least briefly the need for a united Europe - preferably as a federation, considered the only way to combine unity and diversity and to extend democracy over such a vast territory – or even for a form of world government endowed with sovereignty (Seeley 1871-1989; Polanyi 1944: 22; Toynbee 1948: 115-116, 120-125; Dehio 1955-1969: 129-135; Gellner 1994: 78-80; and 1997: IX-X). This happens because to develop a successful strategy to realise a normative goal there is first the need to understand properly the existing reality and the possibility to change it. Thus people with different political backgrounds may develop the same analytical categories to study international reality. I try to select this analytical core of the federalist tradition and to refine it with the contribution of non-federalist authors.

I search for the analytical tools employed to understand reality, before developing a strategy to reach a given normative goal. I am undertaking an analytical enterprise analogous – although rather different in its contents – to Moravcsik's attempt to establish an analytical (neo)liberal IR theory (Moravcsik 1992) and his following liberal intergovernmentalist EU theory (Moravcsik 1993; 1995; 1998). Therefore, just as Moravcsik is criticised from a liberal standpoint, I may be criticised from a federalist one by all those who refuse the possibility to distinguish the analytical from the normative core of a political ideology as argued by Long (1995) for liberalism. Long criticises Moravcsik's idea to "offer a liberal *analysis* from which liberal prescription follow" because what specifically characterises liberalism are precisely its prescriptions (Long 1995: 498). Indeed Long is right in emphasising that a political ideology is characterised by its normative aspect. However, this does not imply the impossibility to identify the analysis on which those prescriptions are based and the analytical categories which sustain that analysis. Long is also right in emphasising that from the same analysis different normative prescriptions may follow according to the value perspective of the observers. It is precisely for this reason that I believe the following theoretical proposal has an analytic value without an intrinsic normative stand. Still - just as Moravcsik had to refer to the term "liberal" to define his

theory since he used insights developed within the liberal tradition to modify the orthodox realist view of international relations - I cannot but call "federalist" my own theoretical proposal. It is the only way to pay the proper tribute to those authors without whom I would have never started this research.

4. A tripartite framework to study international systems change

The framework of analysis proposed in this research focuses on the spheres of coercion, production and culture, thus following Gellner's suggestion to consider these aspects of reality as the most significant one to study human history (Gellner 1988: 19). For each aspect of reality I have identified a broad analytical category, which has been developed mainly within one school of thought. The framework theory is thus based on three categories and on the pattern of interactions among them.

Table 3. The basic structure of the framework of analysis.

Aspect of reality	**Analytical category**	**Tradition of thought**
Production	Mode of production	Marxism
Culture	Ideology	Social constructivism and sociology of knowledge
Coercion	*raison d'état* theory	Realism

Great attention will be given to a refinement of the concept of the mode of production and to the identification of its heuristic value and limits. This will require a detailed examination of the two components of this category: the means of production and the relations of production. While the second element has generally been given great attention, it is the first which is most relevant to the study of international systems change. To revive – and revise – the concept of mode of production may seem a strange choice. However, implicit references to this concept are very common in the contemporary literature. Most studies on globalisation include reference to the concept of "post-industrial" society, economy, or world. All these expressions are intelligible only within the framework of the concept of the mode of production. Clearly it is not used in the same

way as Marx did. The distinction between a capitalist and a socialist mode of production is not retained in this study. The periodisation of the modes of production adopted here is different from the Marxist one. For the study of the contemporary world the crucial distinction is between the industrial and the post-industrial or scientific mode of production (Montani 1999: ch. 2). I link it with economics and society because the concept refers to long-term change in the society, but it is often operationalised through specific economic concepts, especially in relation to the modern era. However, the concept of mode of production is not just an economic concept[8] and it can be applied to periods in which it is difficult to speak properly about economic activity (Montani 1999: ch. 2). It has been more deeply associated with economics, because it is easier to identify its impact at the economic level, but its influence on domestic and international politics is not less important.

The concepts of ideology and *raison d'état* are less out of fashion than the mode of production. The first relates to the (dominant) set of norms and political beliefs, which sustain a polity and the international order. The second to a theory which represents the basis of international political realism. The three categories are linked to the study of a basic aspect and variable of reality. The evolution and change in one of these aspects opens up the possibility for international change. In fact change in just one of them is unlikely to bring about international systems change, but only interaction or systemic change. The convergence of the three is generally required to bring about an international systems change. But a change in one of them may help bring about change in the others. It is precisely the tension between the three when they are not convergent which opens a window of opportunity for change to occur. The new convergence or equilibrium between the three will define what type of change will take place and in which direction.

The next step is to identify the specific aspect of reality that each category is best suited to explain. One chapter is devoted to the analysis of each category and to the aspect of change they are suited to account for. At this point of the argument it is only possible to provide a rough indication of the main results.

[8] Croce notices the difference between historical materialism and pure economics, although he does not stress and analyse this issue in detail (Croce 1897-1977: 66-74, especially 67 and 72). Also Polanyi distinguishes between formal economics and substantive economics. The first refer to what we call economics, the second to the concept of mode of production (Polanyi 1944: 5; 1957: 240, 243-247; 1977: xl, 19-24, 56-60).

Table 4. Heuristic categories and type of change they are suited to account for.

Heuristic category		**Type of change**
raison d'état (adapts to change)	→	change in the situation of power
Mode of production (not easily reversable) - means of production - relations of production (or form of integration)	→	market dimension and interdependence domestic order and change in state power
Ideology (possible to reverse)	→	weakening of status quo; mobilization and legitimation of a given order; change in state power

This basic scheme will be qualified with a limited number of assumptions about the *relative prevalence* of one or the other variable within different time-period, although there are historical cases in which such tendencies do not occur. The analysis of the three categories will suggest the particular importance of the categories of the mode of production in the long-term, of ideology in the middle-term, and of the *raison d'état* theory in the short-term. Therefore the historical explanation of a single event will usually concentrate on this third category while the previous two are needed to indicate the long and middle-term conditions of possibility of change.

A basic idea is that a dramatic change in one of these elements requires, at least in the long-term, an answer in the other aspects too. Therefore change is conceptualised as an answer to conflicts in the development of these three aspects of reality. Such conflicts are windows of opportunity for change (Rosenau 1992a: 1). However, it is not possible to say when the other aspects will adapt to the change of one of them. Nor if they will be able to resist adaptation and reverse the first change. Therefore this framework of analysis leaves no room for historical determinism.

5. The structure of the research

The attempt to sketch a framework of analysis to study international systems change is very ambitious. The complexity of the task suggests proposing a linear exposition

in which each aspect of the framework is considered before an overall analysis is offered. Thus the first chapter discusses the origin of the framework of analysis proposed in this research. I will first highlight the reflection of many authors suggesting to develop a tripartite framework, and then I will analyse those who contribute most to this attempt. Only at this point I will start the analysis of each heuristic category to identify its value and limits.

The second chapter will examine the *raison d'état* theory, which was the basis of contemporary realism and employs concepts characteristic of the IR debate. International systems change is defined of the basis of concepts such as great powers and international system which were first developed and employed within this school of thought. For this reason it seems appropriate to start from the sphere of coercion and to identify the useful analytical tools offered by this theoretical tradition.

The third chapter offers a detailed analysis of the concept of the mode of production. It focuses on the different characteristics of its two components, the means of production and of the relations of production. Polanyi and Montani's works will be particularly helpful in this refinement. Each author focuses on a different element, and their results can be used in a complementary way to identify the different applications of these three basic concepts developed within the tradition of historical materialism.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of culture and particularly of political ideologies in bringing about international systems change. This may seem an attempt characteristic of the IR theories of the second image. It is not. One of the main issues discussed in this chapter is precisely the distinction between political ideologies concerned with the domestic order of a given polity – such as liberalism, democracy and socialism for instance – and those concerned with the identification of the proper, or best, political unit – such as nationalism and federalism. It is the latter group which is most relevant in the study of international systems change, although most studies on political ideologies have focused mainly on the former type of ideologies.

The fifth chapter examines the main patterns of interaction of the three spheres of coercion, production and culture. This will indicate that the convergence of all three aspects is generally necessary to bring about international systems change. On this basis I will suggest the opportunity to assign a relative heuristic preference to the sphere of production in the long term, to that of culture in the middle-term, and to that of coercion in the short term. Hence I will propose a series of theoretical remarks which offer some points on which to build in the development of a proper theory of international systems change.

In the sixth chapter I will try to apply the framework of analysis employing the interpretations of those historians who use analytical categories similar to those proposed in this research. Particular attention will be given to the crisis of the European nation-state and the European state system and the birth of the world state system, and to the globalization process.

Finally in the conclusion I will try to point out the meaning of this theoretical attempt. It is obviously an extremely difficult task to consider the three realms and their interaction. Still, if this research helps to recognise the international systems change which took place in the XX century and its possible consequences, and to develop new ways of looking at reality in its complexity, it will be useful notwithstanding its many shortcomings.

CHAPTER 1. THE ORIGINS OF THE TRIPARTITE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to identify the origins of the tripartite framework of analysis in the insights of many authors and to point out some theoretical issues which will be addressed in the next chapters. Hints at a similar framework can be found in different authors. One of the main difference is that often these insights are used to analyse the current international situation, but are not developed as a theory to understand change which may be used to study contemporary issues, but also to study past and future transformations. The first two paragraphs will be devoted to the identification of the origins of the theory. I will look first at those authors who suggest to consider all three aspects of coercion, culture and production (Gellner 1988: 20) in the study of international reality. I will point out that such a recognition comes from authors of different schools of thought and who focus on different IR images. Then I will examine those who come closer to a proper formulation of the framework which this research tries to define in a systematic manner. In this part I will consider the theoretical proposals of those scholars who have provided the basis for my attempt.

The structure of this chapter also reflects the intellectual path I followed. The original aim of this research was to study different conceptualization of international anarchy and cosmopolitan order and the possible path to move from the first to the second. This brought me to study some of the main IR authors and I was surprised by the relatively little attention they paid to the conceptualisation of change. Furthermore, I was generally unsatisfied with their findings as each school of thought tends to neglect the useful insights of the others, although often recognises the limits of their own findings and the usefulness of complementing them with different approaches. It was only at this point, also thanks to the study of some federalist authors such as Albertini, that I realise that I better try to describe the theory which was coming out of the criticisms to the existing ones[9]. Albertini's works provided the original inspiration, but the following studies pointed to many non-federalist authors whose works go in the same direction. This is why it is difficult to consider this framework of analysis as a federalist theory, but also to attribute it

[9] Mannheim notices that to criticise a theory always means to start developing a new one (1957: ch. II §7).

another name, as it tries not to emphasise only one aspect of reality at the expense of the others.

1.1. The opportunity to consider the three spheres of human activity in their interaction

Authors from all perspectives and traditions of thought have realised the opportunity to consider different aspects of reality in their interaction to provide a more effective understanding of international relations and change. This has been particularly true for liberal IR scholars. This was probably partly instrumental to show that they accepted at least some of the basic tenets of the dominant realist tradition (Spegele 1996). However, after they called for the examination of other aspects too, they generally focused on their preferred one. But there also are genuine attempts to combine liberalism and realism. A particularly fruitful line of inquiry has concerned "the political process of learning and of redefining national interests, as encouraged by institutional frameworks and regimes", and the claim that "transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new definitions of interests as well as to new coalition possibilities for different interests within states". This was due to the fact that "how states define their interests, and how their interests change, has always been a weak area in Realist theory" (Nye 1988: 238-239). In this perspective it is possible to locate authors such as Deutsch (1953-1966), Haas (1958-1968, 1964 and 1990), Keohane and Nye (1972 and 1977), Bull (1977-1995), and recently Moravcsik (1992, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998).

Bull's attempt is one of the most celebrated and successful. His "Anarchical Society" proposes an approach which combines elements of liberalism and realism and started the so-called IR British School (see Evans and Wilson 1992). It can be seen as a form of neo-institutionalism - which reintroduces transnational ideas, international institutions, and interdependence within a basically realist picture - since the crucial question is how much of a society is any international system at a given point (Hoffman 1995: ix). Bull also looks inside the units, unlike neo-realism and similarly to democratic peace theorists, and accordingly to the second image. He looks at the scope, depth and substance of the international society to highlight that a convergence of national interests in structured co-operation is possible, and concentrates his attention on the issue of international order rather than disorder (Hoffman 1995: ix).

Order is based on "a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life" (Bull 1977-1995: 64), which is reflected in the rules about basic things. The first and most important rule or "the fundamental or constitutional normative principle of world politics […] identifies the idea of a society of states, as opposed to such alternative ideas as that of a universal empire, a cosmopolitan community of individual human beings, or a Hobbesian state of nature or state of war, as the supreme normative principle of the political organisation of mankind" (Bull 1977-1995: 65). This is the legitimising principle or the ideology of the international system, which has now often come to be taken for granted, as if it was a "natural" situation, especially by realist scholars, while Bull is well aware that other alternatives are possible. A cultural change implying the erosion of the belief in this principle would seriously jeopardise the legitimacy of the existing international system and would pose a real challenge to its long-term viability. From this perspective it is possible to understand the inclusion of culture and ideology in the tripartite scheme.

From the first basic rule, other "rules of coexistence" followed (Bull 1977-1995: 66-67) to establish the sovereignty and the rights of states. Rules are produced, embodied, implemented and defended by institutions, and the main international ones are the states themselves. Therefore the enforcement of the rules is uncertain (Bull 1977-1995: 51, 68-69). But there are also other international "institutions" in a sociological sense: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers – not international organisations such as the UN (Bull 1977-1995: xvii, xviii, 70-1). International law is attributed a very limited role and is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition of order (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 6, especially 131, 133-137,139-146). Eventually also diplomacy is declining (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 7, especially 172-177). The balance of power is a sociological institution only as a normative rule and a contemporary part of it is nuclear deterrence (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 5, especially 107, 113, 116-119). Hence the main institutions are war and the great powers. War as "organised violence waged by sovereign states" is already a limitation of legitimate violence by other actors. It is an instrument of state policy, a vehicle of change in the international system[10], and a means to enforce international law, and to preserve the balance of power, avoiding universal empire (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 8, especially 178-181). Bull also maintains that nuclear weapons do not change the role of war, but increase its costs, thus limiting its range of use (Bull 1977-1995: 184-188). Great powers have a role in keeping the balance, managing crisis, limiting wars, controlling and mutually respecting their spheres of interest (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 9, especially 200).

[10] Bull's analysis here strongly resemble Gilpin's view of hegemonic war as the main determinant of international change.

These sociological institutions show that international society is more than the sum of its parts (Bull 1977-1995: 71), but they also indicate that the parts are more important than the whole as the system is built to preserve its components and not to endorse its unity. But for international law, all the other "institutions" are characteristic of a realist analysis and emphasise the anarchic nature of the international society. And this is why Bull recognises that there is some convergence on co-operation - due to interdependence, decreased utility of force, and other factors - but the crucial limit is: "how much can society actually flourish in an anarchic milieu?" (Hoffmann 1995: x,xi).

The issue is Bull's recognition of the existence, with different force in different periods, of three elements in the international society which can be associated with Hobbes, Kant, and Grotius (Bull 1977-1995: 39; on this issue see also Hsiung 1997: Part V, ch. 9). Thus international society is just one aspect, and not the whole, of the international reality – or system (Bull 1977-1995: 40, 49). Furthermore, the international society is different from the state. Bull argues against the domestic analogy to sustain the possibility of a "society without government" (Bull 1977-1995: 44-49, 57). This will later open the way towards the idea of "governance without government" (Rosenau 1992). Bull recognises and emphasises, against realist orthodoxy, the element of society within the international system with its implications about interdependence, cooperation and transnational ideas. These three issues will be crucial for this research. Interdependence will be examined from different perspectives also in relation to the analytical core of realism and historical materialism. Transnational ideas, and culture and ideology more generally, will be discussed in chapter four as they play an important role in the legitimation of any given international order.

Bull's ideas, and especially his rediscovery of cooperation, provided the basis for following regime theorists (Hurrell 1993-1997: 49). They developed this concept to account for the convergence of expectation and for regular patterns of behaviour which influence the definition of states preferences (see for instance Krasner (ed.) 1983 and Rittberger (ed.) 1993-1997). However the concept is rather vague and difficult to apply (Young 1986: 105-6; Strange 1983: 343) as the comparison between some of the many definitions clarifies (Rittberger 1993-1997: 8-11).

"Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are belief of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing

practices for making and implementing collective choice." (Krasner 1983: 2). But also "regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities. Like all social institutions they are recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectation converge": the crucial element in this definition is "the conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behavior and practice" (Young 1983: 95). Still "a regime exists when the interaction between the parties is not unconstrained or is not based on independent decision-making. Domestic society constitutes the most common regime. (…) International regimes exist when patterned state behavior results from joint rather than independent decision making" (Stein 1983: 120). Eventually "a regime exist in every substantive issue-area where there is discernibly patterned behaviour. Wherever there is regularity in behaviour some kinds of principles, norms, or rules must exist to account for it" (Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 63).

The difficulty to cope with so many different definitions is clear. Eventually, the concept of regime is overstretched as any "discernibly patterned behaviour" in "every substantive issue-area" would be explained through this concept, which becomes so wide that it cannot account for anything at all. Still it is possible to try to employ it with more or less caution. Krasner suggests that regimes are "intervening variables between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behaviour on the other" (Krasner 1983: 1). Keohane is more prudent in suggesting that regimes "facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements among governments (…) by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedure for negotiation" in a fundamentally anarchical environment. They "help to make governments' expectations consistent with one another" (Kehoane 1983: 142).

All this does not say anything about the origins and the maintainance of regimes. And many scholars tend to assign a dominant role to an hegemonic power in creating and sustaining international regimes (Keohane 1984: 31 and 240; analysed also in Young 1986: 112-113), thus sharing the theory of hegemonic stability (see Kindleberger 1986; Gilpin 1987: especially ch. X §1; the opposite thesis is argued in Keohane 1984). Still most authors would claim that once established regimes constrain also the hegemonic power. And this differentiates most regime theorists from traditional realists.

For all its shortcomings the literature on international regimes has one merit. It highlights the growing tendency towards cooperation on a growing number of issues. To account for this cooperation, the concept of regimes is often supported and complemented by a different one, that of international organizations. Regime theorists stress that regimes do not always require the creation of international organizations. But it is clear that an

international organization may come about on an issue-area in which a regime is in place, or to manage that regime or its change. The advantage of international organizations is that, unlike regimes, they are clearly identifiable, and the same is true for their main features. Thus they allow to distinguish among different kinds of international organizations. Conversely one of the main problem of the concept of regime is that, being essentially a sociological concept (Young 1986: 108), is unable to distinguish between cooperation and unification processes as in the case of the EU, which is sometimes taken as an example of an international regime.

Young suggests a merit of the literature about international regimes is the identification of "constructive opportunities for reintegrating the sub-fields of international politics, economics, law, and organization" (Young 1986: 105). And he is able to point out that "the political, economic, technological, and moral conditions that are their bases [of social institutions] sometimes shift in such a way that the institutions themselves atrophy (for example colonialism in international society). In other cases, circumstances converge to produce an abrupt upheaval in which many prevailing social institutions are swept aside (such as the ancien régime in the French Revolution)" (Young 1986: 108). This means that "institutions change in response to a number of political, economic, technological, socio-cultural, and even moral developments" (Young 1986: 114). But he refuses any attempt to indicate any logical priority between them, and thus concludes that "(1) there are no necessary conditions for change in international regimes, and (2) that any of a variety of factors may be sufficient to precipitate major changes in prevailing social institutions in real-world situation. This variety may seem frustrating to those seeking to construct a parsimonious theory of stability and change in international regimes" (Young 1986: 114-115). Indeed, Young is right. His conclusion may be perfectly correct, but leaves the reader with no indication whatsoever about which variables or aspects of reality to consider, and in which order, to understand stability and change. From a purely speculative perspective he has drawn the best possible conclusion. But given the necessarily also practical character of IR theory, it is an unsatisfactory one. To study reality there is the need for theory. And theory necessarily focuses on some aspects of reality at the expenses of others. Of course it is possible to identify monocausal or multicausal explanations and theories can consider one or many variables. But they require a systematic indication of those variables and their interaction. The tripartite framework proposed in this research, for all its shortcomings, tries to provide a line of inquiry to study international systems change.

So far, I have mentioned some authors who indicate the need to look at various aspects of reality which are considered in the tripartite scheme proposed in this research, in

their attempts to combine liberalism and realism. But similar hints are present in authors who side wholeheartedly with one tradition alone. For example Czempiel's works are clearly located within the second image perspective and the liberal tradition. Still he recognises the need to look at various aspects of reality. He rightly criticises the current IR theory divisions, and claims that globalists and transnationalists added useful insights and layer of complexity to the traditional realist picture. He contests the attitude to study international relations as if there were "two or three different worlds between which states can move freely and independently" and maintains that "the three issue-areas of security, well-being, and rule are related to each other" (Czempiel 1992: 256). There is a clear similitude with Gellner's focus on coercion, production, and cognition.

Czempiel's own works however, reduce the second and third aspect to the internal dimension of the state. Therefore from this useful perspective he only draws the conclusion that any IR theory must include a theory of the state. He then assigns it logical priority and thus places himself squarely within the second-image perspective which explain state behaviour in the international scene through their domestic structure (Czempiel 1992: 256-259, 261). It is interesting to note that even from this insufficient perspective he is able to refer to Seeley's traditional realist doctrine that the freedom of a country is inversely proportional to the political and military pressure on its borders. From this point of view he claims that NATO confrontational policy helped stabilising Soviet communism, and that the opposite policy would have facilitated the democratic transformation of the USSR domestic system (Czempiel 1992: 260)[11]. Thus he rightly realises that "realism as a strategy recommends a behavior the implementation of which then serves to confirm realism as a theory" (Czempiel 1992: 270). But this claim is true for all IR theories. Being concerned with current reality and how to handle it, they always have a normative aspects which is derived from their analytical core and therefore which tends to confirm it. It is probably theoretically more damaging to draw normative conclusion contradicting the analytical core of the theory. In fact Seeley's theory and Czempiel own considerations only show the influence of the international situation on the domestic regime. But not the opposite, as Czempiel implies in his normative preference for the democratic peace theory and in the analytical priority assigned to the second image perspective. With these operations Czempiel accepts to look at reality only from a national perspective and is thus unable to grasp all the useful insights which followed from his own recognition of the need to study all three aspects of international reality.

[11] This is an interesting line of argument, but would need some qualifications about the international situation at different times and the risks involved in pursuing a different policy during different periods of the Cold War.

1.2 The intellectual origins of the tripartite framework

The authors who come closer to define the proposed tripartite framework of analysis are Dehio, Polanyi, Albertini, Gellner, and Rosenau, although each of them sometimes tends to emphasise one or two analytical categories out of the three which made the framework. Polanyi emphasises the concept of mode of production, Dehio of *raison d'état*, Rosenau of culture. Albertini develops a useful definition of ideology, but he does not use it to understand change and emphasises the mode of production and the *raison d'état*. Accordingly some of his pupils used together these categories, but each of them has in fact given prominence to one over the other[12].

The research started with a focus on IR theorists, and in their works I have found interesting hints at the opportunity to consider different aspects of reality. But, probably due to the methodological characters of American social science and of realist dominance of the IR academic debate, the authors who came closer to a proper statement of the tripartite scheme came mainly from other disciplines. Polanyi studied history, economics, and anthropology; Dehio was an historian, Albertini and Gellner were political philosophers both much interested in nationalism and international issues, Montani is an economist. Only Rosenau is a prominent figure of the IR debate. I will analyse their contributions in chronological order, starting with Dehio and Polanyi and following with Albertini, Gellner and Rosenau.

1.2.1 Dehio

Dehio's works provide a sketch of European modern history, or more precisely of the history of the European state system from its formation to its agony. Dehio characterises this history as a chain of hegemonic attempts and subsequent struggle against the coalitions of other states who opposed the aspirant hegemon. His historical research also focuses on the German hegemonic attempts in the XX centuries. Generally speaking he can be considered as an essentially realist author, well aware of the teachings of the German tradition on the *raison d'état*.

It is difficult to decide if it was his historical observation which produced his analytical theory or if the development of certain analytical tools was the precondition for his historical analysis. Probably the two operations went hand in hand. However, those

[12] This is also due to their respective academic discipline. Thus Pistone, a historian with a strong attention to IR theory and realism, emphasises the *raison d'état* while Levi, a political theorist, and Montani, an economist, highlight the usefulness of the mode of production.

analytical tools are interesting because Dehio recognises the need to account for both the changes in the balance of power and in the hegemonic power at any time, and the changes of the system units themselves and therefore of the whole system, or, to use Gilpin's terminology, both systemic and systems change (Gilpin 1981-1995: 40). On the contrary most American realists have paid attention to systemic change alone and thus have neglected some of these analytical tools. Therefore they generally do not consider the European unification process as the overcoming of international anarchy at a regional level through the creation of a new polity.

Dehio starts with the traditional realists concerns. He looks at systemic change first. He tries to indicate the factors which allows for a change in power of the states of the systems, and the following interaction within the system. Thus he characterises the history of the states system as a chain of hegemonic attempts by the strongest state of the continent, and the following hegemonic wars against a coalition of most other states in the system aimed at maintaining their independence and restoring a new equilibrium. But this analysis brought him to consider the factors which produced the main shifts in power. He clearly indicates in different passages the three main factors which represent the three columns of his theory. They are "the foreign situation, the economic civilization, and the moral energies" (Dehio 1948-1963: 212 and 224).

The first category is the geopolitical situation and the constraints it poses on each state. This can be considered as the core of the *raison d'état* doctrine and of international political realism. Dehio uses this concept in a dynamic fashion. On the one hand there will be certain fundamental tendencies in a state foreign policy due to its geopolitical situation. At the same time the shifts in power of one state – whose origins need to be explained - will influence all the others. They will change their perspective and thus there may be changes in the geopolitical situation as far as the freedom of action and the military pressure on the borders are concerned. The expression "moral energies" concerns the dominant ideology and its capability to mobilise consensus and support for different foreign policy and international behaviours. His examination of nationalism in this respect exemplify what he was analysing through the idea of "moral energies".

The concept of "economic civilization" is very broad and Dehio gives it many different connotations. On the one hand it produces a moral and cultural impoverishment and a desire of power for power (Dehio 1948-1963: 96). The links with the German philosophical debate of the XIX and early XX century are quite clear. But this aspect is a secondary one of this category and Dehio does not offer any account of the reason and the modality for this result. On the contrary he refers more often, and describes more

accurately, other aspects of this concept. The main one is that it brings with it the defeat of space and thus the tendency towards unification (Dehio 1948-1963: 8-11, 96-97, 101-102, 130-131, 143-144, 172, 187-188, 193-194, 225-234, 247-253, 259, 264). Essentially Dehio refers to technological progress. This may have important consequences on the economic, social, and administrative situation of a country, but also on is military potential and geopolitical situation. This is clear also in the consideration that the airplanes almost brought to an end British insularity during the Second World War, and ballistic missiles ended American insularity afterwards – so much so that the new Bush administration would like to restore it through a new ballistic missile defence system. Eventually, I believe the core of Dehio's category coincides with the refined version of the concept of "mode of production" developed in this research.

These three categories and perspectives are the building blocks of Dehio's historical account. And their clearest application is offered in relation to the emergence of the German hegemonic attempts (Dehio 1948-1963: 209-228). From those categories followed the identification of militarism, nationalism, and industrialism, as the bases of the German hegemonic struggles. Militarism and expansionism have been a constant feature of Prussia, due to its geopolitical situation: a state encircled by other great powers and with difficult borders to defend. The difficulties of her neighbours in the second half of the XIX century decreased the external pressure and allowed Prussia a certain freedom of action (Dehio 1948-1963: 214-221). Prussia was a state divided in two parts, and could not but aspire to unite them as soon as possible. Russia was paralysed by the threat of internal revolution and hostile to the European powers which had defeated her in the Crimean war. This offered a good insurance about the Eastern borders. France policy in favour of national unifications helped Prussia too. However French hopes to gain the role of the mediator and a political success from a struggle between Prussia and Austria-Hungary were misplaced. Great Britain was still more afraid of France than of Prussia, thus a united Germany could seem useful to balance French power. Such an international situation allowed Bismarck's aggressive policy to unify Germany. And eventually he managed to defeat and diminish France, and Austria-Hungary. Dehio notices that Bismarck was probably aware that Germany had obtained all it could without provoking the reaction of a new general coalition. In other words, he was aware that the basis for a possible German hegemonic attempt had been established, but that such an attempt would have failed. And this would explain his shift from an aggressive to a conservative foreign policy. He stopped to challenge and start to preserve the new status quo (Dehio 1948-1963: 222-223).

At this point the Prussian ascendant stopped at the level of a continental political power, with no world class ambitions. The dissatisfaction with such a position brought afterwards to a new expansive foreign policy. It is possible to say that it was aiming at a new world equilibrium in the sense that Germany may have only aimed at becoming a world class power together with Great Britain, Russia and the USA. But the condition to acquire such a status was continental hegemony. And this would have threatened not only the European states, but also the world powers themselves. Therefore the German hegemonic attempts produced the usual great coalitions. And given the other European states weakness the coalition had to bring in the two emerging world powers, Russia and the USA, to defeat the German hegemonic attempts (Dehio 1948-1963: 234, 240, 262).

The XIX century saw the emergence of nationalism as the dominant ideology and a powerful source of consensus and mobilisation. Prussian militarism and expansionism could embrace German nationalism, and also strengthened it with the on-going rivalry with France (Dehio 1948-1963: 213). But this was possible only because the international scenario brought Prussian expansionism to direct itself towards the west and the reunification of Germany: a traditional power vacuum was to be filled. Nationalism also helps the emergence of caesarist tendencies as international success could well legitimise a government and its authoritarian domestic policies too. This issue will be discussed later on as it is important to discuss the relationship between international and domestic politics.

Finally, industrialism was the third factor which provided Germany with the power to start its hegemonic attempt. The technology of industrialism required bigger markets and pushes towards the *Zollverein* and then national unification. But the impressive growth of German industry required still new markets. The situation changed from Prussian agrarian autarchy to a German industry dependent on foreign markets for both raw materials and exports. At the same time the new German power brought with it a new increase in the political pressure and a decrease in the liberty of action. There were not any small neighbouring European state to be conquered. After the lost of Alsace-Lorraine, France was rather hostile and waiting to seize an occasion to get it back. The German ascendancy also helped in calming down the latent world tension between Russia and Great Britain. To side with one of them would have meant to become a European junior partner of a world class power. But to stay alone between the giants brought the risk to remain entrapped and defeated, as it happened. Russia was looking for new external successes to use pan-slavism to sustain its internal situation and avoid revolution. Germany was pushed towards better relationship with Austria-Hungary to contain Russia, but this produced new tension with Russia's elites and went against the pan-slavistic feelings too. At the same time

there was no improvement in the relationship with Great Britain, which did not have any interest to help Germany to become a world power. The new technology and the following economic civilization made the European continental powers, including Germany, just too little to compete with the world class giants. The new technology could not express all its potential within the small European states, but only in the big "marginal powers". This was the fatal illness of the harmony of the European state system for Dehio (Dehio 1948-1963: 228). Germany could change its position only by becoming a world class power looking away from the European continent. But the attempt to build a powerful navy was a challenge to the most sensitive element of British power. This produced an obvious response and eventually Britain managed to side with the other world power, Russia and the USA.

This very short summary of Dehio's analysis clarifies that he had clearly in mind the tripartite theory proposed in this research. He identifies the three basic categories to study international reality and also applies them in his historical research. Unfortunately he does not offer a detailed theoretical discussion of each aspect and category, which is the task attempted in this research.

1.2.2 Polanyi

Polanyi's works and contribution to the refinement of the concept of mode of production will be at the centre of chapter three. For the time being I will discuss only his hints at the tripartite framework of analysis. He clearly considers all three elements of the tripartite scheme and looks at their interactions. However his grasp of the political aspect remains underdeveloped, just as he never explicitly proposes to adopt a tripartite scheme to study international reality. Eventually he focuses on one aspect and offers useful insights about the interaction between economics and politics, culture and politics, and economics and culture.

Polanyi claims that: "XIX century civilization rested on four institutions. The first was the balance-of-power system which for a century prevented the occurrence of any long and devastating war between the Great Powers. The second was the international gold standard which symbolized a unique organization of world economy. The third was the self-regulating market which produced an unheard-of material welfare. The fourth was the liberal state" (Polanyi 1944: 3). This suggests a double matrix to identify the basic tenets of a given order: politics-economics and domestic-international. Politics was based on the liberal state domestically, and on the balance of power internationally. Economics was based on the self-regulating market domestically and on the Gold Standard internationally.

Looking it from the other perspective the national order was based on the liberal state and the self-regulating market, and the international one on the balance of power and the Gold Standard[13]. Following Polanyi own argument, which I will analyse later on, it is possible to add the cultural aspect as well, since the self-regulating market required economic liberalism - a new ideology which had its international aspect in the free trade doctrine - to legitimise itself.

Polanyi pays attention to the situation of power which supported the liberal state and the balance of power, and notices the lucky circumstances which made such a situation produce almost a hundred years of peace – intending here only lack of war among the great powers, or lack of hegemonic wars. He promptly recognises that the balance of power could not ensure peace after the collapse of the specific economic reasons on which this peace rested (Polanyi 1944: 4-6). But he never focuses on the political aspect and the conclusion he draws from this perspective are hardly convincing. He suggests that by demilitarising Germany the Versailles Treaty made impossible the balance of power because Germany was left with no power, hence "Europe was now without a political system whatever. A bare status quo such as this can last only as long as the physical exhaustion of the parties lasts" (Polanyi 1944: 21). As Dehio points out the problem was rather different. Confronted with the collapse of the European state system and the birth of the world state system, Germany attempted to grow to a world power by acquiring European hegemony. Germany was still too powerful for the other European states to stop its hegemonic attempt, hence the need to draw into the conflicts the external powers to maintain the balance on a world level (Dehio 1948-1963: 234, 240, 262)[14].

Polanyi also stresses the role of the "industrial revolution in establishing peaceful business as a universal interest" (Polanyi 1944: 7). So much so that in the XIX century nationalism and industry made war more ferocious, but there were still strong safeguards for peaceful business in wartime, which disappeared in the XX century (Polanyi 1944: 16-17). This shows his grasp of the impact of economics and of culture on politics, which he maintained throughout his works. He realises that just as the commercial revolution increased the power of Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, Britain and the USA, so the industrial revolution favoured some states over others. More generally to have a certain economic system could help or damage in the struggle for survival (Polanyi 1944: 28).

He is also aware of the role of ideologies as social forces, and claims that nations used fascism or socialism in their struggle to survive; but fascism and socialism also used

[13] Gilpin offers a useful analysis of the different international monetary orders (Gilpin 1987: ch. IV). See also Triffin 1957 and 1966.

[14] This issue will be addressed in more detail in chapter six.

those nations as a vehicle for their spread (Polanyi 1944: 29). At the same time he indicates the influence of the mode of production on culture when he maintains that the idea of a self-regulated market was the result of the impact of the machine on a commercial society (Polanyi 1944: 40). And he criticised the market tendency to absorb society, up to refer the term economic not to the production of the means of livelihood but to the motives of economic action: gain. He explicitly denounces the influence of the market on culture and the following economic determinism of the XIX century (Polanyi 1977: xlvi-xlvii). Eventually he accused the political thinkers of the Enlightenment and the economic thinkers of the XIX century: the first "ignored the economy, while the utopians of the market took no note of politics (…) [and] were totally blind to the sphere of state, nation, and power" (Polanyi 1977: 14).

This attack is made because culture plays an important role in the process of change: "the 'field,' in which such sudden change as the emergence of a new, complex whole occurs, is the social group under definite conditions. These discontinuities broadly determine both what ideas and concepts gain currency with the member of a group and at what rate. But once disseminated, these ideas and concepts permit change at an enourmously accelerated rate, since the patterns of individual behavior can now simply fall into line with the new general pattern preformed by those ideas and concepts" (Polanyi 1977: lii-liv). Here is a clear indication of the impact of a new mode of production on culture, but also of the role of culture in setting the pace of change. For instance it was difficult for the communist ideology to be developed and/or to spread out in an agrarian society. But once it happened within an industrial society it became a social force of its own capable to help bringing about certain changes, such as the Russian revolution (Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. VII).

Polanyi's following research agenda was set according to this idea of the crucial role of the mode of production: "if the breakdown of our civilization was timed by the failure of world economy, it was certainly not caused by it. Its origins lay more than a hundred years back in that social and technological upheaval from which the idea of a self-regulating market sprang in Western Europe. The end of this venture has come in our time; it closes a distinct stage in the history of industrial civilization" (Polanyi 1944: 5). It is for this reason that Polanyi focused on "substantial economics" and provided useful insights to refine the concept of mode of production[15].

Notwithstanding this focus Polanyi never stops to fight against any attempt to look at reality only from an economic perspective: "world history is emphatically *not* economic

[15] This issue is analysed in detail in chapter three.

history" and he supports "an outright rejection of the fallacious view of a timeless predominance of the economic factor in human affairs" (Polanyi 1977: xlvii and xlvi). And this is also due to the fact that "any major sphere of life – whether political, religious, or cultural, so it seems – may gain ascendancy over the other spheres and retain it over a stretch too long to be called merely temporary. Yet even though the economy may take only second or third place, it can never fail to complicate the issues in unforeseeable ways" (Polanyi 1977: xlv). And "in this light, the so-called idealistic and materialistic approaches to history appear not so much as opposites but rather as outcomes of two different phases in the total process. The idealist expresses, although in a mystificatory form, the fact that human thoughts and ideas play a decisive part in the emergence of institutions and the turns of history. The materialist stresses that objective factors condition the spread of these thoughts and ideas, which are not therefore as the Hegelian idealists assumed, born of an abstract dialectic" (Polanyi 1977: liv). Considering the previous reference about the need to take into account politics and power all the three elements of the tripartite scheme are identified by Polany. He even states that the crucial "issues which stand out are those involving the relations of the economic process to the political and cultural spheres of the society at large" (Polanyi 1977: 35). The tripartite scheme proposed in this research is precisely an attempt to build on this insight.

1.2.3 Albertini and the Italian federalist tradition

Albertini's works provided the first inspiration for the development of the tripartite scheme, although his contribution may not be theoretically more important than the ones of the other authors analysed in this chapter. His contribution is particularly relevant in the definition of the category of ideology. He did not write much about the tripartite scheme (but see Albertini 1965a-1999a), but employed it constantly. His ideas provided the basis of the works of many of his pupils who explicitly refer to him in their suggestions of the need to employ together historical materialism and the *raison d'état* doctrine or political realism to study international reality (Pistone 1973: 49-56; implicitly Levi 1997: 83-87; and Montani 1999: ch. 2).

Albertini's contribution can then be reconstructed by his analysis of the European unification process and his attempt to influence it as a federalist militant. He employed the categories of historical materialism and political realism to analyse and describe the crisis of the European nation-state (Albertini, 1961b-1999a; 1965c-1999a; and 1966-1999b). From this double perspective he emphasised their inability to ensure economic prosperity and to guarantee national security: two basic functions of the state. From a political perspective

they had ceased to be great powers, and were subject to the American hegemony. From the economic perspective their markets were too small to allow the best exploitation of the technology available. This explained the European economic integration and the success of the EEC[16]. He employed those two categories to identify the crisis of the European nation-state as the precondition for the start of the European unification process.

To influence the process he tried to show the disadvantages of the nationalist ideology and of the dogma of absolute, exclusive sovereignty (Albertini 1960-1997, 1960-1999a, 1961-1997, 1961a-1999a, 1965a-1999a). At the same time he developed the federalist ideology (Albertini 1963a-1999a, 1963b-1999a, 1973-1999a, 1993) in the attempt to establish a cultural view which could help the creation of a European federation. And this shows his belief in the role of culture in promoting change. This emerges even more clearly in his theory about European integration – which inspired much of this research. He suggests that the crisis of the nation state – analysed through the categories of the mode of production and the *raison d'état* - manifests itself on specific problems which cannot be solved at national level. The federalists may then be able to suggest an integrative step which allows to solve that problem. If a political leader will take the proposal and put it into the agenda to solve the problem, thus strengthening the unification process and providing a European occasional leadership, it will be possible to build a coalition supporting that proposal. This scheme uses the materialist perspective in the identification of the crisis, the cultural one in the proposal of a new integrative step, and the political one in the identification of the need for a political leader to introduce the idea on the agenda and to build the necessary support for the idea to be implemented. The parallelism of this tripartite scheme to conceptualise the European unification process with the tripartite framework proposed to conceptualise international unit change signals Albertini's influence on this study.

Also the works by Albertini's pupils built on his basic insights offer useful hints in relation to the various aspect of the tripartite theory. Pistone's theoretical writings focus on the identification of the analytical core of political realism and of the category of *raison d'état* (Pistone 1973, 1977, 2001) and make explicit reference to Albertini's attempt to combine the *raison d'état* and the mode of production as complementary analytical tools to study international reality (Pistone 1973: 49-56, especially 54). Rossolillo analyses the role of

[16] During the first half of the XX Century the economic growth rate of the USA were higher than those of the European states. After 1950 the gap between the USA and the member states of the ECSC and then EEC decreased. And the growth rate of these countries was significantly greater than those of other west European countries which refused to join and gave birth to alternative forms of economic cooperation (see Cipolla 1962-1965: 68-72 and Milward 1992:396). This issue will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

historical materialism in the study of history and for political action (Rossolillo 1972). Levi's works deal with the European unification process and with the institutional aspect of federalism as an ideology and have many references to the combined use of historical materialism and the *raison d'état* (see for instance Levi 1997). Montani's latest books offer an application of such a combination to analyse the globalization process and many useful insights to refine the concept of mode of production which will be discussed in chapter three (Montani 2001 and especially 1999: ch. 2). I will thus refer to this Italian federalist tradition of thought in relation to some aspects of the framework of analysis developed in this study.

1.2.4 Gellner

Gellner is probably the contemporary author whose approach is closest to the one proposed in this research, both in relation to the contents and the methodological remarks. First of all he challenges all those who wrongly consider the existing political institutions as self-evident and/or eternal. On the contrary many options are always available and the scholar should try to grasp "the principles or factors which generate that range of options" although this does not imply the possibility to foresee the future (Gellner 1988: 11). This task also includes the attempt to explain "the way in which a vision not normally favoured, but on the contrary impeded, by the prevailing ethos and organization of most human societies, has prevailed", and the opposition to "the ethnocentric narrowness of those thinkers who, born among the latterday beneficiaries of the unique situation, naively take it for granted, and talk as if it had been ever with us as a human birthright" (Gellner 1988: 204).

Gellner set himself the task to "understand how, on one occasion at any rate, the entire structure can be modified as opposed to a mere change of personnel within it. How can it happen not merely that the weak, the swordless, overcome the swordsmen, but that the whole organization and ethos of society changes, that Production replaces Predation as the central theme and value of life" (Gellner 1988: 158). Thus he focuses on the change in the structure of a given society, while this research is devoted to study international change. And on the international arena the "change in personnel" is systemic change, while the change of "the entire structure" is systems change.

Also the contents of Gellner's approach is very close to the one adopted here. He makes the most explicit reference to the combined examination of the three aspects of reality examined in the tripartite framework proposed here. The very title of his book is

higly significant in this respect: "*Plough, Sword, and Book. The Structure of Human History*"[17] (Gellner 1988). His account is based on two theoretical pillar. First, he employs the materialistic perspective to offer a periodization of human history in which each period poses specific problems (Gellner 1988: 16, 19-20). In other words the evolution of the mode of production determines the problems men face, but not the solutions men can and/or will adopt (Gellner 1988: 19). Second, he identifies three fundamental human activities - "production, coercion, cognition" (Gellner 1988: 20) - and stresses that there is not an order of priority among them (Gellner 1988: 20, 68). The division between idealists, realists and materialists depends precisely on the priority each school of thought assigns to one aspect alone[18]. Each of them is useful for the identification of the role of the aspect they consider, but underestimate the role of the others. Gellner refuses the possibility to offer an order of priority once and for all since there is no reason to "assume that the question has the same answer in all places and at all times" (Gellner 1988: 15). A change in any one of these spheres of activity may eventually create a tension which may bring a change in all of them. And in different time and different places the original change may regard a different aspect. All this brought Gellner to propose the following table to summarise his approach.

Table 5Gellner's framework of analysis (taken from Gellner 1988: 21)

	PRODUCTION	COERCION	COGNITION
Hunting/ Gathering	→	→	→
Neolithic revolution Agraria	→	→	→
Industrial revolution Industria	→	→	→

[17] And it is significant that in the title he refers to the means of production – the plough – rather than to the relations of production. The analysis of the concept of mode of production and of its uses in chapter three will emphasise this aspect.

[18] Gellner (1988: 15) refers to the division between idealists and materialists. But the inclusion of realists in relation to coercion and power follows logically from the inclusion of this sphere of activity in the tripartite scheme.

This is the basis for a tripartite framework to study human history. And this is due to the fact that for a domestic structural change – and in my view for an international systems change – to occur "all three spheres of human activity – cognition, coercion, production – had to be simultaneously in an unusual and favourable condition" (Gellner 1988: 277). A change in just one aspect – and compatible with the current situation in the other two - will generally not imply a structural change. This emerges clearly in Gellner's discussion of the issue. He claims that culture is a vehicle to preserve or change a society, but it is not the only one (Gellner 1988: 14 and 274). And the same is true for production and coercion.

Gellner's book offers an examination of the development of the three main spheres of human activity within a periodization of human history based on historical materialism (Gellner 1988: 19-21, 145, 213, 253, 275). One of his aim is also to prepare the ground to try to identify the possible new combination of the fundamental factors and thus the options for the future (Gellner 1988: 11, 213). In his analysis of the industrial revolution he suggests that "a miracolous political and ideological balance of power in the non-economic parts of society made the expansion possible, at a time when the technological potential was also available. Just as miracolously, the impulse to make use of the uniquely favourable concatenation of cognitive, ideological and political circumstances was also present in some at least of the producers" (Gellner 1988: 132).

All this notwithstanding Gellner had to employ the materialistic perspective to offer a periodization of human history and admitted that the evolution of the mode of production determines the problems men have to face. In other words, it set the agenda, but does not determines the solutions which depend on the combination of the three factors (Gellner 1988: 19-21). However, this is a general assumption which applies only in the long-term. I will point out in chapter five, that there may be different examples of systems change which do not follow this scheme and started after a change in another sphere of human activity.

1.2.5 Rosenau

Rosenau is the contemporary scholar who comes closest to a proper definition of the tripartite theory in relation to international change, although he tends to place special emphasis on the first level of analysis. His works present many useful insights that point to the development of a framework theory such as the one proposed in this research. However he does not provide it and there are some differences with my proposal.

Rosenau claims that global order is related to "three basic levels of activity: (1) at the ideational or intersubjective level (…); (2) at the behavioral or objective level of what people regularly and routinely do, often unknowingly, to maintain the prevailing global arrangements; and (3) at the aggregate or political level where governance occur and rule-oriented institutions and regimes enact and implement the policies inherent in the ideational and behavioral patterns. (…) It should be stressed that, whatever may be the degree of orderliness that marks global affairs at any period in history, it is a product of activity at all three of these levels" (Rosenau 1992a: 14-15). These three levels can be related to the three categories of my framework theory as (1) ideology, (2) mode of production, and (3) *raison d'état*.

Later on Rosenau attempts to describe the factors influencing the emergence of new system of governance and refers to new "control mechanisms" which need to acquire "legitimacy and support" as they develop as answer to "shared needs" (Rosenau 1997: 152). This last version is very close to the tripartite framework proposed in this research. In my view, and similarly to Gellner's perspective as well, a refined version of the concept of mode of production can help identifying the "shared needs" which require new answers. The analytical core of political realism can be used to study the situation of power and the possible emergence of new "control mechanisms". The concept of ideology helps to identify within the realm of culture a crucial element in the acquisition of "legitimacy and support". At the same time new ideas may provide the legitimacy and the political will for a change of the existing control mechanisms and the creation for new ones.

In his analysis of the end of many wars in 1988 Rosenau proposes a table in which the systemic relevant elements are: "fatigue factor; obsolescence of force; post-industrial factors; lowering of superpowers tensions; contagion factors" (Rosenau 1997: 428, and see 429-435). The category of the mode of production can be linked to the post-industrial factors and explains the obsolescence of force, together with the *raison d'état*, which accounts for the lowering of superpowers tension. The fatigue factors and the contagion factors refer to a psychological attitude and thus to the ideology category, although the evolution of new communication technology – linked to the mode of production – plays a role in making the contagion factor relevant. This summary clearly shows that although he never stated this tripartite scheme explicitly and does not stick to it throughout his works, Rosenau offers some of the main insights which I try to systematise.

In his analysis of the end of the Cold War he also implicitly realised that a change in one of these aspects may call for a change in the others too. And while looking at the overcoming of the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs he realises that new

challenges and thus the possibility of change arises when it occurs "a mismatch between the world's political structures on the one hand and its economic, social, cultural and normative structures on the other" (Rosenau 1997: 148). Here the economic and social structures can be related to the category of the mode of production, and the cultural and normative ones to the one of ideology. Thus he realises that any of these category can be a useful departure point to study international order. That is that each perspective provided by one of these categories is useful to start looking at the tensions and contradictions between the three. Such tensions are the windows of opportunity for change (Rosenau 1992a: 15; 1992b: 283).

Rosenau does not develop all these useful insights into a full theory. He claims that "any technological, psychological, social, economic, or political developments that foster the expansion of interests and practices beyond established boundaries are both sources and expressions of the processes of globalization" (Rosenau 1997:81). The three levels are declined into five variables as the mode of production category is here divided into technological, social and economic change. And it is further divided in many specific agents of change in his table about agents of change and their influence on globalizing and fragmenting tendencies (Rosenau 1997: 88-89). Similarly in the analysis of the factors promoting "a relocation of authority" he indicates "the end of the Cold War (…). A search for new, more effective forms of political organization better suited to the turbulent circumstances that have evolved with the shrinking of the world by dynamic technologies. (…) the skill revolution that has enabled citizens to identify their needs and (…) to engage in collective action. (…) subgroupism (…) globalization of national and local economies (…) the advent of interdependence issues" (Rosenau 1997: 153). The end of the Cold War clearly refers to a change in the international situation of power, that is to a political phenomenon which can be study through the category of the *raison d'état*. The skill revolution, the globalization of the economy, the emergence of global issues and the need for new political structures to cope with them can be studied from the perspective of the mode of production. Subgroupism, that is nationalism and micro-nationalism – which have theoretically the same characteristics, they are just applied at different levels of human communities – refer to a currently dominant ideology.

In his analysis of the three levels, Rosenau also maintains the impossibility to assign explicative priority to one of them from an analytical perspective, while it may be possible from an historical perspective to identify in different cases the temporal priority of change in one of these aspects and the following adaptations in the other too (Rosenau 1992a: 16). This statement is theoretically correct, but presents a strong methodological problem, as

Rosenau recognises: it does not allow to formulate hypothesis linking independent and dependent variables. And it leaves the scholar with much uncertainty in analysing a given situation. This brings Rosenau to move away from that theoretical statement and take a stand quite similar to Gellner by endorsing "the crucial importance of material interests and conditions" as a powerful agents of change (Rosenau 1992a: 20-21). Analysing the contemporary world he concludes "the psychic and consensus-building virtues that attach to the symbols of sovereignty are unlikely to sustain their appeal in the face of either projected or actual problems" (Rosenau 1997: 228). Here the prominence of the material conditions over the ideological habits is stated even more clearly. As I have mentioned already the same prominence to the mode of production category is accorded in this study, but only in relation to long-term transformations. However, Rosenau links much more closely the mode of production and the ideology category than I do. He seems to consider the advancement of the level of human skills as a prime material condition (Rosenau 1992a:22) and as the main consequences of the technological revolution - which will be considered here as the basis of the post-industrial or scientific mode of production. Thus he ultimately tends to give the higher prominence to the so-called first-image, through a "theoretical and functional explanation that locates individuals at the core of the transformation processes" (Rosenau 1992b: 273; and see 272-275; 1997: 218, 227) as emerges very clearly also in his analysis of the phenomenon of war (Rosenau 1992b: 272; 1997: 413-415).

This brief summary highlighted Rosenau's important contributions to the development of the tripartite framework proposed in this research together with the differences from my actual proposal. I try to systematise some of Rosenau's insights and to stick to them in the analysis of international systems change.

1.3 Theoretical issues to be approached to develop the tripartite framework

The examination of these hints and insights in the existing literature shows that the attempt to develop a coherent framework of analysis is valuable. At least it will clarify the analytical categories implicitly used by many authors. This will make it easier to discuss the value of their findings and the strengths and weaknesses of their analytical apparatus. To this aim it is necessary to define more specifically the meaning of the three categories included in the basic scheme. This is the purpose of each of the next three chapters which

will be devoted to the identification of the analytical core of realism, historical materialism and social constructivism to study coercion, production and culture.

The use of approximately this scheme by different authors has also pointed out another crucial analytical issue: the definition of the nature of the interaction of the three spheres of human action. Particularly important is the problem of the identification of the prevalence of one over the other under given conditions. To assign a general priority to one of them would imply a choice for the idealist, or materialistic or realist perspective. To indicate the condition under which each one may prevail is a more difficult task, but a useful one to develop the framework of analysis. Some hints are provided by the authors already examined and will be clarified in the analysis of the analytical tools to study each of the three spheres.

A partial solution to this problem may be provided by attributing a tendency – not a rule as will be seen - to the prevalence of the mode of production category in the long-term; of the ideology category in the middle-term; and of the *raison d'état* one in the short-term. The first hypothesis is explicitly or implicitly shared by most authors considered so far: Polanyi, Albertini, Gellner, and Rosenau. However, this is not the only possible theoretical solution, and chapter five will show its analytical limits within the analysis of the interaction between the three spheres of action and the three analytical categories to study them. But before I can approach these theoretical issues I shall identify the analytical categories which will be the basis of the tripartite framework.

CHAPTER 2. POLITICS, REALISM AND THE *RAISON D'ÉTAT*

Introduction

The *raison d'état* theory is linked to the issues of security and high politics which are the focus of international political realism. In the contemporary IR academic debate the very expression " *raison d'état* " is rarely used. I have chosen to keep it precisely for this reason. To use "realism" would have suggested the theories and works by IR realist authors after the Second World War. On the contrary I want to refer to the analytical core of international realism which was developed earlier, and which was richer and more complex than contemporary realism[19]. Indeed " *raison d'état* " has come to have a negative connotation. But here I refer to its analytical core, not to the nationalist normative conclusions which especially XIX century authors drew from it (Hayek 1967-1978: 137-138).

For all their heuristic value the analytical categories subsumed under the *raison d'état* alone are suited to grasp only certain aspects of the complexity of international reality and change. This explains the development of other school of thoughts, but also the attempt by some realist scholars – such as Dehio - to add other analytical tools to the traditional realist categories. This brought Dehio to formulate in clear if underdeveloped terms a theory of change from which this research is inspired. Unfortunately Dehio's works have not been much considered in the mainly Anglo-Saxon IR debate[20]. On the contrary after the Second World War realism returns to its origins, but loses complexity and ability to grasp international reality. For instance, many authors suggest that Waltz's neo-realism (Waltz 1979) provides an elegant systematisation of classical realism in the form of a parsimonious theory and from the third image perspective thus putting aside Morgenthau strong anthropological assumptions (Keohane 1986a: 11, Nye 1988: 241). Unfortunately, Waltz's theory does not account for change at all and is thus rightly criticised, and also for not exploiting all the heuristic possibilities offered by the concept of international anarchy on

[19] This explains Pistone's judgement (1973: 10) that Morgenthau and other following realists should be considered as a theoretically less sound version of the realist tradition, and his preference for the expression "*raison d'état* theory" to indicate the previous realist authors, which is accepted in this research.

[20] A notable exception is Thompson 1992. However, Thompson is forced to summarise Dehio's main contributions in his article as they cannot be considered familiar to Anglo-Saxon IR scholars (p. 128). In Italian there is an excellent monographical study about Dehio's historical work and his contribution to the understanding of international relations: Pistone 1977.

which it is based (Ruggie 1983; Kehoane 1986, Ashley 1986; Nye 1988: 241-245; and Buzan, Jones and Little 1993, try to refine Waltz's theory and to bring back some layer of complexity of traditional realism to develop a theory of structural realism still based on international anarchy).

During its long evolution realism always had also an ideological bias - this explains for instance the rejection of the German school of the *raison d'état* after the Second World War. This is hardly surprising: in different periods the most important theorists came mainly from the great powers of the specific state system of that time, and often they tended to serve and justify their policies[21]. Furthermore it has often acquired a regressive ideological bias and thus aimed more and more at justifying rather than explaining international politics and its shortcoming. The first modern realist reflections often came from authors trying to change the world. Machiavelli's observations were linked to the existence of Italian state system, to Florence's role in it, and to Machiavelli's own aspiration at national unification, that is the overcoming of that system and of the international anarchy which characterised it[22]. Hamilton's thought was linked to the process of overcoming international anarchy between the thirteen American colonies by promoting a federal union. Kant's realist remarks about international anarchy – within a philosophical framework which is not realist from a normative perspective - were aimed at its overcoming. The XIX century German thinkers developed and refined important concepts such as state system, *raison d'état* and balance of power, but they also adopted a nationalist ideology and used their analytical tools to support aggressive foreign policies. On the contrary the British authors of that period used the same analytical tools to support British foreign policy and maintain its role of balance holder of the European state system. In the XX century German realists such as Meinecke and especially Dehio realised the terrible consequences of international anarchy and asked for its overcoming. The USA new hegemonic position forced this country to think about international politics. This signed the start of the American realist school. Morgenthau inaugurated a trend which re-asserted the state-centric approach. Waltz's neo-realism went back to the origins and emphasised

[21] Mannheim claims that the sociology of knowledge should explain the reasons for the emergence of certain problems and academic disciplines and especially in certain countries (1953: ch. III § 1). This is not so difficult for international realism.

[22] This does not imply that he favoured national unity to ensure peace. On the contrary he was afraid that a fragmented Italian peninsula would be subject to foreign rule by greater foreign states (Machiavelli 1513-1998: ch. XXVI). This shows that even from a realist perspective it is possible to consider the overcoming of international anarchy within a given state system in view of the more general international context. In other words the first modern realist was concerned with promoting what Gilpin calls systems change (1981-1995: 47).

once more the heuristic value of the concept of international anarchy (Waltz 1979 and 1986), but then used it to justify the then current bipolar system as the most stable one.

This brief summary already contains an indication of the changing ideological use of the analytical concepts which are at the core of international realism. It is now possible to examine the basic analytical concepts and insights subsumed under the *raison d'état* theory as employed in this research.

2.1. Anarchy as the dividing line between international and domestic politics

The first realist theorists - from the XVII century[23] to the Second World War, from Hamilton to the German realists - developed the concepts of "*raison d'état*" and "power politics" on the basis of a clear understanding of international anarchy as the crucial factor of international politics (Pistone 1973: 11-12). The necessary premise for such an understanding of international anarchy (Pistone 2001) is Hobbes' identification of the role of the state as a coercive instrument to establish peace on a given territory by imposing the respect of law (Hobbes 1651-1998). This allows to see that the main difference between domestic and international politics is the presence of the state in the first and its absence, that is international anarchy, in the second.

Hamilton and Kant's works present the clearest statements of the centrality of the concept of international anarchy in the XVIII century[24]. "To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages" (Hamilton, 1788-1987: n. 6, p. 104). This passage is probably the best – and one of the most celebrated - description of the structural consequences of international anarchy. There is not any possibility of a stable harmony of interests in an anarchical situation. International anarchy is a situation of actual or potential war. Hamilton's discussion of this subject shows that he is aware of most

[23] I am aware that many scholars trace the origin of international realism in earlier periods and that references to Thucidides and Machiavelli are very common among realists scholars. However, for the purpose of this chapter, that is for the reconstruction of the main analytical concepts which are subsumed under the *raison d'état* theory, it is more useful to analyse only more recent authors.

[24] Hamilton' s analysis could probably suffice. But it was not clearly linked to the general problem of peace as in Kant's thought. Kant's recognition of international anarchy essentially rests on realist arguments. However, unlike most realists, Kant refuses to consider international anarchy as an eternal condition and wishes its overcoming. This choice depends on his moral philosophy and philosophy of history. Still his remarks on international anarchy are coherent with the realist tradition. Furthermore even a brief analysis of Kant's works should be enough to clarify some aspects of his thought which are often discussed and contested in the IR debate.

theoretical issues involved in his bold claim. If war is the consequence of international anarchy, other internal factors will not change it. He criticises the idea that republic or commercial states are more pacific than other, and that the domestic regime can significantly influence the foreign policy in a situation of international anarchy (n. 6 and 7). Thus he refused the thesis of the primacy of domestic policy on which the IR second image is built.

He then proceeds to establish the opposite claim. It is the situation of international anarchy together with the geographical position of a state which influence its domestic regime. He distinguishes between continental and insular powers (n. 8). He claims that without the Union the thirteen American colonies would be in a situation of international anarchy that is in a situation of actual or potential war. This would force them to build permanent armies and to strengthen the executive power at the expense of the legislative, as it usually happens in wartime. On the contrary by uniting together they would be isolated from the European states and would not have strong neighbouring states. Therefore the USA itself would not need to create a standing army and to strengthen the executive power.

This simple argument follows directly from the explanatory priority assigned to the concept of international anarchy and the adoption of the concept of *raison d'état* as at least a will to survive as an independent entity. It allows Hamilton to explain the lack of a standing army in an insular power such as Great Britain and its positive consequences in terms of the strength of the British Parliament and the liberties of the British people, against the authoritarian regimes and standing armies of the European continental states. But it can also be used to explain the centralisation of power in the USA during the XX century, which weakened its federal character (Albertini and Rossolillo 1962). This was due to the American growing international involvement in the two World Wars. Their new role as the Western world hegemonic power implied fundamental international responsibilities which forced them to establish a permanent army and to deploy it all around the globe. From this perspective it was the end of American splendid isolation (Toynbee 1948: 129-130)[25].

[25] A clear analysis of the impact of the two World Wars on the USA international situation and domestic regime is in Wheare 1963-1980: 205-208. Indeed there may be other useful explanations too. The new technological and economic developments strengthened the role of the state in the economy and thus brought a centralisation of power. Still the explanation based on the international situation of the USA is very helpful especially in explaining the centralisation made during the wars – and partially kept afterwards – and the maintenance of a strong standing army within the USA and around the World. At the same time the USA case shows that the growing state involvement in the economy and the emergence of the welfare state was not due to democracy – as it is often believed in Europe. The USA had been a democracy for a long time without creating a welfare system nor having a strong state intervention on the economy. State intervention was the response to a certain situation and was widely adopted by countries with different regimes, such as the democratic USA, communist USSR, fascist Italy, and nazi Germany (Polanyi 1944).

Hamilton also points out the possibility to overcome the problem of international anarchy through a federal union. He was thinking only about the American case. But he was aware that the federal system was a new instrument of a good system of government – together with the principles of the division of power, of check and balances, of an autonomous judiciary, and of elected legislature - whose characteristic was precisely to allow "the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve"[26] (n. 9: 119). It was the instrument to allow a system of government to be used above already existing governments, the instrument to peacefully unite different states[27]. Therefore it could be applied to the USA in 1787, but it may be applied today in different areas of the world, and eventually to the world once certain conditions come about[28].

Hamilton contributed to the development of three key concepts of international realism. First, the real meaning and centrality of international anarchy. Second, the thesis of the primacy of international politics over the domestic one. Finally and consequently, the indication that peace can be achieved only by overcoming international anarchy. The last point is to be considered here in analytical terms: that is as something which Hamilton proposed as an empirical observation, and as a theoretical and logic truth, not as a normative prescription to achieve peace. It may still follow a consideration that such an event is not possible, and that therefore war is a permanent element of international politics. Such a judgement about the future may be supported with arguments from the first, the second or the third image. But it is ultimately an ideological choice. It is possible to argue rationally about the possibility and usefulness or the impossibility and the damage of overcoming international anarchy (on this second perspective see Zolo 1997) within a given state system at a certain point in time. But it is not possible to exclude the possibility in a distant future of a situation allowing for the overcoming of international anarchy. Hamilton did not approach this issue from a theoretical perspective or looking at the problem of peace. He was only concerned about the possibility and usefulness of overcoming international anarchy in a given place at a given time. And one of the main reason he adduced was the establishment of peace, and the consequent benefit for liberty and democracy – given the primacy of international over domestic politics.

[26] Here as throughout this research the emphasis present in the quotations are found in the original. I will signal whenever they will be mine.

[27] According to Levi (1997: 22) this is one of the three innovations of the creation of the USA: first, the unification of 13 existing states into a new one; second, such a unification took place through democratic and peaceful means; third, it also established a new form of government: the federal one.

[28] The special historical conditions which allowed the emergence of federalism in the USA so early have been discussed by Albertini (1963a-1999a). He believes that the democratic regime of the colonies and the very limited degree of class struggle – due to the possibility to colonise the Western territories – are the two fundamental elements of such an explanation. Wheare (1963-1980) analyses the possible reasons to establish a federation in general, or the kind of problems which federations are best suited to solve.

This short summary of Hamilton's contribution is also a good introduction to Kant's one, since they are complementary. Kant's advocacy of a cosmopolitan system – federal or confederal according to different scholars[29] – to establish peace is well known since he discusses this issue in many works[30]. He carries the domestic analogy to the final consequences, although he is aware of its limits and of the differences between domestic and international anarchy, as the differences between his domestic and international political theories show. It will suffice to point out that the situation of domestic anarchy and the following original contract to create a state - a civil society in Kantian terms - can be just an idea of reason to legitimise the existing states, but may not have historical reality. States were generally created by conquest, not by contract. The USA were an exception, not the norm; although this proves that it is possible to follow this path. Being it just an idea of reason Kant could ascribe to each individual the coercive right to force other men to exit the state of nature and form a civil society (1798b-1991: §8, 15 and 44). This means to accept that states may have been lawfully created by force. On the contrary international anarchy is a real historical situation. If it is to be overcome to ensure peace, it cannot be accepted that each state has a coercive right as the individual had (1793a-1991: 91). Otherwise war and universal conquest would be legitimised. Thus the only acceptable way to overcome international anarchy is the contract to form a supranational state – just as it happened with the birth of the USA.

Kant looks at the same problem from a different perspective as well. The situation of international anarchy is a situation of war. And it can be overcome either through a cosmopolitan organization created peacefully by the states themselves or by universal conquest. But the strive to survive would bring all states to form a coalition against the hegemon, thus the second alternative is impossible. And even if it was not, the resulting universal despotic empire would soon break up due to centrifugal tendencies. This implicitly contains the identification of the two trends characteristic of a situation of international anarchy: "balance or hegemony"[31]. But this tendency, at the basis of the theory of balance of power, is effective only in contrasting a hegemon, and in eventually

[29] Most philosophical interpretation of Kant's "IR" theory revolve around the problem of world confederation against world federation. In favour of a confederal interpretation see Riley 1983; Mori 1984, and 1995; Mulholland 1990; Portinaro 1996; and Archibugi 1993. Bobbio (1985) initially accepted the confederal view, but recently he came back on the issue and favoured a federal interpretation (Bobbio 1996). In favour of a federal interpretation see also Levi 1978; Yovel 1980; Albertini 1985 e 1993; Axinn 1989; Loretoni 1996; Marini 1998.

[30] Important references to this problem can be found especially in Kant 1784-1991, 1793a-1991, 1795-1991, 1798a-1991 and 1798b-1991.

[31] It is a pity that the original title of Dehio's greatest work "Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie" have been improperly translated into English as "The Precarious Balance" and not as "Balance or Hegemony" which was the fundamental alternative and the crucial element of continuity in the European history according to Dehio.

provoking new wars. To keep the balance you may have to resort to war. Therefore Kant is crystal clear about the impossibility for the balance of power to ensure peace (1793a-1991: 92). This can be achieved only by a cosmopolitan order, that is by the end of international anarchy, which is the ultimate cause of war.

The centrality of the concept of international anarchy and of the domestic analogy in Kant's works is often overlooked by liberal scholars[32]. They claim that the domestic regime influences each state foreign policy and refer to Kant's first definitive article of *Perpetual Peace*: "*The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican*"[33]. Kant accepts this influence also in different other passages of other works too (eg. 1973a-1991: 90-91). At the same time it is clear that he did not consider this influence to be determinant. Otherwise he would not need to write the second definitive article, together with the first. And he would not be able to claim that "*The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a* ***civil society*** *which can administer justice universally*" (1784-1991: 45; Fifth Proposition) and that "*The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed* ***external relationship*** *with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved*" (1784-1991: 47: Seventh Proposition). And Kant's reasons represent a clear statement of the primacy of the international order over the domestic one. A perfect domestic constitution cannot be established unless international anarchy is overcome. Precisely because in such a situation each state has to prepare itself for war. Thus it may be "forced" to employ standing armies and to adopt other measure which restrict individual freedom and justice. This shows that Kant is aware of the influences of the international situation on the internal regime.

Liberal scholars could oppose a specular argument and demand why Kant wrote the first definitive article and not just the second. There is a reasonable answer. Because only republics may decide to join in together to form a new cosmopolitan state. A despotic ruler cannot accept to share or to transfer power to a superior level of government. The citizens can because they will maintain the same level of control in the new state. In other

[32] For a "liberal" interpretation of Kant's political philosophy see especially Doyle (1983, 1986, 1995), Covell (1994 and 1998), and also Gallie (1978). The relationship between peace and democracy is much debated in contemporary IR theory. Therefore it is not surprising to find liberal interpretation of Kant's philosophy by IR rather than by philosophy scholars. A clear stand against such an interpretation is offered in MacMillan 1995.

[33] It is difficult to know if Kant and Hamilton had the chance to read each other works. It is interesting to note that they contributed at around the same time to the introduction of a very similar and new definition of "republic" as opposed to "democracy". The *Federalist Papers* insisted particularly on two features introduced by the new republican constitution: a representative government, and a division of powers. And they vehemently attacked the legislature predominance in the Article of Confederation and in most colonies statutes (on the use of the concept of "republic" in *The Federalist Papers* see Kramnick 1987: 40-54). Kant defines the republic precisely as a representative system (1793a-1991: 78-79; 1798b-1991: § 52) characterised by the division of powers (1795-1991: 101. On Kant's definition of republic see Marini 1998).

words there can be no federal system without democracy[34]. Thus the first definitive article indicates a necessary if not sufficient condition of peace. It is necessary because without it the next step, indicated by the second definitive article, could not be taken. Finally, it is only with the establishment of a cosmopolitan state that cosmopolitan right may be established. This would explain the link between the first, the second and the third definitive articles.

This argument opens the way for a more complex analysis of the relationship between international and domestic politics. On the one hand international politics influence the domestic regime. On the other the domestic regime may influence, but not ultimately determine, the state foreign policy. Only a democratic government can accept to give up its power to a superior level of government, although it is not at all certain that a democratic government will choose to do so.

It is now possible to see that Kant's works offer some important contributions to the realist tradition, notwithstanding the fact that Kant cannot be really classified as a realist author. First, he refined theoretically Hamilton's view about international anarchy. Second, he started a useful reflection about the complex relationship between international and domestic politics. He essentially maintained the thesis of the primacy of international politics – this is clear in the fifth and seventh proposition of 1784 and in the second definitive article of 1795. But he also realised that to some extent - and within clear theoretical limits - domestic politics can influence international politics. Then he stated more explicitly than Hamilton that peace equal a cosmopolitan organization. But he was more ambiguous and less precise than Hamilton in the indication of the federal form of this organization[35].

2.2. The XIX century normative turn and the superiority of international politics

The firm indication of the centrality of international anarchy in Kant and Hamilton can well introduce the theoretical developments proposed in the XIX and XX centuries, which I will examine only very briefly. Ranke[36] explicitly links the explanation of domestic

[34] It is also possible to maintain that the federal system strengthens democracy at the federal level and in the member states alike. This idea was first expressed by Hamilton and Madison in *The Federalist Papers*, especially n. 9, 10, 39, 47 and 51.

[35] However it seems quite clear that Kant was looking for a world federation, that is for the end of national absolute sovereignty. Even scholars who support a confederal interpretation admit that a federal one would be more coherent with the whole of Kant's political philosophy (Mori 1984: 42-47). Furthermore recent and convincing philological work tend to support a federal interpretation (Marini 1998).

[36] For a more detailed analysis of Ranke's theoretical contribution see Pistone 1977: 14-23.

developments to international events, thus refusing the tendency towards national historiography (Ranke 1833-1973: 73 and 81). In other words he identifies the interdependence of a certain number of states, and the following impossibility to study their individual history without looking at their complex relationship. At the same time he recognises explicitly the existence of a hierarchy of states, and thus distinguished between the great powers and the other states. Finally he indicates that the tendency of each state to maintain its independence tends to produce great coalitions against hegemonic attempts, as Kant already pointed out. This allows Ranke to develop the idea of state system based on the concepts of great powers, of their interdependence and of their tendency towards the balance of power (Ranke 1833-1973: 80)[37].

The XIX century theorists also started a normative shift. Most of them can be associated with the nationalist ideology, and therefore their reflections about international anarchy did not bring them to advocate its overcoming. Ranke believed that war had also a prevalent creative and positive aspect[38]. I will not summarise here the contributions of other great German authors such as Hegel and Von Treitschke about these themes, although they propose great philosophical perspective and useful historical observations. Ranke already provides clear statements of the theoretical advancements of that time.

The German school was too strongly linked to the nationalist ideology (ie Ranke 1833-1973: 111) to be much considered in contemporary scholarship. For instance Hayek attributes German historians a great responsibility in influencing German history in the first half of the XX century (Hayek 1967-1978: 137-138). Hence it seems appropriate to emphasise that their theoretical achievements did not depend on their ideological bias and that the former were shared by more liberal authors in the Anglo-Saxon world too. Seeley clearly stated that the degree of internal liberty within a state is generally inversely proportional to the political and military pressure on its borders (Seeley 1896-1919: lectures VI and VII, especially p. 129)[39]. This is a more precise identification of the kind of influence of international over domestic politics than the one proposed by Kant and Hamilton. Furthermore, the concept of political and military pressure refers not just to geographical element – such as the insular or continental position of a state – but to geopolitical elements. It is not simply the geographical position, but more specifically the political and military pressure which matters. It may be possible, under certain conditions,

[37] On this concept see also Tilly 1992-1997: ch. 6.
[38] Pistone (1977: 23-32) offers a more detailed discussion of Ranke's ideological and normative thought together with its phiolosophical premises.
[39] A similar argument is used by Tilly to shows the link between war and the creation of the state (1992-1997: 20-28, ch. 3, and 137-143).

for a continental state not to have strong political and military pressure. These kinds of pressure are present between interdependent states, which form a state system. These refinements allow these concepts to explain more than the liberties of insular powers and the authoritarian rule of continental powers wishing to survive. And the case of Poland history can be taken as a classical example and a good case-study.

From Seeley's perspective it is possible to explain two things. First, it is possible to explain the last phase of the Polish state history. Poland was enclosed between three great powers such as Prussia, Russia and Austria. Still it did not developed a strongly centralized government able to mobilise all internal capabilities to ensure the state survival. This allowed the three great powers to partition it until it disappeared (Hintze 1913-1973: 157-158). But this example also shows that there is always a choice. Poland chose to retain its elective monarchy and its *liberum veto*. In this sense it is an exception to Seeley's claim. But this very exception explains its disappearance as an independent entity. Furthermore it weakens the claim about the effectiveness of the *raison d'état*, as at least the will to survive, to determine state acts. The will to survive can be too weak, compared to other motives – such as the wish to establish or to retain a certain domestic regime – to impose itself. The result can be precisely the "death" of the state. This places a strong burden on realist assumption – being it ancient, classical or structural realism – about the state, and its motive for action.

Second, it is possible to explain why Poland could develop such an internal system in the first place. Before the emergence of Russia and Prussia as great powers, the political and military pressure on the Polish borders was not that strong. And its size made Poland an unlikely prey for its neighbours. Thus Polish independence was compatible with an internal regime which maintained a balance between the nobles of the country through an elective monarchy and the *liberum veto*. The shortcomings of this system in relation to the independence of the country manifested themselves only later on, when the political and military pressure on the Polish borders significantly increased. Only at this point the internal regime and the international situation became incompatible and one of the two was to be changed. Being Poland unable to change its internal regime towards a more centralised form of government, its international situation changed, until Poland disappeared as an independent state[40].

[40] A similar analysis is offered by Tilly (1992-1997: especially 139). This example is useful also to support Dehio's claim about the impossibility to maintain for a long time in normal condition vacuums of power at international level. They tend to be filled by other powers. Clear hegemonic attempts generally provoke a coalition response by other states. Hegemony more easily comes about as an answer to power vacuums which some states have the opportunity to fill in. This was clearly the case for both British and American hegemony. Britain mainly fought hegemonic wars in a defensive position as part or leader of a league against a

Seeley's application and refinement of the reason of state theory brought him to grasp some fundamental trends of world history. The refinement consisted in bringing into the picture the economic aspect of modern power. And the application of the superiority of international over domestic policy allowed him to see the emergence of the USA and Russia as the new dominant powers thanks to the economic potential of the first and the geographical and demographic potential of the second. He recognises that at stake was the end of the European state system. European nation-states will be like dwarfs compared to the new great powers just as the Greek polis to the Macedonian state or the Italian city-states to France or Spain. This analysis brought him to sustain British imperialism as an instrument to maintain Britain's role as a world power (Seeley 1895-1911). But this choice depended on on the value accorded to his own nation position in the world. It was possible thanks to his comprehension of reality due to the *raison d'état* theory, but it was not a logically necessary corollary without the specific normative preference attributed to the preservation of the British position. In fact at a different time Seeley drew different normative proposals from his analysis and proposed the creation of "the United States of Europe" (1871-1989).

Also the Polish example referred to Seeley's indication of the relationship between the state geopolitical position in the state system and the domestic regime. It is clear that such claim may be used analytically or normatively. It can be used to explain certain domestic developments in relation to the international situation and vice-versa. But it can also be exploited to support a certain domestic or international situation or change. But the second use is linked to values. Hamilton used this argument to support the federal union of the thirteen colonies, to ensure peace and internal liberties and democracy. Ranke and many German authors used it to support an authoritarian rule, as the best one to ensure national autonomy in the face of the Prussian and then German geopolitical situation of a continental power with dangerous borders both on the East and on the West.

To identify a relationship between two situations may help to preserve them or to change them. It will be a choice about values which cannot undermine the usefulness of the understanding produced by the identification of that relationship. Furthermore the identification of a political relationship is often due to the observation of historical reality.

hegemonic attempt by a continental state. The USA tendency towards isolationism is well-known and persisted even after the First World War, when their participation was necessary to defeat the German hegemonic attempt. Many of the problems of the inter-war period were due precisely to the USA isolationist policy and refusal to assume world responsibility (Toynbee 1948: 129-130; Dehio 1948-1963: 12-15, 23, 243-244, 253-256; Kennedy 1988-1989: 357-358). Only after the Second World War the USA were faced with a situation of power which did not allow for their retreat from world responsibility since any power vacuum they were not to fill would have been filled by the USSR. Thus USA hegemony was established although it was not designed or pursued by that country.

They are generally recognised a posteriori. To use them to change or to support a given situation will also depend on the assumptions made about human nature and history. To believe that certain elements of human nature or certain historical situation cannot be changed and are eternal is just a value-driven choice as to say that they can change. Man cannot know the future. Thus it is possible to hope, not to foresee, a change for the better. And in a Kantian perspective it is also our duty to draw on the understanding of the current situation to try to improve it (Kant 1795-1991: 117-118; and 1978a-1991)[41]. But even if it was not our duty, a more precise understanding of social reality is certainly a better basis to try to change reality – in any direction – than a less sounding understanding. In other words, the identification of a certain relationship is not necessarily linked to any specific value or normative vision. It may often be used by many of them in different ways. Or it may show one ideological mystification present in of one of them and thus strengthen another. However, this will not be done because of an inextricable link with the latter, but because of the mystification of reality implied by the former.

2.3. The World Wars and the normative turn

There are other important authors of this school of thought in the early XX century. Once again the main ones come from the German and Anglo-Saxon traditions. Hintze tries to re-establish the insights developed by previous German authors and complains that only historians seemed interested in those concepts while political scientists did not pay attention to them (Hintze 1913-1973: 149). He strongly restates the idea that the international situation influence domestic regimes (Hintze 1913-1973: 146, 149, 158). He adopts the traditional distinction between insular and continental powers to explain the differences of the domestic regimes of England and Germany. Thus he explains the birth of the absolute, centralised, bureaucratic, military state as the characteristic form of a continental state (1913-1973: 150-152). And he considered territorial extension and domestic regime solidity as both essential components of a great power (Hintze 1907-1973: 196). At the same time he links the economic policy of mercantilism to the centralization of the state. And he explains both with the needs of power politics at that time. The aim of that economic policy was not just economic welfare but political and international power too (Hintze 1907-1973: 197). This is an important aspect because Hintze clearly identifies

[41] On Kant's philosophy of history see Yovel 1980, and Loretoni 1996.

the relationship between economics and politics. The growing importance of economics as an element of state power brought it under the influence of the *raison d'état*.

He then proceeds to identify in the concept of nation the new instrument which could allow democracy in a continental state. By integrating the masses and making them reliable soldiers it allowed for a democratic system to be sufficiently centralised and able to defend itself. This was the great lesson of the French revolution. However, the French growing international involvement up to the hegemonic attempt required greater centralisation. Thus the democratic tendencies had to give way to Napoleon's caesarism. But thanks to the creation of the French nation it became possible to unite democracy and power. Hence, in the last part of the XIX century France was republican and powerful, and Hintze suggests that the French national spirit will be always difficult to defeat. It will be possible to defeat the French army, but it may then prove impossible to manage a country in which each and every citizen may become a rebel (Hintze 1913-1973: 170-173)[42]. This allows Hintze for hope about the establishment of democratic regimes in other continental countries too.

At the same time considering German history, its recent unification and its weak national character he concluded that only by overcoming German oppressive encirclement it may be possible to introduce democracy in this country (Hintze 1913-1973: 187). This statement is very important. It could be used to support an aggressive foreign policy aimed at breaking the encirclement. To that aim it would be necessary to mobilise all German internal energy through an absolute, bureaucratic, centralised military government. This is precisely what Nazi Germany meant for Dehio (Dehio 1948-1963: 255-263; and 1955-1959). But Hintze's reflection also shed light on an important aspect of the European unification process. This process broke out German encirclement - by setting on a new basis the Franco-German relationship - and thus favoured the consolidation of a German democracy. Precisely what the interwar international situation did not as Dehio points out (1948-1963: 243-260). Thus Hintze's analytical point could be used to sustain an aggressive foreign policy, but also to support the European unification process.

Hintze's main contributions can be considered the analysis of the economic aspect of power, and his analysis of the concept of nation and nationalism and their capabilities to increase state power on the one hand and to combine democracy and power on the other. Both these aspects have been developed further by Meinecke and Dehio, who are often

[42] Hintze's reflection – made in 1913 – found support in the French resistance during the German occupation in the Second World War.

considered as the last examples of this German school of thought (Pistone 1973)[43]. Meinecke can also be seen as a bridge between the previous German authors and the following because of his ideological revision in the interwar period. He restates the *raison d'état* theory as an analytical tool which does not need to be associated with the support for the *Macht-Politik* and *Macht-State* doctrine (Meinecke 1924-1998: especially p. 409)[44]. But many of these issues were further developed by Dehio who exploited Meinecke systematisation of the *raison d'état* theory to grasp the coming end of the European state system, which started with the First and was completed with the Second World War (Dehio 1948-1963: 23, 179-180, 262-267).

Essentially Meinecke restates the main elements of the *raison d'état* theory as the theory of international anarchy. First he defines the scope and the limits of the theory, which is not a deterministic one. Meinecke describes what can be called "reason of power" with a few universal and eternal motives, and thus analytical categories to understand reality: political egoism, the instinct to keep power, the state interest. But each state has a different geopolitical situation in different times, and also compared to other states. Therefore it is not possible to set the goals, nor the means, of any state once and for all. In other words, it is a macro-theory which may indicate general trends. But it has to be applied historically to different realities.

Second, the *raison d'état* theory can tell us only that each and every state has a will to survive. And this will also imply a will to increase its power whenever possible. If survival is the goal, power is a necessary instrument. And this is due to the permanently unstable condition of each state striving to survive against other states (Meinecke 1924-1998: 2-3, 17). But if power becomes not only the means but the goal, power politics can be

[43] Dehio and Meinecke were historians and did not developed a systematic IR theory. But the fundamental results of their historical works depends on the use of a limited number of interpretative categories centered around the concepts of international anarchy, European state system and the autonomy of the foreign policy.

[44] This judgement is explicit after the Second World War, just as Meinecke's critique of nationalism as the Machiavellism of the masses (1948-1963: ch. VII). At the same time he is unable to break completely with the nationalist idea of the link between state and nation. Thus he is unable to think about the overcoming of the German nation-state exclusive sovereignty within the European unification process. This brings him to demand Germany to renounce the role of great power, just like Sweden or the Netherlands have done in the past – this shows that he was not aware that this had already happened wuth the coming about of the bipolar world and the split of Germany. He also suggests the creation of Goethe's Communities as the only way to renew the country's spirit (Meinecke 1948-1963: ch. XV). It is almost the refusal to apply the theory of the reason of state to the German case. And this clearly appears in his emphasis of the elements of personality and casuality in the advent of the Nazi regime (1948-1963: ch. VIII). On the one hand Meinecke recognises that Hitler would not have come to power in the first place if certain structural conditions were not there (1948-1963: ch. VIII). But then he indicates three short-term elements – the Versailles Treaty, the Jewish problem, and the economic depression – and not any long-term ones which depended on the German position in the state system. Finally he concludes that a fundamental responsibility of his coming to power was on Hindenburg. Thus he can consider Hitler's coming to power as a mystery of history (1948-1963: ch. VIII). On the contrary Dehio offers a structural analysis of the conditions which allowed Hitler to seize power and suggests that "Hitler's 'chance' occurrence must also be seen as the acute symptom of a chronic sickness. Only in desperate conditions can a desperado make his mark" (Dehio 1948-1963: 257).

exacerbated and counterproductive. At the same time Meinecke recognises that the power of a state depends also on the internal solidity of a state, which often rests upon the consensus and the national spirit. This implies that an aggressive foreign policy aimed at increasing power conducted against the general idea of law and morality, may undermine state power, and thus may be counterproductive. This is Meinecke's warning against the temptation of power (1924-1998: 3-4), but it also contributes to explain his claim that the *raison d'état* can be easily harmonised with law and ethics within the state, but not on the international arena (1924-1998: 13-15). This argument uses the concept of international anarchy to explain the state will to increase their power vis a vis other states to ensure its own survival. It is international anarchy which makes the *raison d'état* – that is those eternal and universal motives identified earlier - conflict with law and morality on the international arena.

Third, Meinecke rejects the simple equation between the *raison d'état* theory and the ideologies of *Macht-Politik*, and *Macht-State* with which is often confused. And he also get rid of the myth of the superior and special ethics of the state cultivated by German idealism (1924-1998: 409-410, 426-430). The *raison d'état* theory should be considered as an instrument to understand the reality of a situation of international anarchy. As any heuristic instrument it can be used for different normative purposes and should not be identified with just one of them. This does not exclude that at a given time and in a given situation it may help mobilise support for aggressive policies, like it happened. But such a stand is not identifiable with the analytical theory itself. Furthermore, Meinecke's ideological revision goes far enough to indicate the destructiveness of those ideologies, for which previously he had some appreciation. At the same time this is a sign of the fact that Meinecke himself had originally linked the analytical and the normative aspect of the *raison d'état* as it emerges in his discussion of the elements which have changed the nature of the *raison d'état*.

Fourth, he identifies militarism, nationalism, and capitalism – but it would be more appropriate to term it industrialism, even according to Meinecke's own description of the phenomenon – as the three forces which changed dramatically the reality of international politics and of the *raison d'état* (1924-1998: 418; also 1948-1963: chs. V-VII). Meinecke also describes the link between these three forces. Militarism and conscription made war an event which concerned the whole population. Thus it also helped to justify the transformation of the state into the nation-state integrating all citizens. Nationalism thus became the leading ideology and produced many wars aimed at the creation of new nation-states. This helped to fill some power vacuums, thus after the German and Italian unifications a period of stability followed. But it also produced many irredentist

movements which helped to create new tensions. Furthermore industrialism increased both military capacities and the speed of change in state power. Thus it helped to destabilise the European balance, it produced new motives for imperialism, and it allowed the emergence of total war (Meinecke 1924-1998: 418-423). The overall result was that the combination of militarism, nationalism and industrialism expanded immensely the state capabilities and made war so destructive to be almost intolerable and to make power politics and Machiavellism counterproductive (1924-1998: 430-433)[45].

Dehio develops further Hintze and Meinecke's insights about the need to consider economic, social and ideological factors and offers a great sketch of European modern history based on a complex realist theory. He uses the *raison d'état* theory to sustain a supranational interpretation of the history of the European state system. He grasps the collapse of that system and the birth of the world (bipolar) state system. He also identifies the overcoming of international anarchy in Europe, that is the European unification process, as the way to avoid the tragedies of the past. Dehio's works not only complete the normative turn, but also represent a proper synthesis and an advancement of the theoretical achievements considered to this point.

It is interesting to start with Dehio's methodological considerations[46]. He notes that without his normative choice it would not be possible to apply coherently certain analytical tools because the results would be against some – not all - different normative preferences. Particularly, he criticises Ranke and the following German historians for not applying properly Ranke's own categories. Dehio explains this with the fact that such an application would bring them to Seeley's conclusions about the emergence of USA and Russia as the new dominant powers and the possibility for Britain to maintain its position by strengthening its Empire. But it would leave no chance for Germany to develop into a world class great power. Thus German historians of that period, who were essentially imbued with the nationalist ideology, were unable to grasp the reality of the coming end of the European state system and the emergence of the world state system as Seeley did (Dehio 1948-1963: 5-15, 229-230, 266). This is a very clear indication of the role of ideology and values in any research. They work as unconscious intellectual constraints which is better to make explicit as far as possible in order to limit their influence. Dehio's consideration of the geopolitical factors which allowed Seeley's analysis as a British against the nationalist ideological constraint of the German also explains the reasons of the

[45] This was Kant's prediction too. The more war gets destructive the greater the priority that will be attributed to the issue of the establishment peace, through the overcoming of international anarchy (Kant 1793a-1991: 90).

[46] I discuss only some aspects of this issue. A detailed analysis is in Pistone 1977: especially 77-85.

development of IR theory mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world after the Second World War. In the West only the USA had – and Britain hoped – to play a determinant role in world politics. Therefore a serious discussion about it could develop only in those countries. Only from their perspective it was possible to reconcile the national interest with a clear view of reality. This was not possible for the Europeans as they would have to recognise that they had become just satellite states of the American superpower. This was a reality most Europeans preferred to ignore due to their nationalist prejudices. Dehio was able to recognises this ideological mystification at work in the German theorists of the XIX and early XX century and in the European peoples after the Second World War (1948-1963: 5-15, 229-230; and 1955-1959: 23-25, 136-142).

A second methodological claim concerns the philosophy of history. Even if Dehio emphasises continuity in the history of the European state system, he also identifies some changes, and he refuses the possibility to draw conclusion about the future from the analysis of the past. To understand the past is useful also to underline what should not be repeated, and thus it can be an ally of change. At the same time this second aspect is imbued with normative values. Dehio leaves no room for any deterministic view of history which may curtail human freedom and responsibility. On the contrary he asks for a strengthened imagination to face the new challenges and hopefully not to repeat old mistakes (1955-1959: 142).

Dehio uses a limited number of analytical categories to sustain his analysis. It is not possible nor particularly useful to summarise here Dehio's great sketch of European modern history which will be considered in more detail in chapter six. But I will refer to part of it in order to identify Dehio's analytical tools and exemplify their possible application. Dehio's main theoretical contribution relates to two new lines of inquiry. The first refers to the role of economic and social development in influencing both domestic and international politics, although in different ways. The second is related to the complex relationship between international and domestic politics. He uses the theory of the influence of international over domestic politics in the terms proposed by Seeley, but complemented with a theory of the influence of domestic over international politics too. That is he does not state the superiority of one over the other (1948-1963: 5), but he maintains the autonomy of international politics, and analyses the specific ways by which one may influence the other and the limits of such an influence. He also refines the concepts of international anarchy, state system, and *raison d'état* as defined by Meinecke.

First he revises the concept of state system by indicating its central element not just in the presence of different state, but in the concept of interdependence between them. A

real system exists only in a situation of economic and/or political interdependence of its states. This interdependence produces the tendency to keep the balance of power, since in a situation of interdependence the increase of power of a state influences all the others in such a way to justify their coalition against the aspiring hegemon. A great increase of Chinese power did not influence any European state for much of the world history. But a limited increase of a neighbouring country could provoke serious responses within the European state system.

Thus Dehio employs the concept of interdependence within an essentially realist theoretical framework. The recognition of the existence of interdependence is possible within realism itself (Morgenthau 1948-1985: 8), but it is difficult to measure interdependence and to indicate a quantum which requires a qualitative change[47]. Many contemporary realists have difficulties to come to terms with this category, which is difficult to operationalise. Contemporary scholars debate mainly economic interdependence. Still it is difficult if not impossible altogether to construct a precise index of interdependence and to indicate a threshold of the degree of interdependence which makes a group of states becomes a state system - or maybe today a threshold which makes a state system start an integration process[48]. Dehio speaks about economic and political interdependence. Thus it is even more difficult to operationalise his concept. If it may tentatively be possible to construct an index for economic interdependence it is much more difficult to do so for political interdependence. The problem is that the concept of interdependence is not suitable for quantitative, but for qualitative assessment. This is indeed a great difficulty. But to recognise it is the only way not to get rid of a still useful analytical category. The problem will be to bring this category within a more complex theoretical framework which makes it more operationable. Dehio does this through the concept of "economic civilization", to which he attributes roughly the same heuristic characters which I attach to the refined version of the concept of mode of production discussed in chapter three.

Let me come back to the consequence of interdependence, that is the existence of a state system and of the tendency to the balance of power. This last concept is a useful heuristic tool in as much as it is descriptive and not normative. Dehio does not consider

[47] This issue is crucial and rises questions such as what level of interdependence requires integrative measures. This is a difficult assessment, which Milward, for instance, avoids in relation to European integration (Milward 1993-1994: 5-6). He just considers integration as a proper framework for a high degree of interdependence. But the real problem is to identify which degree requires this kind of answer, and what kind of higher degree will require further integrative step.

[48] This issue has been much debated after the Second World War. One of the first attempt to produce such an index is Deutsch theory of transactionalism (Deutsch 1953-1966).

the tendency to the balance of power as an enlightened policy to preserve peace and international security. It is just a policy imposed by the anarchic nature of the state system to retain the great powers independence and sovereignty, that is to keep the system and its main units alive. Two tendencies are intrinsic in the system: one towards unity, ensured by the hegemonic attempts of the most powerful continental state; the other towards fragmentation, that is the maintenance of the system based on the plurality of sovereign states, against violent attempts to unite them together under a single sovereignty. "Balance or hegemony" are the two possible outcomes of these two tendencies. And it is precisely thanks to the recognition of both that Dehio sketches the history of the European state system as a series of hegemonic attempts and their defeats[49].

At the same time Dehio emphasises both the reasons for those defeats but also the impossibility to predict that any hegemonic attempt will always be defeated. On the contrary he underlines that the conditions which account for those defeats have disappeared. The main condition was the progressive enlargement of the European state system – at least temporarily. He considers the intervention of states which were not completely part of the system, or which were also part of another greater system, the reason for the failure of the struggles for European hegemony. This happened with the Turskish, English, Russian and American participation in the European hegemonic wars. The price the European state system paid for its maintenance, that is for these external interventions was a more fragmented European system, and thus a weakening of the continental European states and a relative strengthening of the external powers. This trend however was not present in the first hegemonic war, and in Turkey's participation. The final result of the enlargement of the scene was that the German attempts to European hegemony did not bring about a new great European hegemonic war, but two World Wars, because without the world powers involvement its defeat would not have been possible. At the same time the attainment of European hegemony would have created too strong a world power. Thus the existing ones made an alliance against any such attempts notwithstanding their ideological, economic and geopolitical rivalries[50]. But these last attempts also brought about the end of the European state system and the emergence of

[49] From this perspective there are important similarities between Dehio's historical work and Gilpin's theoretical one (1981-1995). However Gilpin's theory is much more limited as it aims at emphasising the role of hegemonic wars in determining the shape of the state system. Dehio provides also some categories to understand the emergence of the different hegemonic attempts and the reasons for their failures, and looks more closely at the relationship between international and domestic politics.

[50] It is interesting to note that other perspectives do not use this kind of explanation. For instance Hobsbawm's interpretation of this century as the struggle between capitalism and communism put almost in brackets the Second World War which provoked their temporary alliances against a common threat (1994-2000). This is true for Dehio as well, but he emphasises the structural reasons for this alliance and generally does not place so much emphasis on the ideological factors.

the bipolar world state system as a consequence of the fragmentation of the European continent and the strengthening of the external powers which resulted from the Second World War. Thus a new enlargement of the scene is not plausible as the system has already acquired a cosmopolitan dimension. Change in the actors' power, and thus the emergence of other great powers may be possible, but it is unlikely. Furthermore, the technological development manifested during and after the war made a new hegemonic war an irrational options for both super powers.

The second line of Dehio's innovation concerns the relationship between international and domestic politics. Dehio retains Seeley's indications about the influence of the former over the latter. But he also develops further Kant's idea that the opposite is also possible in given conditions, that is that there may be internal reason to promote a certain foreign policy. And he also shows the interaction of these two tendencies in favouring particular political outcomes in given international geopolitical and domestic economic-social conditions. Dehio considers the possibility of an aggressive foreign policy as an instrument to legitimise internal rule, that is the idea of international success and conquest as a safety valve for internal problems. But he considers this a risky policy for the state. Hence it is a probable choice only in front of such domestic tensions as to threaten internal revolution. And at the same time Dehio claims that the international situation influences the development of internal tensions. Particularly, continental states had initially great incentives to develop an absolutist and centralist rule to defend themselves – as Seeley and others had noticed. Therefore in these countries internal tensions could not be easily accomodated given the rigid structure of their government and administration.

From this analysis descends the identification of the continental state tendency towards the repression and/or the "externalisation" of domestic problems, which may also be combined at the same time. They are two characteristic features of continental absolutism, and its inclination to develop into a totalitarian state, when faced with revolutionary situation as it happened with Napoleonic France, Soviet Russia, and Nazi Germany. They have all combined in different degrees the two tendencies towards internal centralization and externalisation of domestic problems. They did it to the maximum possible level achievable at that time, that is according to their technological, economic and geopolitical situation. Napoleonic France is thus considered as the first totalitarian state. It differs from the other two because of the different technological capabilities at its disposal and thus the amount of internal centralization and mobilization achievable. But the very idea of the continental blockade against Britain is a clear sign of the combination of the two tendencies. External success was a prime source of domestic consensus. And the

people economic well-being could well be sacrificed to the imperatives of foreign policy. On the contrary Soviet Russia had initially to retreat from the international scene to consolidate its internal regime and build up new capabilities. Once this was completed Russia reappeared on the international arena and combined the two tendencies under Stalin's guide. This "*reculer pour mieux sauter*" (Dehio 1948-1963: 104-105) has been a normal strategy especially for those states with a geopolitical situation allowing them to "disappear" from the international scene. That is for maritime powers and for Russia, a continental state with a special geographical position which ensured strategic advantages similar to those of the insular states (1948-1963: 101). And that was also a crucial element of their victories against a continental state hegemonic attempt.

As I have pointed out in the previous chapter Dehio indicates the three basic categories to understand international change and thus enlarge the analytical tools characteristic of international realism. However, the following development of IR theory suggests to stop here the analysis of Dehio's contribution to realist thinking, and to consider the category of "economic civilization" and of "moral energies" in the next two chapters about the mode of production and ideology.

It may seem a strange choice to stop at this point the analysis of international realism. All the Anglo-Saxon realist tradition developed after the Second World War is left out. Most authors of this school had a predominant focus on the Cold War and American foreign policy (for a recent example see Brown, Lynne-Jones and Miller (eds.) 1995). This also explained Morgenthau's attempt to establish realism as a scientific theory in order to influence the American foreign policy and to warn it against the fallacies of the idealistic view it held after the First World War (Keohane 1986a; Nye 1988: 235-6; and Nobel 1995). Thus the IR debate focused on two main issues. On the one hand on the role of nuclear weapons and deterrence. On the other hand on the methodology of IR theory. The second was a very useful discussion. It helped to identify explicitly the three IR images, the different units of analysis and the levels of analysis, and the complexity of the agent-structure relationship[51]. It pointed out the problems involved in stating a set of assumptions about the rationality of the state. It discussed the role of the state as status, utility, or power, maximiser or as a role player (Young 1986: 118-119). However, as far as the analytical core of the *raison d'état* theory is concerned, contemporary realism did not provide many significant developments. Probably this was due precisely to the

[51] On this issue in relation to realism and neo-realism in particular see Ruggie 1983: 262. It is worth noting that although without a clear methodological discussion the previous realist authors had developed useful concepts in relations to all these issues. My short summary of the evolution of this tradition of thinking has touched upon these aspects.

methodological debate. The explicit indication of the different units, and levels of analysis at the attempts to pursue methodological coherence brought theorists to look for parsimonious theories which focused mainly, or only, on one unit of analysis or on one level of analysis which was assigned logical priority. This exercise brought many coherent theories, but lacking the ability to grasp the complexity of international reality and often not taking change into account at all. At the same time the methodological debate did not go far enough. Czempiel's critique - based on Seeley's realists remarks and examined previously - to the confrontation policies prescribed by contemporary realists scholars clearly shows that many contemporary authors have suffered of ideological blindness, just as the XIX and early XX century German realists criticised by Dehio. By ideological blindness I mean the inability to apply their own traditional categories due to their normative preferences. The choice of the analytical tools and the objects of study may be influenced by normative preferences and the IR research agenda is often influenced by normative considerations and contemporary events. This does not represent an ideological blindness, especially when it is recognised by the researcher. The problem arises when the categories chosen are not applied uniformly in order not to clash with those normative preferences, and when this is an unconscious problem.

The limits of contemporary realism are emphasised also by the re-emergence of the liberal tradition in various forms. Nye suggests four basic type of international liberalism, the first three taken from Keohane: "(1) commercial Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of trade; (2) democratic Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of republican government (at the unit level of analysis); and (3) regulatory Liberalism, which asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries. One might add a fourth: sociological Liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests" (Nye 1988: 246). Each of these focused on one aspects of the reality of the western world after the Second World War. Indeed it was a peaceful area: was this due to growing trade and economic interdependence, to the spread of democracy, to the proliferation of international organizations attempting to regulate many issues, or to the new range of transnational contacts fostered by all these developments? Realist authors developed a different explanation: hegemonic stability. The problem arises when the hegemon started declining. Early discussion about the end of American hegemony started with the Vietnam war, and the inconvertibility of the Dollar in 1971. But that hegemony has continued up to the end of the Cold War and many scholars believe we live in a unipolar world. That is that

USA hegemony persists, and many think – whatever their normative preferences - it may still last long.

Conclusion

It is now time to try to recall the basic analytical achievements of the realist tradition and to summarise the concepts subsumed under the *raison d'état* theory. It is an ideal type based on few fundamental assumptions about men, power and international anarchy. Each of those analytical concepts attempt to describe a part of reality from the political perspective. This category is very useful, but alone is not enough. That is why Dehio brought into the pictures other elements too such as the concepts of civilization, and moral energies. This is also the reason for the attempt to develop a tripartite framework of analysis suited to study international systems change. The next chapters will try to identify the analytical categories best suited to complement those developed by the *raison d'état* theory.

Table six in the following page offers a synthetic summary of the concepts discussed so far and which will be employed in the application of the framework of analysis in chapter six. The table highlights the different concepts and the authors who contributed to their development or refinement. It is divided into five sections to identify clearly different aspects of the *raison d'état* theory related to its general assumptions, the concept of international anarchy and its consequences, the relationship between international and domestic politics, the concepts of state system and of great powers. These can be considered as the essential elements of the *raison d'état* theory as employed in this research.

Table 6. The *raison d'état* theory

Analytical core	**Authors**
1. General realists assumptions	
- Anthropological pessimism	Hobbes, Hamilton, Kant
- Drives for action: political egoism, instinct to keep power, state interest	Meinecke
- Need for the state (public coercive law) to ensure peaceful coexistence	Hobbes
- Need for check and balances against existing power	Hamilton, Madison
- States have a will to survive	Ranke, Meinecke
2. International anarchy	
- Centrality of international anarchy	Hamilton, Kant
- Tendency towards balance of power (coalition vs hegemonic attempts)	Hamilton, Kant
- Tendency towards hegemony as well: balance or hegemony	Dehio
- Ineffectiveness of the balance of power to ensure peace	Kant
- Peace means overcoming international anarchy[52]	Hamilton, Kant
3. The relationship between international and domestic policy	
- Primacy of international over domestic policy	Hamilton
- Insular vs continental powers	Hamilton, Hintze
- Internal liberty is inversely proportional to external pressure	Seeley
- Bureaucratic, centralised state as the form of a continental power	Hintze
- Partial constraint of domestic over foreign policy	Kant
- The autonomy of both international and domestic policy	Dehio
- The externalisation of domestic revolutionary tensions in continental powers	Dehio
- Caesarism and internal centralization to face external challenges in continental powers	Dehio
- Totalitarian state as the combination of cesarism and externalization	Dehio
4. The state system	
- Great powers	Ranke
- Interdependence	Dehio
- Balance of power (or hegemony)	Ranke, Dehio
5. Great powers	
- Military capabilities and geopolitical situation	Ranke, Meinecke, Dehio
- Internal cohesion and role of ideology (ie nationalism, democracy)	Hintze, Meinecke, Dehio
- Economic strength	Seeley, Hintze, Meinecke, Dehio
- Thus: economic policy is often subordinated to political imperatives	Hintze

[52] This is considered here as an analytical observation. Hamilton intended this way. It is still possible not to prescribe peace, because the overcoming of international anarchy may have other negative consequences from other perspectives. Indeed Kant indicated it also as a normative prescription, but it is possible to consider this as a simple identification of the means to achieve a given aim. The prescription of the mean and the acceptance of its negative consequences will depend on the priority assigned to the value of peace.

CHAPTER 3. THE MODE OF PRODUCTION

3.1 Historical materialism and the concept of "mode of production"

The attempt to identify the analytical elements of doctrines which have also a normative aspect is proposed also in this chapter. I will try to refine the concept of mode of production in order to use it outside the context of historical materialism and its economic determinism. I follow Croce's proposal to consider historical materialism as an interpretative instrument and his approach in trying to identify its analytical core (Croce 1896–1977; 1897-1977: 74-85, and especially 74-75 and 77-79; 1906-1977: XII)[53].

This theoretical enterprise requires first the indication of the causes of Marxist determinism, which I refuse. Second, the refinement of the concept of mode of production, which I take as the main analytical instrument of historical materialism. Third the identification of its possible uses, and particularly in relation to the study of international systems change. Obviously Marx and Engels offered the first definition of the concept. The main insights to refine it are drawn from the works by Polanyi and Montani. Other useful elements can be found in its use by different authors such as Dehio, Barraclough, Cipolla and especially Gellner, who combines it with other analytical tools and within a non-Marxist theoretical framework.

Historical materialism has been used in a deterministic fashion by many Marxists (Croce 1897-1997: 81-83). There are two main theoretical reasons for this. The first is the logical priority assigned to the concept of mode of production to explain world history. In other words, this concept is considered as the most general one to study the world and as the first causal determinant of the evolution of society, even if often only in the last instance[54]. This unilateral explanation of reality produces either a deterministic or at least a

[53] It is possible to interpret historical materialism in a very different way. For example Habermas suggests to consider "historical materialism as a comprehensive theory of social evolution" and "the theory of capitalism as one of its subparts" or as "a theory of social evolution that, owing to its reflective status, is also informative for purposes of political action and can under certain circumstances be connected with the theory and strategy of revolution" (Habermas 1976-1991: 126 and 130 respectively).

[54] This is clear for example in Godelier's critique (Godelier 1978 in Polanyi (ed.) 1957-1978it: xxii, xxx-xxxiii, xxxvii-xl) of Polanyi's use of the concept of mode of production – which Polanyi called "substantive economy" (1957: 243-248; 1977: 6, 31-34). Also Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism and his attempt to complement it with the theory of communicative action goes in the same direction – Habermas also quotes Godelier as a positive example (1976-1991: 124).

strongly normative use of the concept[55]. Leaving aside this assumption historical materialism loses the character of a philosophy of history, which some Marxists attributed it, and becomes a useful "pair of glasses" to look at reality (Croce 1896-1977: 14, my translation). This appears very clearly in the works of the above-mentioned historians, who use the concept without assigning it that logical priority. By employing it as a useful heuristic instrument among others, they avoid any deterministic stand.

The second deterministic element of historical materialism concerns the theorem about the relationship between the socio-economic structure and the political and juridical super-structure. The famous *Preface* to *The Critique of Political Economics* considers the super-structure as the mirror-image of the structure. But the need to refine this deterministic view was clear already for Engels (Letter to J. Bloch of 21/9/1890; quoted and discussed in Croce 1896-1977: 10-13; and also in Montani 1999: 47-51). The combined use of Polanyi's and Montani's insights allows to indicate that the evolution of the mode of production at any given time is compatible with different socio-political structures both in relation to their dimension and to their internal organization. In other words the concept of mode of production is useful as it allows to identify certain constraints posed to socio-political structures which need to be compatible with the evolution of the mode of production at any given time. But this means that such an evolution always offers a range of possible socio-political structures. Furthermore, the preference for one or another will depend on the normative stand of the observer and not on the identification of the range itself[56].

The tripartite framework proposed in this research employs the concepts of realism on the one hand and of culture and ideology[57] on the other, to explain the existence of different socio-political systems in relation to the same mode of production. And it also avoids the first deterministic element of historical materialism as it assigns logical priority to the combined use of these three concepts and not to any one of them. In this sense I claim to use the concept of mode of production outside the context of historical materialism and its determinism. This is also Gellner's claim in his application of this

[55] Habermas admits the normative element, but argues convincingly that it is possible to employ even this version in a non-deterministic fashion, provided certain assumptions are dropped and some others are made (1976-1991: 140-142).

[56] Croce (1987-1977: 86-95, and especially 92) points out that an analytical tool produces useful scientific observations. They may be the basis for a political choice, but it is not possible to make the latter a logical consequence of the former. The role of values in making normative statements is essential. But this does not make appropriate analytical tools less valuable and useful as any choice is better made on the basis of a sound understanding of reality. The same issue has been touched upon during the analysis of the realist analytical core in the previous chapter.

[57] The concept of "ideology" is used here not in the Marxist sense of false coscience. It basically refers to Albertini's definition of ideology as a complex political world view which includes the identification of a main value, of the institutional instrument to realize that value, and of the historical conditions necessary to establish those institutions (Albertini 1993). These and other aspects of the concept of ideology will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

scheme to the internal development of human societies (Gellner 1988: 16, 19-21, 68, 145, 213, 253 and 275). The concept of mode of production may be useful and may not have any deterministic connotation without the assumption about the necessary convergence between the socio-economic structure and the social-political super-structure and the prevalence of the first over the second. It only requires the assumption that the long-term viability and stability of a given order requires a compatibility of the two aspects[58], but this does not exclude the possibility of a tension among them as a dynamic factor of change. It is then possible to try to identify a range of structures compatible with a given mode of production[59].

This stand excludes the possibility to consider economics, politics and culture as three aspects of societies which can all be studied from a materialistic perspective and brought together within the concept of mode of production. Sometimes there is some ambiguity in relation to the possibility to subsume under historical materialism one or more of the three categories. Habermas stresses the link between historical materialism and culture as an essential element of identity building and thus of the reproduction of society. And he tries to refine historical materialism employing insights taken from his theory of communicative action (Habermas 1976-1991: especially 123-125, 147-148). I consider Gellner's attitude to this issue more effective. Gellner attributes culture the role of messenger of historical transformation, and thus considers it an element of the reproduction of society (Gellner 1988: 14). But then he stresses very clearly that culture is not the only element to perform this function (1988: 14-15). Thus society may change without a significant cultural change (1988: 274). Hence he develops the tripartite framework to include coercion and production, in a similar fashion to the one re-proposed in this research (1988: 14-15, 19-21, 68 and 274-275). And he uses historical materialism mainly to offer a periodization of human history according to the evolution of the mode of production (1988: 19-21, 68, 275).

3.1.1 The concept of mode of production

The main aim of this paragraph is to highlight the two analytical elements of the concept of mode of production. Marx and Engels identified two basic components: the means of production, and the relations of production (Marx and Engels 1846-1976: especially 31-32, 35, 43-44, 53; 1859-1980: 469). Still, their analysis of these two aspects is not completely satisfactory for three main reasons. First, they did not carry all the

[58] On this issue a useful analysis is offered in Habermas 1976-1991: 144-145.
[59] Gellner (1988) applies this idea throughout his book.

consequences from that distinction. This will emerge by looking at Polanyi's and Montani's refinements of each aspect, which draw many more consequences from the identification of each component. Second, they gave prevalence to the second element over the first[60]. This appears clearly in Marx's famous distinction of the mode of production on the basis of the relations of production and particularly of the role of labour relationships (Marx and Engels 1846-1976: especially 31-35). This produces a distinction based on "slavery, serfdom and wage labor" as summarised by Polanyi (1957: 256). Polanyi points out the need to include the role of nature, and particularly of land to characterise a given mode of production (Polanyi 1957: 255-256). Still, even with this adjustment also Polanyi focuses mainly on the relations of production leaving aside the means of production. On the contrary the following argument will show the need to consider them as well for a more effective periodization. And third, sometime Marx and Engels consider some indicators of those concepts as the concepts themselves. This is clear in relation to the use of the concept of property which is equated with the division of labour, and which also determines the relations of production (Marx and Engels 1846-1976: 32). Croce identified many theoretical limits in Marx's works and explained them by claiming that Marx was not particularly interested in theoretical precision in the definitions of the concepts, but more in the application of the insights subsumed under the concepts themselves (Croce 1897-1977: 76), because its explicit aim was to change, rather than to interpret the world[61].

To overcome these shortcomings I refer mainly to Polanyi's and Montani's refinements of these concepts, and to Gellner's application of historical materialism. Polanyi offers a sound theoretical basis. More precisely, his historical analysis stresses the prevalence of the means of production, while his theoretical considerations focus on the relations of production. Montani offers a useful theoretical analysis of the means of production[62]. Eventually he tends to assign them priority over the relations of production.

[60] This is generally true for the whole of the Marxist tradition, even when applied to IR (see for instance Cox 1987 entirely based on the relations of production).

[61] Actually this is partly also Montani's attitude (Montani 1999: 11). However, he believes that a sound understanding of reality is needed to identify the proper course of action to reach any political goal. Thus, Montani *de facto* accepts the separation of the two spheres of knowledge and action. Therefore before employing the concept of mode of production he offers a useful analysis of historical materialism and of its limits, trying to identify its analytical core. The whole chapter II of his book is devoted to this issue. And only in a different part of his book he draws his political conclusions from the analysis of reality based on the analytical instruments identified in chapter II. The link between culture and action is recognised by other authors too. For instance Gellner's claim that culture and knowledge are also instruments for action will be examined in the next chapter. Any understanding of reality may often be used to support and sustain different courses of political action on the basis of different values. This argument take for granted that values always play a part in any social research. At least the interest for an issue or another will eventually depend on the scholar's culture and values.

[62] The Italian federalist tradition has attempted to revise historical materialism and particularly the concept of mode of production. The first to follow this path was Mario Albertini. He devoted many of his university courses in Political Philosophy to this problem, but he did not achieved a vision sufficiently clear to publish

From a general theoretical perspective this is not correct, but Montani specifies that he wants to use the concept to address the specific issue of the dimension of the economic and political unit. The following discussion will suggest that from this perspective such an emphasis is justified.

The examination of Polanyi and Montani's works will indicate the heuristic value of the two components of the mode of production. Each author especially focuses on one aspect, and is thus inclined to emphasise it over the other. Combining their insights it is possible to grasp the whole heuristic value of the concept of mode of production and the specific uses of each of its elements in relation to different aspects of reality, together with the need to use both to obtain a more precise account of any given historical situation.

I share with these authors also the following methodological claims about historical materialism. Montani emphasises the need to consider it simply as an ideal type, that is as an analytical tool which emphasises some aspects of reality and which cannot grasp the whole of historical reality and development (Montani 1999: 51-52). Polanyi and Montani by emphasising different aspects of the concept of mode of production also stress the rejection of different aspects of its determinism. Polanyi argues against any deterministic vision of the evolution of the mode of production (Polanyi 1957: 256). Both authors explicitly reject any deterministic assumption about the necessary relationship between the economic structure and the super-structure (Montani 1999: 48-51), and Polanyi claims that "under the same technology, such far-reaching changes in economic organization may be encountered as transitions from capitalism to socialism. Again, the same organization of the economy seems compatible with sharp changes in the political system, e.g., when a market-organized society changes from a liberal democracy to fascism or vice versa" (Polanyi 1977: xlv). Montani also recognises the need to use other perspectives beside historical materialism – such as the political and the economic ones - to study historical reality (Montani 1999: 66-67).

The suggestion of the complementary use of the economic perspective highlights the fact that the mode of production is not an economic concept[63]. The mode of production has important economic consequences, but it is not an economic concept in

it. Therefore there are only a few pages explicitly devoted to this issue in his writings (Albertini 1965b-1999a: 109-111). However he is crystal clear in considering the evolution of the mode of production as a necessary but not sufficient condition of historical change (Albertini 1965b-1999a: 109). His writings set a research agenda which Montani, one of Albertini's pupils, has developed. Montani, himself an international economist, recours to a revised version of the concept in his attempt to place the analysis of globalization in a proper theoretical framework (Montani 1999: 51). He develops useful insights of the use of this concept to study the proper dimension of the state, which is one issue involved in international systems change.

[63] Croce also notices the difference between historial materialism and pure economics, although he does not stress and analyse this issue in detail (Croce 1897-1977: 66-74, especially 67 and 72).

the contemporary sense, which is the one used by Montani, who is an international economist. This is made very clear also in Polanyi's works. Although he never refers to the concept of "mode of production" that is what he means by his definition of "substantive economics" as opposed to economics which he calls "formal economics" (Polanyi 1944: 5; 1957: 240, 243-247; 1977: xl, 19-24, 56-60)[64]. The analysis of their definitions of the object of their studies shows that they are discussing the same concept. Montani synthetically defines the "mode of production" as "the behaviours and the activities which the individuals, involved in the process of production of their material lives, must necessarily undertake to ensure the survival of the social, productive and political system"[65] (Montani 1999: 52; my translation). This is a broad definition of mode of production as the necessary functions a society needs to perform to keep itself at the economic and cultural level it has acquired. The origin of this definition is clearly in Marx and Engels works (especially 1846-1976: 31-32, 35, 43-44, 53). Also Polanyi pays attention to the definitional problem throughout his works and comes back to this issue with great consistency. "The substantive meaning of economic derives from man's dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results in supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction" (Polanyi 1957: 243)[66]. Later on "the substantive meaning, points to the elemental fact that human beings, like all other living things, cannot exists for any length of time without a physical environment that sustains them; this is the origin of the substantive definition of *economic*. (…) The substantive meaning stems, in brief, from man's patent dependence for his livelihood upon nature and his fellows" (Polanyi 1977: 19, 20). On the contrary "The formal meaning of

[64] On this issue Gellner is less clear. Sometimes he tends to consider production and economics as synonyms. But at the same time he shares Polanyi's claim that economic theory is valid only for market-economy and does not apply to the whole human history (1988: 173-174). I believe that Gellner shares Polanyi's distinction between substantial economics and formal economics, that is between the mode of production and economics, but he never approaches this terminological issue explicitly in his book, and this leaves some ambiguity. The same is true for Habermas (1976-1991: 126) who considers historical materialism as the study of the history of mankind and not only of capitalism. But he attributes to capitalism a paradigmatic role. Thus the study of capitalism offers the instruments and insights to understand previous history. Eventually this would contradict the first proposition. If the economic instruments developed to study capitalism could be applied to previous societies there would be little need to study them through historical materialism. This is precisely the opposite of Polanyi's claim, which will be discussed later in more detail. It is on the basis of Polanyi and Montani's claim that contemporary economic theory will be used to complement the concept of mode of production in the analysis of the contemporary world, not of ancient societies.

[65] This definition offers an element of ambiguity. It seems that the mode of production includes all elements of the tripartite scheme, substituting "social" to "cultural" – and there is little doubt that culture is also socially constituted. But Montani himself emphasises the need to use appropriate analytical tools taken from economics or politics to understand those aspects of reality, which in this definition seem to be subsumed under the "mode of production". Again, I consider this second aspect of Montani's thought as the most useful one, and the closest one to Gellner's position.

[66] Human material needs may be definable and have clear limits. But certainly there are also human non-material needs. And since all human needs are socially determined, they are virtually infinite (Cipolla 1962-1965: 32; and Gellner 1988: 193-194, 225).

economic derives from the logical character of the means-ends relationship, as apparent in such words as 'economical' or 'economizing'. It refers to a definite situation of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means induced by an insufficiency of those means" (Polanyi 1957: 243). And again "the first meaning, the formal, springs from the logical character of the means-ends relationship, as in *economizing* or *economical*; from this meaning springs the scarcity definition of *economic*" (Polanyi 1977: 19).

Polanyi claims that neo-classic economics was explicitly built on such a distinction, which he found in Menger's *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre*. He provides an effective analysis of Menger's original works (in German) and notices that the latest edition – which offers such a distinction – had not been translated into English at that time (Polanyi 1977: 21-24). This explains both some aspects of formal economics, and also the fact that this distinction is not very common among economists. Hence the lack of consciousness about the substantial meaning of economics, which is lost in the use of "economics" to imply both meanings (1977: 20-21). Polanyi believes the two meanings coincide only in the case of a market economy (Polanyi 1957: 244; and 1977: 20), and that formal economic analysis is useful mainly, if not exclusively, to study the market-economy (Polany, Arensberg and Pearson 1957: 240; Polanyi 1957: 247; 1977: 20; see also Gellner 1988: 173-174; the opposite claim in Habermas 1976-1991: 126).

This short summary shows that Polanyi's "substantive economics" and Montani's "mode of production" are both related to the same field of inquiry. I will use their insights in a complementary way to refine the concept of mode of production. I prefer to employ this second term rather than Polanyi's "substantive economics" in order to distinguish it more clearly from economics, since the basic elements subsumed within the concept of mode of production cannot be conceptualised in strictly economic terms, that is in terms of scarcity[67].

Polanyi maintains that "the substantive meaning stems, in brief, from man's patent dependence for his livelihood upon nature and his fellows. He survives by virtue of an institutionalized interaction between himself and his natural surroundings" (Polanyi 1977: 20). This short definition highlights the two basic components on which the mode of production rests. On the one hand the interaction between man and nature depends on the instruments mankind creates to interact with and change its environment. Therefore this type of interaction depends on the knowledge and technology available at any given time. These are the core elements of the means of production. On the other hand the interaction between human beings depends on the organization of social groups. Thus Polanyi

[67] A detailed analysis of this issue is offered in Polanyi 1957: 243-250; and 1977: 19-31.

maintains that "the economy[68] as an instituted process of interaction serving the satisfaction of material wants forms a vital part of every human community" and has "two levels: one is the interaction between man and his surroundings; the other is the institutionalization of that process. In actuality, the two are inseparable; we will, however, treat of them separately" (Polanyi 1977: 31). Marx called the second level the relations of production, while Polanyi uses the term "form of integration". Since I will employ Polanyi's analysis of this concept I will tend to stick to his terminology.

Polanyi and Montani notice both elements of the mode of production, but the first focuses his theoretical analysis on the form of integration, while the second emphasises the technological aspect as he is concerned with the study of the dimension of social and political units rather than their internal organization. At any given time a society is characterised by a specific technological level and a certain form of integration. The mode of production subsumes both elements. But to identify with different names the various aspects is useful to bring analytical clarity.

This explains the existence of different distinctions between modes of production based on the technological level or on the social arrangements. However neither the technological level nor the form of integration may exist alone. To study any society at any given time from the materialistic perspective of the mode of production both elements have to be taken into account. Gellner's account of human history is based on this idea and on the use of different ideal types of modes of production (Gellner 1997: 31, 37). His periodization is essentially based on the evolution of the means of production, and the following main aspect of the economy: "mankind has passed basically through three stages: foraging, agriculture and scientific/industrial society" (Gellner 1997: 14; similarly 1988: 16, 19-20, and 275). But then he focuses on the forms of integration and on the interaction between coercion, production and culture in each stage (Gellner 1988: 19-21, 145, 213, 253, 275; but also 1997: 76 for instance). "The genuine reality underlying the historic development seems to me to be a transition between two quite different patterns of relation between culture and power. Each of these patterns is deeply rooted in the economic bases of the social order, though not in the way specified by Marxism" (Gellner 1994: 199-200). He remains coherent with this method of inquiry also in his many researches on nationalism, when he considers "the transformation of society by industrialism as the main progenitor of nationalism" (Gellner 1997: 75). Consequently he recognises that his "theory can perhaps claim to be a specimen of historical materialism, in as far as it links the phenomenon with which it is concerned – nationalism – to the basic

[68] Polanyi refers here to "substantive economics", that is to the concept of mode of production.

mode of production of the age in which nationalism becomes prominent. It differs from classical historical materialism at two points: it fully recognises the increasing vigour of political nationalism – that after all is the problem with which our argument begins – and secondly, it focuses, not on the ownership or control of capital, but on the nature and implications of the types of skills and activities which are involved in modern forms of production" (Gellner 1994: 44).

I share Gellner's view that both aspects are useful to the study of society. Both elements need to be taken into account to consider the mode of production. At the same time the technological aspect is more relevant in studying international systems change, while the social structure is more useful in studying the domestic organisation of a society. I will first analyse Montani's and Polanyi's recognition of these two components and then I will show their emphasis upon one of them and the possibility to use their insights to offer a more precise definition of the concepts involved.

Montani admits that the use of technology is linked to the existing social conditions. For example the mill was discovered very early but rarely used also because slavery ensured cheap or free manpower. But once manpower had to be paid, technological innovations which reduced the use of labour, spread out rapidly if they did not have other disadvantages. Hence the mill became an essential part of the mode of production of the Middle Ages (Montani 1999: 60-62 reaches this conclusion after a comparative analysis based on Finley 1973 and Bloch 1974; a similar view is in Cipolla 1962-1965: 43-45). This example shows the influence of social conditions on the spread of certain technological innovations which may seem of little significance in different social situation. However Montani's periodization of the modes of production is based on the technological element - and on the subsequent dominant sector of production for man survival. He identifies five ideal types of modes of production: "the mode of production <<of picking, haunting and fishing>>, or <<appropriative>> mode of production; the mode of production <<of agriculture and breeding>>; the mode of production <<of handicraft and trade>>; the <<industrial>> mode of production and, finally, the <<scientific>> mode of production" (Montani 1999: 55-6 my translation; but see also 56-62). It is worth noting that the Marxist distinction between a capitalist and a socialist mode of production is not mentioned. That one considers the owners of the means of production - and not the main sector of production in relation to the current technological level - as the crucial element of the mode of production. Also the social arrangements linked with each technological level are not considered in Montani's ideal types and periodization.

Polanyi initially places great emphasis on the technological aspect, but later on he stresses much more the social one. He claims that "at the heart of the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century there was an almost miracolous improvement in the tools of production, which was accompanied by a catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common people" (Polanyi 1944: 33). This short sentence makes clear that first came a significant technological improvement, which had important social consequences. This judgement is confirmed later on: "the nineteenth century gave birth to two sets of events of a very different order of magnitude: the machine age, a development of millennial range; and the market system, an initial adjustment to that development" (Polanyi 1977: xlviii). From this sentence it seems that the dominant element within the mode of production is technological evolution. But significant technological changes which radically alter a mode of production are rare: that is why "the machine age" is "a development of millennial range". Thus, according to Polanyi, the evolution of technology determines the mode of production, and can be associated with a limited number of forms of integration: reciprocity, redistribution, autarchy, and exchange. The choice of the form of integration depends on ideological and cultural factors, and needs to be compatible with the productivity ensured by the technology acquired as pointed out by the emergence of small autarchic economic units only in the latter phase of the agrarian period (Polanyi 1957: 254; and 1977: 41-42). The range of the dimension of viable economic units depends on the productivity ensured by a given technological level[69].

The coming about of the machine age is considered as a much more important development than the creation of the market system as a new form of social system and social integration. The industrial mode of production is made possible by the technological discoveries. This situation also produces new social ideas and arrangement. This was

[69] This argument has important consequences for the political use of the concept of mode of production. First, it is useful to conceptualise very rare, or long-term changes. Second, the establishment of a new form of integration depends on other variables too. Therefore the ability of the concept of the mode of production to sustain a political movement and to influence everyday political decisions is generally very limited. However, during transition period in which major technological changes are under way, it may be a useful category. And it is possible to claim that the exponential character of the contemporary evolution of technology may increase the frequency of major changes with a deep impact on society. This would tend to give a greater role to this category in normal politics as well. Personally, I am skeptical about this possibility. Within each main technological stage there is the possibility for a vast number of improvements and discoveries which do not change the main character of that stage. Still, to exclude the possibility of such an acceleration would also be a deterministic stand, which is not possible to make on sound basis. Furthermore, if the contemporary technological stage really pushes towards the creation of a global internal market and global democratic institutions, the next changes will not influence the dimension of the economic and political units. But if they push towards a change of the internal structure of the form of integration, this may eventually allow for a change in the dimension of the units as well. The evolution of technology produces a greater division of labour and interdependence only within the market. In the agricultural period, within a different form of integration, it allowed a decrease in interdependence and in the size of the main economic units. This does not seem to be the case today. But it is impossible to exclude this possibility for the future.

expressed even more clearly in 1944: "But if the breakdown of our civilization was timed by the failure of world economy, it was certainly not caused by it. Its origins lay more than a hundred years back in that social and technological upheaval from which the idea of a self-regulating market sprang in Western Europe. The end of this venture has come in our time; it closes a distinct stage in the history of industrial civilization" (Polanyi 1944: 5). Technological development was the cause of the birth of the idea of a self-regulating market, that is of a new form of social arrangement. Notwithstanding these statements, in his theoretical works Polanyi pays little attention to the technological development and concentrates upon the form of integration.

These two elements cannot exist in isolation and Polanyi recognises the interaction of the two aspects (Polanyi 1957: 261). For example he claims that the inventions of machines required the creation of the market. Machines were expensive and to make investments secure the other elements of production necessary for their use were to be always available. Thus emerged the need for a market of labour and of raw materials to ensure the supply of both (Polanyi 1944: 40-41). The influence of technological innovation on the evolution of social organization is clear in this account as in others too. But also looking at ancient modes of production Polanyi stresses that "trade routes, too, as well as means of transportation may be of no less incisive importance for the institutional forms of trade than the types of goods carried. For in all these cases the geographical and technological conditions interpenetrate with the social structure" (Polany 1957: 261). It is this interaction which defines the mode of production.

Polanyi's own expression "industrial civilization" shows that this concept can be seen from two perspectives. The adjective refers to the major role of industry within that productive system, which is due to the technological knowledge acquired in that period. The noun refers to the social arrangements employed together with that technological level. But the technological level which makes industry the most important sector of production may be compatible with different forms of integration. For example the market-based capitalist USA and the communist USSR, were both based on the industrial technology. And they were associated with different political institutions: the liberal democratic state; and the single-party bureaucratic centralised state. This shows that it is not possible to determine precisely the form of political and social units just from the perspective of the evolution of technology. A given technological level may be compatible with different social arrangements. Following Polanyi's own reasoning it becomes clear that the mode of production is related to the technological level. But the mode of production is defined by both the technological level and the social arrangement combined with it. Thus I suggest to

distinguish the capitalist from the socialist form of integration rather than confusing them with a proper mode of production. The USA and the USSR were based on the same technological level, but associated it with different social arrangements.

Polanyi understands this very well: "The choice between capitalism and socialism, for instance, refers to two different ways of instituting modern technology in the process of production". And he emphasises the need to take into account "the interdependence of technology and institutions as well as their relative independence" (Polanyi 1957: 249). This simple statement opens the way for a classification of the mode of production based on both the technological level and the social arrangements associated with it in different places and times. And it also highlights the need to study both aspects in their interaction. It is possible to identify different technological levels, which are considered as modes of production themselves in Gellner's and in Montani's periodizations. But these technological levels can be associated with different social arrangements. The USA and the USSR are a perfect example to understand the importance of these differences. Employing only the technological element to define the mode of production, the USA and the USSR are both part of the industrial mode of production. It may be possible to argue that they were at the start of the post-industrial or scientific mode of production, but this is not a relevant issue at this point. On the contrary using the form of integration as the only criterion to identify a mode of production, they are the examples of two opposite modes of production: the capitalist and the socialist ones, each based on exchange and redistribution as the dominant form of integration. One element is not enough to have a clear picture of the situation, because it highlights only the similarities or only the differences. Only the combined use of both elements can describe effectively the situation from the perspective of the mode of production.

So far I have stressed the differences of the two aspects comprised under the concept of the mode of production. Carried to the extreme this argument may lead to the refusal of the concept itself and to the use of just the two components. But the two elements interact effectively between each other and thus the mode of production as the concept which subsumed both elements and their interaction is still useful. The example of the USA and the USSR shows the usefulness of the concept of mode of production to consider both elements and be able to see both similarities and differences between those two states from a materialist perspective. Furthermore, the identification of the two elements is due to the very definition of the mode of production which focuses on human interaction with nature and with other individuals within society. Hence the need to consider both for a more effective study of empirical reality. Otherwise the mode of

production is equated with just one of its two components and loses part of its heuristic value. The next step is to develop further the analysis of each component to clarify their respective value and uses.

3.2 The "forms of integration"

I will discuss first Polanyi's analysis of the forms of integration, which he based on a comparative historical and interdisciplinary research. The basis of Polanyi's study is the institutionalised character of any stable mode of production. In his terminology a substantive economic system is "an instituted process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want satisfyng material means" (Polanyi 1957: 248; see also 1977: 31).

I have already analysed the issue of men's interaction with nature and with themselves. The key issues now are the concepts "process" and "instituted". The process requires an analysis in terms of movement and change. This is due to the fact that human interaction "can be broken down into two kinds of changes, locational and appropriational, which may go together or not. (…) The locational movement is most clearly illustrated by transportation and production; the appropriational by transactions and dispositions" (Polanyi 1977: 31-32). Actually "locational movements include production, alongside of transportation, to which the spatial shifting of objects is equally essential"; while "the appropriative movement governs both what is usually referred to as the circulation of goods and their administration" (Polanyi 1957: 248). However Polanyi is more interested in their being instituted because the social conditions are the factors which accounts for "the interdependence of the movements and their recurrence on which the unity and the stability of the process depends". In other words "the instituting of the economic process vests that process with unity and stability" (both quotes from Polanyi 1957: 249). Eventually "if the material survival of man were the result of a mere fleeting chain causation – possessing neither definite location in time or space (that is, unity and stability), nor permanent points of reference (that is, structure), nor definite modes of action in regard to the whole (that is, function), nor ways of being influenced by societal goals (that is, policy relevance) – it could never have attained the dignity and importance of the human economy. The properties of unity and stability, structure and function, history and policy accrue to the economy through its institutional vestment. This lays down the foundation for the concept of the human economy as an institutionalized process of interaction which

functions to provide material means in society" (Polanyi 1977: 34)[70]. This last paragraph clarifies why Polanyi's theoretical analysis tends to focus rather on the form of integration than on the technological development in the study of substantive economics or the mode of production. Social institutions define the form of integration: "integration is present in the economic process to the extent that those movements of goods and persons which overcome the effect of space, time, and occupational differentials are institutionalized so as to create interdependence among the movements". Hence "forms of integration thus designate the institutionalized movements through which the elements of the economic process – from material resources and labor to the transportation, storage, and distribution of goods – are connected" (both quotations from Polanyi 1977: 35).

A major difference between Marx and Polanyi is precisely their analysis of social institutions. While Marx attributes logical priority to the economic function of any social institution, Polanyi looks at pre-existing social institutions which may assume also an economic function under given social conditions (Polanyi 1957: 249; on this point see also Gellner 1988: 43 and following)[71]. The clearest example is the family. It may have a crucial economic function within certain modes of production, but it is not just an economic institution. It may be studied also from this materialistic perspective, but this is unlikely to be a sufficient and effective one. And this is true for many social elements which have also an economic function, but which may be considered as "ecological, technological or societal according to whether they belong primarily to the natural environment, the mechanical equipment, or the human setting" (Polanyi 1957: 249). Actually "the human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves" (Polanyi 1957: 250). This is also one of Gellner's main thesis and brings him to investigate the role of political and religious authorities, and not just of producers, within different modes of production (Gellner 1988: 43, 102-103 and 158).

The economic function of different social elements and institutions depends on the form of integration. Polanyi identifies three basic ideal types: reciprocity, redistribution, and

[70] Also Habermas employs this concept which he draws directly from Durkheim. But he does not consider it abstract enough to conceptualise the evolution of society. Therefore he tries to develop the concept of "principle of social organization" or "organizational principle of a society" (Habermas 1976-1991: 153-158). Furthermore, he is looking for a more abstract concept able to be subsumed under a logic of development. This is precisely the operation Polanyi refuses to do with the concept of form of integration.

[71] In these passages Polanyi used "economic" with reference to his concept of substantive economics, that is of mode of production. This is the case throughout this analysis.

exchange (Polanyi 1944: 55; 1957: 250-256; and 1977: 35-37). But they may work together within the same mode of production regulating different areas of activity or social life. Actually whatever is the dominant one, it will probably work better if it is accompanied by the others to regulate some specific fields not suitable to the dominant one (Polanyi 1957: 250-255). The economic order created within the European Union provides a contemporary example. The Single Market is based on the principle of exchange. But it is accompanied by redistribution through the social and the regional funds. And it exploits reciprocity embodied in the legal principle of mutual recognition affirmed by the European Court of Justice. For the time being it is enough to clarify the possibility of coexistence of these three principles within the same society. Later on I will also discuss Polanyi's suggestions to identify the dominant principle within any society.

Polanyi stresses the specific relationships between the forms of integration and the social organisation[72]. Reciprocity requires a symmetric social organisation. Polanyi's analysis of Aboriginals and of ancient civilizations shows the possibility of rather complex economic systems based on reciprocity, provided a symmetric social organization is shared by different groups. Redistribution requires the centralization of the economic and political authority to claim the goods produced and to redistribute them. Obviously the criteria for the redistribution will depend on the dominant ideology of that society: the Soviet one was based on different criteria from the one of the ancient agrarian empires. Finally, exchange requires the market, although not necessarily a self-regulating one[73] (Polanyi 1944: 56; and 1957: 250-251). But the existence of a given social structure does not necessarily imply a given form of integration and vice-versa. For example reciprocity requires symmetric systems often based on kinship. But reciprocity is not enough to create kinship, nor kinship disappears without reciprocity (Polanyi 1957: 251).

Eventually Polanyi adds a fourth form of integration, householding, which is linked with autarchy (Polanyi 1944: 53, 56). Sometimes Polanyi implicitly considered householding as the result of the application of redistribution on a very small scale, such as the family – but not the contemporary atomist family characteristic of the industrial society (Polanyi

[72] This aspect of Polanyi's reasoning seems close to Habermas's already mentioned attempt to identify different "organizational principle of a society" more abstract than the forms of integration, but their uses of the two concepts are very different. It is not the case to review here Polanyi's detailed empirical studies and examples as I am interested in his theoretical developments and generalization. But his 1957 and 1977 books provide much empirical evidence in relation to different case-studies to sustain his claims.

[73] Polanyi's life-long challenge to economic liberalism and the idea of the self-regulated market as a natural, spontaneous order which can be found in any human society is well-known. His distinction of the forms of integration precisely points out the possibility of societies in which the market has a very limited role. This statement runs against a common assumption of most of his contemporary economists. And this was astonishing as the very existence of USSR was a clear empirical evidence of Polanyi's claim. Its economic system was less efficient than a market-economy, still it proved the possibility of an economic system in which the market had little if any significant role.

1957: 254). But this is not correct as it can be associated with different technological levels and different economic units, even large ones, just like the other three forms of integration. The autarchic economic policies of many states after the 1929 crisis show the possibility to organise a nation-state on this principle. Considering the origins of householding, Polanyi recognises the determinant influence of technology to establish the condition of possibilities for this form of integration: "only under a comparatively advanced form of agricultural society is householding practicable, and then, fairly general" (Polanyi 1957: 254; see also 1977: 41-42). This shows at least the influence of technology in determining the productivity of a given economic system and the minimum dimension of an economic and social unit regulated by that form of integration. Eventually, according to the same argument, technology should also determine the ideal dimension of the economic and social unit, that is the dimension which allows the best exploitation and the highest productivity of the technology of the time. This explains Montani's choice to stress the technological aspect of the mode of production in enquiring the problem of the best dimension of the market and of the state. But this second aspect is not easy to be established with certainty as any technological level sets some constraints, but always leaves open a range of options in relation to the dimension of the economic and political units.

All forms of integration are based on institutions which are not concerned with production alone and with an economic motive alone (Polanyi 1944: 56). This explains why "in the absence of any indication of societal conditions from which the motives of the individuals spring, there would be little, if anything, to sustain the interdependence of the movements and their recurrence on which the unity and the stability of the process depends" (Polanyi 1957: 249). On the one hand the "forms of integration are relatively independent of the aims and character of the governments, as well as of the ideals and ways of the cultures in question" (Polanyi 1977: 36). This statement is also an indispensable methodological assumption. If they were not - at least relatively – independent, it would be impossible to study them as forms of integration and not as the result of those other factors. On the other hand it is impossible to determine empirically one form of integration without looking at these aspects as well, which cannot be studied from the perspective of the mode of production. Again the USSR will provide a useful example. The communist ideology is necessary to explain the kind of redistribution that took place in the USSR[74].

[74] Here is a fundamental difference between Polanyi and Marx, Habermas and most Marxists. Polanyi's recognition of the USSR as an example of the form of integration of redistribution, which characterised many ancient empires, excludes the possibility to conceptualise a logic of development of the forms of integration. Socialism is not a new form of integration, but a different application of an old one. This is precisely the opposite of Habermas hope "to classify, according to evolutionary features, the forms of social integration determined by principles of social organization" (1976-1991: 154).

And political realism is needed to understand the relative priority conceded to military research and production over other goods. But different choices are possible. The ancient agrarian empires were also based on a highly centralized redistributive system. But the dominant ideology was different and sustained very diverse criteria for the redistribution of the available goods. This is the reason why Polanyi maintains most economic systems are embedded in society, and heavily influenced by its culture and values[75]. And his attack against the idea of a self-regulating market is due to the fact that such a system has the peculiarity of subordinating society to the economic system (Polanyi 1944: 56-57).

On this issue it is useful to summarise briefly Polanyi's famous analysis of the advent of the industrial era in Britain. This brought the development of the self-regulating market. The first attempts to establish it provoked enormous social problems and subverted the priority of society over economics. Eventually society managed to defend itself by regulating the markets of the three most important factors of production: labour, land and money. Polanyi defines the first two "fictitious commodities" since they are men and nature. The self-regulated market did not guarantee them enough; hence the development of social legislation throughout the late XIX century up to the development of the contemporary welfare state (Polanyi 1944 is entirely dedicated to these issues). This account emphasises once more the two aspects of men's material existence: the interaction among people and with nature. Hence "dominance of a form of integration is here identified with the degree to which it comprises land and labor in society" " (Polanyi 1957: 255; see also 1977: 43). This is essential to realise the partial retreat of the market occurred in the XX century which otherwise may be seen only as the time of the affirmation of market economy against concurrent systems. This is only part of the picture as the western model actually includes a great deal of regulation especially in relation to these two elements: labour and nature.

Polanyi also challenges Hayek's idea that the market is a spontaneous order. Actually he refused the idea that any form of integration can simply be the result of individual behaviours[76]. He claims that "the integrative effect was conditioned by the presence of definite institutional arrangements, such as symmetrical organizations, central points and market systems, respectively. But such arrangements seem to represent a mere

[75] This claim also supports the proposal of a tripartite framework. Hints at this idea can be found in Polanyi's works, but have not been developed by the author.

[76] This issue will be reconsidered in discussing Montani's analysis of the mode of production. He emphasises the technological aspect and considered it as an example of a spontaneous order in Hayek's sense, as the results of individual actions. It will be important to consider Polanyi's and Montani's conclusion about each element of the mode of production to understand their interaction and the way to use these concepts in relation to different issues.

aggregate of the same personal patterns the eventual effects of which they are supposed to condition. The significant fact is that mere agregate of the personal behavior in question do not by themselves produce such structures" (Polanyi 1957: 251). With reference to the market he believes that "exchange, as a form of integration, is dependent on the presence of market system, an institutional pattern which, contrary to common assumptions, does not originate in random actions of exchange" (Polanyi 1977: 37). Polanyi analyses the role and function of the market in different ancient societies and within the western world throughout history. He emphasises the limits different societies always imposed on exchange and market, and the absence of any intrinsic tendency of the market to expand or to impose itself, before the industrial revolution.

His analysis includes also the other forms of integration. Thus Polanyi concludes that "only in a symmetrically organized environment will reciprocative attitudes result in economic institutions of any importance; only where centers have been established beforehand can the cooperative attitude of individuals produce a redistributive economy; and only in the presence of markets instituted to that purpose will the bartering attitude of individuals result in prices that integrate the economic activities of the community" (Polanyi 1977: 38). He is maintaing the prevalence of society and culture over the individual in regulating the world: "the supporting structures, their basic organization, and their validation spring from the societal sphere" (Polanyi 1977: 37). While the theoretical argument may seem circular and partially tautological it highlights a deep insight. A mode of production or a material economic system may depend on kinship, but the latter exists independently of the former. And the relationship between economics and politics – which is another aspect of society - appears even more clearly in relation to the creation of the market. The European national markets were created by the states during the mercantilist period. The creation of the European Single Market required so much legislation that in order to establish it according to their own schedule, the member states had to give up their veto power and to accept qualified majority voting on that issue within the Council of Ministers of the European Community (this view is quite common in the academic literature on the subject; see for instance Moravcsik 1991, and 1998, ch. 5; and Weiler 1999). Generally the link between market and political institutions was clear for many liberal economists such as Robbins (1937: ch. IX) and Einaudi (1943-1986 and 1947-1986) although it is often forgotten by contemporary neo-liberal authors.

Although the form of integration is linked with political institutions and social values, it has an autonomous value. Therefore in order to study the society from the perspective of substantial economics or the mode of production Polanyi maintains the

value of the "classification according to dominant form of integration" (Polanyi 1957: 255)[77], but ruling out the possibility of considering them from an evolutionary perspective: "in any case forms of integration do not represent 'stages' of development. No sequence in time is implied. Several subordinate forms may be present alongside of the dominant one, which may itself recur after a temporary eclipse" (Polanyi 1957: 256; and 1977: 42-43). This conclusion is theoretically sound: once again the existence of the USSR showed the possibility of associating the form of production of redistribution, which was quite common in ancient times, with the industrial technology. And this shows the possibility that a form of integration may dominate in one period and then decline and be rediscovered later on. This excludes any deterministic stand about the sequence of the forms of integration[78]. And this explains Polanyi's critique of Marx. Marxist and communists did not try to predict the next development of the means of production, but of the form of integration. They predicted the self-destruction of the market and the coming about of a dominant redistributive form of integration. But Polanyi's studies, and the Soviet experience, bring much evidence about the impossibility of such an intellectual operation due to the limited number of basic forms of integration so far and their recurrence in different societies at different times.

It is now possible to summarise Polanyi's theoretical results. Like Marx he gives prevalence to the relations of production within the mode of production. He emphasises the social character of most institutions which have also economic functions, but which cannot be studied only form the perspective of substantial economics or the mode of production. Thus he abandons one deterministic element of historical materialism. Polanyi also develops the concept of form of integration and identifies four different ideal types of them. Still he recognises their coexistence in most societies, and admits the influence of

[77] This issue is crucial because it will help to partly undermine Polanyi's previous analysis and his refusal of the concept of "spontaneous order". Gellner is partly aware of this paradox. On the one hand he claims that new orders are often spontaneous – if they were the result of a conscious plan, the pre-existing dominant elements of society would form an irresistible coalition to stop the change (Gellner 1988: 253). And once the new order is established it will be irresistible because of its strength (Gellner 1988: 159-160, 200, 204). On the other hand he also claims that the market rests on political institutions which cannot be the result of individual actions, but requires a plan (Gellner 1988: 180-189). Montani offers a useful solution of the paradox. A spontaneous order may appear in the transition period, but it will then require the creation of political institutions suitable to its maintenance and consolidation to survive (Montani 1999: 76-81). I will come back to this point later on in this chapter.

[78] Polanyi's refusal of any possibility of identyfying a logic series of the forms of integration is explicit. Still Gellner offers the opposite interpretation and attributes it to Polanyi (Gellner 1988: 19, 180). Furthermore, Gellner has to drop out the concept of autarchy, which would not fit his historical series. This is due to the fact that Gellner, just like Polanyi, is interested in the internal organization of societies. But, just like Montani, he is interested in suggesting an evolutionary view of the past. Therefore he ends up applying the evolutionary view to the forms of integration, although not in terms of progress with a pre-determined end (Gellner 1988: 247-249). The following analysis will show that an evolutionary view is possible only in relation to the means of production but not to the forms of integration as explained by Polanyi.

political and cultural factors upon them. He also refuses to consider them as spontaneous orders resulting from individual actions. Finally, he rejects the possibility of a deterministic view of the sequence of the forms of integration and thus of the modes of production too. To assess properly the usefulness and the limits of these views it is necessary to consider the other main component of the mode of production, and its influence on, and interaction with, the forms of integration.

3.3 The evolution of the means of production

The concept of means of production has many different features from that of the form of integration. I have already pointed out that in his historical accounts Polanyi gives prevalence to the technological aspect, for example when examining the development of the industrial revolution and its consequences on the form of integration up to the emergence of the idea of the self-regulated market (1944: 5, 33, 40-41, 73-75; 1977: xlviii-li). And he also recognises the interaction of the evolution of technology with the form of integration at both historical and theoretical level (1957: 261; 1977: xlv). On this basis it is possible to analyse the concept of means of production itself in more detail to understand its heuristic qualities.

The first element is the identification of the means of production with technology. Polanyi identifies clearly the concept of production with the interaction made by a combination of goods. And he recalls Menger's "distinction between goods of a 'lower' and a 'higher' order" (Polanyi 1977: 33) on the basis of their ability to satisfy human needs directly or indirectly. And "production stems from the difference between the goods of a 'lower' order and those of a 'higher' order – a technological fact of the substantive economy" - and "the preminence of labor as a factor of production is due to the circumstance that labor is the most general agent among all goods of the 'higher order' " (Polanyi 1977: 33). With specific reference to production he claims that "it can no more be physically detached from the ecological, technological, and societal tissue which forms its background" (Polanyi 1977: 33-34). The social element is studied through the concept of form of integration. The environmental situation is given at any moment, but can be changed through the technological instruments people create to interact with, and change, nature. Technology is thus the essential component of the means of production[79], and it is

[79] Today the word "technology" recalls computers and robots. But at a theoretical level it includes all human knowledge applied to production and the objects people create to produce. For instance the plough is an

part of the productive process together with the form of integration as they define human interaction with nature and among themselves.

Montani focuses almost exclusively on the means of production on the explicit basis of one view of the mode of production suggested by Marx and Engels: "a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage" (Marx and Engels 1846-1976: 43). This passage implicitly equates the mode of production with the means of production. I have pointed out already that the expression "industrial", referred to an economic phase or a mode of production, is based on a distinction and periodization based on the evolution of technology and the following dominant sector in the productive process. Montani accepts that this is always linked to what Polanyi called a form of integration, or to given social relations of production. But the first element is considered as the independent variable, that is as the main analytical element. This brought him to underestimate the form of integration in his analysis. This appears quite clearly when he applies the concept and claims that "the contemporary world economy is thus a spontaneous order, because national governments are forced to follow the rules dictated by the evolution of the productive forces" (Montani 1999: 33; my translation). I will come back shortly to the issue of the spontaneous order and the possibility to consider the evolution of technology, and eventually of modes of production as spontaneous orders. For the time being it is important to emphasise the implicit equation between mode of production and productive forces, that is means of production, which again does not take into account the concept of relations of production and forms of integration.

The emphasis on the means of production is necessary to conceive an evolution of the modes of production. This is recognised by Polanyi himself: "technological progress is cumulative and unbounded, but economic organization is not. There are only a few general ways in which the economy may be organized" (Polanyi 1957: xviii). Polanyi wishes to refuse the idea of an evolution of the modes of production. Therefore he focuses on the forms of integration which are a few and may recur in different eras, characterised by different technological levels. This way he is right in refusing Marx's idea of the economic stages in relation to capitalism and socialism, that is to the forms of integration. And he is also able to challenge Hayek's view of the market as a spontaneous order (Hayek 1967-1978: 99-100, 164; 1976-1979 ch. 10, especially 107-109, 115-117; 1978: 11, 90-91). On the contrary technological progress, being cumulative and unbounded, can be seen in terms

essential technological object which embodies a great deal of knowledge at the basis of agriculture, and which distinguishes different modes of production (on this issue see Cipolla 1962-1965: 18, 43-44, 112).

of successive phases[80]. Being cumulative each phase requires the previous one, and it is possible to conceptualise them in terms of an evolution. At the same time it is impossible to predict the future because it is unbounded too. This also poses the problem of the (ir)reversibility of the mode of production when analysed from the perspective of the means of production, which will be addressed later on in this chapter.

This explains why Montani explicitly refers to the theory of stages of development which points out that "some institutions are born from individual's actions, whose immediate aim was not the specific creation of collective institutions" (Montani 1999: 73 – my translation, see also 72-77; and 2001: 12-13). Montani makes specific references to the Scottish philosopical and economic tradition, to List[81], and obviously to the Austrian School and Hayek. Hayek himself, in his refinement of the concept of spontaneous order, always attributes its origin to Mandeville and the Scottish philosophical tradition, (Hayek 1949: 7-13; 1967-1978: 77, 84, 86, 94, 99, 103, 108; 1973-1979: 20, 22; 1978: 135, and the whole ch. 15). The concept of spontaneous order is at the centre of Hayek's theoretical reflections. In Hayek's words the basic insight is "that many institutions on which human achievements rest have arisen and are functioning without a designing and directing mind; that, as Adam Ferguson expressed it, 'nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action but not the result of human design' " (Hayek 1949: 7).

In his analysis of the concept of spontaneous order and of the philosophical tradition which first defined it, Hayek is very keen to refuse some distorted interpretation. Just like Robbins, he stresses that liberalism has nothing to do with anarchism, and claims that the Scottish philosophers did not believe " that there existed some original harmony of interests irrespective of those grown institutions" (Hayek 1967-1978: 100-101; and very similar statements are in Hayek 1949: 13, 16-17; and 1960-1976: 60-61, 162). They simply developed an evolutionary theory to explain the origin of spontaneous orders and of certain forms of conduct, such as traditions and institutions, which embody accumulated and shared knowledge selected by success and mutual adjustment (Hayek 1960-1976: 27-30, 57-63).

At the basis of Hayek's emphasis on the importance of spontaneous order, or cosmos, as opposed to designed organization, or taxis (Hayek returns many times to this terminological distinction: see especially Hayek 1973-1979: ch 2; and 1978: ch 6), is the

[80] A convincing analysis of this issue is offered by Cipolla (1962-1965: 18, 43-44, 49, 108 and 112); and Gellner (1988: 17, 117). Gellner's analysis is particularly sound as it points out that while technological progress was always cumulative, only with the industrial revolution it also becomes exponential. And this is now its peculiar character, which is due to cultural and productive factors together.

[81] A useful analysis of these authors is also in Meek 1976. Montani examines List's thought in relation to these issues also in Montani 1986, ch. 4, pp. 66-86.

recognition of the limits of human reason and knowledge (Hayek 1949: 91; 1960-1976: 22, 24, 25, 26; 1967-1978: 90-92, 115; 1973-1979: 11-15; 1976-1979: 11-12; 1978: ch. 2, and 71). Society is too complex for any individual to know all relevant facts necessary to draft a careful plan for the organization of the whole society. This does not exclude that any individual, and also collective bodies do make calculations and plan: "all economic activity is in this sense planning. (…) This is not a dispute about whether planning is to be done or not. It is a dispute as to whether planning is to be done centrally, by one authority for the whole economic system, or is to be divided among many individuals" (Hayek 1949: 78-79). As Robbins points out "it was the aim of the liberal plan to create a framework within which private plans might be harmonized" (Robbins 1937: 7). But since "planning" is too often used for "central planning" Hayek decided "that it was too late to vindicate the word for its legitimate uses. (…) I directed my criticisms simply against 'planning' " (Hayek 1967-1978: 82-83).

Hayek is well aware that "where it is a question of using limited resources known to the organiser in the service of a unitary hierarchy of ends, an arrangement or organization (*taxis*) will be the more effective method. But where the task involves using knowledge dispersed among and accessible only to thousands or millions of separate individuals, the using of spontaneous ordering forces (*cosmos*) will be superior" (Hayek 1978: 76). This is particularly the case in the analysis of the different modes of production, which is the focus of this chapter. Thus it is not surprising that Gellner and Montani accept Hayek's notion of spontaneous order as made by men, but not on the basis of a plan and apply it to the modes of production (Gellner 1988: 20; and Montani 1999: 72-77).

Gellner claims that "the two very great transitions – the neolithic and the industrial revolutions - cannot plausibly be attributed to conscious human design and plan. (…) This point in no way applies to the subsequent *diffusion* of a new social order, once established and successful in one location" (Gellner 1988: 20). Gellner analyses the transition from the agrarian to the industrial society, and suggests that if it was planned it would have encountered the resistance of the most powerful groups of the existing order, which may lose that position in the new one (Gellner 1988: 253-257). Hence "the tacit compact governing our social order, the commitment to certain rules of productive, political and conceptual comportment which had made that order possible, could never have been a real *compact*. It would have gone against the grain, against the rational interests of participants, who were not yet imbued with the spirit of this order. (…) *We had to be tricked into it*. We

may see this as the cunning of reason or as a concatenation of accidents" (Gellner 1988: 257)[82].

New social orders are not planned. At the same time, they are not necessarily built in the previous one: "there is no series of manifest and inevitable stages, allegedly exemplifying the same principle, both in the mechanics of their succession and in their gradual approximation to excellence. Radical discontinuities and transformations do indeed occur: but they are not inevitable. They are not inscribed into the very essence of the earlier form" (Gellner 1988: 248). Gellner_supports an evolutionary view of human history, and maintains that the specific aspect of his view is that it "is distinctively historical: the *sequence* or order in which new important elements are added to the model is a matter of recorded or surmised fact, not just of logical convenience. Food production, political centralization, the division of labour, literacy, science, intellectual liberalization, appear in a certain historic sequence. They do so because some at least of the later developments in human history seem to presuppose the earlier ones, and could not have preceded them. (…) The theorist of human society cannot introduce them in any order at will. Some changes are at least relatively irreversible: agriculture, centralization, literacy, science can of course disappear in areas where they were once established, and occasionally such regressions do occur; but by and large, there does seem to be a kind of overall cumulativeness" (Gellner 1988: 13-14). However, "to say that history does contain steps, such that the earlier ones are preconditions of the later ones, is not to say that the earlier ones necessitate the later ones. It does not mean that the development is predetermined or predictable. There is no reason to suppose that all possibilities are fulfilled, or that the actual development was uniquely necessary" (Gellner 1988: 15).

The fact that there is no room for historical determinism in Gellner's view does not imply a refusal to see that once a new unplanned order is successfully established it will spread out rapidly. For instance the strength of the industrial civilization in expanding itself by conquest or emulation is clear: "it does so because all those outside it are eager to emulate it, and if they are not, which rarely happens, their consequent weakness allows them to be easily overrun. The prevalent eagerness in turn is so strong just because the new order plainly 'works', i.e. it is the key to a technology which confers unparalleled economic and military power, incomparably greater than that ever granted to other civilizations, to

[82] The importance of the concept of spontaneous order also on the sphere of international politics may be recognised looking at the emergence of a successful international hegemon. All clear attempts by a European state to acquire hegemony has usually been checked by great coalitions. On the contrary, the filling up of power vacuums by the strongest state opposing the hegemonic attempt have succeded and brought about first the British and then the American hegemony. Althoug it is not formulated in explicit terms this idea returns many times in Dehio's analysis of modern history (Dehio 1948-1963).

their visions. So its superiority, in one sense, is not open to doubt. The question is – can that superiority be explained and vindicated by its own favoured theory?" (Gellner 1988: 200). The birth of the industrial society was not bound to be in the West. The task of the scholar "is to explain the circuitous and near-miracolous routes by which agrarian mankind has, *once only*, hit on this path; (…) he must counter the ethnocentric narrowness of those thinkers who, born among latterday beneficiaries of the unique situation, naively take it for granted, and talk as if it had been ever with us as a human birthright" (Gellner 1988: 204).

It is at this point that Gellner and Hayek split. One of Gellner's polemical targets is precisely the vision of the market as a spontaneous order and of the tendency to barter as an ever-present tendency of human beings. On this issue Gellner explicitly sides with Polanyi against Hayek: "the generalized market was made possible by a mild technological expansion which in turn, initially, favoured a further expansion of the market and technological growth. But the very powerful technology eventually also came to presuppose an enormous, indivisible, inherently shared and_collective infrastructure. This in turn reduced the social role of the market. During the first economic miracle, the required infrastructure happened to be ready and available, by an historic accident[83]. This is no loger so: the infrastructure that is now presupposed has grown so enormously, and can no longer be generated spontaneously. Nor can it itself be run or maintained in a market manner, and it cannot be set up without conscious design" (Gellner 1988: 181; see also 180-189, and 278).

On this issue Montani joins Gellner and departs himself from Hayek[84]. Montani develops in explicit theoretical terms what Gellner has suggested from a historical perspective. Montani considers historical materialism as a useful ideal type to look at the individual material behaviours necessary to reproduce the existing society, which may

[83] The concept of historic accident may seem a weak explanatory one. Polanyi in his historical analyses (1944: 40-41, 55, 62-67, especially 65), and Montani also at a theoretical level (1999: 55, 58-62) propose a different explanation based on a different periodization of the modes of production. They suggest a sequence which includes the mercantile mode of production characterised by the emergence of the modern state and its creation of higly regulated internal markets and the development of mercantilist policies. From this perspective, the existence of the state infrastructure and of internal markets at the time of the first industrial revolution is not just a historical accident, but the result of a previous development of the mode of production.

[84] Montani is not involved in a philological study on Hayek. He is trying to develop useful analytical instruments to understand reality. From this perspective it is perfectly acceptable to try to identify the analitycally useful insight of all authors, leaving aside other aspects of their thought. Montani states explictly what he takes, and what he refuses and offers a coherent framework for the use of the e concept of spontaneous order. He employs it differently from Hayek, and more similarly to the classic tradition of thought which first offered some hints to that concept. And, just like Polanyi and Gellner, Montani challenges Hayek's idea that the market is a spontaneous order. He draws on classic liberal economists such as Robbins and to the example of European economic integration and particularly to the creation of a European Single Market, to show the link between political institutions and legislation on the one hand and the creation and maintainance of the market on the other (Montani 1999: 87-88; 2001: 54-59).

produce new spontaneous orders. Furthermore, Montani considers spontaneous orders as transitory and reversible achievements. Therefore the concept of spontaneous order is particularly suitable to study transition periods. But to become stable a spontaneous order needs the establishment of a public authority and its sanctions (Montani 1999: 76-81; a similar insight, although in less explicit terms is in Habermas 1976-1991: 147-148). This was the conclusion reached by Gellner too: "this infrastructure is not, and cannot be, spontaneously generated, but needs constant attention and servicing, unlike its predecessor at the time of the inception of the new world. The state is now largely the name for the cluster of agencies that perform this role" (Gellner 1988: 278). In relation to the market Polanyi (1944: 62-67; 1977: 37), Robbins (1937: ch. IX), Gellner (1988: 129-130, 178-189) and Montani (1999: 80-82) offer similar analyses: the market requires an order which can only be maintained by the state; hence the market requires the state. It was first created by the state, and it is regulated and de-regulated by the state.

This insight is quite close to Polanyi's claim that only the form of integration, that is the "institutional vestment", gives unity, resilience and meaning to a given mode of production, or more precisely, to a given stage in the development of the means of production, thus making it a new mode of production. Eventually on this basis Polanyi got more interested in the institutionalization of the mode of production. He identifies a limited number of ideal types of forms of integration, which can not be considered as a sequence, or as phases of a linear progressive development. Montani on the contrary is interested in the transition periods, as he tries to identify the heuristic instruments to study globalization. Therefore he focuses on the evolution of the means of production and on the successive spontaneous orders that they create.

Due to the cumulative character of technological progress, it is possible to think about a given logic of development. But it must be clear that it is not possible to indicate the inevitability of this development, or the impossibility for a given society to skip a given phase, or the prospect of unlimited progress excluding any possibility of a reversal (Gellner 1988: 13-15; and also Montani 1999: 92-95). There may be a number of specific elements, often of a geographic character, which may produce those outcomes. For example, part of the inhabitants of some Pacific islands who were already employing agriculture moved to a new island whose geographical character was not suitable to agriculture. They "went back" to the "appropriative mode of production" and introduced a tight system of population control to maintain it within the limits sustainable by that mode of production. On the other hand the contact between the European industrial mode of production due to the European imperialist policies brought some countries to skip the "mercantile mode of

production"[85]. The point is that this can happen for specific societies under specific conditions. The ideal type of the stages is based on the first society to overcome the previous one. And as the world becomes more interdependent there may be a tendency for the most advanced technological level to spread out. Once it has reached all parts of the world, the next level will probably spread around rapidly all over the world. In other words, there is a tendency for the most advanced technological level to spread to the areas with which the most technologically advanced society enters into contacts. And that society has also the greatest capabilities to enter into contact – peacefully or forcefully – with others. Thus it becomes the vehicle of the new technology and generally of its social arrangements too (Cipolla 1962-1965: 101-104; and especially Gellner 1988: 19-21, 200, 204, 277). The dimension and degree of interdependence is a crucial factor in determining the possibility for a society to resist the adoption of the most advanced technological level, if it is to survive as an independent group[86].

At the same time each new technological level produces new problems[87]. The success of a given form of integration in managing a new technological phase is precisely due to its ability to tackle the new issues for which the old institutional system may not have been suitable. This does not imply that any significant change in the technological level always requires a change in the form of integration. This may be necessary only if and when the previous one proves unable to cope with the new challenges. Eventually the resilience of the existing institutional order may prove very strong and a new one may not emerge until the new problems become acute and develop into a crisis, or may not emerge at all. This implies either an evolution of the old institutional system to maintain its fundamental character, but creating the instruments to face, and eventually solve, the new

[85] The possibility to identify a specific mercantile mode of production is often contested. Montani and others preferred to consider it as a specific ideal type of the modes of production on the basis of the creation of the single or internal national markets, which is characteristic of the mercantile period.

[86] This is clear from a realist perspective and the European imperialist wars are clear evidence of this point. A deep consciousness of this issue underlies Barraclough's useful analysis of this aspect of world history and its role in bringing non-European countries to the centre of world politics and history (Barraclough 1967-1990).

[87] This concept is stressed by Habermas as system problems or crises. The need to solve these crises requires the identification of new ideas and solutions. Thus the role of culture in transition period is linked with the existence of crises (1976-1991: 98, 124). The same insight was used by Albertini. On this basis he develops the basic elements of a tripartite framework to analyse the European unification process. He suggests that after the Second World War the mode of production and the international situation required large economic and political units. The European nation-states were too small from this perspective. Hence the emergence of crises on specific problems which required common solutions. He then claims that the federalist movements role was to suggest integrative steps to solve those problems since normal politicians would tend to stick to the means available to them, that is to the national government, or to international cooperation, rather than creating new supranational institutions and policies. At this point the proposal could be accepted if an important European political leader understood that this was the way to solve that problem – and hence to enhance its own power – and managed to build a wide coalition on that issue. This scheme adopts the concept of crisis to explain the timing of different steps in the European unification process, while identifying also the role of ideas and power in bringing about the main changes (Albertini 1966-1999b).

problems, or the impossibility to solve them. In this last case a reversal of the mode of production is possible[88].

A clear example – but not the only one - is the current international order and its inability to make a nuclear war impossible. Such an event may happen, and the international institutional system has no instrument to ensure its impossibility, notwithstanding the fact that it is an unlikely event, since it is in nobody's interest. A nuclear war may produce an enormous devastation of the environment and leave alive only a very limited number of human beings, if any. This could imply the reversal of the mode of production. It is an extreme example, but it is within the realm of possible events. And it will remain so until a new institutional system capable of making it impossible comes about, if it will. More generally a new mode of production generally poses new challenges, which mankind has to cope with. The emergence of nuclear weapons and of globalization – which can be considered as results of the scientific mode of production – is just this new challenge. Previous technological level could not allow a war to be so destructive as to endanger human survival. Today the problem is simply more acute and involves more people than in the past as it does not regard just one society, that is a part of the world, but the whole human population.

This was very clear to Polanyi as well. Considering the industrial mode of production he writes: "by all counts, this new civilization (…) should be expected to continue over a long period. It has come to stay. It is our fate. We must learn to live with it, if we are to live at all" (Polanyi 1977: xlviii). This sentence shows the scholar's tension. On the one hand he always refuses very clearly any sort of determinism and even the possibility of thinking about a logic of development of the modes of production, especially with reference to the forms of integration. Therefore he writes that it "should be expected to continue over a long period". But when he looks at this development from a technological perspective he tends to emphasise the difficulty to reverse the evolution of the means of production. Hence the industrial civilization "is our fate". And he realises that it poses new problems, which challenge mankind survival: "we must learn to live with it, if we are to live at all".

The reversal of technological innovation, and thus also of a mode of production is very unlikely although not impossible. The reversal of the contemporary one seems only the possible result of a nuclear or environmental catastrophe, or of the exhaustion of the energy sources before having developed appropriate instruments to exploit renewable

[88] Later on - after having analysed the link between evolution of the mode of production and evolution of the market in the modern era - I will come back to this issue in relation to the emergence of a global market in the late XIX and early XX century (Hirst and Thompson 1996) and its reversal.

sources. Polanyi was well aware of these new problems - which characterised the advanced industrial society, according to Gellner (1988: 17), or the post-industrial one according to Montani (1999: 56) - when he wrote "such an event trascends by far the economic field; only time will unfold its powers and perils and spell out its implications for the existence of man" (1977: xlviii) and concludes that "today the underlying concern is not for equality, justice, charity, and a humane life for the laborer, but rather for the freedom and survival of all" (1977: li) because nuclear energy creates new moral and political problems about the very existence of mankind, thus "no longer economic progress and welfare, but peace and freedom become man's supreme aims" (1977: xlv)[89]. This idea is shared by many other authors considered in this research (Cipolla 1962-1965: 80-82; Gellner 1988: 224; Einaudi 1948a-1986 and 1948b-1986; Toynbee 1948: 27-28, 115-116, 135-137) and is similar to the main thesis of one of the founding document of European federalism, the Ventotene Manifesto: "the dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of more or less democracy, or the pursuit of more or less socialism, but the division falls along a very new and substantive line: those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of the struggles as being the ancient one, the conquest of national political power and those who see the main purpose as the creation of a solid international State" (Spinelli and Rossi 1941-1998: 8). The need to set new political goals to answer structural challenges posed by the evolution of technology confirms Gellner's claim "that the economic or productive base does indeed determine our problems, but that it does *not* determine our solutions" (Gellner 1988: 19). There may be different responses to a given challenge, and the catastrophe is one of them.

So far I have excluded the possibility of predicting an unlimited progress or the impossibility of a reversal of the mode of production. The next step is to exclude the possibility of predicting future developments. If anyone knew what the new technological discoveries would be, this would mean that they would have been invented already. That is, they would be part of the current situation and not of the future. Thus it is also impossible to identify the kind of new problems which new technological discoveries may bring about. And this makes it impossible to identify *a priori* the best institutional system or form of integration suitable for the future once and for all. Still it is possible to analyse the present situation to identify the new problems linked with the new scientific mode of production and the kind of institutional system best suited to cope with them. However, this last

[89] Also less dramatic technological innovations may have deep impact on society and international relations in particular. The invention of the airplane almost destroyed British insularity in the Second World War. Contemporary balistic missiles may in the future endanger American insularity (Dehio 1948-1963: 206, 240, 264).

operation will always require a normative standpoint. Any system has both virtues and shortcomings and it is possible to appreciate more the former or the latter only on the basis of a value judgement.

In other words, the fact that technological progress is cumulative only allows the researcher to look at the past to elaborate some ideal types, as if the past followed a linear logic of development[90]. But this does not imply that each society necessarily had to pass through each single stage or ideal type - provide the first society did, otherwise it is impossible to develop an ideal type of a specific phase which nobody has passed through - nor makes it possible to predict the future. The identification of different ideal types of the mode of production, which mainly consist of a periodization of the different modes of production or economic phases as if they were part of a linear development, is common to many historians and economists alike. Again I will mainly consider Polanyi and Montani's ones.

I have noticed already that Polanyi focuses more on the forms of integration. However he cannot avoid to approach the issue of the evolution of technology when considering the modes of production. Therefore he offers his own periodization and a clear statement about technology as the basic criteria to distinguish different phases: "first, the Neolithic; second, the period of plough agriculture in which almost all history happened; third, the brand-new machine age. All along, technology provided the criterion" (Polanyi 1977: xlviii). Gellner also employs the same periodization in his book on the structure of human history (Gellner 1988: 16, 275; the same in Cipolla 1962-1965: 107). Polanyi initially identifies only three ideal types of modes of production, but then, in his analysis of the different case studies, he also distinguishes between the feudal and the mercantile societies. The first rests within the agricultural mode of production, while the second is characterised by the emergence of the nation-state and its successful attempt to create the domestic national market (Polanyi 1944: ch. 5).

I have already pointed out that Montani identifies five ideal types of modes of production: the appropriative, the agricultural, the mercantile, the industrial, and the scientific ones (Montani 1999: 55-62). The last three are his main concern as they characterised modern history (Montani 1999: 17). This periodization implies a refusal of the distinction between a capitalist and a socialist mode of production, based on the rejection of the property of the means of production as the main criteria. Just as the

[90] Habermas stressed the usefulness of assuming a "logic of development" but employing it in a non-deterministic fashion (1976-1991: 139-142). He also proposes a comparison between those applying to the creation of personal and collective identities, which go from the small and empirical ones to the universal and abstract ones. Thus an abstract cosmopolitan identity can be taken as the final point of the development of human identity (1976-1991: 103-104, 114-116).

collapse of the USSR shows, at least for the time being, that the socialist mode of production, or more precisely, the socialist form of integration, is not the next stage which is going to be established after the eventual self-destruction of the capitalist one (Montani 1999: 62-71; and 2001: 46-47).

The point again is to identify the criteria to offer a useful periodization. Considering only the evolution of the means of production it is probably more coherent to identify three or four modes of production. The first three are the "appropriative", the "agricultural" and the "industrial" ones. Cipolla suggests that the main difference between each one is the ability to produce, transform, move and store energy (1962-1965: ch. 2). Mankind started using only the energy contained in animals and vegetables and transformed through eating. Then we learnt to raise animals and fruits and to employ them in different ways. In this period we also learnt to use some sorts of solar energy, such as water and wind through the mill. Eventually we learnt to use the energy from minerals and to employ sophisticated instruments to transform one kind of energy into another physical, mechanical, chemical. But that period also started the consumption of exhaustible energy sources which mankind had allowed to be created in thousands of years[91]. From this perspective the often employed distinction between first and second, or early and late, period within the industrial mode of production (Gellner 1988: 17) may be considered as the shift from coal to oil as the main energy source. However, from this perspective it would be coherent to consider this shift as internal to the industrial mode of production as it always relates to exhaustible sources. At this point the invention of nuclear energy can be considered as a new step and as the start of the post-industrial or scientific mode of production. It is true that this is not yet the most employed source of energy in contemporary world. And it may never be if other inexhaustible sources are discovered. But the discovery of this new kind of energy has already produced such military consequences to radically alter the social situation of mankind and challenge human survival[92].

Cipolla also suggests that "the three basic types of economic organization – hunting, agricultural, industrial – are accompanied by three corresponding ranges of

[91] Eventually, either mankind is able to identify and employ renewable energy sources or the exhaustion of the available sources may bring about a reversal of the mode of production (Cipolla 1962-1965:54-55).

[92] So much so, that it made possible the collapse of the USSR without an attempt to externalise its crisis through a military conflict as realist theory would have expected in similar situations during previous modes of production. And this also challenges Gilpin's theory of systemic change, which attributes a major role to hegemonic war. The latter are now difficult to be conceived in rational terms. Either future systemic change occurs through hegemonic cold wars, or the life on the Earth is at great risk. The alterative is to find different ways to think and act to achieve systemic change.

economic and demographic levels at which human societies operate" (1961-1965: 107)[93]. This important insight suggests to link significant shifts in human population with the changes of the modes of production, and also to study the dimension of human societies, that is of the main productive units. This second view is the most interesting one in relation to international systems change and will be analysed in more detail.

The dimension of productive units is linked to the kind and level of interdependence and productivity[94] which characterised the different periods. From this perspective, Montani's distinction of five modes of production is useful. It includes the mercantile and the post-industrial modes of production precisely in relation to the change of dimension of the market caused by technological changes. Actually, this line of argument would require at least a sixth period, to explain the development of small units after the emergence of many great ancient empires during the agricultural mode of production. Eventually Polanyi has offered an explanation from a materialistic perspective when he looked at the coming about of householding as a new form of integration which derived from the application of redistribution – characteristic of great empires - to small units. He claimed that this was possible in a second, or late, agricultural period due to the technological innovations which increased agricultural productivity and made viable small units of production.

The problem is that technological innovation is cumulative and continuous. Therefore it is difficult to identify sharp breaks. There is a general consensus about two such breaks: the agricultural and the industrial revolution. But within the agricultural and the industrial stages many authors distinguish between early and late phases. Others prefer to consider one, or more of these periods as separate stages or modes of production. There

[93] From a demographic perspective Cipolla suggests the existence of a stabilizing mechanism of human population which brings a given society to a proper equilibrium, given the current potential of the mode of production. Accordingly the "appropriative" societies were characterised by both high birth and death rates. The "agricultural" revolution allowed a great increase of human population. After a while "agricultural" societies stabilized themselves and on average they had higher birth than death rates. But occasionally they were shocked by an extremely high death rate which produced a sudden and significant decrease in the population. In this perspective they were Malthusian societies in which population tended to increase more than production and once the limit was reached they were vulnerable to events such as famine, diseases, etc. The "industrial" revolution allowed a new great increase in human population – initially only in Europe where this revolution started, and this fostered European migration and conquest and the spread of the industrial revolution itself. But also the industrial society found its equilibrium and is now characterised by very low birth and death rates. This is an anti-malthusian society since productivity grows more than population. The demographic problem exists in those countries which have decreased their death rate thanks to foreign intervention, but have not an industrial economy and its cultural consequences. Thus they continue to have high birth rate as an agricultural society accompanied by lower death rate than those of such a society. Therefore these societies are still very much – and maybe more than ever – Malthusian societies. And this requires enormous sacrifice in the accumulation of the capital necessary to develop an industrial economy (Cipolla 1962-1965: 59-62, 64, 107, and especially 85-90). With time this situation will get worse and a significant global effort will be even more necessary to change it.

[94] Cipolla offers a clear analysis of the link between technology, energy and productivity and interdependence (1962-1965: 52; see also Rosenau 1992a: 13; 1997: 78).

is no need to make a definite terminological choice. The issue is to understand what makes one period different from another in terms of its consequences on the dimension of the economic and political unit. At this point to identify a mercantile, or a scientific phase within a given mode of production – but it would be more precise to say within a given level of the evolution of the means of production - or to consider them as ideal types in their own right is the same. However, this discussion aims at the identification of some ideal types, which emphasise some aspects of reality. Hence, when looking at the evolution of the means of production in relation to the dimension of the economic and political units, it is probably more useful to consider each phase as one different level in the evolution of the means of production.

3.4 Means of production and the economic and political unit

Polanyi refuses the idea that the market was an important feature of modes of production and forms of integration previous to the industrial one (see also Gellner 1988: 129-132, 173-174, 178-187). And he also examines the creation of the market in the mercantile period (Polanyi 1944: ch. 5). On the one hand Polanyi emphasises the absence of an inherent tendency of the market to expand itself within society for a very long part of human history. On the other hand, he considers the creation of the market as the result of the evolution of the means of production. Hence he implicitly maintains the existence of a strong link between the evolution of the means of production and the emergence of the market, as a dominant form of integration. This insight is developed by Montani who focuses on the relation between the evolution of political institutions and the evolution of the market.

Polanyi claims precisely that the market was the result of the technological changes which characterised the mercantile and the industrial period. The first produced the national market, which was still much regulated. The second brought about the initial de-regulation of the national market, that is the idea of a self-regulating market, including also the specific markets of land and labour[95]. Polanyi notices this studying the different forms of integration and the creation of the market. He claims that before the establishment of

[95] Gellner offers a similar view. He proposes two parallel periodizations. He distinguishes between the appropriative, agricultural and industrial modes of production. Then he identifies three stages in the evolution of the market as "Subsistence Economy, Partial Markets (for luxury and strategically crucial goods), and Generalized Markets" (1988: 180), and he recognises a contemporary trend towards the creation of a global market (1988: 277).

national markets, the economy was mainly based on different forms of integration from exchange. There were just two kinds of trade and markets: local and international. The first was based on exchange of local goods between local people. It was highly regulated to ensure the remuneration of the producers, through the corporation, but also to avoid that the competition from occasional foreign participant could damage the local stable participants. The second dealt mainly with luxury goods, and was also highly regulated. The towns represented the contact points between the rural economy and these kinds of trade. Towns were bourgeois organizations to ensure a peaceful place for the market, but also to prevent it from spreading in the countryside, which was based on a different form of integration. In other words towns were also an obstacle to the establishment of a competitive national market as they kept regulated and non-competitive local markets, and non-competitive long-distance trade (Polanyi 1944: 62-66)[96].

Hence the need for the emergence of "the territorial state to the fore as the instrument of the 'nationalization' of the market and the creator of internal commerce (…) for which the capitalist wholesaler was pressing" (Polanyi 1944: 65). This is a clear indication of the link between economics and politics. On the one hand Polanyi emphasises the emergence of a new class of merchants due to some technological innovation, related to the means of transport and to some limited use of basic machines in the production of handicraft goods. On the other hand he considers the pressure of this new social group for the creation of a national market as a crucial factor in bringing about the new territorial state. This analysis brings Polanyi to the conclusion that "internal trade in Western Europe was actually created by the intervention of the state" at the time of the "Commercial Revolution" (Polanyi 1944: 63). The expression "Commercial Revolution" is quite interesting. When studying the modes of production the term "revolution" is generally employed to indicate a change from one mode of production to another. For instance Cipolla and Gellner wrote about the neolithic or agricultural revolution and to the industrial one to refer to the start of the agricultural and the industrial modes of production (Cipolla 1962-1965: 18, 25, 29-30; Gellner 1988: 16, 19-21, 68, 275). Referring to the commercial and to the industrial revolutions, Polanyi seems to share Montani's periodization which identifies a specific mercantile mode of production, characterised

[96] Cipolla generally accepts this claim, but he also believes that trade was always a strategic, if marginal, aspect of all economies as it was one of the few, if not the only, dynamic and expansive sectors (1962-1965: 61-62). This issue will be approached later on in considering the degree of economic efficiency of the closed, free, and internal market and trade. Eventually, Polanyi's and Gellner's view explains why, notwithstanding its greater economic efficiency, the market did not manage to expand itself significantly during a given level of the evolution of the means of production, in which the productivity potential could be exploited by the existing economic and political units which rested on a different form of integration.

precisely by growing trade and the birth of a national market. Polanyi himself recognises that mercantilism destroyed particularism and paved the way to the establishment of national markets (1944: 65).

It is worth recalling however that the state created the market to answer a real need, due to the evolution of the means of production, that is of technology, as Polanyi suggested[97]. Thus it is possible to think that the creation of the market could have also been the spontaneous result of individual actions due to the evolution of technology. In other words, it is possible to make the hypothesis that the national market could come about without the intervention of the state, which still was necessary to make it stable and to overcome the opposition to its consolidation. This hypothesis would be coherent with Montani's theoretical suggestion and would link Polanyi's two opposite insights – on the one hand the pressure from the producers derives from the autonomous evolution of the means of production; on the other hand he signals the role of the state in creating the market – which are the insights of Hayek and Robbins as well. This requires an analysis of the mechanism through which the evolution of technology may produce interdependence and encourage the creation of a market.

Marx and Engels considered the development of the mode of production as the progressive increase of the division of labour and interdependence (Marx and Engels 1846-1976: 50-51) This is not necessarily always the case, but it is correct in relation to the modern age and the development of the market. The market implies a sophisticated division of labour, and hence a strong interdependence of the participants in the market. In an economic system based on the market there is a very high interdependence: an individual cannot withdraw from the market hoping to maintain the same living standard, and eventually he may not be able to survive at all. This is very different from the situation during the agricultural mode of production. As Polanyi points out the increased efficiency of agricultural techniques allowed the creation of small, virtually self-sufficient, familiar agricultural units. This example shows that the development of the means of production does not always bring an increase in the level of interdependence. On the contrary it may also allow a decrease of interdependence and the viability of smaller economic units. As Gellner points out this viability may be fictitious and depend upon the existence of a class of coercers to defend the little production on which human survival rested (Gellner 1988: 102 and following). It is the emergence of an instrumental rationality, with the idea of one world to be investigated, and the creation of industrial machines which brings increased interdependence and the tendency to the creation of the market (Gellner 1988: chs. 4 and

[97] A similar argument is discussed by Tilly (1992-1997: 47-51, 143-151).

5). Given those premises and the structure of the market, from that time onwards the development of the means of production tends to increase the level of interdependence and the division of labour.

It is time to introduce Albertini's distinction between the extension and the scope of interdependence (Albertini 1965b-1999a: 109-111; a useful analysis of this distinction is also in Levi 1993 and in Montani 1999: 84-85). The extension refers to the number of people involved. The scope refers to the strength of this interdependence. The first is more relevant to consider the dimension of the economic and political units, the second to deal with the internal organisation of those units. A group of interdependent people will have some common issues and problems to solve. If they had no such commonality they probably would not have enough contacts between each other to be considered interdependent. Eventually they may need some common institutions to tackle those issues. The scope of their interdependence will determine the amount and kind of institutions which that group may need and/or accept. Albertini claims that the industrial revolution increased the scope of interdependence within a given society. In other words the creation of the national market and of industry increased the division of labour within a society and made the lives of millions of people to depend on what other people did within the market. The creation of the global market increases the extension of interdependence; just as the creation of continent-wide states and markets has increased the extension of interdependence in comparison to the national markets. In other words, the creation of the global market tends to extend the scope of interdependence, which previously characterised the participants to the national market, to the participants to the global market[98]. To participate in a broader market and to be interdependent with a greater number of people pushes towards the creation of new political units and to look at reality from different perspective: "day by day the world seems smaller and smaller and societies that for millennia practically ignored each other are suddenly put in contact – or in conflict. In our dealings, in politics as in economics, in health organization as in military strategy, a new point of view is forced upon us. Somewhere in the past people had to move from an urban or regional point of view to a national one. Today we have to adjust ourselves and our way of thinking to a *global* point of view" (Cipolla 1962-1965: 13)[99].

[98] It is possible to claim that the relationship between members of the same society – considered from an institutional perspective as citizens, or from an identitarian perspective as nationals – is not entirely based on their productive activity being part of the national market. Still, when looking at reality from a materialistic perspective this is the main issue. Other consideration such as security and identity are considered elsewhere in the discussion of *raison d'état* and ideology.

[99] It is significant that Cipolla, just like Barraclough, uses the word "global" with reference to an existing trend almost thirty years before a large academic debate about "globalization" started.

Having identified the link between market and interdependence, it is time to recall that the market is also dependent on the state for its survival. But the dimension of the market cannot always also be taken as an index of the main economic and political unit. Here Montani's use of the concept of spontaneous order as a transitional phase, which requires an institutionalization to become tendentially irreversible, is very useful. The emergence of the nation-state in the mercantile period was accompanied by the creation of the national market. The emergence of a free international trade in the second phase of the industrial revolution was not accompanied by the spread of continental states or of global institutions, and eventually the emerging global market of the late XIX and early XX century (well described by Hirst and Thompson 1996) collapsed.

That enlargement of the market was really needed to exploit the productivity potential of the current level of the evolution of the means of production. This emerges clearly from the fact that the states of continent-wide dimension had greater economic success, and ultimately remained as the only great powers (see the data presented in Cipolla 1962-1965: 63-72; and a useful analysis in Levi 1993: 99-115). The Second World War signed the end of the European states as great powers and the creation of a bipolar world state system (Dehio 1948-1963 and Barraclough 1967-1990 offer a convincing account – which will be examined in chapter six - of the changes occurred in this period as both systemic and systems change). The link between this event and the continental dimension of the USA and USSR is clear, although it was – and still is - often unnoticed by IR scholars, and forgotten by many European authors. This link was so evident that on that basis it was possible for authors such as Seeley (1895-1911: especially 18-19, 349-350), and Einaudi (1918a-1986: 19-27) to foresee the emergence of the USA and Russia as the only future world powers (their insights are examined also in Levi 1993: 99-115, and referred to in Montani 2001: 52-54). That was precisely an international systems change, although it was mainly perceived as only an international systemic change. Indeed with the First World War began the emergence of the USA hegemony, which was absolutely clear after the Second World War. But the emergence of a bipolar world in which the only great powers had continent-wide dimension - and the units which may hope to reach that status, such as China, India, and the EU, also have that size – signals that a systems change has also taken place. And this situation initially stimulated Germany to unite Europe under its hegemony, and afterwards sustained a peaceful European unification process (all this analysis is remarkably clear in Dehio 1948-1963, especially the last chapter).

Authors such as Seeley, Einaudi and Dehio emphasised that national markets were too small to use the technological knowledge of the time at its best. This explains the lower

productivity and economic growth of the European countries in comparison to the USA from the beginning of the XX century. While the mercantile mode of production was characterised by national economic and political units and rather closed national markets, the industrial one saw the success of continent-wide economic and political units, such as the USA and USSR, and the emergence of free trade on the international market, together with the attempt to create in Europe a single economic, and eventually political unit. First the unification was pursued through the German hegemonic attempts (Einaudi 1945-1986: 41; Toynbee 1948: 120; Dehio 1948-1963: 12-15, 210, 225-226, 228-233, 241-242, 253-257; 1955-1959: 20-21, 34-35, 127-128), which significantly also rested on the idea of the "living-space" which many trace back to List's economic theories (List 1837-1983: ch. 2; 1841-1856: Introduction, Book II Ch. V)[100]. Then, after the Second World War, the peaceful European unification process brought about a common market, it went on to establish a single or internal market, and eventually a monetary union with a single currency. Nowadays a representative Convention has been set up to discuss the future of the EU and there is a wide debate about the creation of a European economic government and the establishment of a European Constitution and[101].

At the same time the emergence of the scientific mode of production is pushing towards the creation of a world internal market. From a political perspective, Montani suggests that the related global problems require some forms of world democratic government. Similarly Polanyi links the solution of the social problem created by the emergence of the industrial mode of production and the consequent creation of national markets of labour, to the establishment of democracy and the enlargement of suffrage up to the universal suffrage, which gave the poorest people the institutional means to solve the problem.

The issue is thus the relationship between market and political units. This was best identified by a great liberal economist such as Lionel Robbins. He was explicit in clarifying the link between state and market: "the invisible hand which guides men to promote ends which were no part of their intention, is not the hand of some god or some natural agency independent of human effort; it is the hand of the law-giver, the hand which withdraws from the sphere of the pursuit of self-interest those possibilities which do not harmonize

[100] However, it is worth noting that if List is the theorist of national economy he is also explicit in his claim that from a normative perspective he favours a cosmopolitan economic and political model rather than a nationalist one (List 1837-1983: chs. 1, 2, 34; 1856: 70-71). A useful analysis of List's thought is in Montani 1996: ch 4.

[101] While an international Treaty regulates the relationship among states, a European constitution would create a European polity based directly on its citizens (on the constitutive and regulative functions of a constitution and on the significance of constitutional moments see Castiglione 1995).

with the public good. There is absolutely no suggestion that the market can furnish everything; on the contrary, it can only begin to furnish anything when a host of other things have been furnished another way" (Robbins 1952: 56-57; the whole Lecture II is devoted to this issue). Thus he maintains that the market needs "an apparatus for maintaining law and order. But whereas *within* national areas such an apparatus, however imperfect, existed, *between* national areas there was no apparatus at all" and he criticised other liberal authors because "within the national areas they relied upon the coercive power of the state to provide the restraints which harmonized the interests of the different individuals. Between the areas they relied only upon demonstration of common interest and the futility of violence: their outlook here, that is to say, was implicitly not liberal but anarchist" (Robbins 1937: 241, but the entire ch. IX is devoted to this issue).

The study of Robbins also brings Montani[102] close to Polanyi's claim that the "institutional vestment" is the factor which gives unity and resilience to a certain mode of production. For Montani institutions make stable and tendentially irreversible a given spontaneous order produced by the evolution of the means of production. This is true for him both in the economic and in the political field. This is why he shares Kant's idea that the establishment of perpetual peace requires cosmopolitan institutions (Montani 1999: 36); and also Robbins' idea that the invisible hand is that of the legislator (Robbins 1952: 56).

It is interesting to consider the Soviet case from this perspective. A given form of integration, based on redistribution, has collapsed with its political institutions. And this collapse can be linked to the difficulty and growing inefficiency of an essentially autarchic policy applied to the Communist Bloc. That indicates the difficulty to remain outside the emerging global market and its interdependence and division of labour (Montani 2001: 49-50; and on the influence of the emergence of the scientific mode of production and globalization on the collapse of USSR also Montani 1999: 29-34). But the collapse of the communist regime has brought into being a different form of integration, tendentially based on exchange and market, and to some form of democratic political institutions, notwithstanding the shortcomings of this system as currently applied in Russia. But there has not been a reverse in the phases considered through the criteria of the evolution of the means of production. And from the perspective of the market evolution, the Russian market may have many shortcomings, but is better than the previous black market.

The recognition of the need for political institutions to make spontaneous orders stable and tendentially irreversible sheds new light also on the attempt to compare the

[102] In the past Montani has studied Robbins' ideas and has edited the Italian translation of Robbins' main works about the international situation and its link with economics (Robbins 1985).

current globalization process, that is the creation of a world internal market, with the free trade era based on the gold standard which characterised the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century (Polanyi 1944: 3 and following; Hirst and Thompson 1996). Indeed, the evolution of the means of production at that time increased the division of labour and interdependence and required large markets to exploit all its productivity potential[103]. This brought about a tendency towards a more open international market. But this spontaneous order collapsed against the attempts of the states to maintain their hold on national economies and to find national solutions to the economic crisis. The lack of supranational institutions to ensure peace allowed the national destructive answers to this new situation. On the one hand, confronted with an economic crisis, the nation-states adopted autarchic policies and brought to an end the process of creating an international free market. On the other hand the most powerful European state attempted to create a European market under its own hegemony. The spontaneous order of a free international market proved to be transitory, and did not become irreversible. The lack of a proper "institutional vestment", or institutional mechanism analogous to the state, made it impossible for it to survive; just as Robbins claimed for the market and Polanyi for the mode of production.

From this perspective Barraclough identification of a new global character of world history after the Second World War, overcoming the previous Eurocentric vision of history is extremely significant. What he describes is precisely the dramatic change of the mode of production and the coming about of a new global civilization: "We live today in a world different, in almost all its basic preconditions, from the world in which Bismarck lived and died" (Barraclough 1967-1990: 9). This was a good opening statement for a book hinting at the coming about of a globalization process some twenty years before the academic debate on this issue started. This also suggests that the analytical categories which allowed authors such as Seeley, Dehio, Barraclough to understand the situation and its prospects much earlier than other scholars are worth studying.

[103] Against this argument some IR scholars have objected that there is no clear and uncontroversial system to measure interdependence and to fix a threshold which would require a change in the dimension of the market or the start of an integration proces or the change of the dimension of the political unit (Jones 1984). To look at the different level of interdependence characteristic of specific modes of production in order to determine the best size of the market, and of the political unit – to regulate the market - allows to avoid this problem. The assumption is that within a given mode of production there can be significant increase in the level of interdependence which do not have such consequences. On the other hand, when a change in the mode of production occurs, it is reasonable to look at the possibility that such changes may be useful to exploit the new technological potential. This allows a qualitative rather than a quantitative measure of interdependence.

3.5 The evolution of the means of production and the evolution of the market

Montani focuses on the three modes of production which characterised modernity and proposes a parallel periodization of the evolution of the market. This is coherent with Polanyi's views as implies the recognition that the market – in the contemporary sense – is a modern feature. He links a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of different kinds of market, with a historical analysis of the evolution of the means of production and the market, linked through the concept of interdependence as analysed in the previous paragraph. This is possible for two reasons. First, because the modern market has a built-in tendency towards efficiency and tries to expand itself in scope and in extension, which did not characterised pre-modern form of the market, as Polanyi highlighted. Second, because the evolution of the means of production within a market-economy brings with it an increase in interdependence either in scope or in extension – and I have already pointed out that Marx and Engels's general claim on this issue is valid only within a market-economy.

Montani thus considers in evolutionary terms both the developments of the means of production and of the market. He also shows that both liberal and Marxist authors often employ this approach. Rostow applies it to national economies and markets, but considers the world economy just as the sum of national economies and their developments (Rostow 1978, also discussed in Montani 2001: 43-46). On the contrary Hobsbawm employs it also for the international economy and market similarly to Montani (Hobsbawm 1979, also analysed in Montani 2001: 43-46). Accordingly, the mercantile mode of production stimulated the creation of internal national markets within a rather closed international one. The industrial mode of production, which was best exploited within continent-wide states and markets, also led to a partial liberalization of the international market as well. Eventually the scientific mode of production is bringing about globalization or the creation of an "internal" world market (Montani 2001: 31-46).

At his point it could be argued that the liberalization of the international market in the XIX century can be considered as a form of globalization: and hence there would be no need to theorise a scientific mode of production to explain it. But at that time the main focus of world economy and world politics was Europe. And the great powers of that time were still nation-states. The emergence of the USA and USSR as the new dominant powers was foreseen by very few authors. Thus the foreign policies of most European states did not pay much attention to these players – Dehio shows very well that the German elite did

not understand the deep reasons for the American intervention in the First World War, which would bring them to fight against a new hegemonic attempt in Europe (Dehio 1955-1959: 20-25). Therefore, from the perspective of the European nation-states, the liberalization of the international market was the alternative to the creation of a European continental market within an integration process. Their national markets were too small to exploit the productivity potential of the time. And they tried to have access to larger markets – some authors use this argument also as one aspect of the explanation of colonialism (Pistone 1973: 49-56) – through the liberalization of the international market. But the creation of a continent-wide market would have been sufficient at that time. The fact that the EEC economic growth rate was comparable to the one of the USA and almost double than the British one is a clear example of the possibility to exploit the productivity potential within a continent-wide market. The academic discussion about globalization is recent – although it was possible to discern the trend much earlier – because only the recent evolution of the means of production has made the perception of the creation of a global market so widespread and clear. On this basis the possibility to develop an ideal type of a scientific mode of production seems reasonable.

Montani proposed a parallel periodization of the evolution of the means of production and of the markets. In relation to the markets he claims that also its development has an evolutionary nature as it tends to create a more efficient market. To sustain this point he refers to Ricardo's theory of comparative costs, which is generally used to sustain the greater economic efficiency of international free trade over closed national markets. Employing also more recent economic models, Montani emphasises that it is possible to conceive three stages in the development of an efficient international market. First, an international market made by many closed national markets. Then an international free market, based on the liberalization of the exchanges of different, and eventually of all, goods. Finally, an international internal market, characterised by the freedom of movement of goods, services, and all other factors of production, that is capital and labour[104]. From an economic perspective this sequence is also based on the efficiency of the market. In other

[104] This account is discussed in Montani 2001: 10-11 and 25-31, also the whole chapter II (135-160) offers a strictly economic and mathematical analysis to sustain this claim. Montani is surprised by the fact that he has not been able to find elsewhere a theoretical discussion of all these three models. Economists generally consider only the first classical two identified by Ricardo. Ricardo did not considered the third option because at that time international mobility was limited and because he believed capitalists preferred to invest in their own country even for lower profits. In the age of globalization and of extreme financial mobility this third option needs to be examined. Hayek does not analyse this third model from a theoretical perspective, but he refers to it very briefly in a few lines in his analysis of the economic advantages and of "the economic conditions of interstate federalism" (Hayek 1949: 255).

words, just as an open international market is more efficient than a closed one, so an international "internal" market is more efficient than an open international one.

A quick exemplification of the problem shall suffice, following Montani's use of Ricardo's famous example (Montani 2001: 25-31). In a closed international market England produces one unit of textile using 100 units of labour, and one unit of wine, employing 120 units of labour. To produce the same goods Portugal employs 90 and 80 units of labour respectively. The total production of the international market is thus 2 units of textile and wine, employing 390 units of labour (see table 7).

Table 7. Production in a closed international market (from Montani 2001: 27).

	TEXTILE	WINE	TOTAL LABOUR
	(1 unit)	(1 unit)	
England	100	120	220
Portugal	90	80	170
			390

Ricardo went on to show that in a situation of free trade a specialisation and division of labour would occur, increasing productivity. England would produce two units of textile, employing 200 units of labour, while Portugal would produce two units of wine employing 160 units of labour. This means that the same production level would be achieved employing 360 units of labour instead of 390 (see Table 8). A free international market is thus more efficient than a closed one.

Table 8. Production within an open international market (from Montani 2001: 27).

	TEXTILE	WINE	TOTAL LABOUR
	(2 unit)	(2 unit)	
England	200	-	200
Portugal	-	160	160
			360

Montani goes further to look what would happen in an international market characterised by the fredoom of movement of the factors of production, which occur within national market or within economic unions, such as within the European Single Market. In this case, given the productivity in the two countries, all production will move to Portugal. But the same production will require only 340 units of labour (see Table 9).

Table 9. Production within an economic union (from Montani 2001: 29).

	TEXTILE	WINE	TOTAL LABOUR
	(2 unit)	(2 unit)	
England	-	-	
Portugal	180	160	340
			340

The result may scare the reader. But this is precisely what happens within a capitalist economy and a free market. Production goes where the costs are lower, that is where it is more efficient. This is a more efficient market as it produces the same goods at lower costs. This obviously may require workers to move to find a job – and the contemporary discussion about the flexibility of the labour market also relates to this issue – and may create different social problems. Italy offers a perfect example of such a situation considering the very different economic condition between the North and the South of the country. It was essentially the same problem facing the German government just after the reunification. This is why economic unions are generally accompanied by equalizing measures. This is the case in Italy, in Germany and within the European Union as well, where the agreement of the poorest states of the Union to the establishment of the Single Market required the creation of regional and social funds to sustain the economic development of the poorer regions. Many western complaints about the globalization process depend precisely on this situation, since the delocalization of many industries into developing countries with lower labour costs, increases unemployment in the countries where the factories were previously established. A main problem is that the freedom of movement of capital is not paralleled by that of workers.

What is more relevant here are the theoretical consequences of this analysis. In short it aimed at showing that a more competitive market is more efficient than a less competitive one. But it also shows that trade is not a zero-sum game, and this supports Cipolla's claim about the marginal but dynamic role of trade within all great agricultural

societies against Polanyi's attempt to consider it as a marginal appendix which did not fulfil a strategic role. Furthermore, it shows that the development of a more competitive market at world level can increase global productivity and global welfare. It is thus a useful economic argument in favour of the globalization process. This analysis also explains the greater success of continent-wide internal markets over a (partially) free continent-wide market. That is, it helps to explain the greater economic growth in the USA than in Europe in the first half of this century, and also the reduction of the gap occurred after the creation of the European Economic Community for its member countries, but not for most other European countries[105].

Eventually Montani proposes a comparison between the development of the world and the European markets. In the second half of the XX century the European integration process has brought the European market from a closed one, due to the autarchic policies of most European states before and during the Second World War, to a free international market, the Common market based on the free movements of goods and a custom union, to the European "internal" Single market, based on the freedom of movement of all factors of production and eventually completed by a monetary union as well (Montani 1992: ch. 2; and 2001: 12, 54-59).

But the differences between the evolution of the world and European markets are just as interesting as their similarities. The difference is mainly an institutional one. Montani ascribes the success of the European economic integration up to the economic and monetary union to the parallel construction of supranational institutions to regulate the new market (2001: 54-59). Indeed, most scholars link the launch of the Single Market project in 1986 to the introduction of qualified majority voting within the Council of Ministers of the European Community in relation to that project (obviously such a change is emphasised by intergovernmentalists such as Moravcsik 1991, and 1998: ch. 5). But the existence of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice have been emphasised by different authors and schools of thought with

[105] Milward (1992: 396) offers a detailed account of the greater (almost double) economic growth of EEC countries compared for example with Great Britain in the period 1950-1973. From an economic perspective this also explains the attractiveness of the EEC, compared for example with EFTA, and its tendency towards enlargment. Incidentally it should be stressed that at that time the EEC did not have an internal market either. But thanks to its supranational institutions it managed to establish quickly the Common Market, and to implement some important common economic policies. It is also worth mentioning that the European economic boom was suddenly brought to an end by the inconvertibility of the Dollar – which *de facto* had functioned as the Common Market currency – and by the Oil crisis (Montani 2001: 56-57). This example, together with a complex analysis of the main macro-economic theories, brings Montani to support continental monetary union and eventually the idea of a world currency (Montani 2001: 106-120), also on the basis of Triffin's analysis of the international monetary system (especially Triffin 1954, 1957, 1966).

convincing argument[106]. It is this institutional situation which allowed integration to proceed and not to be reversed even during domestic or international political and economic crisis. The latter have produced some slow-down of the process, but not a proper reversal. Furthermore, the existence of those institutions allowed for the creation of common policies to regulate the internal market – some of them are hardly commendable such as the Common Agricultural Policy; this policy suits the interests of a well-organised fraction of the European population, and thus the will of the national governments to sustain it, against the European Commission and Parliament attempts to radically modify it – and to apply some form of European equalizing measures, such as the Social and Regional Funds and policies mentioned earlier.

On the contrary the evolution of the world market is characterised by a partial absence of collective institutions, and certainly of democratic ones. Public goods, such as an international currency, were generally provided for by the hegemon, such as the UK and then the USA. And they last as much as their hegemony. Therefore international crises often brought a reverse in the evolution of the international market. After a relatively free international market in the XIX century, the first half of the XX century saw a spread of autarchic policies, especially after the First World War and the 1929 crisis. This is often used to claim that the globalization process is nothing new, as the international market was much integrated and free also in the XIX century (Hirst and Thompson 1996). If this comparison is accepted, it is impossible to exclude a possible reversal of the globalization process as well, as it happened to the liberalization one of the XIX century. This would suit very well the hegemonic stability theorists. According to them the globalization process is sustained by the American hegemony, just as the liberalization process was sustained by the British one (this thesis has recently been upheld by Jones 2000; a general discussion of this perspective is in Montani 2001: 17-25).

The spontaneous character of the globalization process and also the prospects for its survival are at stake in this debate. Is the future and the stability of the emerging world internal market linked to the maintenance of the American hegemony? Would a change in the hegemon or a challenge to the hegemon spell the end of the globalization process? Can the creation of democratic supranational institutions provide the institutional aspect of the form of integration most suitable to exploit the current technological potential and to solve

[106] Generally neofunctionalists, from Haas (especially 1964 and 1968) onwards (for example Sandholtz and Zysman 1992), emphasise the role of the Commission. International and constitutional lawyers focus on the role of the European Court of Justice in establishing the principles of supremacy of European law, of mutual recognition, and so on, all essential for the creation of the European market (for example see Weiler 1999). Others also indicate the role of the European Parliament and the Spinelli Project in provoking a relaunch of European integration through the Single Market project (Lodge 1984; Albertini 1985-1999a and 1986-1999a).

the global problems created by this technology? This research attempts to answer this question since it tries to "understand how, on one occasion at any rate, the entire structure can be modified, as opposed to a mere change of personnel within it" (Gellner 1988: 158). This means to oppose "the ethnocentric narrowness of those thinkers who, born among the latterday beneficiaries of the unique situation, naively take it for granted, and talk as if it had been ever with us as a human birthright" (Gellner 1988: 204). This is a clear indication of the need to question the self-sustaining claims for one-self hegemony as an essential instrument for the survival of society or mankind characteristics of the dominant political unit, class and ideology (see also Gellner 1988: 116). Anglo-Saxon theorists arguing for the maintenance of American hegemony as a pre-condition for the world well-being are also defending a position of privilege.

To this aim I employ the categories Gellner has developed to explain "the way in which a vision not normally favoured, but on the contrary impeded, by the prevailing ethos and organization of most human societies, had prevailed" (Gellner 1988: 204). He conducted this intellectual operation with great ability in relation to the internal organization of society. I try to follow his path in order to offer a contribution in relation to international systems change and the dimension of political units. And as Gellner points out, only a proper examination of the development of the three fundamental aspects of human reality may allow the researcher to imagine their possible new combination and thus the options for mankind future within which to choose (1988: 11, 19-21, 145, 213, 253, 274-275). This may confirm hegemonic stability theory, but it is unlikely. As Morgenthau pointed out, these theories have always existed and will always exist, as they help providing legitimacy for the status quo. But eventually the world has seen some major changes and new forms of order coming about (Morgenthau 1948-1985: chs. 4, and 7 especially 104-106). In the middle or long term there is always at least the possibility of a systemic change, or a change of the hegemon, if not of systems change as well.

3.6 Conclusion

It is time to try to summarise the analysis of the concept of mode of production and of its components and their use. The aim is to identify also the possible application of these analytical categories, as defined in this research, to the contemporary world. The examination of the form of integration and of the evolution of the means of production as the two main elements of the mode of production has brought the following main results.

First, the usefulness of the composed category of the mode of production in the analysis of a given situation in static terms. From this perspective only the combined analysis of both components exploit the heuristic potential of the category of the mode of production. Any society in a given situation is characterised by both a given technological level and a given form of integration. To consider only one of the two may highlights just some of the similarities or some of the differences – and sometimes only the similarities or only the differences as in the case of the USA and USSR, since they were characterised by the same stage in the evolution of the means of production, and by different forms of integration. Polanyi's distinction of four ideal types of the forms of integration – reciprocity, redistribution, autarchy, and exchange – is very helpful as it shows the ambiguity of other classifications as in the opposition of socialism and capitalism. Ancient and modern history alike also show that the same technological level can be combined with different forms of integration. From this follows that it is possible to propose a classification of different modes of production in static terms, based on a double matrix to include both the level of the evolution of the means of production and the form of integration.

Second, while a static classification of the modes of production is a useful analytical tool, a periodization of the modes of production is not. This is due to the fact that the forms of integration – which are an essential component of the concept of mode of production - cannot be subsumed under a given logic of development. The dominant form of integration in a given society can change, and also recur. The fact that redistribution has been the dominant form of integration in many ancient_empires and it has been again recently for almost a century in Russia and in other socialist countries suggest not to project an evolutionary logic on the forms of integration. Hence the composed concept of mode of production cannot be used for a proper periodization of human history, unless certain assumptions are accepted. Among them at least the acceptance of the theorem about the necessary congruence between the evolutions of the means of production and of the forms of integration, if not between structure and super-structure, as well. The refusal of such an assumption has brought me to refuse a periodization of history based on the composed category of the mode of production.

Third, the recognition of the different characteristics of the two components of the mode of production explains why many authors have offered different periodizations of human history based on a materialistic perspective. Some are based on the evolution of the means of production, some on the forms of integration. However, as Polanyi has pointed out, it is not correct to establish a logic of development for the forms of integration. Thus

while it is useful to classify different forms of integration it is not to propose a periodization of human history based on them. Still, it is possible to think the evolution of the means of production in evolutionary terms and to propose a periodization based on this category - which is a materialistic periodization, but not based on the mode of production. It is through the category of the means of production that it is possible to look at human history from an evolutionary perspective.

These three basic conclusions were reached thanks to the analysis of the works of authors such as Polanyi, Montani and Gellner. However, it needs to be stressed that none of them employs the terminology used here. Gellner and Montani write about the mode of production, although many of the qualities they attribute to this concept are characteristic only of the means of production. This appears clearly thanks to Polanyi's studies on the forms of integration. It is interesting to note that Gellner's use of the concepts is particularly similar to the one proposed in this research, although he never focuses explicitly on the distinction and differences between the means of production and the forms of integration.

Fourth, not only the examination of the concept of means of production has suggested the possibility to consider their development in evolutionary terms, but also that this evolution can be conceptualised as an essentially spontaneous process. It is influenced by many social factors and interacts with the form of integration. But both Polanyi and Montani have highlighted the relative independence of each component, which has different characteristic from the other in its development. Thus it is possible to conceive the evolution of the means of production as producing successive spontaneous orders. In relation to this aspect, Hayek's refinement of the concept of spontaneous order on the basis of the insights proposed by the Scottish philosophical tradition has been used together with Montani specific association of this concept with the tradition of historical materialism.

Fifth, the different characters of the two components brought some authors to develop contradictory insights to explain certain events, or to formulate the explanation in terms of paradoxes. For instance Polanyi explains the emergence of the market through the pressure from the producers derived from the autonomous evolution of the means of production, while emphasising at the same time the role of the state in creating the market. They can be solved thanks to Montani's useful idea that spontaneous orders created by the evolution of the means of production are transitory or reversible, and their survival and consolidation depends upon the establishment of a suitable form of integration embodied in appropriate political institutions. This insight is particularly useful in relation to the study

of globalization and international systems change. The evolution of the means of production may produce a spontaneous material order which may find formidable obstacle to its consolidation in the political or cultural spheres. After the First World War, the nationalist ideology and the following autarchic economic policies and expansionist foreign policies combined to destroy the world market which was emerging since the end of the XIX century (Hirst and Thompson 1996).

Sixth, the analysis of the modern era has pointed out some specific characteristics of the modern and contemporary market. Within such a form of integration the evolution of the means of productions produces greater specialization and division of labour, and greater interdependence together with an increase in productivity. This supports the tendency of the market to enlarge itself to become more efficient up to the creation of a global internal market. Montani's analysis has also shown the greater economic efficiency of this kind of market compared to other forms of international market. This recognition highlights that the modern evolution of the means of production has not pushed simply towards a dramatic change of the internal structure of the economic and political units – which is a main aspect of the form of integration – but to the change of the dimension of those units too. Since the market is the dominant form of integration, its tendency to enlarge brings with it the tendency towards the enlargement of the economic and political units, given the strong link between the market as a form of integration and the political institutions necessary to sustain it – an element emphasised by Polanyi and Gellner, but recognised also by liberal scholars such as Robbins and Hayek, as Montani recalls. Without the development of suitable institutions there can be real "retreats" of the market. This happened after the First World War, which, among other things, brought to an end British hegemony and this allowed the reversal of the trend towards the creation of a free global market which started at the end of the XIX century under British hegemony. The contemporary globalization process rests on the American hegemony, and it may be reversed with its decline. An alternative is the creation of supranational democratic institutions, that is federal institutions, to complement the market as also liberal economists such as Robbins (1937: ch IX, and 1941) and Hayek (1944-1979 ch XV, especially 163, 164, 169, 172-176; 1949: Ch XII; 1960-1976: 184-5; 1967-1978: 146, 155) suggested long ago.

Seventh, the very possibility of a "retreat" of the market shows the heuristic limits of the mode of production. The evolution of the means of production may produce a spontaneous order. This brings some pressure towards the establishment of a compatible form of integration in order to consolidate the spontaneous order. But each technological level is compatible with different forms of integration both in relation to their internal

organization and their dimension. However, some of them may allow a better exploitation of the productivity potential of the given technological level. Therefore, in the long run, they may have more chances to be adopted by different societies. Still, the emergence of a new form of integration does not depend only on the evolution of the means of production. And only after a new form of integration is established, a wide recognition of its ability to exploit the productivity potential more than others may arise. Thus if the spread of a given form of integration may be explained from a materialistic perspective, this is not the case for its emergence in the first place. This requires the employment of other analytical categories too. This shows the impossibility to use the mode of production as the only category to study human history, and the need to refuse any deterministic stand. The tripartite framework proposed in this research aims also at complementing the materialistic perspective with other categories to explain the political and cultural changes needed to produce a change in the form of integration in relation to international systems change.

This discussion should be enough to describe the content of the analytical category of the mode of production and the way I propose to employ it and its two basic components. Hopefully it has established the possibility to use the concept outside the context of historical materialism and its determinism. Eventually, also the need to employ it with caution, and taking into account the different characters of its components should also now be clear, together with the opportunity to complement it with other analytical categories. The clear distinction of the different heuristic qualities of the concepts of means of production, forms of integration and mode of production, together with the identification of the connection of the first with the concept of spontaneous order, and of the need to consider them as transitory ones until suitable political institutions are established to consolidate them are thus the main heuristic tools proposed to look at reality from a materialistic perspective.

CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMACY, CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter analyses the role of culture and ideas to study international systems change. Recently many authors have paid attention to the role of ideas and of human representation of reality, thus supporting what has been called a normative, a constructivist, or a social constructivist turn in IR and EU studies (Biersteker and Weber 1996; Checkel 1998 and 1999; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Weiner 1999; Koslowski 1999; Rosamond 1999; Chryssochoou 2000). Their claims are valid as a critique to the dominant realist tradition, but social constructivism shall be considered as a complementary rather than an alternative approach to the realist and materialistic ones. As Gellner pointed out, arguing against the trend to propose all-cultural explanations of nationalism, "by seeking primarily or exclusively 'cultural' rather than organisational explanations, this trend prejudges, unjustifiably, a most important question concerning the relative importance of structural and cultural factors. (It is quite possible that there is no *general* answer to this question, that the relative importance of the two types of cause varies from case to case and situation to situation)" (Gellner 1997: 94-95; on this point see also Albertini 1960-1997: 117-136). The strength of this theoretical prudence will be assessed more clearly in chapter five in the discussion of the interaction between the evolution of the means of production, of the balance of power and of ideology to conceptualise international systems change.

The importance of considering culture together with the evolution of the means of production and the balance of power is due to a basic observation. Mankind as a species is characterised by culture, and cultural diversity, but all human societies have also an organisation (Gellner 1988: 14 and 274; 1997: 1 and 3). "These two general characteristics, culture and organisation, are the raw material, so to speak, of all social life. They are the two basic elements of social life. They may not be wholly independent: a culture may be dominated by a certain model of social organisation, or a given form of organisation may require a certain type of culture. (…) But though these two basic categories of social life may not be wholly distinct, it is nevertheless important to distinguish them. Both culture and organisation are universally present in all social life" (Gellner 1997: 3, and 92-93). In other words "culture and social organisation are universal and perennial" although,

obviously, they can change over time (Gellner 1997: 5 and 94). In fact "historical transformations are transmitted by culture", defined as "systems of concepts or ideas which guide thought and conduct", together with other agents such as coercion and famine (Gellner 1988: 14-15, and see also 55 and following, and 274).

This research places great emphasis on the recognition of the importance of different spheres of human activity. What Gellner calls "social organization" is studied through the realist and materialistic perspectives which focus on two necessary aspects of any social organization: political power and the material reproduction of society. This chapter focuses on the sphere of culture which interacts with social organization. In this regard, it is important to stress that culture guides both thought and conduct, and it has an impact on social reality. "The origins and sources of a social order are located only secondarily in charters, constitutions, legislative decrees, or any other founding documents; their primary sources is the ideas, orientation, predispositions, memories, habits, and belief system of a people and their leaders" (Rosenau 1997: 241-242). It is worth recalling that this role was recognised also by Polanyi, even if his studies focus on the organization of societies and specifically on the forms of integration. This shows that this claim is accepted not only by those scholars who focus on the cultural sphere, but also by some who emphasise other aspects such as Polanyi. He recognises that all forms of integration are based on institutions which are not concerned with economics, and with an economic motive, alone (Polanyi 1944: 56). On the one hand the "forms of integration are relatively independent of the aims and character of the governments, as well as of the ideals and ways of the cultures in question" (Polanyi 1977: 36). On the other hand it is impossible to determine empirically any form of integration without looking at these aspects as well, which cannot be studied simply from a materialistic perspective. For example, the communist ideology is necessary to explain the specific kind of redistribution taking place in the USSR - and political realism is needed to understand the relative priority conceded to military research and production over other goods in that society. The ancient agrarian empires were based on a highly centralised redistributive system, but the dominant ideology was different and sustained a very diverse criteria for the redistribution of the available goods. In both cases redistribution was the dominant form of integration, but cultural elements determine one – of many - crucial differences between these two historical cases of the same form of integration. Thus Polanyi maintains most economic systems are embedded in society, and heavily influenced by its culture and values. Similarly, Mannheim stresses that ideas and culture are heavily influenced by the historical and social conditions in which they emerge. Actually the task of the sociology of knowledge is precisely to study

this link between ideas and their social origins (Mannheim 1953: ch. 1 §1). It is significant that authors who provided basic insights in relation to one sphere of human activity were able to do so also thanks to their recognition of the interaction of that sphere with other ones. This is a sign of the opportunity to consider all the three aspects considered in this research to study the great changes in human societies, and thus also international systems change.

At this point it is important to offer some short remarks on the concepts of culture, language and ideology and their relationships. This research is concerned with international systems change. The very word "international" is meaningful only in relation to the modern era when the modern state emerged and eventually became national. Mannheim (1953: ch. I §2) and Gellner (1988: especially chs. IV and V) claim that from the cultural perspective the most important change from the medieval to the modern era is the break-up of a unitary vision of the world and of the monopoly of the Church to interpret it. Significantly this also brought about a decline of Latin as the unitary language of the world, and the emergence of a number of other languages, also for scientific and literary purposes. Indeed a language offers certain meanings and structures which influence our way of thinking. However, a language alone cannot sustain a political order, although it can be used as an element of a political ideology, for instance in the case of nationalism, which can provide legitimacy to a political struggle and/or to a given political order. For this reason the analysis of the sphere of culture in relation to a political order – being it domestic or international - will focus on political ideologies rather than on language and culture in general. This stand is made possible precisely because the break-up of the unitary vision of the world also produced a progressive separation of religion and politics and the autonomy of the latter (Mannheim 1953: ch. I §4). Thus in the modern era it is the specific political aspect of culture – and not the religious one as previously – which sustains the political order[107].

The political culture plays an important role to legitimise the organisation of society. The disjunction between the organisation of society and the dominant ideas in relation to its legitimacy may undermine that organisation and the following order. In this sense any stable domestic or international order is based on a convergence between the

[107] In previous eras religion has sustained the political order and has fulfilled also the functions currently attributed to political ideologies. This explains for instance the classic Marxist view of religion as the first ideology. Ricoeur discusses the relationship between religion and ideology and, following Geertz, points out many fundamental differences, although he recognises that before the modern era religion has sustained the political order as political ideologies are supposed to do in the modern era (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 253; since it has been impossible to get hold of copy of the original English book, the references are taken from the Italian translation).

mode of production, the organisation – and sometime the balance - of political power, and the dominant political culture. This explains why each of these perspectives may be a useful starting point to look at the viability of a given order, or to the prospects for international change (Rosenau 1992a: 17). So much so that Gellner not only refers to the concept of balance of power, as any realist would do, but also to an "*intellectual* balance of power" (Gellner 1994: 93). This last concept can make sense only when there are different visions of the world competing for supremacy within society. This implies that they have all acquired at least some degree of intellectual legitimacy, that is that the monopoly of one vision and one organization of legitimators has been broken (Mannheim 1953: ch. I §2, 4; Ricoeur 1986-1994: 180-181). Hence this concept is valid and useful mainly in relation to the modern era, on the basis of Mannheim and Gellner's analysis of the cultural transformation from the Middle Age to modernity.

This change, which also produced the autonomy of politics, ultimately required the systematisation of political ideas aiming at legitimising a political order. First, the state had to justify itself separately from the Church. The concept of sovereignty was developed to this aim (Hinsley 1966-1986: 2, 25). Later on all political groups, movements and parties had to offer a vision of the world to sustain themselves and their favourite political order (Mannheim 1953: ch. I §4). Thus in the modern world the main ideas to legitimise a given political organisation tend to be properly systematised in what are generally called political ideologies.

4.1 Culture and legitimacy

The basic idea sustaining the following discussion is well summarised by Keynes famous sentence that "the ideas of economists and political philosophers … are more powerful than is commonly understood" (quoted and analysed by both Gellner 1988: 11-12, and Montani 1996: 9). What I will discuss is the power of ideas to sustain a given political order or to promote change[108]. This is linked with the idea that culture sets the boundaries and the limits of our way of thinking. Language and culture also fulfil the task to ensure the loyalty of people to certain concepts and to the community employing them[109]: in other words "men are not free to think as they wish; they are in thrall to their

[108] These are the roles Mannheim attributes to ideology and utopia, which I will discuss later on.

[109] Eventually, according to Gellner, the possibility to be consciously loyal to a culture, rather than to a religion or a dynasty, also allows the birth of nationalism (Gellner 1988: 206 and following). The issue of nationalism will be addressed in more detail at the end of this chapter.

ideas, and their ideas are socially shared" (Gellner 1988: 55 and following). Hence culture can also be seen as ultimately a form of coercion (Gellner 1988: 217-219).

It is rare, but not impossible, that a new political institution is created which at least some people have not asked for – this is different in relation to other social institutions and spontaneous orders may come about, although they may not consolidate themselves if they are not accompanied by suitable political institutions too. That means that the idea of that political institution has often been developed before its creation, and probably its establishment was influenced by the pre-existing idea. The political ideas of the Enlightenment influenced the events of the French Revolution (Gellner 1988: 133-134). Marx, and especially Lenin's ideas were determinant to bring about first a revolutionary movement, and then the October revolution (Carr 1950-1954: especially ch. I and IV; Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. VII). Essays on liberalism have been written in many absolutist regimes, and have helped to bring about the rule of law, and the liberal state. The same is true for democracy, socialism, communism, and even nazism. Similarly many scholars believe that nationalism created nations (Albertini 1960-1997: 40-43; Kohn 1961: 4-6; Gellner 1983: 2-7, 43-49, 1994: 178, and 1997: 8, 90-101; Hobsbawm 1990: 9; Anderson 1991: 3; Smith[110]: 1991: ch 5, especially 99, 106). A theory of European and world federalism exists although a European or a world federation have not yet been established, if they will ever be. Different ideas are developed to think the future, and they guide the conduct of many groups and thus influence the final outcome. In other words, ideas are necessary to mobilise support in view of a given goal, which need to be conceptualised to be shared by different people.

Ideas are also important to legitimise a given order. It is generally accepted that no political regime can endure for a long time without the consent of the people living under

[110] It is difficult to discuss Smith's reflections about nationalism. He wrote many articles and books, and his position has changed although the main line of argument is the same throughout his works and focus increasingly on nationalism as a cultural phenomenon not linked to the state. His books are rich of useful insights as well as contradictory remarks. For instance he claims that "we cannot understand nations and nationalism simply as an ideology or form of politics but must treat them as cultural phenomena as well. That is to say, national*ism*, the ideology and movement, must be closely related to *national identity*, a multidimensional concept, and extended to include a specific language, sentiments, and symbolism. While for analytical purposes it is necessary to distinguish the ideological movement of national*ism* from the wider phenomenon of *national identity*, we cannot begin to understand the power and appeal of nationalism as a political force without grounding our analysis in a wider perspective whose focus is national identity treated as a collective cultural phenomenon." (Smith 1991: vii). Either nationalism is also a cultural phenomenon or national identity is a collective cultural phenomenon which is linked to, but is different and wider than nationalism, considered as both an ideology and a movement. Here and throughout his works Smith seems to support both claims. The same is true also for the relationship between nationalism and nations. He identifies "the ethnic basis of national identity" and seems to suggest that it is not nationalism that creates the nations. Then he offers a definition of ethnic community which reproposes the same problems of nations, as it is based on the belief of certain basic tenets which happened to be essentially those of nationalism (Smith 1991: ch. 2). Therefore I will employ Smith's insight with caution and I will not rely too much on his works (interesting critical analyses of Smith's many contradictory claims are in Goio 1994 and Tamir 1995).

that regime (Weber 1922-1978: ch. III; also discussed in Levi 1970: 6 and following). Ricoeur starts from Weber's insight that in any society there is a dominant group which rules and requires legitimacy to identify the proper function of ideologies. He suggests that there is always a gap between the request of legitimacy by the rulers, and the belief of the ruled in that legitimacy: this gap is filled by ideologies. Ricoeur explains this with the fact that no system of government is perfectly rational – even majority vote is a sophisticated and abstract form of violence – and hence any claim to legitimacy can never be entirely accepted (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 20-22, 198, 204, 210-216, 231-233, 285, 328-329, 339, 341).

Force may provide a surrogate for consent for a while. But as soon as the balance of power changes and some signs of weakness appear, the regime may soon collapse. It is true that in the contemporary world the military power at the disposal of the state is much greater than that which can be brought together by a rebellion. And the endurance of a stable military power may allow a system to survive without consent. Many rebellions and protests against the communist regimes in Eastern Europe failed, but as soon as the strength and the cohesiveness of the rulers diminished, the lack of consent proved fatal (Gellner 1988: 234-236). The Soviet Union represents once more a good example. The communist regime was militarily extremely powerful. Still, this ultimately did not save it from the deep distrust of the people[111]. This may also be taken to imply that civil society – that is "society minus the state" (Gellner 1988: 206) – is stronger than the state, if and when endowed with a strong ideological cohesion (Gellner 1988: 115 and following; he also discusses many historical examples). This brings Gellner to speak about the "dominant ideological institution" (Gellner 1988: 116), and to share Polanyi's idea that modernity and the industrial society required also an "ideological transition to the generalised market" (Gellner 1988: 182, and discussed in 182-189) that is the emergence of a general consent about this new form of integration of the society.

The collapse of the USSR shows very well the role of culture and the power of civil society, since its military capability were so impressive that it was indeed one of the two so-called superpowers. An analysis of the term "superpower" will also show another function of words and ideas. The superpowers fulfilled the functions previously performed by the great powers (Bull 1977-1995: ch. 9). But calling them with a new name, allowed the former great powers to keep thinking of themselves as crucial actors on the international

[111] It could be argued that this was due to the even more powerful American military capabilities. But past events in Eastern Europe had clearly shown that the USA would not intervene in the face of military force been deployed within the Soviet empire. On this point Czempiel's idea that military confrontation helped USSR to ensure internal cohesion, and that the easing of tension brought about by Gorbatchev's foreign policy had internally destabilising effects, seems plausible (Czempiel 1992).

scene, as they had been in the past (Dehio 1948-1963: Epilogue; Barraclough 1967-1990: especially chs. III and IV; Kennedy 1988: chs. 5 and 6). A clever use of words helped legitimising many states and deeply influenced the psychological attitude of millions of people for a long time, helping to hide themselves their new situation. Even recently, after the terrorist attack on the 11th of September against New York and Washington, a BBC journalist asked the Russian foreign ministry's spokesman if the new situation could allow Russia, Britain and the USA to make a new deal about nuclear and strategic weapons. No one but a British could ask such a question, implying that Britain plays a relevant role on that issue. Probably not even a French journalist may have asked the same question inserting France, beside the USA and Russia, even if the French nuclear capacity is much more autonomous from the USA than the British one. All this is partly due to the power of words and ideas as part of a culture. They can show or hide certain things. They can unite different concepts or attempt to make them be felt as one thus legitimising one with the other. The state is a great example as in different periods and in different cultures it has been linked to different concepts. Church and state in Europe, and specifically in Italy went together for a very long time, and religion and state even longer, as kings pretended to rule a polity by divine right (Gellner 1988: 93 and following). And today nation and state are often confused as one, as will be seen later on. All this is due to the possibility of words to convey more than one meaning. "Multi-strandedness generally makes it *possible* (not mandatory) to subordinate the referential to the exigencies of the social, to ensure that no fact will ever brazenly overturn the vision that is socially preferred" (Gellner 1988: 59). Eventually this is the reason why ideologies tend to depict, and bring people to consider, certain institutions as natural, legitimate and perennial (Albertini 1960-1997: 142, 145; and Gellner 1988: 11). For instance it is common to consider the history of a given nation and to trace it back for centuries although there was nothing such as that nation many centuries ago[112]. These are just a few examples to indicate the power of words and ideas, and to justify the following argumentation, which comes back to the problem of consent and legitimation and the role of culture to acquire both.

Gellner argues that the power of the sword and that of the pen are both very important as the second is able to impose some limits to the first (Gellner 1988: 93-99), since ultimately "coercers and legitimators are complementary" (Gellner 1988: 18, but see also 157). This is due to the fact that power also depends on the possibility to find allies, especially in a situation of balance of power. And those controlling culture, are generally

[112] The impossibility to write a national history was very clear to Ranke, and brought him Dehio's praise (Dehio 1948-1963: 4-5).

able to attribute legitimacy too, influencing the consent of some relevant actors and their alliances (Gellner 1988: 148; he is referring mainly to a struggle within society, and not to international conflicts). This argument was developed with special reference to the agrarian society, but it is valid in the modern world as well. The two superpowers contending for world hegemony and leadership also supported opposing ideologies to win consensus (Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. VII; Gellner 1988: 238-242, 258; and Montani 1999: 5-8)[113]. It would have been impossible to mobilise all possible support just for the struggle between the USA and the USSR national interests or reason of state. But it was possible to do so in the name of capitalist democracy and communism. It may be argued that this was just a cover for the real, and realist, conflict - by neglecting the ideological factor Kennedy (1988-1989) implicitly accepts this position. Even if this was the case – which is not sure - it was an inevitable cover, that is a necessary element to be considered in the analysis of the situation (Taylor 1954: 568), and which could evolve partially independently of the military confrontation. This also hints at the role of culture and ideology to the study of international change.

Consent for a given regime depends on many things: among them, especially in the modern world, the capacity to provide basic goods such as security and affluence (Gellner 1994: 200; and 1997: 25-26). This kind of effectiveness provides what is often called the "legitimacy of output" – which is generally attributed to, and considered insufficient for a proper legitimation of, the European Union (for example Weiler 1995; Bellamy and Warleigh 1998). But this concept is valid for any kind of political regime. If it fails to deliver on fundamental issues its consent basis may be weakened. But the other crucial element on which consent is based is the dominant political culture. If this is widely held and normatively enforces the idea that the existing regime is legitimate, this may provide a very strong support for any regime even in the face of failures to deliver essential goods. The widely held support for democracy brings people to attribute failures to the party majority and the government in office, and not necessarily to the democratic system itself. Even if sometimes a change in the government does not bring significant improvement.

The widely held idea that the nation-state is the natural political unit, helps to keep it alive in Europe although some of its main functions are now exercised by the European Union. The issue of economic sovereignty is particularly interesting as very often political debates and electoral campaigns focus on economic and fiscal policy and the consequent budget. Since the signing and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the definition of the

[113] This aspect is at the basis of Hobsbawm's interpretation of what he calls "The short twentieth century" (1994-2000).

convergence criteria for the participation in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) a strange series of events occurred in France. The opposition parties campaigned against those criteria, and won the next elections. France went from a socialist President and a socialist government to the Miterrand-Chirac cohabitation, then Chirac – at that time the most eurosceptic candidate – won the presidential election, and Juppè, also a gaullist, became Prime Minister. But once in government also the gaullists were forced to comply with the criteria, and lost popular support. This brought Jospin, the socialist leader, to take a strong stand against the convergence criteria to win the elections, leading to the Chirac-Jospin cohabitation. But less than a month later Jospin presented a budget which complied to those very criteria he had attacked during all the electoral campaign. Eventually, every government had to comply with the criteria notwithstanding its preferences: there was simply no choice. In this case the failure to change the economic policy was due to the loss of economic sovereignty which had occurred, but which nobody had presented as such to the French public, pretending that a monetary union did not imply also a loss of economic sovereignty. Similarly most analyses of the European nation-states after the Second World War point out the need for European integration in order to deliver those basic goods – security and affluence – which the European states alone had not been able to provide[114]. And this was very clear to the whole population since citizens in the previous years had been at war and not safe at home. Furthermore, they were often dependent on foreign aid to survive (Kennedy 1988-1989: 470-476). Still the widely shared belief that the nation-state is the natural political unit did provide the legitimacy to the existing states to re-build themselves instead of building something new at European level, as some federalist authors envisaged[115].

This example shows the role of culture in ensuring the legitimacy of a given order and in providing popular consent, even in the face of partial or temporary failures to deliver some basic goods. But culture has many aspects, and at different times different ones have acquired a special political relevance. That aspect will constitute the bulk of the "political" culture. Religion had been – and still is in some parts of the world – a crucial

[114] Milward claims that European integration was instrumental to the "rescue of the nation-state" (Milward 1992). This shows that the European nation-states could not solve their problems alone without recurring to the integration process. This is precisely the analysis put forward by federalist scholars discussing the crisis of the nation-state (Albertini 1961b-1999a: 224-226, 1965c-1999a: 237; Levi 1979: 13-17; Spinelli: 1991; Pistone 1999: ch. 2).

[115] Spinelli in his Ventotene's Manifesto (1941-1998) hoped that at the end of the Second World War the United States of Europe would come about as an answer to the manifest inability of the nation-states to secure peace in Europe and the consequent collapse of the economy and of the living standard of the whole European population. He underestimated the strength of nationalism.

factor to legitimise a given order, and thus an essential element of the "political" culture[116]. In the West this changed with modernity and the industrial society. Contemporary international relations, and consequently also the IR debate, are mainly based on the existence of a system of sovereign states. This situation emerged with modernity and is generally traced back to the Westphalia Treaty of 1648. I also focus on modernity and this leads me to consider the role of political ideology, rather than religion[117], as a key element for the legitimation of any political system, especially in relation to international systems change.

4.2 The concept of ideology

The word "ideology" has been attributed many different meanings. For this reason this paragraph is devoted to define the one employed in this research. I will not stick to Mannheim's, nor to Ricoeur's, terminology and distinction between ideology and utopia, for several reasons. First, they do not consider an important distinction between two different kinds of ideologies, which is extremely important to study international system change: those concerned with the definition of the proper political community, such as nationalism and federalism, and those concerned with the internal organization or the political regime of each political unit, such as liberalism and socialism[118]. It is the first kind of ideology which is crucial for international systems change, while it is the second kind on which political theory has generally focused. However, any stand about political order implicitly or explicitly require to take position on both aspects. This explains the

[116] Gellner (1988: chs. 4 and 5) offers an interesting analysis of the evolution of the role of religion and of clerics in the history of mankind. He maintains that in the agrarian societies the alliance between the clerics, who have the authority to control the religious and cultural power, and the political rulers, who control physical coercion, dominates society.

[117] I am also aware that many ideologies have often assumed the character of secularised religion, and have also employed a religious language. This is true for the communist messianic message, as for the nationalist emphasis on the sacredness of borders, or territory or of the nation itself (Albertini 1960-1997: 139).

[118] In their analysis of political ideologies both Mannheim and Ricoeur consider only those concerned with the domestic political order. By considering classes as the basic elements of society they focus on the relationship between classes inside society, but do not pay any attention to the international scene (Mannheim 1953: ch. 3 § 2 and ch. 4 §3; Ricoeur 1986-1994: 20, 218, 267, 289). Mannheim also discusses the end of utopia as socialist values get more and more integrated into society. Thus he hopes that utopian elements will remain thanks to the most disadvantaged classes still fighting for socialism and communism and to an always freer intellighentsia (Mannheim 1953: ch. 4 § 4). Indeed the welfare state tries to provide a synthesis of the values at the basis of liberalism, democracy and socialism. This does not mean that there are no other values – that is social needs – of contemporary society which have yet to find satisfactory structural answers. The discussion about global problems hints at the recognition of many new values and social needs which cannot found an answer at the national level. From this perspective the values of peace and of an environmentally sustainable economic system can sustain new ideologies as the emergence of federalists and of green movements shows. This obviously does not mean that they will necessarily be successful in attaining their goals.

internationalist aspect of most ideologies and also the possibility to link nationalism and federalism with liberalism, socialism and so on (Polanyi 1944: 29; Albertini 1960-1997: 60-63; Levi 1979: 17-19, 1993: 95-104, and 1996; Alter 1989-1994: 1; Vincent 1997). This has created a great deal of confusion in the study of political ideologies, and particularly of those related to the definition of the proper or best political community[119].

A second reason is that the distinction between ideology and utopia is not that useful for the following discussion as it has a static character. Mannheim recognises, and Ricoeur emphasises, the link between the two, their parallelisms, and the need to consider them together (Mannheim 1953; Ricoeur 1986-1994: 7-9, 191-192, 274, and 340-341). Still they do not investigate the possibility to consider them as one from a long-term historical perspective. They suggest that both ideologies and utopias are unable to conceptualise reality properly. They both contain an element of non-congruence with, deformation of, and resistance to reality (Mannheim 1953: ch.1 §4, and ch. 4 § 1; and especially Ricoeur 1986-1994: 188, 192-194, 264). The difference lies in the fact that ideologies help to consolidate and preserve the existing order, while utopias produce practical actions to change that order (Mannheim 1953: chs. I § 4, II, and IV § 1; and Ricoeur 1986-1994: 17, 183, 194-195, 302, 317). Mannheim himself recognises that this distinction is theoretically useful, but that it is difficult to employ it (1953: ch. IV § 1). The point is that the definition of a political idea as an utopia is always related to the specific historical and social situation from which we look at it. Only utopias can identify ideologies and vice versa (Mannheim 1953: ch. 4 §1; and Ricoeur 1986-1994: 191-192) In other words the dominant groups of societies often consider utopias the political stands of vanguards. Ideologies consider reality as something which cannot change. But utopias can be seen as critics of a given order, which can realize themselves and contribute to the birth of a new order, within which new utopias may emerge to criticise the old ones which in the meantime have become ideologies. Mannheim and Ricoeur recognise that the idea of freedom has produced first an utopia and then an ideology (Mannheim 1953: ch. IV §3 (b); and Ricoeur 1986-1994: 196-197). Looking from a long-term perspective liberalism, democracy, socialism can all be seen as utopias first and then as ideologies, according to Mannheim and Ricoeur's distinction

[119] Freeden (1998) examines the literature on political ideologies and suggests that many scholars do not consider nationalism and federalism as ideologies, or do so in a contradictory manner. Eventually he suggests identifying nationalist elements as supporting aspects of different ideologies. At the same time scholars of nationalism and federalism often consider them as ideologies, or at least also as ideologies (Kedourie 1960-1993; Albertini 1960-1997, 1961a-1999a, 1965a-1999a, 1993; Kohn 1961; Chabod 1961-1962; Friedrich 1968; Smith 1971 and 1991; Hobsbawm 1990; Breuilly 1993-1995; Gellner 1983, 1994, 1997; Burgess 1993; Elazar 1994; Goio 1994). The recognition of the distinction between ideologies related to the political community and to the political regime and the possibility of their linkage ensures the possibility to use the useful insights of both views.

and terminology. This is implicit in Mannheim's claim – due to his discussion only of the ideologies related to the domestic order and to his identification of classes as the main political units witin societies – that in the contemporary world the utopian elements of thinking are disappearing, given their success in empowering the social classes which they represent (Mannheim 1953: ch. IV § 4).

The idea that in the long term utopia and ideology coincide is coherent with the identification of the link between utopia and praxis. Mannheim and Ricouer recognise that utopias are attempts – and not just dreams - to change the world. Mannheim sticks to this constitutive element of utopia, while Ricoeur is more ambivalent as he considers utopias also as a literary species, that is he focuses on written and self-declared utopias (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 9, 23, 295). But utopias which try to change the world may not be written and self-defined as utopias. There is no single book which can be taken as the liberal utopia. Still, as Mannheim and Ricoeur recognise, liberalism has been first an utopia and then an ideology. Just like ideologies are linked to the praxis of political movements (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 183), the same is true for utopias. Following Mannheim, and also some passages by Ricoeur (1986-1994: 302), utopias are only those ideas which manage to change the world, which reduce the gap between what is now and what should be, according to the utopia itself. But to change political reality there is always the need for a political struggle (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 192, 273). Hence also utopias are linked with the praxis of a political movement. The success of that political movement implies that the same ideas from utopian become ideological. As Mannheim points out, utopia embodies social needs not yet addressed. Once the political order is changed to satisfy those needs, the former utopia becomes an ideology which sustains the new political order.

Interestingly Ricoeur identifies the reasons for this transformation although he does not draw the conclusions I propose. As mentioned earlier, Ricoeur recognises that both utopias and ideologies are characterised by an element of non-congruence with, deformation of, and resistance to reality. On the one hand ideology shows reality different, and better, from what it really is, and support the existing order and seems satisfied with it. It fills the gap between the request of legitimacy and the belief in that legitimacy, thus it integrates the society (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 21, 299, 327). On the other hand utopia shows that gap, highlights the faults of the current system, and indicates what should be, which is partly attainable, but which can never be fully attainable (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 299, 327). Here is the reason for the transformation of an utopia into an ideology. An utopia embodies a new social need expressed in terms of value. Once the political movement which support this claim is successful in gaining power and satisfying that social need to a

reasonable degree, it will suggest that the utopia has been fully realised, and that the new order, in which it plays a crucial part, is thus fully legitimate. In other words, it will depicts the new order as something better than what it really is. Any utopia first mobilise support against a given order, but then has to mobilise consensus for the new one to consolidate its success and the new positions of the leaders which have brought about the change. Mannheim does not clearly describe in theoretical terms this mechanism, but he hints at it three times: when he recognises this shift in the case of liberalism, when he fears the end of utopia, and when he suggests that utopias do not become ideologies until they contribute to change and not to preserve reality (Mannheim 1953: ch. 4 § 1). If this is correct, from the long-term perspective – which is necessary to study international systems change – the distinction between utopia and ideology is not necessary. It is more important the recognition of the possibility for utopias to become ideologies.

Ricoeur identifies a crucial problem which is generally overlooked and that he himself just mentions, the study of the structure of ideologies and especially of utopias, that is how a social need, or interest is expressed in terms of values up to the development of an utopia or ideology (Ricoeur 1986-1994: 9, 17-18). In his analysis Ricoeur often moves from Mannheim's to Engels's definition of utopia, that is from an idea which change the world, to an idea which is unable to cope with reality in order to change it. With Engels he suggests that utopias do not provide suggestions on how to change reality, but only a sketch of the bright future – and this is true for some literary utopias, such as those directly analysed by Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1986-1994: Part II). But from the perspective offered by Mannheim's opposite definition an idea needs to provoke some changes to be classified as an utopia (Mannheim 1953: Part II). On the basis of this first observation it is possible to describe the development of a political vision employing Albertini's insights about the structure of political ideologies and utopias[120].

For these reasons I prefer to use the insights offered by Gellner and Albertini as the basis of the following discussion about political ideologies. Accordingly I will distinguish between the ideologies related with the proper dimension of the political units and those concerned with their domestic organization. Secondly I will always called them ideologies, although I will point out that they generally have first the function to mobilise support to change a given order and to establish a new one, and then the role to legitimise what they have contributed to create, that is that in different historical moments they can be seen as utopias or ideologies on the basis of Mannheim's distinction.

[120] Albertini (1993) discusses only ideologies, but he considers federalism – which ultimately means world federalism – as an ideology. Therefore employing Mannheim's definitions it is possible to claim that Albertini is discussing together the structure of ideology and utopia.

Political ideologies have the specific function to mobilise consensus to change and/or to legitimise a given order, by producing emotional feelings of loyalty and identification (Mannheim 1953 ch. 4 §1; Gellner 1959-1979: 1-2; see also Smith 1971: 3; Stokes 1978; Ricoeur 1986-1994: 25, 192, 198, 213, 285). This function is performed through the belief in one or more basic political principles, which stand at the core of the political ideology. Hence "an ideology manifests itself simultaneously as a set of ideas or doctrines, a set of practices, and a more or less closely organised, more or less institutionalised social group" (Gellner 1959-1979: 253-254; see also 1983: 1; 1994: 69, 177-178; 1997: 3, 7, 25-26). The social group shows the ability of the ideology to mobilise support, even before its objectives have been reached.

The point is now to identify the structure of political ideologies, to see how they mobilise consensus. Albertini suggests that the basic principles at the core of any political ideology relate to three basic aspects (1993: 7-12, 20-21, 50-51, 101)[121]. Any new ideology focuses on a specific value, suggesting that it should be the main concern of a certain group, or of everybody. It is easy to associate liberalism with freedom, democracy with participation and equality, socialism with social equality or solidarity, and so on. However, the indication of a specific value is not enough. An ideology also identifies the empirical transformations required to secure that value in reality. Thus it proposes a specific institutional structure, a new political order. These elements were implicitly recognised also by Mannheim and Ricoeur. Mannheim suggests that utopias embody new social needs (1953: ch 4 § 1) and Ricoeur suggests that they describe in detail the future ideal order, although they do not offer suggestions about the transition (1986-1994: 314-317). But to effectively promote change - that is to be an utopia according Mannheim's rather than to Engels' definition – any political ideology is linked to a political movement which indicate the historical conditions in which the transition is possible. Hence they offer a vision of history to justify that "here and now", or in a short time, it will be possible to attain the goal[122]. This explains also Mannheim's idea that utopia offer a coherent view of history, because they see history as the preparation of the conditions for the establishment of the new political order they struggle for (Mannheim 1953: ch. 4 §4). According to this scheme

[121] I realise that divisions into three parts are very common in this research. Often this follows from the tripartition of the framework of analysis proposed to study international system change. Sometimes, like in this case, they are taken from other authors on specific issues. There is not any intention to consider a constant division of any theory into three aspects as particularly useful or necessary.

[122] As a specification of this third aspect, the social movement promoting a given ideology will propose a strategy, a conduct of action, to bring about the changes needed to secure that institutional structure and thus its main value.

it is possible to identify a normative – Albertini called it a value-aspect - an institutional, and a historical-social aspect in each ideology (Albertini 1993: 101).

All this argument implies that at the beginning a new ideology promotes change – in Mannheim's term is a utopia. Once it has succeeded in establishing the changes it promotes, it will perform a legitimising function for the new order. The modern world has seen the rise of liberalism, democracy, socialism, communism, fascism and nazism as new ideologies challenging the existing order. Once the institutional changes they proposed were established, these ideologies became a stabilising factor of the new order. At the same time they also became an obstacle to the success of new ideologies. Some of them have generally been rejected and are not shared by most people in the world. Liberalism, democracy and socialism are generally shared to a very high degree, and the political movements they inspired differ only in relation to government's policies, not to the political regime. This was not the case when each of them was first proposed. Their supporters had to fight, often even literally, to establish the institutional structure characteristic of each ideology. Any new ideology is revolutionary as it proposes to change in a very significant way either the political community or the political regime. Even the ideologies which are now taken for granted originated as revolutionary ones. Liberalism was a revolutionary ideology trying to reverse the *ancient regime* by establishing the rule of law. Just as the democratic ideology and its emphasis upon universal suffrage was felt as revolutionary – so much so that even great powers' foreign policy was much influenced by fear of both nationalist upheavals and/or democratic revolutions in the XIX century (Dehio 1948-1962: 184-190; Taylor 1954: xxxiii, and ch. 1; and also Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. V about the fundamental differences between XIX century liberal and XX century mass democracy). Socialism split into a socialist gradualist movement, which recognised private property and helped bringing about the welfare state, and a communist revolutionary movement which abolished private property and established a single-party state where it managed to seize power.

The crucial point is why and how a given new ideology may establish itself as a dominant one. Each ideology purports one value as the main one. However, many values can be easily accepted by most people. In the contemporary industrial society most people share the values of freedom, equality in front of the law and participation in collective decision, and solidarity. The welfare state model is an attempt to combine and ensure a reasonable degree of each and all of those values. Still people may share those values and vote differently and support different ways of balancing the one with the other. The issue is the order of priority.

The historical and social conditions heavily influence the perception of the people in assigning priority to one or another value. This idea is at the basis of the democratic system. The possibility of people changing their minds and voting differently from the previous elections presupposes the idea that people may be unhappy by the way the government has attempted to secure certain values, but also the possibility that changing conditions may bring people to give priority to other values. The political debate of most industrial societies generally focuses on economic issues, but in time of crisis security is often assigned a greater priority than affluence[123]. The debates and the measures taken by many states after the September 11th terrorist attack provide a recent and good example of this point.

It is precisely the recognition that different conditions help giving priority to one or another value that requires a new ideology to offer a vision of history and particularly of the phase in which the ideology is developed, to convince that its main value should acquire special significance. At the same time, if this vision is not plausible, the ideology will not spread out. In other words there are times particularly suited for the spread of certain ideologies. This idea underlies both Gellner and Albertini's discussion of ideologies. Gellner confronted this issue in relation to nationalism and affirmed that the possibility to develop a theory of nationalism in the agrarian society existed. It did not spread about because the historical conditions were not favourable until the industrial society came about (Gellner 1994: viii, 11, 41-44, 62-69, 177, 199-200; and 1997: 16 and following, 96 and ch. 4). At any time there may be many new competing ideologies. Eventually the one which really addresses the main problem of the time, and thus is linked to the value which is more likely to be given priority by most people, will have more chances to spread out and to establish the institutional system it supports. That is why the social group which supports a given ideology generally succeeds at a time in which its interests and those of the whole community coincide (Polanyi 1944: 133). In other words, when the situation makes the value at the basis of an ideology, and the problem addressed by it, as the main one of society, that ideology and the social group more closely linked with it will probably assert themselves. Eventually this was Polanyi's explanation of the socialist parties success in bringing about social legislation and the welfare state: it was the society response to survive the market system. Having noticed that the historical conditions have a great role in

[123] Kennedy emphasises the constant need for every state to strike a balance between economic investments and military expenditures, the first representing long-term and the second short-term security. He also highlights the influence of events on the choice about this ever-changing balance (Kennedy 1988-1989: 693-698). Kennedy's argument in relation to international relations is very similar to Tilly's one in relation to the formation of the modern state (192-1997).

the spread and success of ideology it is important to stress that once established, the ideology will ensure the consent for that system, its legitimacy, and will try to make it being felt as a "natural" system.

It is this line of argument which brought Gellner to emphasise that "men and societies frequently take the institutions and assumptions by which they live as absolute, self-evident, and given. (…) In fact, human ideas and social forms are neither static nor given. (…) We need to know the principles or factors which generate that range of options" (Gellner 1988: 11). This is why Gellner uses a refined version of historical materialism claiming that "the economic or productive base does indeed determine our problems, but that it does *not* determine our solutions" (Gellner 1988: 19). And this also explains his idea that "it is unfortunately not customary to include sketches of the social background and consequences of philosophies in expositions of them. This is deplorable because their social role is frequently an essential clue to understanding them. People do not think in a vacuum" (Gellner 1959-1979: 251). All this is very clear in Gellners's explanation of nationalism and in the attention he pays to the social conditions linked to modernity and industrialism from a political, cultural and economic perspective (Gellner 1983, 1994, 1997).

The influence of the existing social conditions, including the dominant ideological view, makes ideological innovation quite difficult. In the long term there are many chances to be unsuccessful, and in the short term there is the risk of social marginalization (Barraclough 1967-1990: 24-28; and Gellner 1988: 221-222 discusses this issue in relation to cultural innovation in general, and within the agrarian society especially). This accounts for the role of vanguards: groups which oppose the current situation from a minority position, and are ready to face social marginalization until they succeed in spreading their ideas. This also explains why it is often possible to recognise some main agents of historical change only after the change has occurred. Barraclough suggests that very few people, if anybody, would have indicated Lenin and the Bolsheviks as very important actors in the Russian and indeed world history before the Bolshevik revolution had taken place. They were a rather small group, prosecuted by the authority and disliked by most other political forces. Without the crisis provoked by the war, they would have had little chances, if any, to impose themselves and their ideas (Barraclough 1967-1990: 24-28, 36, 204-207; but see also A.J.P. Taylor 1954: xxxiv).

This highlights the power of ideology when combined with favourable historical conditions. Even a small group endowed with the "right" ideology for the historical condition of the time, may eventually succeed in bringing about a major change if a

propitious occasion comes about and the group is able to seize it – and this is why leadership is crucial for any revolutionary movement (Barraclough 1967-1990: 201-205 and 210-212; and Albertini 1956-1999b: 77-79; 1966-1999b: 70-72). In other words, Gellner's "more or less organised social group" does not need to be a very large part of society at the beginning. Still its success requires that at a certain point that ideology be shared by a significant part of the population. But its spread may be very rapid in times of crisis as the events in 1917 Russia showed (Carr 1950-1954: ch. IV; and Barraclough 1967-1990: 204).

So far I have discussed two of the three basic elements of ideology. The first one is its function to mobilise support to change or to legitimise a given order. The second one is its identification with a political doctrine characterised by a value-aspect, an institutional aspect, and a socio-historical aspect supported by an organised group. The third element traces back to Marx's definition of ideology as false consciousness and is at the basis of the analysis offered by Mannheim and Ricoeur too. Indeed, any ideology looks at the world from one perspective alone. It makes one value as the main one. It offers an institutional model aimed at ensuring that particular value, and a vision of history capable of mobilising forces to attain the necessary institutional changes now or as soon as possible. Any ideology thus offers a unilateral vision of the world and hides many other perspectives. Therefore it always involves some degree of mystification. This does not imply that all elements of an ideology are mystificatory. On the contrary, to be accepted any ideology must include elements which help understanding a given situation or solving a particular problem. At the same time it will also exclude those aspects of reality which would contradict its vision. Thus ideologies always include both true and false propositions (Gellner 1959-1979: 253-255; Albertini 1960-1997: 126-127, 142; Archard 1995).

The specific character of ideological mystification is the camouflage of a value judgement into an analytical proposition (this idea was proposed by Bergmann and is discussed in Albertini 1960-1997: 126-142; and in Goio 1994: 210-213). This is especially clear in the attempt to make certain institutions be felt as "natural" once established. Those who developed the ideology are always well aware that this is not the case, otherwise the institutions they support would have always been in place and would not require a new ideology and a political struggle to establish them. Gellner clarifies this concept in relation to nationalism, which considers nations as natural and eternal entities: "this theory is dangerous not merely because it is false, but, more significantly, because the self-evident status which it ascribes to itself, and which indeed attaches to it, makes those who hold it fail to see that they are holding a theory at all" (Gellner 1997: 7). On the other hand, nationalism has to develop the idea of the sleeping nations and of the awakening of

nations, because for long period and in many places there was no sign of nations whatsoever[124]. Thus nationalism is "a sociological self-deception, a vision of reality through a prism of illusion" (Gellner 1983: 58; but see also Albertini 1960-1997: ch. 4; Hobsbawm 1990: 78). Gellner ascribes this mystificatory character, among others, to all ideologies: "a great absurdity, a violent intellectual resistance-generating offensiveness at some one or more other points" (Gellner 1959-1979: 254, and 255). Still, once established, ideologies are powerful, due to the possibility within culture and ideologies "to subordinate the referential to the exigencies of the social" (Gellner 1988: 59). A given situation may bring people to assume a certain belief. Afterwards they will keep it even in the face of different conditions until a new belief on that issue manages to replace the old one[125].

This aspect makes for the contingency of ideologies. It is possible to unveil the mystification involved in each of them. Once this is done, their ability to legitimise and gather consent and support is limited or fades away (Gellner 1959-1979: 36)[126]. This explains why most new ideologies have to fight against one or more of the established ones, although once established they can live together and eventually strengthen each other and the existing institutional order, like it is the case for liberalism, democracy, and socialism within the welfare state. At the beginning a new ideology needs to unveil the mystificatory elements of the existing dominant ideologies which make it impossible to conceive and/or accept the perspective of the new ideology.

All this argument points to the importance of the shift in the ideological paradigm or in the dominant ideology (Gellner 1959-1979: 220). If the new ideology does not spread out, it is unlikely that its struggle to establish new institutions will succeed. Even if it did, the lack of consent for, and perceived legitimacy of, the new order would make it difficult to consolidate it. The spread of a new ideology is more likely in favourable historical conditions. Hence the social group supporting the new ideology needs to be organised and ready to seize all opportunities to increase its support and reach its institutional goals. This can be done in different ways. First, by highlighting every fact or event which helps unveiling the mystificatory element of the dominant ideology or which may bring people to

[124] This mystificatory element of nationalism is widely recognised in the literature: see for instance Kedourie 1960-1993: 1; Albertini 1960-1997: 27-31; Kohn 1961 6-7; Hobsbawn 1990: 12-13 Breuilly 1993-1995: 1; Gellner 1997: 8. Many of these authors quote Renan's famous sentence that historical mistake is a necessary component of the creation of a nation.

[125] This also explains the success of nationalism outside the geographical and historical conditions which allowed it to spread out initially. Some authors criticise Gellner's theory, which links nationalism with the industrial society, because of the existence of nationalism in areas not really or not yet industrialised (for example see Waldron 1985). But those conditions were crucial to allow the new nationalist ideology to spread out and establish itself. Afterwards nationalism as an ideology became a force in itself, precisely exploiting the power of a successful ideology.

[126] For this reason Albertini kept writing essays with the explicit aim to unveil the mystificatory element of nationalism (for instance Albertini 1960-1999a; 1960-1997: 141-145; 1961a-1999a; 1965a-1999a).

assign a higher priority to the specific value endorsed by the new ideology. Second, by suggesting solutions to urgent problems which advance towards their overall institutional goal. Third, by exploiting a serious crisis to start revolutionary upheaval, seize power and obtain changes by force. Whatever the strategy and the tactics of the organised group inspired by a given ideology, legitimisation in time of change is very important (Barnett 1997: 548). If the ideology has not spread out and the power is seized by force, it will also require more force to maintain power in face of widespread opposition. The Russian revolution provides a good example, as the successful revolutionaries had also to fight a civil war. Furthermore, also the international hostility to their ideology ensured some foreign help to their adversaries. If the ideology is already widely accepted, the new order will be easily consolidated. This is the case for many contemporary national liberation movements, which are easily recognised at the international level, sometimes even before they won their struggle.

What is important at this point is the identification of the three elements employed to define ideologies in this research. First, the function of political ideologies is to mobilise consensus to change and/or to legitimise a given political order. Second, the internal structure of any political ideology generally includes three specific aspects: a basic value or social need, the institutional structure which can satisfy that need, the historical and social conditions in which that political order can be established. Third, there are one or more mystificatory elements in every political ideology.

4.3 Legitimacy and the international order

Political ideologies have certain characteristics and have the role to promote and then to legitimise and provide consensus for a given order. The next element to be considered is the object of legitimacy. It is useful to distinguish between the legitimacy of, and the consent towards, the political community, the regime, and the government (Levi 1970: 9 and following for a detailed discussion of this issue). A nationalist separatist movement or an ethnic minority within an existing state generally question the political community as such, not just its internal regime or its government. A communist movement willing to seize power and to establish a single-party regime within a given country questions the legitimacy of the existing democratic or tyrannical regime, and not the existence of the political community as such. The legitimacy of the government is generally a reflection of the first two aspects. In a democratic regime the opposition to the

government generally does not question its legitimacy, but opposes its choices in relation to specific policies. Even when accuses of electoral fraud arise what is in question is not the democratic regime as such, but the government in place which adopted a practice in contrast with the democratic regime itself.

It is quite common to implicitly draw a horizontal axis on which to locate political ideologies as the right-left division implies. This traditional distinction between left and right does not cover all the three objects of legitimacy identified earlier. It focuses on the preferred regime and on the government policies, especially from an economic perspective in relation to more or less public intervention. The differences about political communities, and their consequences for the international order are the most relevant to study international change. This conclusion comes from both an empirical and a theoretical analysis. At an empirical level, it is easy to recognise that international wars about borders often arise because of the contested legitimacy of certain political communities on the basis of competing interests and claims by different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Obviously wars about borders may arise for other political and strategic reasons related to national interests, but even in this case they cannot be attributed to ideological differences on the right-left division. At a theoretical level it is equally easy to realise that if the nation-state, as it happens now, is regarded as the best and natural form of political communities, the possibility to establish infranational and/or supranational states is excluded (Mayall 1990-1993: 145; and Bull 1977-1995: 8, 65 in relation to sovereignty).

Most existing ideologies can easily be placed on the horizontal axis, and are mainly concerned with the internal organisation of a society, that is with the political regime, and not with the international order. They generally have an internationalist aspect, based on the idea that if all societies were democratic, or liberal, or socialist, or communist, depending on the ideology considered, there would be peace, cooperation and harmony (this view is discussed and criticised by Robbins 1937: chs. VIII, IX and XI, and 1941; Wootton 1941; Albertini 1960-1997: 60-63; Levi 1979: 17-19, 1993: 95-104, and 1996). The international order is thus taken as a by-product of the domestic order of each and every state. And this is one of the mystificatory elements of all ideologies. Considering one value as the most important, they propose the generalisation that when people and states use violence it must be in relation to that value. Hence if that value was secured in each and every country there would be no serious reason to resort to war. The problem is that only the ideology which has peace as its main value, that is federalism (Albertini 1993: Part I), may work on this issue. As a consequence it would have little to say about freedom, democracy, prosperity and so on, but on very general terms. This also explains why all

other ideologies do not consider international anarchy as a relevant factor in thinking about peace and war, while it is the most relevant one for the realist tradition and the federalist ideology.

At the same time, the ideologies of the right-left division have little to say about the proper or best political community or unit. They generally accept and take for granted the existing division of the world into states, and often into nation-states (Albertini 1960-1997: 61, 143; Levi 1979: 17-19, 1993: 95-104, and 1996; Seglow 1998: 963). In other words they are generally all combined with an idea and an ideology specifically concerned with the definition of the best political community and with the legitimation of the international order. The idea, and the legal principle, at the basis of the international order since the Treaty of Westphalia is that of sovereignty (Hinsley 1966-1986: 215-216; Bull 1977-1995: 65; Camilleri and Falk 1992: ch. 2; Biersteker and Weber 1996), or more precisely of absolute and indivisible sovereignty – this may seem an oximoron, and for Bodin or Hobbes indeed it was; but today there is a wide debate about pooled, shared and divided sovereignty, which requires this specification to be made. This idea can be associated with many different agents, and always needs to be associated with one, which should be endowed with sovereignty. At the beginning the sovereignty was attributed to the king, also called in some languages "the sovereign". But it can be attributed to an institution such as the state, or more specifically to the Parliament, or to the Government; or to the people, or to a metaphysical entity such as the nation.

This last association is particularly frequent and nationalism is probably the most successful ideology in the contemporary world[127]. On the contrary, federalism challenges the idea of exclusive and indivisible sovereignty, and also the idea of the "natural" division of the world in different states and/or in different nation-states. Thus nationalism and federalism can be considered as the two main contemporary alternative ideologies in relation to the definition of the proper political community.

These ideologies can be combined with those of the horizontal axis, related to the political regime. For example nationalism has often been declined in connection with one of the other depending on the convenience of the time and on the geopolitical situation

[127] On this issue see Albertini 1960-1997; Kedourie 1960-1993; Kohn 1961; Gellner 1964-1974, 1983, 1994, 1997; Smith 1971, 1991. Useful reviews of many different stands on this issue are in Stokes 1978; Waldron 1985; Goio 1994; Hutchinson and Smith 1994. There is still an on-going academic debate about nationalism with some authors still questioning the usefulness of considering nationalism as an ideology on its own: for instance Alter 1994; and Freeden 1998. Incidentally it is worth noting that those who do not consider nationalism as an ideology on its own, consider nationalist ideas and concepts as complements of hosting ideologies such as liberalism, democracy, socialism and so on. Their argument is based on the assumption that ideology can and must be located only on the right-left divide. The argument proposed so far shows the limits of such an assumption, and of the corresponding definition of ideology.

(Albertini 1960-1997: 60-63; Levi 1979: 17-19, 1993: 95-104, and 1996; Alter 1989-1994: 1; Vincent 1997). This has brought many scholars to classify different kinds of nationalism and nationalist movements (Smith 1971: chs. 8 and 9; Breuilly 1993-1995 part II and III). In other words within a socialist or a liberal party, there can be nationalists and federalists, just as in a nationalist or federalist movement there can be socialists and liberals. Eventually any political position always includes both aspects; still it is possible and useful to distinguish them. Rosenau (1997: 252) hints at the perennial role of the ideologies related to the definition of the political community, but the clearest indication was offered by Spinelli and provided the basis for the creation of federalist movements in Europe: "the dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of more or less democracy, or the pursuit of more or less socialism, but the division falls along a very new and substantive line: those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of the struggles as being the ancient one, the conquest of national political power and those who see the main purpose as the creation of a solid international State" (Spinelli and Rossi 1941-1998: 8). Thus Spinelli and Rossi claim that the historical conditions made the issue of the definition of the political community more important than the issue of the political regime, which was ultimately settled in favour of liberal democracy and the welfare state, at least for Western Europe.

4.4 Nationalism and federalism

Sovereignty and nationalism are the dominant concept and ideology in relation to the political community, and are at the basis of the international order (Bull 1977-1995: 8, 65). Eventually they influence every sphere of social knowledge and action, and are thus a powerful political force and factor in world politics (see Smith 1971: 3; Albertini 1961a-1999a and 1965a-1999a; Hobsbawm 1990: 1, 87; on its influence on economic thought Robbins 1952: 9-11; Montani 1996: especially ch.1, but this issue underpins the whole volume; on IR and political theory Rosenau 1997: 221).

Nationalism is often considered as an ideology (Kedourie 1960-1993: xiii; Albertini 1960-1997: ch. 4, 1961a-1999a, and 1965a-1999a; Kohn 1961: 10-11; Gellner 1983: 1 and 58, 1994: 65, 1997: 3**;** Hobsbawm 1990: 9), a political movement (Breuilly 1993: 1-2, 5), or both (Smith 1971: 3; 1991: VII; Alter 1989-1994: 1). But any political movement is defined in terms of its inspiring ideology and consequent claims. Thus a nationalist movement is a movement endowed with a nationalist ideology, as Smith recognised (1991: 73). Therefore

even scholars who study nationalist movements and offer a catalogue of them, ultimately have to offer a basic account of the core doctrine of nationalism – thus defined as an ideology or a political principle – to decide which movements can be termed nationalist (for example Breuilly 1993: 1-2). This shows the opportunity to consider nationalism as an ideology in the first place, employing the definition of ideology suggested earlier.

Gellner offered this famous definition: "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. (…) In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" (Gellner 1983: 1). But then he specifies that culture rather than ethnicity is involved: "the legitimate unit was to be one composed of persons of the same culture" (Gellner 1997: 6), and more precisely "the political unit (the state) is a protector of a culture, the culture is the symbolism and legitimation of the state" (Gellner 1994: 44; see also 1983: 4-6, 48). These sentences emphasise the link between the modern state and the nationalist ideology, also recognised by many other authors (Albertini 1960-1997: 117-139; Kohn 1961: 4, 16-20; Hobsbawm 1990: 9-10; Breuilly 1993: x, xii, 1; De-Shalit 1996; Alter 1994: 4-6; Goio 1994). For these authors nationalism is a political principle which links culture and politics, and more precisely culture and the modern state.

Nationalism as a legitimising political principle has been defined in different ways, many of which point in the same direction. I will discuss only some of them. Breuilly reduced them to "three basic assertions: (a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. (b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and value. (c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty" (Breuilly 1993: 2)[128]. Thus nationalism is basically an ideology which takes as its main value the self-determination of the nation (Kedourie 1960-1993: 85). This is to be ensured by providing the nation with an

[128] Smith's classical suggestion is that the core doctrine of nationalism is based on seven propositions: "1) Humanity is naturally divided into nations. 2) Each nation has its peculiar character. 3) The source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity. 4) For freedom and self-realization, men must identify with a nation. 5) Nations can only be fulfilled in their own States. 6) Loyalty to the nation-States overrides other loyalties. 7) The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-State" (Smith 1971: 21). Later on he retains only four of them by combining propositions 1) and 2), 3) and 6), and abolishing altogether proposition 5), thus explicitly refusing to identify a fundamental connection between nationalism and the state (Smith 1991: 74). Both definitions refer only to a "good" version of nationalism, which aims at peace and harmony and excludes expansionism and hegemony. It is a form of nationalism with its internationalist aspect: if every nation had its own state, there would be global freedom and harmony. But the nationalist ideology may also take a less positive face, as in the fascist and nazist doctrines. Thus Breuilly definition is more useful, because it does not exclude *a priori* certain kinds of nationalist doctrines through a narrow definition of nationalism, since "it is absurd to exclude Nazism as a form of nationalism" (Breuilly 1993-1995: 3; against the many attempts to distinguish between good and bad nationalisms - often proposed in terms of mine is good and yours is bad - as if they were not versions of the same ideology see also Albertini 1960-1997: 60-63; Chabod 1961-1962: 81; and Vincent 1997).

institutional organization, the state, to exercise the sovereignty of the nation[129]. The socio-historical aspect is based on the idea that the world is naturally divided into nations, which are perennial entities, which sometimes are temporarily unaware of themselves, sleeping nations, but should be awakened as soon as possible so that they can claim their own state.

The problem lies in the impossibility to define precisely and objectively a nation (for this and the following analysis see Albertini 1960-1997: 40-43; Kohn 1961: 4-6; Gellner 1983: 2-7, 43-49, 1994: 178, and 1997: 8, 90-101; Hobsbawm 1990: 7; Anderson 1991: 3). Everywhere it is possible to create a nation on the basis of some pre-existing elements of communality at the expense of others. Many authors have attempted to indicate the constituent parts of the nation and have emphasised language, culture, religion, and ethnicity. But no nation in the world really has all those components. Therefore different groups can consider one of these elements as the main one, and produce competing nationalisms on equally (im)plausible nationalist grounds. This justifies Anderson's (1991) famous claim that nations are "imagined communities". Gellner goes further, claiming that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically" (Gellner 1983: 49 and 55)[130]. This also implies that they are not natural and perennial.

Nationalism can appear anywhere on the basis of different existing elements. But it appears in different places at various times. The crucial element is the link between the nation and the modern state. Nationalism emerges and is adopted to legitimate existing states, or to support the creation of new ones. This is extremely clear in relation to nationalist movements and their claim. Nationalism is then linked with the state, and its appearance was impossible before the creation of the state (Albertini 1960-1997: 117-139; Kohn 1961: 4, 16-20; Hobsbawm 1990: 9-10; Breuilly 1993: x, xii, 1; De-Shalit 1996; Alter 1994: 4-6; Goio 1994). Eventually it is linked even more precisely with the concept of absolute and indivisible sovereignty which is at the basis of the modern state and is reflected into the nation, also considered as indivisible and having absolute value since its interests must override any other. In fact this aspect of nationalism derives from its being the ideological reflection of the modern bureaucratic and centralised state endowed with

[129] De-Shalit (1996) offers a very clear and convincing account of the fact that nationalism implies political and not just cultural self-determination, against Tamir's version of liberal, and only cultural, nationalism (Tamir 1993).

[130] Eventually this also undermines Smith's attempt to link nationalism with a pre-existing national identity (Smith 1991: vii). To show the inconsistency and absurdity of this claim is one of Breuilly explicit aims (1993-1995: 1; the same is true for authors such as Albertini 1960-1997, 1961, 1965; Kohn 1961: 4-6; Hobsbawm 1990: 7-10).

sovereignty. The emergence of this form of state and of this concentration of power (Poggi 1978 and 1990: ch. 2) required a legitimation principle with similar characteristics (Albertini 1960-1997: ch. 4; and 1965a-1999a; but this insight in a less explicit form is also the basis of Carr 1945). Breuilly clarifies that nationalist movements always want independence, although temporarily for tactical reason, they may demand autonomy rather than independence, as a step in the right direction, and when independence is not achievable (Breuilly 1993: 2, 15; and De-Shalit 1996; this is also implicit in the argument of all authors who consider nationalism as inextricably linked with the state).

The specific character of the nation-state is that "the political unit (the state) is a protector of a culture, the culture is the symbolism and legitimation of the state" (Gellner 1994: 44). Hence the nation-state tends towards the centralisation of power and the homogenisation of the society through the imposition of a national language and history, what Gellner called a "high culture", by means of the national school (Albertini 1960-1997: 99-102; Gellner 1983: 57). This is true both for nationalisms based on existing states, and for those aiming at building new ones. The case of France and Italy are exemplary. In 1789 the French National Assembly made laws "*in tous les idiomes*" (in all the languages). Only the Convention turned to French, established primary education and sent French teachers in every district to promote national feelings (Albertini 1961a-1999a: 32-33 examines this historical example; but see also Hobsbawm 1990: 19-21). Massimo D'Azeglio's famous sentence "Fatta l'Italia bisogna fare gli italiani" (Made Italy, we must make the Italians) clearly shows the lack of national feelings and national identity in the new unified Italian state[131]. The ruling dynasty of Piedmont which unified Italy was from Savoy, thus, in today national terms, French. Their court and Parliament used the French language. And the Italian greatest national hero, Garibaldi, was from Nice, well beyond the natural and/or sacred borders of the Alps[132]. The state owned school had an important role in creating the nation (Soldani and Turi, 1993, especially Vol. I). Still nation-building would have failed if the conditions for success were not there. This introduces the problem of the historical-social aspect of nationalism and of the conditions for its success.

"The real problem in understanding nationalism is: why is it that, of the many things found within this world, which in the past often have attracted devotion and loyalty, it is precisely large, anonymous categories of people-sharing-the-same-culture, which

[131] This argument can be used to support the thesis of the leading role of the intellectuals in the start of any nationalist feeling and movement (Smith 1991: 64-69, 92-98). This is the role played in the emergence of any ideology by the intellectual vanguards, identified earlier.

[132] In relation to the nationalist use of religious symbols and language see Chabod 1961-1962: 50-52; also Albertini 1960-1997: 139.

capture most of the available political affect?" (Gellner 1994: 69). Gellner suggests it was due to the new political relevance of culture which characterises industrial society (Gellner 1994: 62, 63, 177), which is based on semantic work. "In industrial society, physical work is virtually unknown (…). What passes for manual work generally presupposes the capacity to read instructions and manuals". Hence "it is the first society in history in which literacy is near universal; to put it another way, it is also the first society ever in which a high culture becomes the pervasive culture of the entire society, displacing folk or low culture ". This makes possible the establishment of the principle "that homogeneity of culture is *the* political bond, that mastery of (and, one should add, acceptability in) a given high culture (the one used by the surrounding bureaucracies) is the precondition of political, economic and social citizenship" (Gellner 1997: 28 and 29). Anderson (1991: ch. 3) pays attention to similar factors when he emphasises the role of capitalism, printing and the existence of different languages and the need for large linguistic markets. Eventually the issue is more industrialism than capitalism and the need of large market to exploit the new means of production (Albertini 1960-1997: 97-102, and 1965a-1999a). This is very clear in the XIX century nationalist formulation which placed great emphasis on the "threshold principle" of nation, that is on their being politically and economically viable (Hobsbawm 1990: 31-42, 102).

"The national road to either capitalism or socialism was not only viable, but mandatory. It was the *national* path to industrialism that was essential " (Gellner 1994: 13). This was due to the role of the state in establishing the conditions for the market to function (Robbins 1952: 9-11), and in protecting the new-comers (List 1837-1983: especially chs. 2, 5, and 1856: especially the Introduction and Book 2; also discussed in Gellner 1994: ch. 1; and in Montani 1996 ch. 4). Industrialization did not take place at the same time, and with the same speed everywhere. Late-comers needed the protection of the state to start their business before being able to compete on the international level. Eventually, as mentioned in chapter three, the weakness of Ricardo's theory of comparative costs in promoting international free trade is precisely that it did not take this fact into account. Living in the state which had industrialised earlier he could only see the advantages of free trade. But that system helps the strongest state by keeping it producing and selling industrial goods, while other countries produce agricultural goods. List suggested that with an initial state intervention all states could industrialise and then their firms could successfully compete against foreign firms. The success of German industry would not have been possible otherwise, and showed the correctness of List's perspective.

The new role acquired by the state in the regulation of the economy during the industrialisation helped to strengthen the modern bureaucratic and centralised state. The importance of literacy helped the association of culture and politics. Nationalism provided the ideology to link them through the concept of nation, which recalled both a political and a cultural aspect. The concept of nation hinted at a cultural collective being, with a right to self-determination which required a political roof, the modern state. Thus the nation and the state became two faces of the same coin. The state refers to the empirically identifiable bureaucratic apparatus which makes political institution. The nation refers to the representation of this entity and of its legitimacy in the mind of its citizens (Albertini 1960-1997: ch. 4).

Nations however are imagined communities, which cannot be defined objectively. This is the mystificatory element of nationalism: the fact that it portraits nations as natural and perennial entities, while they are not. Thus "the phenomenon of nationalism is like a recurring decimal, it has no end, every national flea has smaller fleas to plague it in turn, not to mention the fact that fleas of the same size also torment each other" as the XX century history of the Hapsburg Empire and of Yugoslavia clearly shows (Gellner 1994: 177-178). This also undermines the nationalist version of internationalism, that is the idea that if each and every nation had its own state they would cooperate between each other without recurring to war (recent supporters of this argument, which had in Mazzini a classical theorist, are Smith 1971: 21, and 1991: 74; and Moore 1997). The logic of nationalism can be applied at different levels. Thus it is possible to have nationalism at the level of a city, a province, a region, a macro-region, a nation - taken here on the basis of the European dimension of nations - a continent, or almost a continent, such as the USA, Russia, China, India, Australia, Europe[133]. But nationalism requires the idea that one and only one is the proper political community, the nation – at whatever level it is recognised, such as Lombardy, Padania, Italy or Europe - which has the right to self-determination.

It is now possible to summarise the definition of nationalism as an ideology. It draws its capability to mobilise and legitimise from its being "a state of mind, an act of consciousness" (Kohn 1961: 10). "Modern nationalism, which is a passionate identification with large, anonymous communities of shared culture and cultural imagery, creates its units out of pre-existing differences of various kinds" (Gellner 1994: 178). Nationalism is thus

[133] It is interesting to note that even Smith, who ultimately tries to separate nationalism from the state, raises this point. He suggests considering those who want a European state as pan-European nationalists. This shows on the one hand the strong link between nationalism and the state even in his mind. And on the other the little relevance of culture for nationalism, since it is difficult to find anybody willing one European state and one European culture. Even the most committed federalists, who are considered the group most in favour of a European (federal) state, would be strongly against the idea of one European culture.

the ideology which supports the cognitive representation of the citizens relationship with its state as the nation (Albertini 1960-1997: ch. 4). It links politics and culture in order to legitimise the state. It spread out thanks to the historical conditions created by the industrial revolution. But then it became a political force on its own, given its success in making people believe that nations exist and that they are natural and perennial entities.

From a domestic perspective nationalism stands for the right of self-determination of the nation through the establishment of a state. From an international perspective nationalism supports international anarchy, that is the division of the world into separate nation-states. The opposite claim is advanced by cosmopolitanism, which indicates the world as the proper political unit. Obviously this is also generally linked to the recognition that the world may be one proper level of government, but not the only one. It is difficult, if not impossible altogether, to find anybody in favour of a world centralised government, or of only a cosmopolitan level of government. Cosmopolitanism is thus often linked with federalism[134], which suggests that different problems should be dealt with at different levels of government. Thus decision-making powers can be attributed to various levels of government in relation to different issues. This implies that two powers are crucial. First, the competence to interpret the constitution in relation to the attribution of competences among the different levels of government in case of conflicts among them. Second, the power to write, ratify, and amend the constitution. If the institutions endowed with these powers are composed by representative of different levels of government, and not of just one of them, it is plausible not to expect them to take their decision *a priori* on the basis of their being expression of just one level of government.

Albertini (1993) suggests that federalism can also be defined as an ideology[135], opposite to nationalism. Nationalism supports domestic unity and international division.

[134] There are cosmopolitans who do not support federalism, considering federal systems too centralised. For example some scholars support an idea of "cosmopolitan democracy" which should combine the features of the federal and the confederal model (Falk 1995; Held 1995; Archibugi and Held (eds) 1995; McGrew 1997a and 1997b; Archibugi, Held, and Köhler (eds) 1998). The term "cosmopolitan democracy" is misleading as federalists also consider themselves as advocates of supranational and ultimately cosmopolitan democracy. Once again this choice shows the importance of words since "cosmopolitan democracy" is probably the best label or slogan any cosmopolitan group can share. I will consider mainly federalism since this has been defined as an ideology (Albertini 1993) and it is possible to identify organised movements which support it. It is not possible to do so with "cosmopolitan democracy". The latter can be considered as a variant of federalism, since it proposes a slightly different institutional model within a line of argument which is essentially shared with the federalist tradition. It is also difficult to identify an organised movement supporting the "cosmopolitan democracy" model, but rather a group of academics, which may be considered as an epistemic community, although this term is usually adopted to indicate all those specialists on one issue and not only the ones proposing one of the possible courses of action in relation to that issue (Haas 1990).

[135] I will not consider here Elazar's definition of federalism as a principle which can take different forms, from the confederation to the federal state (Elazar 1987), for two main reasons. On the one hand I maintain the usefulness of the distinction between confederation and federation or federal state, which Elazar refuses. Ultimately a confederation leaves sovereignty to the member states, and can be considered as a mere alliance

Federalism supports supranational unity and domestic division or articulation, that is diversity within unity. Peace is the main value for federalism, on the basis of the insights developed by Kant and Hamilton. Federalism accepts the realist identification of international anarchy as the condition of possibility of war, and suggests overcoming it through supranational federations, and eventually a world federation.

The institutional aspect is the federal state. There is often some confusion about the concept of sovereignty in the federal state. If sovereignty is considered as the power of last resort decision-making on a certain issue, the federation allows for a division of sovereignty between different levels of government. The federal level would be usually entitled with ultimate authority on foreign and security policy for instance, while member states can have ultimate authority on other issues such as the education system or even penal legislation[136]. It is possible to argue that sovereignty is attributed to the federal government if this is endowed with the monopoly of physical coercion, following Weber famous definition of the state (Weber 1922-1978: vol. II. Section VIII § 2). However, the 1787 American constitution which established the federal state included provisions for both a federal army and member states police and militias. Even if the federal level of government had the monopoly of physical coercion, this would not take away all member states sovereignty. If, as it is usually the case, the decision to employ the army requires a parliamentary decision, the member states will have a decisive say through the chamber of the states – such as the American Senate, especially before the XVII Amendment of 1913**,** or the German Bundesrat. Furthermore, the efficacy of a legal system does not normally require the monopoly of force. The sentences of the European Court of Justice are applied, even if the EU does not have the monopoly of force.

The concept of division of sovereignty and of shared sovereignty is best understood looking at the difference between a federal state and a decentralized state. The Italian Constitution assigns certain competences to Regions, Provinces, and Municipalities. However the Constitution was written by a Constituent Assembly in which these entities had no role as such. And the Constitution can be amended through a procedure which excludes them. The British process of devolution is very similar, in fact it is even worse

of states. The 1777-1787 American confederation is a clear example of this situation (Kramnik 1987: 12-36; Levi 1997: 10-12, 32-34, 69-71). The federation has generally been recognised as a state. It is different from a bureaucratic centralised state, but it still is a state. The best account and analysis on this issue is the classic Wheare 1963-1980. A recent and extremely useful discussion is also in Levi 1997. On the other hand, Elazar's definition would leave undetermined the institutional aspect of federalism. Hence it would not be able to be the basis of an organised group supporting a certain sets of new institutional arrangements.

[136] The USA does not forbid the death penalty. This implies that decisions about life and death are taken by the member states. On a theoretical ground death penalty should be forbidden in a federation, since federalism purports peace as its main value.

from a federalist perspective. The British Parliament decides on devolution. It can take back the devolved powers by a new act, and if it passes a law on issues devolved it is still valid in the whole UK. A federal state is characterised by the fact that the Constitution assigns different competences to different levels of government. And that more than one level have an essential say in the process of amendment of the Constitution. Therefore it is not possible for the federal level of government to take away member states competences without their consent. Obviously, if in the course of history new conditions require a change in the attribution of competences and all levels of government recognise this, there must be the possibility of a change. But it cannot be a decision taken by one level of government alone (Wheare 1941, and 1963-1980: chs. I and II, especially 21).

All this shows the crucial role of the Constitutional Court in a federation, as it has the power to decide when a conflict of competences arises. Once again the power to nominate the constitutional judges will be crucial. It would be appropriate that they be nominated by different levels of government as well, although this is not always the case even in some existing federations. Eventually it is appropriate to think of a federal state as having many different levels of government – historically federations have generally had two main levels, but the logic of the subsidiarity principle could be applied to establish many more levels – each of which is sovereign on certain issues. But it is still possible to think about an overall sovereignty, the power to take ultimate decisions in time of crisis. This is attributed to the federation as a whole, and not to any one single level of government, not even the federal level. This happens through the principle of double representation of the citizens and of the member states which characterises the federal system. And this can be applied both to the legislative and the judiciary power as mentioned before[137].

Thus the characteristic of the federal state is its negation of the principle of absolute and indivisible sovereignty[138]. This is one of the reasons of the federalist opposition to nationalism. Another one is due to the historical-social aspect of federalism.

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137 An excellent and detailed discussion of this issue is offered by Levi 1997: especially 32-37.

138 However many federations have undergone some centralising tendencies, and some authors claim that "the federal form of state is always a unitary state in the process of formation or dissolution" (Hinsley 1966-1986: 219). Wheare (1963-1980: ch. XII) offers a useful analysis of the causes of this trend. Sometimes this was due to the evolution of society and applied to all kinds of states: it is the case of completely new competencies in relation to the economy for instance, that in the USA Constitution of 1787 were not attributed altogether. But most of the times they were due to wars and other international requirements. The First and the Second World Wars produced a centralization in all federal states, and after the war this was undone to a limited degree, also to face the post-war recovery. In the USA this process was stronger, especially after the Second World War, due to their new international role. This shows that any federation will run some risks of centralisation until a world federation is established, since this trend is mainly due to the situation of international anarchy. This was also one of the main factors in the centralisation of power which brought to the creation of the modern state (Poggi 1978 and 1990: ch 3; Montani 1999: ch. I).

Nationalism suggests that the nation is natural and perennial and is the appropriate political unit, often defined as a community of fate. Federalism suggests that ultimately the only objectively defined collective entity is mankind. All other distinctions can be justified on different grounds, but no one has any really compelling power to define the proper political community. It is useful and appropriate to distinguish different communities between the individual and mankind, but none of them is entitled to claim absolute authority and loyalty. Different communities have to cope with certain problems and should have the right to democratic collective institutions to deal with them. This is true from the local to the global level. Global problems call for the establishment of a democratic world government to deal with them, but not with other problems.

Obviously the problem of the historical conditions in which such a programme becomes attainable arises. It is significant that the World Federalist Movement was created after the Second World War, when nuclear weapons made it possible to think about the end of mankind by human action. As Kant had predicted, when war becomes so destructive as to be unbearable, men cannot postpone the problem of establishing peace (Kant 1793-1991: 90). Also the globalization process and the emergence of other global problems (Soroos 1986-1989) can be considered as events which make such program more feasible. However, political institutions may be established only among a very interdependent group. To be interdependent on a few issues may suffice if they are a matter of life and death. This helps to explain the spread of regional integration processes (Johnson 1991; and Telò 2001) of which the European one is the most advanced one in terms of the creation of supranational institutions. Eventually regional groups may become the pillars on which to build a world federation (Levi 1999, 2000, and 2001; and see also Viviani 1998).

This program is still far away from being accomplished. It is often not even considered a feasible, nor useful, project. It is then clear that nationalism is the dominant ideology in relation to the definition of the appropriate political community. Nationalism had to come about so that nationalist movements could be created and regional and supranational states dismantled, thus producing an international systems change. But it is also true that some of the nation-states came about as dynastic states, and helped the establishment of nationalism in two ways. First they helped to develop it to legitimise themselves. Secondly, they helped to spread it, because other peoples had to follow the same path and to build big powerful nation-states if they did not wish to be conquered by the existing ones. Ideologies help to produce changes, but often also reflect change.

As nationalism was necessary to create nation-states, so federalism is to establish federal states. If culture guides thought and action, an appropriate political ideology is necessary to guide human conduct towards a given goal, being it the nation-state or the federal state. Until people believe that the nation-state is the appropriate political unit, and eventually also the only appropriate locus for democratic decisions, a new international systems change will not be possible. At the same time an international systems change has already taken place, although people have paid little attention to it. The emergence of a bipolar world after the Second World War, implied that a new world state system had come about, in place of the previous European state system (Dehio 1948-1963: Epilogue; Albertini 1961b-1999a, 1965c-1999a, and 1966-1999b; Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. IV; Kennedy 1988-1989: chs. 5-7). And this also implied that the dimension required to be a "great power" in this new system had become significantly different from the past.

This helps to explain the European integration process, which started soon after the Second World War among countries and people which had been enemies for centuries, such as France and Germany[139]. Eventually people have to face reality and deal with it. Einaudi, President of the Italian republic, had to do so in those difficult years and recognised that "the contemporary states are dust without substance" (Einaudi 1956: 89, my translation). Most states were just too small to play a significant role in world politics. The need for ever bigger market to exploit the most advanced means of production encouraged the creation of free trade areas, the start of economic integration process, and eventually the start of the globalization process. Integration processes are means to enhance the collective power of the member states and their citizens. But ultimately this requires some form of political union. The EU is the best example of the ineffectiveness of economic union alone to acquire great power role as shown by the famous sentence "the EU is an economic giant and a political dwarf".

Federalism as an ideology has come about because there were some elements of the political reality which could be better understood from a federalist than from a nationalist perspective. If those aspects are strengthened, the chances for federalism to replace nationalism as the new dominant ideology will grow. Eventually the success of integration processes and their spread may be a sign of the declining power of nationalism. Certainly national sovereignty is being eroded. Concepts such as shared or pooled sovereignty are being discussed. If some of these processes succeed in bringing about a new (federal) state, able to have its say in world politics, this example may push others to follow the same path.

[139] It is worth recalling that the Schuman Declaration of the 9th of May 1950 was directed to Germany and to all other interested countries (the Declaration can be consulted in different languages at the following site: http://www.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/declaration.html).

Furthermore, institutions can have a powerful role in creating feelings of loyalty. Certainly neither American patriotism, nor nationalism, existed before the establishment of the federation (Kramnick 1987: 12-36; Albertini 1960-1997: 63-70; Levi 1997: 80-95). D'Azeglio's claim showed that the same was true for Italy. There were nationalist intellectuals, just as there was a communist vanguard in Russia, and as there are federalist movements in Europe and in the world. If the historical conditions are propitious, many vanguards may eventually reach their goals.

The role of culture and ideology is thus important for international systems change in different manners. On the one hand without an ideology and an organised group proposing a certain new conduct of action, that conduct will never come about, if it is against the existing dominant ideology. On the other hand if a new institutional system is established without much consciousness of all its new features and implications, this may not survive if a proper ideology to legitimise it is not developed. In relation to international systems change nationalism and federalism are the main competing ideologies. This fight of ideas may have an impact on the future of the international system. It is questionable if the abandoning or weakening of nationalist ideology and the strengthening of federalism would be a likely or a positive scenario, but there can be little doubt that this is one of the conditions of possibility of IR systems change (implicit in Mayall 1990-1993: 145).

CHAPTER 5. THE PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

Introduction

The framework of analysis proposed in this research is based on the consideration that realism, historical materialism and social constructivism, are all too unilateral to offer a satisfactory grasp of international change. This is particularly true for international systems change, which has rarely been at the centre of their analysis. However each of these schools of thought helped to identify the heuristic tools to study the three realms of coercion, production, and culture, on which the previous chapters have focused.

It is time to look at the patterns of interaction between these three realms. This will show the impossibility to consider one of the aspects as the "motor" of history in general. Even if it was possible to identify one element as the crucial one in one transformation, this may not be the case in another since "there is no guarantee that the underlying mechanism of social change is similar in all great historic transformations" (Gellner 1994: 9). History is too varied to make easy generalisations. Several examples show that a change in any one of these aspects can start a process of overall change interacting with the other aspects (Rosenau 1992: 17).

At a theoretical level there is the need to indicate how to employ in a complementary way the analytical instruments offered by the three schools of thought considered in the previous chapters and to discuss the relationship and the relative strength of each aspect. I will first analyse the considerations offered by the authors who inspired the framework of analysis, although they mainly refer to the interaction within a given society. Then I will briefly consider this relationship with reference to international change. The following paragraphs will focus specifically on international systems change which will be discussed in more detail. Following this analysis I will try to put forward some theoretical remarks in the last paragraph.

5.1 General considerations on the relative strength and interaction of the three spheres

Gellner addresses the question of the relationship among the different spheres in many occasions. He maintains that, especially within the agrarian society, "the sword is mightier than the plough" (1988: 156). This is due to their different inner logic: "economic advantage is divisible, calculable and negotiable. Coercion is not. It operates in a context of incommensurate, starkes, yes/no absolutes. Economic exchange is the sphere of fine adjustment. The operating sanction or incentive is *advantage*. (…) Coercion is totally different. The final sanction of coercion, the *ultima ratio regis*, is the infliction of death. Death is incommensurate with other things" (Gellner 1988: 176-177). Obviously this is an overemphasised contrast. Gellner recognises that "societies often succeed in taming, ritualizing, restraining violence and coercion. A society is a group of people, endowed with a mechanism which inhibits pre-emptive escalation of conflict" (Gellner 1988: 177-178). And this may be temporarily true on the international level as well: many wars fought within the European state system in the XIX century had not a total character and the very existence of the contending states was not at stake (Polanyi 1944: ch. 1; Dehio 1948-1963: ch. 4.1; Gellner 1988: 177; Kennedy 1988-1989: especially 246-248). The problem lies in the "temporary" character of that situation which is ultimately due to the fact that there is an international society, but it is an anarchical one (Bull 1977-1995: vii-xii, 13-15, 44-49, 225). In other words, the logic of power allows only two solutions: hegemony or balance (as Dehio 1948-1963 German title recalls; and see also Gellner 1988: 147). Self-restrain works temporarily since it is linked to the situation of balance of power. During a hegemonic struggle there are often no limits, and war acquires as much a total character as it is possible in the historical conditions of the time[140]. "In serious military and political struggles, victory and defeat are irreversible, and infinitely distant from each other. *Vae victis*: a real victor does not allow the vanquished to have another go next season. That would be utter folly. The vanquished of this season, if allowed another try next year, would not be so foolish as to indulge in similar generosity. The logic of deterrent nuclear strategy is that neither victor nor loser will be there when next season come" (Gellner 1988: 179).

Only in a situation of balance of power there can be limits to the logic of power. Unfortunately, such a balance is always precarious (as Dehio 1948-1963 English translation

[140] Dehio (1948-1963: 138, 173, 234-236, 260) suggests that both Napoleon and Hitler mobilised all resources of the society as much as they could. However the technological level, and the organisation of the state at the time of Napoleon could not allow a mobilisation such as the one achieved by Hitler.

of the title maintains; see also Gellner 1988: 149). In such a situation legitimacy is crucial to keep consensus and to find allies, therefore the role of intellectuals and ideology is strengthened (Gellner 1988: 93-100). At those times more than ever "coercers and legitimators are complementary" (Gellner 1988: 18, and also 157). At this point the role of culture and production can be enhanced (Gellner 1988: 148-154, also for the following argument), because coercers may not have the strength to take most of the production away from the producers, also because of the intervention of the legitimators. Under these conditions the industrial revolution and the coming about of a new society, characterised by a domestic balance of power, in which producers and economic issue have a major role, was possible.

This hints at the link between the evolution of the means of production and the role and forms of power and culture. In a Malthusian agrarian society famine is recurrent and people starve in a definite order: first the peasants, last the coercers. Coercers, not producers, dispose of the production. And it is pointless for the producers to maximise production, because the surplus will be taken away by the coercers (Gellner 1988: 154-158)[141]. When a situation of balance of power occurs, this may allow producers to retain a larger share of production and encourages innovation. Eventually, this may produce a technological breakthrough, a dramatic improvement in the means of production which significantly increases productivity and brings a society out of the Malthusian cycle. This may provoke a change in the relationship between coercion, production and cognition.

In a non-Malthusian society everybody can get richer by allowing the best exploitation of the means of production. Hence, within an industrial society a market system can be established and may consolidate itself. The producers can keep most of the production, but what goes to the coercers will still be much more than in the past. Economic prosperity becomes useful and instrumental to political power as well. Technological innovation proves beneficial to coercers as it increases the overall resources at their disposal, especially when they are most needed, since during international crises all resources of the society can be mobilised. Furthermore, technological innovation may bring great military advantages. Either other societies adopt the same technology or they will be too weak to resist an attack. This also helps the spread of the new technologies by emulation or conquest (Gellner 1988: 200). Different historians explain the rise of Britain as the hegemon of the European state system with its technological and economic

[141] The communist regime can be taken as an example. It combined industrial technology with the supremacy of the coercers over producers and discouraged producers since maximisation of production did not imply greater wealth for them. Thus the same logic of stagnation characteristic of the agrarian society dominated. And this helps to explain the inefficiency of the communist economic system compared to the capitalist one.

performances, although they did not have an immediate military application (Dehio 1948-1963: 133-135; Kennedy 1988-1989: 193-203).

Such a dramatic transformation from the agrarian to the industrial society also requires a change in the way of thinking: an ideological change towards a market society is needed (Polanyi 1944: 40-41; and Gellner 1988: 182-189)[142]. This is due to the fact that "historical transformations are transmitted by culture" (Gellner 1988: 14). Any society, and especially new ones, needs legitimacy. The communist and the liberal – from an economic perspective - ideologies were both answers to that dramatic change, which helped to establish and to legitimise two different forms of integration within an industrial society. Even if ideas may sometimes follow and respond to the material situation, they also have an influence of their own. The ideas developed in the early transition period can have a huge impact on the future. Polanyi considers classic economic liberalism as an answer to the industrial revolution, developed mainly by British thinkers, from Smith to Ricardo, observing that great transformation where it first took place. However, the main tenets of this new discipline were largely mistaken because they were developed in a situation in which there was not a labour market, although this was not acknowledged. It took much time for those mistakes to be corrected. In the meantime they influenced negatively the economic and social policies, and were thus an obstacle to the society adjustment to the new situation. Eventually other states which industrialised later on, adopted quite rapidly the policies that the British had adopted after some decades in which the misery of the working class had been astonishing (Polanyi 1944: 84-85, 104-108, 122-127).

At the same time the new society required coercion too. The state is necessary to secure order and to set the rules of the market (Polanyi 1944: 65; Robbins 1952: 9-11; Gellner 1988: 181, 187). Eventually, it may turn to be necessary also to constrain the market in order to make it acceptable for the whole society, thus avoiding its overall rejection and dismissal (Polanyi 1944: 3, 76, 130-132). The latter was a possibility - since any given technological level, that is any stage in the evolution of the means of production, can be associated with different forms of integration - as the soviet revolution showed. The communist regime attempted to get the benefits of the industrial technology together with a form of integration which preserved the priority of the coercers over the producers.

These comments mainly concern the interaction of the three spheres within a given society. It is time to focus on international change, and then on international systems change specifically. The evolution of the means of production influences the power

[142] Polanyi and Gellner agree on this point. Still they differ in the fact that Gellner employs Polanyi's distinction between reciprocity, redistribution and exchange as stages of development, and wrongly attributes this use to Polanyi (clear opposite statements are in Polanyi 1957: 256; 1977: 42).

situation and the ideological scene. The state endowed with a new technology ensuring either a greater productivity or enhanced military capability will be significantly more powerful than its rivals until the others do not have access to that technology, as military history shows (Kennedy 1988-1989: 25-38, 494-496, 509-511, 566-573).

At the same time the exploitation of new means of production may require a change in the form of integration of that society, which in turn needs an ideological change to be accepted. If industrialisation provided the conditions for the development of two opposing ideologies in relation to the domestic regime, it also helped the development and the spread of nationalism (Gellner 1994: 62-63, 177; 1997: 28 and 29). This was needed to legitimise the political community and also to justify the external exploitation of the new means of production, for instance through military conquest of other states. This was translated into many ideas which could be easily linked with nationalism – from the justification of any measure which could bring economic benefit to the nation, to the duty of the nation to civilize other parts of the world, to the simple idea that in a world of nations, war and conquest were the means of a natural selection following which the most powerful nation could dominate on the basis of the right of the stronger to rule.

The power situation deeply influences the evolution of culture and ideology, and in a less direct way also the evolution of the mode of production. A continental state is more likely to have a centralised and illiberal government, to be characterised by a militaristic and expansionist foreign policy, and to be vulnerable to the spread of extreme forms of nationalism. On the contrary an insular state is more likely to have a liberal regime (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1788-1987: paper VIII; Seeley 1896-1919: lecture VI, especially 129-134; Dehio 1948-1963: 68, 255). Gellner defines the latter as an internal balance of powers among coercers which allows greater freedom to both intellectuals and producers. This can help to establish a more liberal ideology and also to strengthen producers in relation to coercers, and stimulate them towards innovation and accumulation thus promoting the evolution of the means of production (Gellner 1988: 154-158).

The following paragraphs analyse the different kinds of interactions in relation to international systems change. Therefore I will only consider ideas and ideologies related to the definition of the political community rather than the ones concerned with the domestic regime. In order to make clear all possible sequences, I will begin each discussion with a numerical code, which indicates the sequence. I will refer to the situation of power as 1; to the evolution of the means of production as 2; and to the development and spread of an ideology as 3. Accordingly it is possible to analyse the different interactions between these three elements identified by different sequences between 1, 2, and 3. Several historical

examples will suggest that there is no single path towards international systems change. I will refer to the same events under different sequence of change. This is due to the fact that international systems change often occurs when there is a convergence of changes in the three spheres. The very possibility to consider a change in one element as the original one depends on an arbitrary choice of the time chosen to start accounting for a given historical example. Still it is possible and useful at this stage to analyse events from different perspectives to see the different and complex interaction among the three spheres. Chapter six on the contrary will offer a more general overview of the evolution of the modern European state system on the basis of Dehio, Barraclough and Kennedy accounts, which analyse the on-going interaction between the three spheres as the basis for their historical analysis.

5.2 The situation of power and its combinations

This paragraph considers the possible interactions started by a change in the power situation. I will consider some examples to show the possible sequences of change in the different spheres.

1-- Changes in the situation of power may not involve a process of change in the means of production or in the dominant political ideology. In this case it is unlikely that international systems change will take place. This is the situation generally studied by realist IR scholars. They consider power as the determinant of international change and pay little attention to the other two aspects. A change in the hegemon[143], or in the aspirant hegemon within the European state system can be considered as an example of such a situation[144]. This was the case particularly in the first part of the history of the European state system, in which hegemonic attempts were not coupled by ideological struggle.

13- A favourable situation of power may help to develop a new ideology, and together may bring about an international systems change. The situation of power, together with the

[143] For the time being, I am using the term in the way Gilpin and most realists do. However, as Dehio (1948-1963) pointed out, the character of the European state system was precisely not to allow the emergence of a hegemon. There could be a state more powerful than any other. But when it attempted to establish a proper hegemony, it was always defeated.

[144] Actually, a proper analysis would also require an account of the reasons for the shift in power. This will often depend on the evolution of the means of production and economic growth. However, for this discussion, it is possible to think about a change due to a new form of military organisation, which entirely remains within the field of politics.

ideological compromise which resulted in the invention of the federal state brought about the creation of the USA[145]. This can be considered as an international systems change, since it represented the overcoming of international anarchy for that part of the world. The alternative was the creation of an American state system, similar to the European one, in which much smaller states would have been the basis of that international system. Eventually their very independence could have been at risk if the European states had proved able to play some American states against the others (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1788-1987: especially papers II-VII; also discussed in Albertini 1963-1999A: 93-97).

The very idea of the federal state was developed as an answer to the challenges involved in that power situation. The concept of federation was developed in the making of the Constitution. It was a compromise reached during the process of amendment of the Articles of Confederation, which eventually brought to a completely new Constitution (Kramnick 1987: 31-36; Albertini 1963-1999A: 80-82, 90-93; 1973-1999A: 117-120; 1993: 47-48; Levi 1997: 24-27). The evolution of the means of production did not require such a large market. The communication and transport system could not really unite the new country. Unity was needed to ensure independence and avoid war among the different colonies, by providing a legal system to solve controversies. Hence the attempt to obtain unity and division at the same time through the establishment of a new kind of state: the federal one.

Another example of a political change which helps the development of new ideas to support even more political change is offered by the reflections on European federalism after the Second World War. The military catastrophe and the crisis of the European nation-states were at the basis of Spinelli's Ventotene Manifesto and of the first steps towards European integration in the 1950-1954 period[146].

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[145] Indeed there were also specific favourable social conditions, generally associated with other modes of production, which were due to the specific geographical situation. In the American states there was little class conflict, given the absence of aristocracy and the possibility to colonise the Western territories. This provided almost everybody with the possibility to own a piece of land and settle there (Albertini 1973-1999A: 122-125; 1993: 51-55). However the evolution of the means of production did not require such a large market or economic and political unit. On the contrary, this evolution was almost too backwards to sustain the new state. The communication and transport systems were unable to link very quickly the different parts of the federation. The election of the President took place much ahead of the time of appointment because it took time to bring the results of the local ballots to the capital and then send messengers everywhere to communicate the final result.

[146] In this period integration was proposed first in the field of coal and steel. This may seem an economic issue, but it was not. Coal and steel had been the basis of military industry, and the Franco-German rivalry had focused on territories rich of mineral resources such as the Ruhr and Alsace-Lorraine. Hence Monnet identified those issues as crucial for the Franco-German reconciliation. The failed attempts to establish a European Defence Community and a European Political Community had also a political character. Only later on integration took a clearly economic path with the Messina Conference and the development of the European Economic Community. Milward's thesis that integration is mainly an economic development

132 It is possible to think that in other cases also a change in the means of production may be needed to bring about systems change. The American case points to the opposite conclusion, but it was favoured by specific social conditions due to its unique geographical situation. In the European case, the sequence 13 allowed the start of the European unification process. However, the early attempt to create a military and political community failed. On the other hand, the need for larger markets, due to the evolution of the means of production, pushed economic integration forward, as Milward pointed out (1992: x-xi, 27-28, 44-45, 120-125).

12- The situation of power can influence the evolution of the means of production, although specific technological innovations tend to be due to other causes. Anyway, Kennedy suggests that the industrial revolution occurred in Europe and not elsewhere because the situation of power forced every state to compete with the others and thus placed a high incentive for technological innovations which could be exploited on the economic and military fields. Other areas of the world with similarly advanced civilizations were more static, because of their pacification under a given wide empire. The dominant elites of these empires generally possessed a more advanced military technology than the dominated groups, and did not face major challengers. This lack of competition brought them to fall behind the western states from a technological perspective. This allowed the western states to colonise most of the world later on (Kennedy 1988-1989: 20-38).

Also the economic development of the USA, and its following emergence as a world power may be taken as an example of such a situation. I have suggested that its creation was due to the convergence of the power situation and a new institutional form and idea. The new power situation created by the existence of this new state favoured the fast development of the industrial mode of production in the country. The USA provided a continent-wide market, which American entrepreneurs could hope to satisfy. It also created an incentive – on the basis of the reason of power – for politicians engaged at the federal level to gradually strengthen federal competencies in the economic field, in order to increase their powers. For example Hamilton contributed to the creation of a federal industrial policy and of the Federal Reserve (Hobsbawm 1990: 29; Montani 1996: 24-33). The power situation provided by the creation of the American federation did not directly produced a change in the means of production. Still, when the industrial society appeared,

depends precisely on the fact that he starts his analysis in 1955, ignoring the previous phase of the process (Milward 1992).

it allowed a faster economic growth than in other countries[147], and thus the emergence of the USA as a world power. This contributed to a world-wide international systems change, with the emergence of the bipolar world after the Second World War. This can be considered as the result of two separate sequences: 13 allowed the creation of the USA, which in itself changed the situation of power. The new situation started a 121 sequence, in which sustained economic growth, thanks to the exploitation of the means of production allowed by the continent-wide market and polity made possible the coming about of a new situation of power which coincided with an international systems change.

123 After the Second World War, the emergence of the bipolar world – a new international power situation – together with the evolution of the means of production, which brought about nuclear weapons and required large markets, helped bringing about a more precise definition of federalism as an ideology. If the goal of a united Europe had been stated before, it is only with the Ventotene Manifesto, that this is purported as the main goal for an autonomous political movement and struggle. Only at that point, the discussion about the means to reach that goal was developed. This found two early expressions in Spinelli's constitutionalism and in Monnet's gradualism. For Spinelli a European federal state could only be founded on a Constitution, drafted through a democratic constituent procedure. Monnet believed there were not the historical conditions for such a breakthrough. Hence he suggested a gradualist path, to reach ultimately the same goal[148]. Albertini provided a synthesis of the two insights with the theory of constitutional gradualism, indicating that a constituent procedure could be started only when the European institutions had achieved an important share of sovereignty and had developed some democratic forms of expression. Thus he suggested that the federalists should obtain two partial goals – the direct election of the European Parliament and a European currency – before demanding a European democratic government and a federal Constitution (Albertini 1967-1999b, 1973-1999b, 1976-1999b). The fact that this theoretical refinement is paralleled by the historical evolution of the European unification process shows the effectiveness of his analysis.

[147] In chapter three I have discussed the different rate of economic growth of the USA and the European states after the second industrial revolution, which many authors attributed to the dimension of the respective markets.

[148] Monnet is often simply considered as a functionalist. For the time being, it is enough to recall that his Memorandum to Schuman, and also the following Schuman Declaration stated clearly that the ECSC was meant as "the first concrete foundation of a European federation" (the Schuman Declaration is available on line in different languages at the site: http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/declaration.html). On this issue see also Albertini 1985-1999a: 273-275.

5.3 The evolution of the means of production and its combinations

This paragraph considers the evolution of the means of production as the origin of changes in the other aspects too.

2-- The slow evolution of the means of production usually does not involve any significant change in the situation of power or in the dominant ideology. In this case international systems change does not occur. Gellner stresses the static character of the agrarian society from the perspective of technological innovation (Gellner 1988: 16-18, 102-104, 154-158). Technological discoveries which significantly modify the international situation are rare.

21- Sometimes the evolution of the mode of production may change the situation of power. However this is unlikely to produce an international systems change. The development of naval technology and the following start of the exploration of the world brought many discoveries. The American discovery opened the way to colonisation, changed the European balance of power and greatly increased Spanish and Portuguese power. However important in the history of mankind, these events did not produce an international system change. Later on, the first industrial revolution enhanced Britain's power and role in the world (Dehio 1948-1963: 133-135; Kennedy 1988-1989: 193-203). Similarly the second industrial revolution or the late industrial period and the start of the post-industrial one required large markets and thus strengthened the USA and weakened the European nation-states.

213 The evolution of the means of production from the mercantile to the industrial phase required bigger market. This contributed to create a situation of power, in which only big nation-states were powerful enough to defend themselves and to play a significant role on the international scene. This favoured the emergence of the first theories of nationalism, which emphasised "the threshold principle" that only the nations that were big enough to be economically viable had historical plausibility (Hobsbawm 1990: 30-35, 102). All this helps to explain the spread of nationalism and of the nation-state model in Europe and the national unification in Germany and Italy (Toynbee 1948: 114).

The same interaction can be considered at the basis of the start of the European unification process. The evolution of the means of production required large markets. This

helped to make European states too small to be great powers, thus allowing the creation of the bipolar world. This new situation helped the refinement – in fact the statement in a complete form - of the federalist ideology. All this helped to bring about the start of the European unification process.

23- Ideas may be developed to understand - and as an answer to - the evolution of the means of production. Marx developed historical materialism to understand the industrial mode of production. However, an unfavourable situation of power may prevent their success. The attempted socialist revolutions of the XIX and early XX century failed. And even the successful Russian revolution did not turn out to be the start of a world revolution – which could have provided an international systems change – as the communist ideology foresaw.

Two other competing ideas can be considered as useful examples: nazism and European federalism. Especially after the First World War it became clear to many people that the evolution of the means of production made any European state too small to be a world power in the world states system which was replacing the old European one. This helped the development of two competing ideas: the peaceful unification of Europe through integration, or the violent unification of Europe by one state. These two possible answers found expression in the development of the federalist tradition between the two world wars (Pistone (ed.) 1975; Mayne and Pinder (eds) 1990), and the emergence of nazism in Germany (Dehio 1948-1963: 255, Einaudi 1947-1986; Barraclough 1967-1990: 98-99). The German bid for European hegemony was an attempt to ensure Germany a role among the world great powers, as the emphasis on the concept of "vital space" recalls. The attempt was risky and it could have chances of success only on the basis of the complete mobilisation of all national resources, which could be best ensured by a totalitarian regime (Dehio 1948-1963: 255-263).

The situation of power was not favourable to the spread and success of European federalism because the European states still considered themselves as great powers. The USA partial retreat from the international scene and the USSR isolation made it more difficult to understand the new situation. The European states were declining powers, but the ascendants were hiding themselves, and this delayed the Europeans coming to terms with their new reality (Dehio 1948-1963: 244, 256). The inter-war period was thus "an era of illusion" (Barraclough 1967-1990: 27). Nationalism was also very strong and the idea of European union did not gather support. At the same time the situation of power was not favourable for the German hegemonic struggle either. A united Europe under German

hegemony would have been very powerful. Therefore, not only Britain, but all world powers, the USA and the USSR, had good reasons to prevent such a power to be created. Within the open European state system, the emergence of a new power would only make the alliances and the balance more complex. The world state system is closed and any new sphere of influence would come at the expenses of others. Hence the common interest of world powers to avoid the establishment of any new world power (Dehio 1948-1963: 234-239, 262, 266-267).

The situation of power was unfavourable to both ideologies. However many people in Germany, a potential European hegemon, would not accept this verdict without fighting. Thus nazism found expression through a definite political ideology and organisation. On the contrary even the most prominent federalists of the time, such as Lionel Robbins, Barbara Wootton and Lord Lothian, indicated the goal of a European federation, and the reasons to establish it, but they did not identify a proper strategy to reach their goal. Eventually they are recalled more as liberal or socialist than as federalist. The historical conditions allowed them to see the need for a federal Europe, but to struggle only for the realisation of other ideologies at the national level, although they recognised that this could only be a partial and insufficient goal without a federal Europe (Robbins 1937 and 1941; Lothian 1935-1990; Wootton 1941).

231 The previous example can be considered in relation to the emergence of favourable conditions. After the Second World War the situation of power was more favourable to the proposal of a European federation, and this allowed the start of the European unification process. The first European Coal and Steel Community was proposed by the Schuman Declaration and considered from the start as "the first concrete foundation of a European federation".

5.4 Ideology and its combinations

This paragraph considers the impact of new political ideas on the overall process of change. From this perspective it is also important to look at the different level of development of ideologies in relation to the conditions set by the evolution of the means of production and the situation of power.

3-- The first case to be considered is the emergence of a new idea in unfavourable material and power situations. Human thought can be partially independent from those external conditions, and thus develop a new idea incompatible with them. However it is unlikely that this new idea will gather much support. That is, it will be considered as an utopia or wishful thinking. Still it indicates an aim, which may be taken up later on. The very existence of such an idea may inspire other people in other places or in the future, confronted with a more favourable situation. Hence it may turn out to be a seed for change, but until favourable conditions arise it will not produce any significant change.

For example Kant's idea of world federalism to establish perpetual peace (discussed in Marini 1998) indicates a goal, but it did not become dominant when it was put forward. There were not favourable conditions for its spread. Consequently, no wonder that his idea of federalism was confused (Albertini 1985; 1993: 19-22) although its statement about the need to abandon absolute national sovereignty to ensure peace was clear (Albertini 1985; Marini 1998). Kant identified the core value of federalism, but did not say much about the institutional and historical-social aspect. So far a world federation has not been established – and may never be. The idea still exists and can be considered as an idea about international systems change which has not produced significant changes on the material or power situation so far.

31- A new idea may help to produce a favourable situation of power by shaking the political consensus and legitimacy of the status quo and by suggesting possible alternatives. The success of the new idea may however not be possible if appropriate material conditions do not arise. In the XIX century the two competing ideologies of nationalism and federalism found many theoretical expressions. However the first one was refined to the level of a proper ideology. On the contrary the second one remained at the level of the indication of a goal and the critic of the alternative. Nationalism succeeded, while the embryonic federalist ideas failed, to gather significant consensus.

The spread of nationalism – which some authors link to the emergence of the industrial society as discussed in chapter four – undermined the legitimacy of infranational and supranational states and helped to develop movements aiming at national unification. These feelings were exploited by national leaders such as Cavour and Bismarck. It may be true that they were simply pursuing a foreign policy of aggrandisement. However, it is also true that the nationalist ideology and movement was a necessary element of their success, especially in the Italian case. This is clear by looking at the role played by figures such as Mazzini and Garibaldi in the Italian unification process (Taylor 1954: ch. VI).

An insightful critic of the nationalist ideology and of the nation-state was also developed at that time by authors such as Proudhon, Frantz (see the texts reproduced and discussed in Albertini 1993). They also supported the idea of a united federal Europe. The situation of power was not completely unfavourable. Napoleonic wars had been very destructive – they involved the total mobilisation of resources which could be achieved at that time (Dehio 1948-1963: 173, 234-236, 260). The idea of establishing a European union to avoid new wars could have been accepted. However, the ideological struggle was won by nationalism – probably because it best suited the current stage of the evolution of the means of production (Albertini 1960-1997: 144). The nationalist ideology in the XIX century was not very successful in establishing many new nation-states, but it was in gathering consensus and becoming the standard norm of political legitimacy (Gellner 1994: 26). This had a huge impact on the XX century, especially from the end of the First World War onwards, so that nationalism is still considered a powerful force in world politics today (Mayall 1990-1993: 145).

312 In the XIX century there was a combination 312 for nationalism, but not for federalism. Still the ideal of European unity survived. An idea which does not spread out under certain unfavourable conditions may find support later on under different ones. This shows the strength and resilience of ideas and also the importance of external conditions for their success. After the Second World War the evolution of the means of production produced more favourable circumstances for European federalism. On the one hand the exploitation of the level of technology acquired required at least large continental markets (Einaudi 1943-1986: 75-79; 1947a-1986: 44-47; 1947b-1986, entirely devoted to this issue; and Albertini, 1961b-1999a: 224-225; 1965c-1999a: 237; 1966-1999b: 62-63; and 1993: 233-235). On the other hand this fact helped the emergence of a bipolar world in which the two superpowers were continent-wide states. This helps to understand the crisis of the European nation-states (Dehio 1948-1963: 263-288; Barraclough 1967-1990: chs. III and IV; Spinelli 1991) and the start of the European unification process. The European states were confronted with the alternative of living united or perish separately as independent and relevant political entities (Einaudi 1947a-1986; 1956: 89). A continental market was necessary to ensure economic development. Political union was necessary to have a role in the new world state system. In this new situation the idea of European federalism found

support and developed into a proper ideology[149], which helped the start of the European integration process[150].

The interaction between the evolution of the means of production and of the international balance of power allows this example to be located within a pattern of interaction 312 or 321 according to the perspective emphasised. Dehio's account of the emergence of the world state system and the need for European unity emphasises the first case. Also many IR scholars claim that the start of the European unification process was made possible by the bipolar world and the American leadership and defence of Europe (Hoffmann 1965: 88; Keohane and Hoffman 1991: 5). This is accepted by Albertini too, however he suggests that this situation of power, and the economic need of a large market, were both due to the evolution of the mode of production, thus hinting at a 321 interaction. These two different accounts suggest that there is a continuous interaction among the three spheres and it is difficult to identify the sequence which brought to their convergence.

32- An idea may be developed at one point and then spread out when favourable material conditions arise. The idea of a world federation can be traced back to Kant, but the World Federalist Movement was created after the Second World War – and it still does not have a real strategy to reach its goal. This may seem a moral and political response to the horror of that war. However, war existed for a long time – in fact this was the cause of Kant's reflections on world federalism too. What had changed were the means of

[149] I have claimed earlier that the emergence of European federalism as a proper ideology was favoured by the evolution of the means of production and a new favourable situation of power. Now I am looking at the same fact from another perspective. Even if it is true that federalism as an ideology can be seen as an answer to these developments, it is also true that those who provided this answer did so by refining the basic ideas which had been developed earlier. Spinelli makes explicit reference to the influence of the British federalist tradition on the development of the Ventotene Manifesto (Spinelli 1984: 307-311). Albertini develops his definition of federalism as an ideology referring to Kant and Hamilton to define two basic aspects of the federalist ideology (Albertini 1993). The evolution of the means of production and of the situation of power is interlinked with the development of an ideology, from the identification of its core value, to the definition of its institutional and historical-social aspects, to the proposal of a strategy to establish the proposed changes.

[150] Milward claims that the federalists movement and ideology did not play any role in bringing about European integration (1992: 15-17, and ch. 6). His detailed study considers the establishment of the European Economic Community as the start of the integration process. This choice is highly questionable. The first European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, and the attempt to establish a European Defence Community and a European Political Community failed for a few votes at the French National Assembly thanks to the unusual alliance between the Communists and the Gaullists. The very start of the process can be traced back at least to the Schuman Declaration of the 9th of May 1950, which proposed to establish a European Coal and Steel Community between France, Germany and any other willing state. The explicit aim was to ensure peace in Europe and the Franco-German reconciliation. And the Community was proposed as "the first concrete foundation of a European federation". Monnet's role in proposing this idea and drafting the Declaration is well-known and his memories explain very well that the federalist ideal was at the basis of his action (Monnet 1976-1978). More generally on the federalist influence on the European unification process see Burgess 2000.

production, which made possible the creation of nuclear weapons and the idea of the death of mankind through nuclear holocaust. This allowed Kant's idea to find enough support to establish a political movement with that aim. However this new situation did not ensure the spread and success of such an idea.

The situation of power characteristic of the bipolar world has never been favourable to such a development. The balance of terror seemed able to avoid a new nuclear war. Furthermore, the conditions for a world integration process were not there. Integration is possible only among ideologically compatible regimes. Federalists – inspired by the first definitive article of Kant's Perpetual Peace - would also generally suggest that it is only possible among democratic regimes. But the main states which should have started such a process to ensure a common management of the nuclear risk, were precisely the two competing superpowers. It is thus clear that a world unification process was unlikely.

321 The emergence of the idea of European federalism up to the start of the integration process can be considered as an example of the 321 interaction, as mentioned earlier. Hypothetically it may be claimed that if a favourable power situation will arise even the ideology of world federalism could spread out and be realised. The recent debate about cosmopolitan democracy and global governance are clear signs of the existence of problems which require global answers. If those problems will become so acute to demand immediate effective actions, the chances for the start of a world unification process will be significant. However it is impossible to predict if and when this will occur.

5.5 Theoretical remarks

This brief analysis of some historical examples shows the impossibility to consider one pattern of interaction alone as the most likely. It also reveals that generally a convergence in all three aspects is required to produce an international systems change. Occasionally, under favourable conditions, such as in the case of the creation of the USA, the convergence of two of them can be enough. On the basis of these considerations it is possible to tentatively indicate a scheme to investigate the interaction among the three spheres in relation to the study of international systems change.

A first important remark is that international systems change represents a form of revolutionary change which establishes a new order. From a collective perspective the new order is always a spontaneous one. "The two very great transitions – the neolithic and the

industrial revolutions – cannot plausibly be attributed to conscious human design and plan. In each case, the new social order, due to be ushered in by history, was so radically discontinuous and different from its predecessor, within which its gestation had taken place, that it simply could not be properly anticipated or planned or willed" (Gellner 1988: 20, see also 257). That new material orders come about spontaneously or even by mistake can be quite easily accepted: Marx, Hayek, Polanyi, and many other scholars such as Gellner and Montani agree on this point. The crucial issue is that the same is partially true of new political orders.

Machiavelli suggested that there is nothing more difficult than to create a new order. Those who benefit from the existing one know what they would lose and will struggle to death to maintain it. On the contrary it is difficult to assess the benefits of an order which is not yet established. Thus the supporters of the new order will often tend to be more cautious (Machiavelli 1513-1998: ch. VI). The whole history of the European states system indicates the difficulty of consciously planned and widely recognised change. All explicit hegemonic attempts have provoked a major reaction, and were ultimately defeated. It was generally possible to identify the strongest state in Europe at any given time. And this state obviously exerted a great influence. But hegemonic attempts are those aimed at transforming this influence into a proper domination and thus ultimately to overcome the European state system. In Dehio's words: "all previous struggles for supremacy" have essentially been "attempts to unite the European peninsula in a single state" (Dehio 1948-1963: 234). Their success would have represented not just a systemic, but also a systems change. This is why hegemonic struggle opposed the dominant power against the European state system itself (Dehio 1948-1963: 261-262).

It may seem that any systemic change ultimately coincides with a system one. This is not the case. Within the European state system there have been many changes in the continental most powerful state, which can be exemplified by the different states which carried out hegemonic attempts: from Spain, to France, to Germany. Within the European state system the decline of one and the ascendancy of the other constitutes a systemic change. A successful hegemonic attempt would have implied also a systems change.

The only very significant increase of power which did not provoke a great coalition was the less visible and the most effective: the British one. Britain acquired enough power to be a world power, but never enough to establish a real European hegemony (Kennedy 1988-1989: 193-203). This was possible because Britain played on both the European and the emerging world state systems. This brought both advantages and disadvantages. Britain generally gain many resources from its action on the world level. Seeley suggests that

Britain overcome the other five European states competing for the new world because it was less involved in the the struggles for European hegemony, which distracted the others (Seeley 1895-1911: 108-113). However, sometimes it had to intervene to avoid the establishment of a European continental hegemony, and this ultimately exhausted its resources (Dehio 1948-1963: 174-180; Barraclough 1967-1990: 103-114).

Hegemony may come about as the result of the fill-in of power vacuums, each of which is not considered as a hegemonic attempt. The emergence of American hegemony was certainly not planned. The USA were drawn into the two World Wars, and both times this proved crucial for the overall war result. After the First one the USA were already a potential world hegemon – and this was the sign of the on-going process of systems change (Dehio 1948-1963: 23; 1955-1959: 21; Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. IV; Kennedy 1988-1989: ch. 6) - but they retreated into partial isolation. Such a move, allowed the European states to focus on themselves and to dismiss the USA potential. This explains the "era of illusion" which made possible the choice of a course of action which brought not only to the collapse of the aspiring hegemon, but of all the states of the European system, and of the system itself (Dehio 1948-1963: 263-265; 1955-1959: 128). If the European states had been conscious of the self-destructive meaning of their choices, they would have probably taken another path.

This introduces two important problems. One is that international systems change takes time to occur and fully produce all its consequences. The emergence of the modern state, its transformation into the nation-state, and its spread as a universal norm and practice took time. Between the end of the XIX century and the Second World War the European state system was superseded by a world (bipolar) state system. Most observers focused on the new bipolar structure of the international system, rather than on the emergence of a new world system. This was not just an international systemic change – the shift from a multipolar to a bipolar structure implies the reduction to two of the great powers, each of which became the hegemon in its sphere of influence - but an international systems change too: to be a great power in the new system required economic and military resources which could not be acquired by the traditional European nation-states. Only continent-wide states can aspire to such a position (Dehio 1948-1963: 266; 1955-1959: 130; Barraclough 1967-1990: 94, 121-123; Kennedy 1988-1989: ch. 8). It may take time for people in different areas of the world to conceptualise this change and to identify a course of action to create appropriate political unit. Machiavelli (1513-1998: ch. XXVI) called for Italian unification to resist foreign rule much before this program was put into practice. Still it is precisely on the basis of this kind of reasoning that it makes sense to consider the

European unification process as part of this overall process of international systems change. At a time in which they could not be international actors, the European nation-states started a unification process to gain together such a role. Obviously in the different states there were many motives behind each single decision which pushed the process ahead. However they ultimately relate to this new situation. Similar observations can be made in relation to the emergence of other forms of regional cooperation and integration around the world[151].

The second problem, which is linked to the first one is that of the recognition of international systems change. A change may occur or may be happening, but may not impact on human conduct due to the initial lack of consciousness of that change. International systems change was taking place after the First World War (Einaudi 1945-1986: 40; Dehio 1948-1963: 234; Barraclough 1967-1990: 10, 93-94; Kennedy 1988-1989: ch. 6), but it was recognised only after the Second one, and not that clearly even then, because the dominant nationalist ideology was contradicted by that change. Einaudi suggests that after the First World War the issue of European unity was already the crucial one (Einaudi 1918a-1986: 19-21; 1947a-1986). Still in 1918 Europe was divided into many more states than in 1914. It was a time of great success for the principle of national self-determination, and marked the abandonment of the "threshold principle" (Hobsbawm 1990: 31-42, 102). Furthermore nationalism made national absolute sovereignty be felt as a positive, vital and intangible value, on which to build a new international order. On the contrary, as Einaudi pointed out, the situation had already evolved so that "among the ideas which, carried to its logical consequences, can produce evil, the dogma of absolute and in itself perfect sovereignty is the most evil one" (Einaudi 1918b-1986: 30, my translation) so that "the first enemy of civilization and prosperity – and today it must be added of people life itself – is the myth of state absolute sovereignty" (Einaudi 1947a-1986: 257, my translation). The belief in this dogma ultimately paved the way towards the Second World War (Lothian 1935-1990**;** Robbins 1937: ch XI, especially 325-327; Einaudi 1947a-1986).

[151] I refer to cooperation and integration because what is generally called regional integration is often regional cooperation. There is a significant difference between the two. Cooperation refers to national governments which cooperate among themselves, maintaining all their sovereignty. The term "integration" has been developed at a theoretical level in relation to the European unification process started after the Second World War. The term "integration" was preferred to "cooperation" because the first implied some form of supranationality, that is the pooling or sharing of sovereignty in relation to a given issue (Haas 1958-1968: 58-60; and Beloff 1963). Eventually, as Albertini suggested, it is possible and useful to distinguish further between unification, integration and construction in order to identify more precisely the different aspects involved in the process (Albertini, 1985-1999a and 1986-1999a, but already sketched in 1963a-1999a).

It is possible to attribute the general lack of recognition of the new power situation to the nationalist ideology. Many of the few people who recognised it were federalist authors, consciously trying to identify a new paradigm to look at reality. Eventually this was what Spinelli read in the texts by the British federalists which Rossi and himself got from Einaudi (Einaudi 1945-1986: 39; Spinelli 1984: 307-311). From a federalist perspective it was possible to look at the consequences of the evolution of the means of production, because this did not contradict its main value. On the contrary the nationalist perspective hide those facts which would suggest a course of action opposite to the application of the principle of national self-determination. Facts are not the only variable, since ideologies subordinate the referential to the normative and must thus be taken into account. Their interpretation and the following considerations which guide people action is therefore an important factor too. However, an ideology which is often contradicted by facts, may ultimately be abandoned in favour of another more suited to the new situation. This will help to conceptualise the change and to draw all consequences.

The second remark concerns the role of the evolution of the means of production, to which most authors discussed in chapter one tend to assign a long-term prevalence[152]: "the contention is that the economic or productive base does indeed determine our problems, but that it does *not* determine our solutions" (Gellner 1988: 19), which depend on the interaction of the three spheres. According to Rosenau, "the more the time frame is broadened, the clearer it will become that in the interaction between globalising and localizing dynamics it is the former that tends to drive the latter. (…) recorded human experience is a history of expanding horizons – of individual, families, tribes, and societies driven by their own growth as well as by technology and industrialization to build ever more encompassing forms of social, economic and political organization" (Rosenau 1997: 95). The evolution of the means of production tends to overcome space and time and makes the world more interdependent. The ensuing tension between the new best dimension of market and economic areas and the existing political units is a major factor of – or better opens a window of opportunity for - international systems change (Rosenau 1997: 164).

[152] Even if all these authors are well aware of the need to consider all three aspects of reality, occasionally seem to emphasise one of them, at least in the long term. Polanyi focuses on the form of integration, which is part of the mode of production. Gellner always looks at all three aspects, but he acknowledges that its periodization of history is based on the evolution of the mode of production, which is taken as the underlying element in all his analysis (1988: 20-23). Also Albertini emphasises the long-term impact of the evolution of the mode of production (1965b-1999a: 109-111) - and with him many other federalist authors (see Pistone 1973: 49-56; implicitly Levi 1997: 83-87; and Montani 1999: ch. 2).

Rosenau's generalisation is the result of the projection of a specific character of the industrial era, to the whole human history. As Polanyi pointed out, the evolution of the means of production may also make viable smaller economic units: "only under a comparatively advanced form of agricultural society is householding practicable, and then, fairly general" (Polanyi 1957: 254). However, it is true that so far the industrial era has been characterised by an exponential rate of technological innovation, which has increased the world interdependence. This has happened through improved communication and transport systems, through the creation of a more integrated global market, and also through the global problems posed by the use of the contemporary technological tools[153]. However, it is not possible to conceptualise the whole human history as a linear trend towards growing interdependence (Milward 1992: 9; and Hirst and Thompson 1996: 3, 31). Certain territories and populations were probably more integrated within the Roman empire than in the Middle Ages. Rosenau's analysis of the causes of the growing interdependence produced by the globalization process is valuable, but it cannot be stretched to cover the whole human history.

Dehio was more precise in identifying the specific nature of this recent trend. He suggested that the European state system was able to avoid hegemony by drawing extra-European forces into the balance, thus allowing the tendency towards unity to be defeated. With the emergence of a world system of states, the tendency towards unification based on the evolution of the means of production, which characterises only the new industrial civilization, would ultimately win: "deep down, however, the stream took a direction that thwarted Germany's hope. Today we recognize as a fallacy our instinctive analogy between the European and the world system which fed those hopes. In all previous struggles for supremacy, attempts to unite the European peninsula in a single state had been condemned to failure primarily through the intrusion of new forces outside the old Occident[154]. The Occident was an open area. But the globe was not, and, for that very reason, ultimately destined to be unified, not split up, unless the progress of civilization, with its conquest of distance, slowed down or came to a standstill. In that event, the divisive tendency might also triumph in the global framework. If, however, the pace were increased, the process of unification must also of necessity increase" (Dehio 1948-1963: 234; also 266, 269-270).

[153] The literature on interdependence and globalization emphasises this kind of development since a long time: Einaudi 1945-1986; Dehio 1948-1963: 234, 264, 266, 269; Barraclough 1967-1990: especially ch. II; Keohane and Nye 1977; Soroos 1986-1989; Rosenau 1992 and 1997; Camilleri and Falk 1992; Dunn (ed.) 1994; Held 1995; Axtmann 1996; Rhodes 1996; Clark 1997; Evans 1997; McGrew (ed.) 1997; Beck 1997-2000.

[154] By "Occident" Dehio means here only Europe. This is made clear in many passages of his book (for instance Dehio 1948-1963: 264).

Dehio singled out the new trend, but he did not project it on the past history. Furthermore, he singled out the specific situation of power which allowed the tendency towards unity to be defeated, and foresee the success of this trend on the basis of the lack of that specific power situation in the new world state system. This consideration illustrates that the evolution of the means of production may encounter a formidable obstacle in the situation of power. However, Dehio's account also shows its long-term influence, since this trend always manifested itself after each and every defeat. In other words, the evolution of the means of production sometimes poses structural problems. Their solution can be delayed, but the problems will continue to demand attention and a final solution. There can be different kind of solutions with positive and negative aspects, but they are not an infinite combination, and the previous order may not be part of the viable range. In this case there is a window of opportunity for international systems change to occur.

As discussed in chapter three, in the long term, the evolution of the means of production tends to be a continuous process. It is useful to look at its consequence in the middle and in the long-term. In the middle-term it influences economic performances and may alter the balance of power. Gilpin and Kennedy consider the shift in the hegemon as essentially linked to this phenomenon. The different growth rate of various countries ultimately may upset the balance of power, or undermine a given situation of power (Gilpin 1981: 10-13; Kennedy 1988-1989: xxiv-xxvii, 566-567, 693-694). Basically this takes the form of the decline of the hegemon and the ascendancy of a challenger. Eventually, according to Gilpin, a hegemonic war is the usual mean to address the issue. It may be a preventive one, started by the existing hegemon, before it is too late. Or it may be launched by the ascendant power to radically modify the status quo and assert its new strength and acquire a prominent position. This is a traditional realist view of the work of the international system and Gilpin's explanation of systemic change (Gilpin 1981: 10-15, 40, 46-48).

Occasionally, the evolution of the means of production can have a more profound impact. The new technological level may require a different economic and political unit from the existing one to be fully exploited. This may relate to the internal nature of the unit or to its dimension. Gellner discusses at length the domestic conditions in which the industrial revolution could start and establish itself. Ultimately it required a new form of integration, the market society, to be fully exploited. It was possible to adapt it to another form of integration, such as the communist regime, but its efficiency was significantly inferior, and this ultimately caused its failure. The same technological level also required large markets to be fully exploited. Those states which for different reasons had acquired a

continental dimension found themselves in a privileged situation. This accounts for the much higher growth rate of the USA compared to the European countries since the end of the XIX. Also the Soviet success in transforming an underdeveloped country into an industrial superpower owes something to this situation, although it is related to many other factors too[155]. Thus the impact of the evolution of the means of production may be a strong incentive towards international systems change. When such an event occurs the other states have to acquire the same kind of dimension if they want to compete on the international level. Eventually a process of emulation may bring the whole system to be composed of continent-wide units. The process of emulation can take two forms: peaceful unification or violent conquest. The XX century saw three attempts to unify Europe: the first violent two failed, the third peaceful one is still going on, but its final outcome is still uncertain. In other words, notwithstanding a century-long pressure of the evolution of the means of production towards the creation of a continental market – and political unit - the European states still prefer to keep their sovereignty, also showing the resilience of nationalism. This clarifies the fact that the evolution of the means of production may stimulate, but not determine, international systems change.

On the basis of this argument it is possible to suggest that the evolution of the means of production brings successive spontaneous orders. They are characterised by a given level of technology and interdependence and can be associated with different forms of integration, which may be more suitable to different areas and situations, and which may have different degrees of efficiency. Each technological level can be employed by economic and political units of different size – usually within a given range - although generally there will be an optimal dimension. The great interdependence acquired in the late XIX and early XX century was not coupled by appropriate political institutions – suited to consolidate a new situation of power - and was reversed[156]. This example is used by Hirst and Thompson (1996: 3, 49) to challenge the idea that globalization is an entirely new phenomenon. At the same time the fact that we are now confronted with the globalization process, suggests that that reversal was only temporary. In other words, following Gellner's insight, it is plausible to think that the evolution of the means of production determines certain spontaneous

[155] Barraclough suggests that the communist regime is more effective than the market-system to produce a quick transition to the industrial mode of production. This would explain the Soviet success, and its appeal towards underdeveloped countries. Indeed, its human costs are formidable, but the speed and significance of the change may often be considered worth the costs in certain areas of the world, even if this system is ultimately less efficient than the capitalist one. Sometimes a swift significant improvement may be considered more valuable than a long process of change towards an even better situation (Barraclough 1967-1990: 221-227).

[156] Eventually this helped to bring about the 1929 Great Depression (Robbins 1937: 319-321; 1971: 153-160; Einaudi 1943-1986: 74-78; 1947b-1986: 164-165; Montani 1996: 13-17; 1999: 26-27).

orders with characteristic sets of problems. The solutions may differ, but if the main problem is not solved in a structural way, it will represent itself sooner or later.

To investigate the possibility of an international systems change, it is appropriate to look at the tension between the spontaneous material order - due to the evolution of the means of production - and the situation of power and/or the dominant ideology. When this tension is strong enough, it significantly undermines the situation of power, and produces a crisis. At this point the structural problem posed by the new spontaneous material order will be addressed, and one solution or another will be attempted. Power and ideology are the variables to be considered to study the choice of the solution.

Rosenau identifies this occurrence, with particular reference to the role of ideology. Although he seemed to believe in a linear historical tendency towards globalization he is aware that there also "have been the resistances to globalyzing dynamics, counter-reaction driven by the need for identity and the psychic comforts of shared territory and culture" (Rosenau 1997: 95). Thus he is conscious of the fact that the evolution of the means of production may provoke a psychological reaction, a tendency to stick to the existing ideology, which provides personal identity and collective legitimacy. If the changes required to exploit the new means of production are ultimately compatible with the existing dominant ideology, the latter will adapt to the new situation and its new version will keep the traditional function of sustaining the existing political order. If they are ultimately incompatible a tension will arise that opens a window of opportunity for change. In the long term, the evolution of the means of production will tend to prevail since technological innovation is difficult to be stopped or reversed. But in the short term the strength of the existing political order and of the dominant ideology will be powerful instruments of the status quo. Politics and culture may ultimately have to respond to long-term economic change, but in the short-term they play a crucial role.

This argument may seem to indicate a long-term direction of history in relation to international systems change. Indeed it would if the irreversibility of the evolution of the mode of production is assumed, and if Rosenau's claim that its evolution always leads to ever-larger economic and political units is accepted. However, both are to be rejected. The reversibility of the evolution of the means of production is unlikely, but is possible, as discussed in chapter three. And the tendency towards ever-larger economic and political units can also be stopped. Hirst and Thompson (1996: ch. 2) compare the interdependence of the late XX century with the one achieved before the First World War. Einaudi suggests that this was at the basis of the tendency toward European unity which took a violent form with the German hegemonic attempts in the first half of the XX century. After the First

World War the nationalist autarchic policies provoked a decline of that interdependence and a renewal of the German hegemonic struggle under the Nazi regime. After the Second World War, the tendency towards unity was peacefully expressed by the European unification process. Politics may postpone and delay the solution of a problem. It may not respond to the challenges posed by the evolution of the means of production. And it is impossible to predict if and when they will converge. When a tension arise different solutions are possible. A crisis may bring towards a new positive solution or to a disaster.

The relative strength of each sphere and the outcome of their interactions cannot be predicted once and for all. Convergent synchronous changes in all spheres are unlikely. Usually a change in one of them will influence the others. The tension between them provides windows of opportunity for change. If the evolution of the means of production points in one direction and the situation of power in another a crisis may arise. The result may be a change in the situation of power or a reversal of the evolution of the means of production, at least temporarily. In such crisis the role of ideology is very important.

To establish the institutions which can consolidate the spontaneous order by creating a convergent situation of power, new ideas related to the new characteristic problem will often be necessary[157]. In time of crisis the role of ideas and leaders is particularly important. This is possible precisely because the previous order and situation of power has been at least partly undermined by the evolution of the means of production. The situation of crisis can be compared to the one analysed by Gellner in relation to the domestic evolution of the society: in a situation of internal balance of power the role of legitimators is strengthened. The undermining of the old order creates a situation of uncertainty similar to the one characteristic of the internal balance of power.

The spread of ideologies generally reflects the material and power conditions. But when the two point to opposite directions, the ideological struggle is more open and its result may determine the overall outcome. The leaderships of the opposing ideological movements will be decisive to seize the favourable opportunities offered by a situation of crisis. This explains the role often attributed to single individual leaders – such as Napoleon, Lenin or Hitler – by many historians. However, for all his virtue any leader would fail if there is not an opportunity to seize; and the opportunity will not be exploited without a great leader: fortune and virtue both play their parts (Machiavelli 1513-1998: ch. VI). Dehio rightly took seriously Machiavelli when he wrote "certainly 'chance' plays an even more obvious role in periods of crisis than in normal times. But Hitler's 'chance'

[157] Barraclough (1967-1990: especially 204, 206, 209, 211) offers useful insights on this issue in his discussion of the Russian revolution.

occurrence must also be seen as the acute symptom of a chronic sickness. Only in desperate conditions can a desperado make his mark" (Dehio 1948-1963: 257).

The few ones who are conscious of the coming about of the new order and are determined to bring it about, are the great ideological leaders who leave their mark on history. At the same time, as Dehio points out, they cannot be considered only as the element of 'chance', but also as the symptom of the crisis. To have certain ideas in normal times makes a man a visionary, during a crisis makes him a revolutionary leader. This was the difference between Marx and Lenin (Trotsky, quoted in Carr 1950-1954: 24; and Barraclough 1967-1990: 201-204). Only Lenin understood the crisis potential of 1917 Russia and was conscious of the steps to precipitate the crisis and seize power (Barraclough 1967-1990: 205, 211). An analogous argument is often proposed in relation to the authors of *The Federalist Papers*. Before the Constitution was actually in place Hamilton, Madison and Jay seemed able to conceptualise the main features and consequences of the new order - the result of a compromise, which originally some of them disliked. This is the specific and distinct character of *The Federalist Papers*. Therefore it is hardly surprising that Hamilton and especially Madison played a major role in bringing about the Philadelphia Convention, and its results[158]. Similarly, reasoning about the start of the European unification process Albertini suggests that "at the turn in which Europe inverted its direction, and took the path towards unity, there is only one man, Jean Monnet. (…) one man alone, understood by Schuman and Adenauer, introduced in the situation of power the European factor, which had conditioned the economic and foreign policies of the western European states for a quarter of a century; however it was not foreseen, willed, prepared by the organised social and political forces, which found themselves to accept and manage, without really realising it, a European process willed by one man alone" (Albertini 1993: 232-233, my translation). In his Memories Monnet recalled the secrecy of his initiative, and explained it with his worry that if the proposal was discussed by the diplomats of the French foreign ministry it would have been fundamentally altered (Monnet 1976-1978). This suggests that Albertini's claim highlights at least a part of truth.

[158] At the Annapolis Convention – which failed to settle the commercial issues for which it was called – Hamilton and Madison asked the call of a new Convention to tackle all the difficulties and problems of the Articles of Confederation, and invited delegates from all other American states to meet in Philadelphia the next spring. At the Philadelphia Convention Madison played a major role, while Hamilton was initially unsatisfied by the compromise and temporarily left. However, when he grasped the real significance of the proposal which was coming about he came back to Philadelphia and actively supported the compromise. Then he fought for its ratification and asked Madison and Jay to write with him what became *The Federalist Papers* (see Bolis (ed) 1957; Albertini 1993: 47-55; Levi 1965 and 1997: 10-13, 24-27; D'Addio and Negri 1980-1997: 117-138; Kraminck 1987: 12-36).

During crisis few men are able to grasp the coming order and to see the path which can bring it about. This is the task of the revolutionary according to Lenin: "it is not enough to be a revolutionary and an advocate of socialism in general; it is also necessary to know at every moment how to find the particular link in the chain which must be grasped with all one's strength in order to keep the whole chain in place and prepare to move on resolutely to the next link" (quoted from Carr 1950-1954: 25). Hence the role of ideological leaders is crucial to bring about the new order, which from a collective viewpoint would not yet be really understandable and acceptable. But "once a new and visibly more powerful order is in existence, it can be, and commonly is, consciously and deliberately emulated" (Gellner 1988: 20). This process of emulation can be very long. It takes time for all the beneficial aspects of the new order to be conceptualised and for a course of action to bring it about to be identified.

So far, I have discussed the role of ideology and ideological leadership during a crisis. However the result of the crisis will depend even more on the situation of power. This may seem a return to the priority of politics and realism, but it is not. International systems change is very rare, and is generally the result of long-term processes. However, we can conceptualise it only when it has occurred, that is when it has produced a specific new situation of power, characterised by the fact that the significant units of the systems have changed their nature. Therefore the final step of the transformation always relates to the situation of power, although this may take time to be recognised and to exercise its influence on people behaviour.

In the short-term unfolding of events the situation of power is a crucial determinant. The birth of the USA came about when the evolution of the means of production did not require it at all. For this reason Levi considers the USA as an "historical anticipation" (Levi 1997: 83-87 my translation). Levi's argument is useful in the analysis of the conditions in which the USA were created, but the concept of "historical anticipation" is not appropriate as it implies that the direction of history is determined by the evolution of the mode of production. The very example of the birth of the USA shows that this is not the case. Indeed there were permissive social conditions, generally not associated with the mode of production of the time (Albertini 1973-1999a: 122-125; 1993: 51-55). But especially there was a favourable situation of power which helped to find a new political idea to overcome the impasse. The compromise and the idea of the federal state was necessary, because by complementing unity and diversity it allowed the weak unitary tendency to be accepted. Otherwise, that tendency could more easily be defeated – although, as Hamilton pointed out there were strong reason for unity anyway, on the basis

of the situation of power. Therefore leaders with the new orientation were able to seize the favourable power situation notwithstanding the fact that the evolution of the means of production did not require such a large economic unit. However, since the evolution of the means of production did not require such large unit, this dimension did not bring an immediate economic advantage to the new state. Furthermore, it did not create a situation in which all other states had to acquire that dimension to be great powers. In other words, it did not yet imply an overall international systems change. The creation of the USA was an international systems change within the American continent, as it superseded and avoided the emergence of an American state system. However, it was not yet part of an overall world system change, and this explains why it did not produce any emulation process. It was not seen as the establishment of a "new and visibly more powerful order" which only could ensure the status of a great power. However, the evolution of the means of production created later on the conditions in which only a continent-wide state could be a great power, and the USA found themselves in this privileged situation. Eventually this brought to the American unplanned hegemony after the Second World War. In this sense Levi's idea of a "historical anticipation" has some explanatory value.

Also the most enlightened ideological leader may fail, if he does not manage to get access to, or to find an alliance with, a significant source of power. Also Albertini's statement on Monnet's role during the start of the European unification process contains a clear indication of the role of power together with the one of ideas: "one man alone, understood by Schuman and Adenauer" (Albertini 1993: 232, my translation). Without Schuman's and Adenauer's support, Monnet's ideas would have had little impact, if any, just like those of previous supporters of European unity. At the same time, without Monnet's idea, Schuman and Adenauer would have probably taken another course of action, and the European unification process would not have started. To take a certain course of action there is the need of the idea which identifies that course of action as the appropriate one, and of the power to make that choice. One element is not enough.

It is possible to conclude that if the long-term evolution of the means of production creates spontaneous material order characterised also by a specific set of structural problem, the convergence of ideology and power is necessary to establish a new political order to solve those problems and thus to consolidate the new material one and make it irreversible (Gellner 1988: 278; Montani 1999: 71-82). If this does not happen, this evolution may be temporarily reversed, and other insufficient solution attempted. The nationalist and autarchic policies after the First, and the European unification process after the Second World War, are two different responses to the growth of interdependence

linked to the second industrial revolution. Many solutions can be attempted, but some may not be effective. The autarchic policies helped to bring about the Great Depression, that was also an under-exploitation of the available means of production. Eventually the need for a large market found expression in the idea of the "vital space" and helped to bring about the second German hegemonic attempt.

So far I have suggested that the long-term slow evolution of the means of production creates fragile spontaneous orders which may not be convergent with the existing power situation and the dominant ideology. If the tension is strong enough a window of opportunity for international systems change will open up. This requires the solution of the new structural problems which characterise the new material order, through a new suitable political and ideological order. The identification of the institutional and social character of the new order is the role of the ideological leaders. If there is an ideological leader able and willing to define the possible steps forward to bring about the overall change, there will still be the problem of obtaining the power necessary to take these steps. The role of power is thus essential within this general scheme, since a favourable situation of power, coupled with an appropriate idea[159] may bring about a new order, as the creation of the USA shows. Later on, this may turn out to be particularly appropriate and suited to a new technological level, thus assigning huge advantages to the state endowed with it. This makes less relevant the emergence of a complete ideology to endowed that state with an appropriate order and to make it a world power. This helps to explain the unplanned emergence of American hegemony on the one hand, and the opposite need for the emergence of a federalist ideology and a suitable situation of power to start the European unification process.

It is now possible to try to summarise the theoretical results of this analysis. The tripartite framework identifies three basic categories particularly suited to study a specific aspect of reality, and stresses the need to considered them together and in their interaction. It is not possible to indicate an eventual direction of history: any form of historical determinism is to be refused. This framework can try to provide indications of likely change. More specifically it may help to identify the windows of opportunity for change. But it cannot predict if and when change will happen and which of the three forces examined by the three categories will actually prevail at any given time.

[159] In such a situation it is difficult to develop a complete ideology. The historical-social aspect would be difficult to be identified, since the general condition which in the future will be associated with the new order are not yet in place. This helps to explain why *The Federalist Papers* developed only the normative and institutional aspect of federalism, according to Albertini (1993: 47-55).

The examination of different historical examples indicates the impossibility to identify only one recurrent pattern of interaction. However, from a theoretical perspective there is the need to offer some indications and hypothesis to study together the three spheres. In general terms the analysis of the three categories and their inner logic suggest to consider the long-term evolution of the means of production and the successive spontaneous order to identify new structural problems which may undermine the situation of power and defy the dominant ideology, thus producing a crisis which offers a window of opportunity for international systems change. At the same time it indicates the crucial role of ideology and power to determine the solution of the crisis. This may turn out to be a re-proposal of the existing political and ideological order, and a partial or temporary reversal of the evolution of the means of production. Eventually a crisis may bring such a catastrophe as to completely reverse that evolution. A crisis may not always bring a new order. The new structural problems may still be accomodated within the old order without becoming so acute as to deeply undermine it. Furthermore different paths towards a structural solution may be attempted: European unity has been pursued by violent and peaceful means alike.

This analysis suggests that a combination of ideology and power may bring about a given order not required by the evolution of the means of production and which may benefit from the following material order. However, it is still important to consider the evolution of the means of production. When a new order is not paralleled by this evolution it will not immediately be more powerful, and will not be emulated. Thus a real process of international systems change will not take place. Two examples are useful from this perspective. The first large modern states found themselves in a privileged position with the emergence of the commercial and in the early industrial society. These developments favoured an increase of their power and the emergence of nationalism to legitimise them. Eventually only these states could be great powers. Smaller states were not powerful enough. And large multinational empires were internally fragile, due to the spread of the nationalist ideology. It took time for the national model to spread out. The XIX century German and Italian unification can be seen as late consequences of that process of international system change. The creation of the USA and the expansion of Russia help to explain their ability to emerge as the two superpowers after the Second World War. Their dimension allowed them a better exploitation of the means of production – especially for the USA – and anyway the disposal of the overall resources to maintain adequate military capacities to have a global reach.

All this argument indicates that a convergence of the three aspects is ultimately necessary for a process of international systems change to occur. Even if the establishment of states of a dimension appropriate to future stages in the evolution of the means of production is possible, that dimension will not be required to be a great power until the evolution of the means of production has not reached that stage. Therefore to look at the process of international systems change from a dynamic perspective it is appropriate to examine all three aspects. This argument suggests considering the long-term evolution of the means of production and the following spontaneous material order characterised by specific structural problem to identify the windows of opportunity for international system change; and to focus on ideology and power to look at the response to the crisis engendered by the tension between the evolution of the means of production and the existing political and ideological order.

CHAPTER 6. THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AT WORK

Introduction

This chapter applies the framework of analysis developed so far to the systems change which have occurred in modern history[160] and which have been described by some historians. They did not want to develop a theory, but proposed an interpretation of history which employed the basic analytical categories on which the framework proposed in this research is built. Although many historians have studied modern history, only a few have focused on the international system rather than on one specific state, and even fewer had international systems change as their specific concern. Accordingly, the perspective from which these historians looked at modern history may seem unusual.

Dehio (1948-1963) draws a convincing sketch of the life and agony of the European states system and the birth of the world state system. He stresses that the European state system has a birth and an end, which can be considered as two systems changes. He suggests that the life of the European state system is characterised by successive unsuccessful attempts towards systems change[161]. Barraclough's analytical tools are similar to Dehio's, but Barraclough considers the much shorter transition period in which the world state system became predominant over the European one, which ultimately collapsed. Thus he offers a useful account of the transition from the European to the world state system – which he considers as the shift from modern to contemporary history (Barraclough 1967-1990).

It is impossible here to summarise all the evidence and the arguments offered by these great historians. I will only try to show that the pillars of their interpretation of

[160] It is obviously difficult and arbitrary to indicate with a precise date the start of modern history. Dehio suggests to consider 1494 as the starting date of the European state system (Dehio 1948-1963: 23). This date is also very close to the classic one of the American discovery and thus can be a useful reference to identify the period considered.

[161] Kennedy (1988-1989) provides a similar account, but from a different perspective. He remains within the classic realist tradition and focuses upon "the rise and fall of the great powers". His historical analysis can be seen as a very appropriate complement to Gilpin's theory on international systemic change, i.e. of changes in the hegemon(s) of the system. Kennedy does not explicitly mention and consider systems change, although he refers to, and uses, Dehio's interpretation when he looks at the interaction between the European great powers. Kennedy also devotes two chapters to "the coming of a bipolar world and the crisis of the 'Middle Powers' " in which he proposes an analysis similar to Dehio and Barraclough's ones. However, while Dehio and Barraclough recognise that process as an example of systems change, Kennedy only focuses on the systemic one, which also took place. Kennedy employs a vast amount of literature and an extremely detailed empirical and statistical research to sustain his arguments, which can generally be used to support Dehio's interpretation as well.

modern and contemporary history are the categories employed by the tripartite scheme proposed in this research. To this purpose I will examine their accounts of the periods in which an international systems change was possible, or considered possible, or attempted. These are the periods in which the European state system superseded the Italian state system, but also those in which a hegemonic struggle took place in Europe, and when the emerging world state system superseded the European one. In other words, I will offer an overview of modern history looked through international systems change. Afterwards I will examine the globalization process and its origins from the same perspective to consider if it opens a window of opportunity for a new systems change. In relation to this aspect, Rosenau's works provide valuable analytical help.

6.1 Dehio and Barraclough's analytical categories

Dehio's interpretation of modern European history is based on the analysis of the three spheres examined in this research. This appears in his whole argument, and is also explicitly stated twice in the analysis of the conditions which allowed the emergence of a German hegemonic attempt: "the situation in foreign affairs, the economic civilization, and the moral energies" (Dehio 1948-1963: 224, see also 212)[162]. Similarly Barraclough explains the transition from the European to the world state system employing the concepts of industrialism, imperialism and ideology, and he stresses the need to look at their interaction (Barraclough 1967-1990: 18-27, 55-61). Also the categories they employ to study each aspect are extremely similar to, if not exactly the same as, those proposed in this research.

In relation to the international power situation, Dehio employs the basic tenets of the German realist tradition from Ranke to Meinecke [163]. Following this tradition he pays attention to the geopolitical situation, to the shift in alliances, to the relative power of the various states, to the interaction of domestic and international politics. Similarly Barraclough analyses from a realist perspective the changes in the relative power position of the different states in the period of transition (Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. IV).

Dehio considers moral energies in relation to two different phenomena: religion and political ideologies. In the analysis of the first three European hegemonic attempts Dehio considers the strength provided by the idea of a universal mission such as the

[162] Although Dehio does not explicitly declare that this is what he analyses, the same focus on the three aspects appears in his discussion of the starting condition of each and every hegemonic attempt (1948-1963: 34-35, 43-47, 72-74, 132-144, 210-212, 224-232, 247-262).
[163] Dehio acknowledges this influence (1948-1963: Introduction), which is also discussed in Pistone 1977.

unification of Europe under a Christian rule. This universal mission helped the attempt by Philip II, but not those by Charles V and Luis XIV (Dehio 1948-1963: 45-46 and 73). In this first phase of the European state system only religion was able to mobilise internal resources for a shared goal. Later on he looks at the emergence of political ideologies such as liberalism and nationalism and their role in the hegemonic struggles which followed the French revolution. Napoleon initially exploited both ideologies: liberalism to divide the enemies, and nationalism to mobilise all French internal resources (Dehio 1948-1963: 135, 142-144, 169-170). On the contrary the two German attempts in the XX century did not have any universal mission to justify themselves, and found an obstacle in the spread of nationalism. Still they were based on an extreme form of nationalism which ultimately found expression in nazism (Dehio 1948-1963: 225, 261). Finally, Dehio considers moral energies in relation to internal revolutions and the ideology which sustained them, for example socialism (1948-1963: 252, 260-261). In other words, Dehio considers religion, when this is still an essential part of politics, and then focuses on political ideologies, when they have taken its place in mobilising people and legitimising the political order. Barraclough is concerned with a more limited and recent period of time and thus focuses only on political ideologies. He looks at the role of democracy, socialism and nationalism in promoting or resisting change, and also in facilitating or impeding a proper recognition of the situation at a given time (Barraclough 1967-1990: 24-28, 36, ch. V, 154-160, ch. VII)

Dehio's use of the concept of civilization is more complex, but ultimately can be linked to the mode of production, as it appears in many passages (see also Pistone 1977: 163). For instance Dehio claims that "the march of civilization within the comprehensive scheme of life is in itself a phenomenon that runs all through the recent centuries. It is the most conspicuous expression of a slow and many-sided process that nevertheless follows a single consistent line of development: the evolution from the world-denying asceticism of the Middle Ages to the vigorous mastery of the world in our own day, from renunciation of earthy life to positive acceptance of it, from a pessimistic to an optimistic view of life, from a relatively static to an extremely dynamic attitude" (Dehio 1948-1963: 132). This can be considered as a synthetic description of what Gellner defines as the transition from the agrarian to the industrial society, employing the basic category of the mode of production (1988: 16-18, 20-23). Barraclough is more explicit in his use of the category of the mode of production (Barraclough 1967-1990: 18, 25-26, 39, 42, ch. II, ch. V).

In the analysis of the concept of the mode of production I have emphasised the differences between the relations of production, or the forms of integration, and the means of production. Dehio considers both under the heading "civilization". This distinction was

probably not clear in his mind, otherwise he would have employed two different terms instead of one. However, in his argument he attributes to the concept of civilization, the characteristics of both components of the mode of production. On the one hand Dehio looks at the evolution of the relations of production, or of the form of integration, when he analyses the internal development of a society. This appears when he identifies the different effects of the march of civilization on insular and continental states, and refers to the social dynamics and tensions provoked by that march (Dehio 1948-1963: 73-74, 132-138, 142, 159, 183-188, 198, 201-202). Also Barraclough considers the impact of the evolution of the mode of production within societies, offering an analysis of the transition period very similar to Polanyi's one (Barraclough 1967-1990: ch V and VII; and Polanyi 1944). On the other hand both Dehio and Barraclough also look specifically at the impact of technological innovation, and discuss its consequences also in relation to the best dimension of the political unit and systems change (Dehio 1948-1963: 14, 96-97, 130-133, 142-144, 172, 179-180, 192-194; Barraclough 1967-1990: 39, 55-61, 92, 99-103, 121-123). In this second case Dehio sometimes adds the adjective "technical" to the word "civilization" - and in English this is often translated simply by "technology", for instance when he claims that the initial emergence of the USA as a world power in the XIX century "was the product of technology, of steam and electricity" (1948-1963: 14). In these cases he is emphasising the elements and characteristics of the means of production – not those of the form of integration - which explain also why the dynamics of civilization is linked to the conquest of space, through improved communication and transport systems (Dehio 1948-1963: 144, 172, 192-194, 206, 234, 264; and 1955-1959: 127-128, 172; also discussed in Pistone 1977: 70-75).

This analysis shows that Dehio and Barraclough employ analytical categories which have at least a close similarity to the one proposed in this research. Furthermore, they employed them with a similar purpose, to study historical transition which can be considered as windows of opportunities for international systems change. Dehio uses them to assess the conditions in which each new European hegemonic attempt, that is a struggle to unite Europe, emerged (Dehio 1948-1963: 34-35, 44-47, 72-74, 132-144, 210-226). Finally he implicitly suggests that the analysis of the three spheres through the analytical categories proposed can be useful to assess the coming about of systems change. Dehio criticises German historians and intelligentsia for their failure in the late XIX and early XX century to realise that a new systems change was taking place (1948-1963: 8-15). Dehio argued that it was possible to recognise the new trend, applying Ranke's method and complementing it with the two categories of civilization and expansion, as Seeley had

done[164] (1948-1963: 13-15): "We Germans are accustomed to speaking of the two decades after 1870 as an era of world history bearing the stamp of Bismarck's thought. Seeley does not even mention Bismarck's name. He looks beyond Germany, indeed beyond the whole Continent, as if it were no more than a mountain range of medium altitude, toward Russia and the United States, the two giant powers looming into view. (…) France and Germany, the two greatest states of old Europe, would both shrink, in relative terms, to the size of pygmies and would be reduced to second-class status. As representatives of states of a new magnitude, the two giant powers would overshadow the other great powers as completely as Macedonia overshadowed the Athenian polis in ancient times, or as sixteenth-century Spain and France towered above the Florentine city-state. Britain would have to decide whether to drop to the level of a European power or, by exploiting her technology, to tighten the inner unity of her scattered empire and weld it into a third world power. (…) He did not even consider projecting the European system on a world-wide scale. (…) From her island position, it was possible to view European problems and world problems in a common perspective" (Dehio 1948-1963: 14-15, and see also 11, 23, 179-180, 210, 228, 234, 249, 262-267; 1955-1959: 20-21, 34-35; similarly Toynbee 1948: 103, 114-125, 128-130)[165]. It is not surprising that Barraclough employs similar analytical categories to study the emergence of the new world system and the end of the European one (Barraclough 1967-1990: 9-10, 30-31, 39-42, 92, ch. IV).

Dehio's masterpiece thus analyses the period between two systems changes. Both were the result of long term processes, but if there is the need to conventionally indicate a starting date, Dehio suggests using 1494 and 1917 (Dehio 1948-1963: 23). In 1494 Charles VIII French invasion of Italy provoked the reaction of the other powers. This was the start of the agony of the Italian state system and of the emergence of the European state system, whose agony started with the coming about of the world state system, which Dehio considers already established in 1917[166]. The life of the European state system can be

[164] Dehio does not indicate to what writings he is referring. However, it is easy to recognise that this argument is explicitly addressed both at the beginning and at the end of Seeley's two courses of lectures published as *The Expansion of England* (Seeley: 1895-1911: especially 18-19 and 349-350).

[165] It is interesting to notice that this implies that the categories to study the windows of opportunities for international systems change *a posteriori* from a historical point of view, or in advance from a theoretical IR perspective, are the same. This link between history and political science was much emphasised by Seeley himself: Lecture I of his II course on *The Expansion of England*, and Lecture I of his *Introduction to Political Science* are devoted to this issue (Seeley 1895-1911, and 1896-1919). Very similar arguments have been developed by another great British historian such as Toynbee (1948: ch. 5, 6, 7, and especially: 23, 114-121).

[166] However, Dehio thinks it was possible to recognise this trend already during the XIX century. Barraclough indicates the period 1890-1960 as the transition period (Barraclough 1967-1990: 24 and 29), while Kennedy suggests the period 1885-1942 (Kennedy 1988-1989: ch. 5 and 6), although they offer quite a similar account of the transition. This shows that it is always difficult to identify a date to mark a great change in human history, since they are the result of a long-term process of change.

characterised by the recurrence of different unsuccessful attempts towards European unity or European systems change. The last two German hegemonic bids can also be seen as part of the process of world-wide system change linked to the agony of the European state system (Dehio 1948-1963: 23; 179-180, 262-267; and 1955-1959: 20-21, 34-35, 127-128, 138-141: but also Einaudi: 1945-1986, 1947a-1986 and 1947b-1986; Toynbee 1948: especially 114-121; Barraclough 1967-1990: especially 95-103).

Dehio also refines Hamilton's distinction between maritime and continental states (1788-1987: n. 8) and identifies also the differences between maritime and continental hegemony, which German elites failed to grasp, according to him (1948-1963: 12, 121-122). The concept of British or American hegemony are not linked with the actual conquest of the countries on which the hegemony is exercised. Maritime hegemony can employ subtler instruments and is not such a heavy burden like the continental one. The latter expresses itself through conquest and generally produces major reactions, unless is caused by an external threat, like the European unity of the Middle Ages (Dehio: 1948-1963: 12, 19-23, 32-34). This also explains why the British hegemony did not produce any major coalition against the hegemon, while continental hegemonic struggles did. Furthermore, Dehio notices the different ranges of control possible on the seas and on land before the second industrial revolution (see also Toynbee 1948: 68-70). This is made clear with reference to the Napoleonic hegemonic attempt. His hope of success was based on this consideration: "On the seas, shipping had mastered global distances for three centuries. Was not the new civilization perhaps equipped to do likewise on the mainland?" (Dehio 1948-1963: 144). The failure of the Russian expedition proved that "even the new civilization offered no adequate means of mastering the immense distances of the East. Thus Russia was now enabled to prove herself as a guarantor of the system alongside Britain" (Dehio 1948-1963: 172). This difference also made possible the establishment of a British maritime hegemony while preventing the establishment of a continental one. Within the European state system the change in the dominant power, i.e. in the strongest continental state, which may attempt an hegemonic bid, shall be considered as an example of systemic change. The purpose of the hegemonic attempt itself is the overcoming the European state system as such and thus the achievement of a systems change altogether.

Dehio's account is based on the insight that the whole history of the European state system can be seen through the opposition of the tendencies towards unity and division (1948-1963: 19). The long term evolution of the means of production seems to push towards unity (Dehio 1948-1963: 11, 179-180, 234, 239-242, 247-249, 262-267), while the *raison*

d'état to sustain division[167]. This was well expressed by Einaudi looking at the nationalist view in the XX century: "in the conflict between technology, which economically unifies the world, and the tricks by which governments attempt to split this unity, who will win? The truth and reality of technology which overcomes mountains, seas and distances, or the governmental tricks against economic progress? There can be no doubt. Victory will go to technology, not to tricks. If men of state will not find a common way between the small spiritual homelands and the economic unity of the world, the first, and not the second, will be destroyed. In 1914 and 1939 William II and Hitler have been the instrument of historical necessity" (Einaudi 1943-1986: 76-77, my translation).

Dehio explains the success or defeat of the hegemonic attempts in Europe, and elsewhere, according to the possibility to enlarge the system so to make it impossible for the aspirant hegemon to conquer it all[168] (Dehio 1948-1963: 8-10, 38-42, 47, 50, 55-57, 60, 79, 90, 93-94, 101, 117-118, 149, 242). Dehio stresses that when it was possible to include into the system new territories which were out of reach given the current evolution of the means of production, the tendency towards unification was defeated. However, the evolution of the means of production provided always greater strength to the aspirant hegemon and the number of territories to be taken into the system gradually increased. In the first hegemonic attempt, by Charles V, Muslim Turkey was brought into the system by France (1948-1963: 34-42). The attempts by Philip II and Louis XIV were defeated thanks to the new overseas territories and their positive effects on the maritime powers, England and Holland (Dehio 1948-1963: 42, 57). Napoleon's struggle required also the Russian intervention to be defeated (1948-1963: 154, 163, 171-172). Finally, in the XX century, the emergence of a world state system transformed a European hegemonic war into a world

[167] However different combinations are possible in which their role may be inverted. For instance the first hegemonic attempt was made possible by a sudden change in the situation of power, which was not accompanied by a significant evolution of the means of production. The election of Charles of Spain as Emperor Charles V created such a vast empire to allow the start of a hegemonic attempt. However, at the time of the Reformation the religious situation – which at that time played the role assigned later on to the ideological one - did not help the tendency towards unity (Dehio 1948-1963: 34-45).

[168] Dehio's book is devoted to the life and death of the European state system, thus only cursory attention is given to the rest of the world. However, he suggests that the creation of the USA, and its expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean was made possible by the impossibility to significantly enlarge the system at the crucial time in which these events took place. Generally they happened when the European powers were unable for one reason or another to intervene and prevent the victory of the tendency towards unification (Dehio 1948-1963: 121-123, 175-176, 191-194). Dehio also considers the role of geography. This helped the tendency towards unification to prevail on the Eastern periphery of Europe. The Russian expansion towards the Pacific did not find important geographical obstacles, since the Urals are not that high. And thanks to the contact with western Europe Russia disposed of a technological level which ensured success (Dehio 1948-1963: 93-96, 101). Kennedy explains the existence of the European state system at a time in which most of the world lived under huge empires using a similar argument. According to him, European geography provides for different climates and for natural borders which favoured the existence of different states and their competition. Eventually this competition also explains their technological advancement compared with large empires which did not have strong rivals (Kennedy 1988-1989: 21-22).

war, and brought a coalition of the three world powers, including the USA – which implied the direct intervention of the overseas territories of the New World - against the aspirant hegemon (Dehio 1948-1963: 242)[169].

The possibility to enlarge the system allowed the defeat of the trend towards unity and brought always greater division to ensure that a new hegemonic attempt will not start again in the future. The European continent was thus always more divided after each hegemonic attempt: the number of great powers increased, while each of them was actually getting smaller. However, the evolution of the means of production provided enough power for new hegemonic attempts to start even from a weaker territorial position than the previous one. At the same time in the long run the evolution of the means of production required larger territories and populations to be exploited at its best (Dehio 1948-1963: 14, 96-97, 130-133, 142-144, 172, 179-180, 192-194; see also Einaudi 1947a-1986 and 1947b-1986; Toynbee 1948: especially 114-115; Barraclough 1967-1990: 39-42, 91-92, 95-103). This explains the slow, but progressive strengthening of the lateral powers, which had greater possibilities to expand in the wider world while most European states were confined within the continent. All this brings the recognition of the crucial importance for the European state system of the evolution of the means of production and of the lateral powers – the elements which, according to Dehio, were not understood by Ranke, and the following German historians and intelligentsia up to the Second World War (Dehio 1948-1963: 8-15, 38-39).

On the basis of this argument Dehio recognises the essential role in the European state system played by British insularity, which required only the control of the Channel to be out of reach of an aspirant continental hegemon (Dehio 1948-1963: 39, 81, 162). If the dominant continental state could break this maritime hegemony this would allow the conquest of overall hegemony and the end of the European state system (Dehio 1948-1963: 150). This explains why any attempt by a continental state to build a powerful military navy has always produced not just a British reaction, but also a hegemonic war. This also accounts for the fact that every hegemonic attempt – from Philip II to Hitler - included the creation of a powerful navy and/or a plan to invade Britain (Dehio 1948-1963: 74-76, 81, 150, 153, 156-157, 161-164, 235; 1955-1959: 13-15). The insular position and maritime hegemony allowed Britain to continue the war alone, for some time, against

[169] Seeley offers a consideration which may be at the basis of Dehio's view. Seeley suggests that all the European states together may not be stronger than only one of them. He considers how difficult it was to defeat Napoleon and wonders if Europe would be able to resist alone against a German hegemonic attempt (Seeley 1871-1989: 182).

aspirant hegemons such as Napoleon or Hitler, although success always depended on the ability to build a wide coalition against the hegemon (Dehio 1948-1963: 149, 264).

The insular position allowed Britain, even without a vast population or a powerful army, to be probably the most powerful great power for a long time. This was also made possible by the characteristics of naval warfare. On the one hand for a long time continental warfare exhausted resources, while naval warfare brought prosperity. The first naval wars against Spain basically consisted in British and Dutch assaults against Spanish ships bringing precious metals from the New World. Later on they included the suppression of foreign maritime trade and the expansion of British trade (Dehio 1948-1963: 55, 147-148, 166-167). Furthermore, the great maritime battles compress "into days and hours crises which on land may be spun out over decades" consuming human and material resources of the continental opponents (Dehio 1948-1963: 55). Finally maritime battles produce very little human casualties - the great victory at Trafalgar made 449 dead and ensured the command of the sea for about a century (Dehio 1948-1963: 164). However, the evolution of the means of production slowly undermined British insularity through the invention of steam-driven vessels, submarines and airplanes (Dehio 1948-1963: 206, 240, 264). British insularity was preserved in both World Wars, but at a significant cost which had never been required before. At that point also the intervention of the USA proved necessary to defeat the aspirant hegemon (Dehio 1948-1963: 234, 264). Furthermore, that kind of technological developments made the world smaller and allowed the emergence of a world state system, by making world powers more interdependent and their sphere of interest always larger and contiguous. Thus Hitler's hegemonic bid produced not just the collapse of Germany, but of the European state system itself (Dehio 1948-1963: 23, 210, 228, 262-267; 1955-1959: 20-21, 34-35; Einaudi 1947a-1986; Toynbee 1948: 115, 124-125, 129; Barraclough 1967-1990: 32, 39-42, 95-103).

This discussion shows the similarity of the framework of analysis proposed in this research and Dehio and Barraclough's analytical categories employed to sketch the history of the European state system from the perspective of international systems change. Furthermore, this explains why I rely on Dehio's account to apply and sustain the framework of analysis developed in this research. He employs similar categories with a similar purposes, and what I have proposed is basically an explicit theoretical analysis and refinement of those categories.

6.2 The birth, life and agony of the European state system

The birth of the modern European state system can be considered as an international systems change as Toynbee (1948: 118-120), Dehio (1948-1963: 23, 28, 35-36) and Gilpin (1981-1995: 41) suggest. The emergence of a new state system implies the end of a pre-existing one: the European state system overtook the Italian one. In other words the emergence and consolidation of large European states made the Italian states too small to remain great powers in the new system. This was early recognised by Machiavelli, who called for Italian unity to avoid foreign rule (Machiavelli 1513-1998: § XXVI). It is worth recalling that large states existed in Europe even before 1494 – Dehio considers this date as the beginning of the European state system because it signs the start of the European struggle to dominate Italy. Still, until that time the Italian states managed to maintain their independence and formed a system between themselves, but not really with the other European states. Hence, there is the need to identify some changes which allowed for the birth of the new European state system and the dwarfing of the Italian states.

Dehio offers a realist account for both the emergence of the Italian and then of the European state systems. He suggests that the Muslim external threat helped to keep Europe united under the Empire and the Church in the Middle Ages - so much so, that the main wars were crusades. The diminishing of the threat weakened the Empire in front of the Church, which still had a mystical mission to legitimise itself. The lack of an external threat allowed internal friction, which took the clearest form in Italy where the fight between Empire and Church was fiercer. This was the permissive condition for the creation of different Italian states, which could side with the Church or the Empire to sustain themselves. Eventually this originated the Italian state system (Dehio 1948-1963: 19-24), which implied a continuous struggle for survival, which helped the internal social dynamic and the flourishing of the Italian economy and culture[170].

This account does not consider the evolution of the means of production as a major factor in the creation of the Italian state system. The internal development of an agricultural society – often linked with an empire - is essentially static (Dehio 1948-1963: 21; Gellner 1988: 16-18, 20-23). In such a situation the evolution of the means of production is very slow and does not fundamentally alter the situation. Therefore the

[170] This argument is similar to Kennedy's explanation of the fact that the transition form an agricultural to an industrial society took place in Europe. The first cause he mentions is the existence of a European state system, that is of a plurality of states struggling to remain independent (Kennedy 1988-1989: 20-38). Kant's well-known idea of "*unsocial sociability*" as the driving force of progress points to the same insight (Kant 1784a-1991: 44).

explanation of the emergence of the Italian state system has to be found in the change in the international situation of power: the weakening of the Muslim external threat provided for the break-up of European substantial unity and the creation of the Italian state system. The plurality of states fighting to survive helped to establish a new internal dynamic. Only at this point the evolution of the means of production became an essential element to be considered, together with the international situation of power and the religious – and then ideological – situation. This also explains that the tripartite framework of analysis developed in this research only refers to modern and contemporary history.

The Italian state system produced a dynamics which favoured the development of towns and their reliance on handicraft, trade and banking. It was the start of the commercial mode of production (Montani 1999: 55-62). Montani follows Weber in considering the ancient towns as centres of consumption and the late medieval towns as centres of production. Towns provided the possibility to develop non-agricultural economic activities which found expression in local markets and long-distance trade (Polanyi 1944: 62-64; and Montani 1999: 58-62). At the same time towns also avoided the spread of the market in the countryside in which other forms of integration prevailed (Polanyi 1944: 65). Furthermore, both local and long-distance trade were highly regulated. Corporations were powerful, production was limited in order to be remunerative, and competition within these markets was restricted (Polanyi 1944: 64).

However, these developments created a class of bourgeois capitalist merchants who pushed for the expansion of the market (Polanyi 1944: 65). Significantly, Italian merchants and sailors were employed by the main European states (Dehio 1948-1963:_50-54). The improved naval technique allowed the great geographical discoveries of the time which shifted trade routes and strengthened the states on the Atlantic ocean and weakened those limited to the Mediterranean sea (Dehio 1948-1963: 47-54; and Toynbee 1948: 70-71). This encouraged large agricultural states to organise themselves for trade and to create a large domestic market (Polanyi 1944: 65; and Dehio 1948-1963: 47-57). This required a consolidation of these states and their internal pacification.

The Italian state system survived until the consolidation of these greater states was completed (Dehio 1948-1963: 23, 28, 35-36; Toynbee 1948: 113-121). The French success in keeping the English out of the continent was beneficial to both. During this struggle the French monarchy consolidated itself – continental states tend towards internal unity when confronted with an external threat or struggle. England thus benefited of its insular position becoming less vulnerable, since Scotland and Ireland were hardly serious rivals, and started to develop its textile and maritime industries. The Spanish monarchy also

consolidated itself and benefited of the American discovery. The Hapsburg managed to establish a dynastic state, although without a potential national character as the other three. Having stabilised themselves the three continental powers started to look outside, and the small Italian states, with their prosperity and culture, were the most contended preys (Dehio 1948-1963: 28-39). The large European states were much more powerful than the small Italian states. Not only they disposed of larger armies, but they could also exploit the new mercantile system and the new long-distance trade. And mercantilism paved the way to the establishment of a national market (Polanyi 1944: 65).

This account of the emergence of the European state system combines the insights offered by the realist and materialist perspectives. On the one hand it highlights the pressures for the consolidation of the large European states and the creation of domestic markets. On the other hand, it explains the survival of the small Italian states for a certain period, until the consolidation of larger territorial polities was completed. When this occurred, an international systems change took place. The Italian states were too weak to compete with the new modern states, just like the Greek polis when confronted with the Macedonian state (Toynbee 1948: 118-120; Dehio 1948-1963: 23, 35-36).

Initially, the new European state system found a balance of power among the three main continental states. This balance was upset by the election of Charles I of Spain as the new Emperor, Charles V, in 1519. This sudden change in the situation of power provided the impetus for a hegemonic attempt. Charles V also tried to exploit the idea of Christian unity, but the Pope attitude was not too favourable and the Reformation brought him strong resistance by the German princes. At that time religion still played the role which political ideologies assumed later on. It is possible to say that the ideological situation of power was not favourable to the tendency towards unity because of the link between the religious and political struggles. Charles V successes in Italy were thus counterbalanced by the dissolution of the German part of the Empire. A crucial balancing role was also played by Turkey, a lateral power at the edge of the system - while England did not yet play that role. France had two fronts to defend against Charles V. The French alliance with Turkey forced also Charles V to fight a two-front war, and allowed France to resist and the European state system to survive (1948-1963: 34-42).

The defeat of the aspirant hegemon also implied the progress of the tendency towards division. The union between the Spanish crown and the Empire, which had provided the possibility for the first hegemonic attempt, was broken through the split of the Hapsburg House into a German and a Spanish branch. Notwithstanding this fact and the growing division in the German part of the Empire, Charles son, Philip II, was able to

try again. This chance was due to the initial weakening of the enemies of the first attempt: France was turned apart by civil religious war, and thus also lost the support of the German protestant princes[171], Turkey was weaker, and the Pope gave Philip II His support. Thus Spain also disposed of a universal mission to mobilise all the energy of the country. Philip II had also kept the territories all around France, his main rival. Finally, the American precious metals and the union with Portugal and its colonies greatly increased his financial means, notwithstanding Spanish general economic backwardness. He seemed to dispose of a favourable situation of power, a propitious ideological climate, and huge economic resources (Dehio 1948-1963: 43-47). Notwithstanding these conditions, Philip II failed and weakened Spanish power to such an extent as to make a third Spanish hegemonic attempt impossible.

Dehio attributes a crucial importance to the American discovery and the overseas expansion in bringing about the Spanish defeat. This expansion was favoured by the evolution of the means of production, and specifically by the improvements in the navigation technique – which took place first in Italy, thanks to the rivalry among the Italian states and their attempt to control the Mediterranean sea, and then in Portugal, which started a systematic attempt at geographic discoveries in the Indian ocean. Also Turkey stimulated the search of new routes by making difficult the trade with the East. All this favoured the development of the commercial mode of production, linked to the development of towns and of new routes of long-distance trade. This was at the basis of the Spanish hegemonic attempt and its failure. On the one hand the hegemonic attempt was made possible precisely by the Spanish colonies in the new continent and the following trade and especially intake of precious metals. At the same time these discoveries and the following oceanic trade were beneficial also to the insular and the amphibious states on the Atlantic Ocean, Britain and the Netherlands. The latter dominated the trade between the Iberian ports and the Baltic sea. The former exploited the Spanish oceanic trade through the buccaneers. Furthermore they developed many economic branches related to maritime trade, such as the ship-building industry, much more than Spain. Thus also the strength of the Spanish opponents derived from the exploitation of the discoveries and the new trade routes.

The Spanish second hegemonic attempt met especially the resistance of these emerging maritime powers. First Spain did not manage to swiftly defeat the rebels in the Netherlands. Then, given the losses caused by the bucaneers, Philip II attacked England.

[171] This is a useful example to sustain Gellner's claim that the interaction between the cultural and political spheres plays a crucial role in providing allies (Gellner 1988: 148).

The defeat of the Armada could have spelt the end of his hegemonic attempt. However, to compensate the maritime defeat the aspirant hegemons often look for continental compensation. Philip II, was the first to take this course, but he would be followed by Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and Hitler. However, the continental campaign against France was so successful that this external threat produced a new French unity under the converted Henry of Navarre, who managed to make peace with the Pope. Thus renewed French resistance ended the Spanish hegemonic attempt and started the slow Spanish decline, sanctioned by the state bankruptcy and inability to pay its debts (Dehio 1948-1963: 47-62).

Dehio emphasises the crucial importance of maritime defeats for the fate of the aspirant hegemons. First, they make it impossible for them to fight directly against the maritime power, which is generally their main opponent. Second, they force them to look for major continental compensations for such defeats. Such a move generally brings an over-stretch of their continental forces and a renewed continental resistance, which often results in a major continental defeat for the aspirant hegemons, which is forced to abandon its hegemonic attempt. This pattern repeats itself from Philip II to Hitler with the partial exception of Louis XIV (Dehio 1948-1963: 58-60, 81-83, 150, 162-164, 171, 262-263).

Dehio always analyses also the periods between two hegemonic attempts, and offers an account of the evolution of the international power situation and of the mode of production. These, together with the ability of an ideology or a universal mission to mobilise resources, were also the keys of his analysis of the start and failure of the hegemonic attempts. Although these accounts are very interesting - and enlightening in relation to the very different effects of the evolution of the mode of production in insular and continental states, showing that Dehio always considered the interaction and the influences of the power situation and the mode of production one over the other - they refer to periods in which international systems change was not possible nor attempted. Hence they will not be considered in any detail because they are mainly related to systemic change - that is the emergence of a new dominant power in Europe, which may then try to conquer hegemony - and the progressive rise of the lateral powers into world powers.

The slow decline of Spain was accompanied by the raise of France, which became the dominant European power, and launched a hegemonic bid under Louis XIV. Although France had a compact territory and for the time excellent lines of communication, the territorial basis was clearly inferior to Philip II's one. This was also due to the success of the tendency towards division after the defeat of each hegemonic attempt which was shown by the raise of France and Sweden, the progressive dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the decline of Spain after Philip II's defeat. France also lacked a universal

religious spiritual force, or a new mobilising political ideology. This was a disadvantage, although it allowed alliances with anybody, even Muslim Turkey. French strengths came from the evolution of the mode of production. Dehio ascribes to Colbert the successful development of the French economy, the following significant demographic increase, and the mobilisation of both for the sake of state power, also aiming at overseas expansion. In view of this expansion France also started building a huge military navy – a characteristic landmark of all hegemonic attempts according to Dehio (1948-1963: 55-56, 74-77, 81-82, 156-157, 161-162, 232).

During the commercial mode of production, Colbert's mercantilism was an appropriate policy to increase state power. Also this hegemonic attempt can thus be linked to the ability of one state to exploit the potential of the mode of production of the time. What was peculiar in this case was the conscious, rational state attempt to do so in order to acquire power and ultimately hegemony. Given the character of the commercial mode of production this required the appropriate development and exploitation of the French oceanic coasts. The "new forms of economic activity, rapidly grown from maritime origins, were to be transplanted to France by careful planning and with the aid of the bureaucratic apparatus grafted onto her economy from above. For the first time, a Continental country began, with rationalised energy, to compete with a naval power. (…) She used her resources of power to achieve prosperity, not as an end in itself, but as a means of increasing those resources of power. Europe's first standing army, a creation of Louis's, was based on a taxation system developed by Colbert on mercantilist lines. However, a cardinal point in the programme of this system of acquiring wealth was expansion overseas. (…) indeed, France, with her extensive Atlantic coast, has a far larger maritime region than Spain. But this region, for one thing, lay in the shadow of France's conflicts with Spain, and had to take second place to Continental concerns nearer at hand; at the same time, it was overshadowed by internal conflicts, and was more cruelly afflicted by the wars of religion than almost any other area in the centre of Europe. Both causes seemed to have been eliminated at the start of the new regime. Would they remain so? Or were they inherent in the nature of the French body politic?" (Dehio 1948-1963: 73-74). It is interesting to note Dehio's awareness of this aspect which shows the relationship between the mode of production and geopolitics in influencing the course of events.

The French first strike against the Spanish possession in the Netherlands was checked by Britain and Holland. The French diplomacy managed to divide them – exploiting British will to weaken a maritime rival – and attacked Holland. However, Holland resisted and the British Parliament, now aware of the French hegemonic potential,

forced the king to make peace. Unable to win against a maritime power, France turned towards the continent – a recurrent feature of hegemonic struggles. France was successful against the Empire, which was also threatened by Turkey's pressure. However, the British "Glorious Revolution" brought William of Orange to the throne and he built a wide coalition against France. Louis XIV then planned the invasion of England to bring the Stuart back to power and win their support, but France was defeated on the sea. Once again a maritime defeat could prove decisive, but Louis nephew was to acquire the Spanish crown and this provoked the Spanish succession war, to avoid a repetition of the French hegemonic assault. As soon as this result was achieved Britain signed a separate peace with France, in order not to favour the ascendancy of Austria. The defeat of the French hegemonic attempt brought the success of division, exemplified by the division of Spanish possessions and the creation of the Sardinian and Prussian kingdoms. Britain acquired Mediterranean basis and the access into Portuguese and Dutch port in the East. Furthermore, Britain took away some of the French colonies in America, where British emigration was much greater than the French one. The tendency towards division won in Europe, while the one towards unity on the sea and overseas where British power was much strengthened (Dehio 1948-1963: 84-89). The reduction of the strength of France and other continental states, allowed Britain to fill the gap and increase her power. This was an example of the tendency of power vacuums to be filled by the strongest power (Dehio 1948-1963: 68, 84-89, 176-179, 242-246, 264-266), which appears after each hegemonic struggle but the First World War, since the USA preferred to turn to isolationism rather than fill the power vacuums which had been created, thus making impossible the establishment of a stable peace and international order.

Before considering the next hegemonic attempt by Napoleon, Dehio analyses the ascendancy of three world powers which were to establish a world state system: Russia, Britain and the USA (Dehio 1948-1963: 118-122). These three states had the geographical, or demographic, or power potential to be world powers. Each of them imposed unity over large territories in which a system of states could have been established, as many Europeans wrongly expected. Eventually some sources of conflict among them on the global scene emerged. However, they will be ready to put them aside to confront a hegemonic attempt in Europe, since a united Europe could become the most powerful world power (Dehio 1948-1963: 113-114, 146-147, 171, 204, 234, 240, 262). The Old Continent was still more advanced in the evolution of the means of production, and thus managed to remain the centre of the world even divided, although no single continental state alone could be a world power without acquiring European hegemony. It is possible to

consider this phase as the first origin of the international systems change which brought to the world state system, which Dehio considers clearly established by 1917. The emergence of these potential world powers is the seed of change. When they will be internally consolidated and when the evolution of the means of production will require their dimension to be properly exploited, international system change will take place – similarly to what happened in the transition from the Italian to the European state system. All these conditions will appear between the end of the XIX century and the first half of the XX (Dehio 1948-1963: ch. IV; Einaudi 1918a-1986, 1947a-1986; Toynbee 1948: 102-105, 110-125; Kennedy 1988-1989: ch. V and VI; and especially Barraclough 1967-1990: 39-50, 95-103, who offers an enlightening and well sustained analysis of the different impact of the first and second industrial revolutions from this perspective).

Dehio suggests that the birth of nationalism is linked to the emergence of the industrial society and to the fact that this process took place at different time in different places – thus he links List's and Gellner's insights. At the same time he emphasises that the evolution of the means of production produces different effects on insular and continental states. In Britain it proceeded at an accelerated pace through reform to establish a new industry stronger than in the past. In France it brought internal revolution, and produced the first form of totalitarian state, Napoleonic France. Dehio considers this result and the events which followed the French revolution as a logical and typical situation to be associated with the convergence of two tendencies: the decline of a continental state and the evolution of the mode of production. The first condition undermines the legitimacy of the existing order. The second helps to bring about a revolution. The collapse of the state and the following anarchy require the immediate and improvised creation of a new state, which is very centralised and prone to external adventures in order to sustain itself. Through terror and propaganda Napoleonic France offered some forms of internal equality and external national glory, and exploited the new nationalist ideology to mobilise the masses and get their support. Eventually the last point grew more and more important and everything was subordinated to the end of national glory (Dehio 1948-1963: 137-138, 198, 253-262).

From this follows that the Napoleonic hegemonic bid was possible because of the convergence of the evolution of the mode of production and the emergence of new ideologies which provided a great strength to the new state, while other states could not yet exploit those forces. On the one hand nationalism strengthened France internally. On the other hand the liberal ideals of the Revolution split the enemies: Napoleon was often initially seen as a liberator in many places. However, the situation of power was not

favourable: France did not have a colonial empire, nor a strong military navy – much of it was monarchical and went to Britain during the revolution. The new ideology strengthened the army, but this was not accompanied by a new military technology. Still this proved to be enough at the beginning. France easily conquered Belgium and the Netherlands. However, Britain managed to strengthen its commercial position and to take over the former Dutch trade. British control of the sea brought also industrial development since all overseas territories could trade and import only from Britain. Britain fought only a maritime war, which often brings prosperity (Dehio 1948-1963: 147-148). On the contrary France could not attack Britain and was forced to use its resources against other continental states and advanced in Italy and in the German area. With the Peace of Campoformio France achieved all Louis XIV's continental aims. The only missing element was peace with Britain – the same happened to Germany in the period 1939-1940. The need to fight against the insular country brought to the Egypt expedition. However, British control of Gibraltar allowed its navy to enter the Mediterranean and destroy the French fleet at Abukir. This helped Turkey to rebel against France, and Austria and Russia also joined the coalition. Most military successes were due to the Russian, and its sudden peace with France left Austria alone on the continent, allowing France to easily defeat her. Once again France managed to dominate the continent, but it was still at war with Britain until 1802. At that point France needed time to consolidate itself before attacking Britain, but its expansion and the construction of a new navy made Britain start a new war. Napoleon planned the invasion of the Island but the French navy was destroyed at Trafalgar. As usual, after a defeat against a maritime power, the aspirant hegemon looked for continental compensation. With all his successes Napoleon was unable to defeat Britain and the continental blockade provoked unrest and undermined the cohesion of its empire. The Spanish rebellion was a sign of the weakening of the Empire. Russian refusal to really apply the blokcade brought Napoleon to start the fatal Russian expedition until its empire was powerful enough to have a chance to succeed. The campaign failed and exhausted French power. The following French moves were just the sign of the inability to grasp that the hegemonic bid had already been lost (Dehio 1948-1963: 139-173).

Napoleon hegemonic attempt came much closer to success than any previous one. Its failure thus opened the way to still more division on the continent, to avoid any new such attempt by France or others. The result mainly favoured Britain, which strengthened its position in the Mediterranean sea, gained Ceylon, retained the control of the sea. At the Wien Congress Britain helped to maintain France as a great power to balance the Russian ascendancy – this did not happen to Germany in 1918 because the chaotic Russian

situation following the revolution did not require such a caution from the British perspective. Russia was also strengthened and acquired vast territories such as Finland and Poland, but did not get access to the Mediterranean and to the North seas. The union of Sweden and Norway and of Belgium and Holland also seemed to create stronger states more able to defend themselves against a new hegemonic attempt. While overseas and at the eastern periphery of Europe unity increased, in the European mainland division prevailed. Dehio suggested that since 1815 it is possible to identify a European and a world state systems. Britain and Russia were active in both, the USA only in the second, the European states almost only in the first. However the world was still wide and open and there was space for the expansion of the three world powers without creating major frictions. This was not the case for the European states which eventually expanded mainly in Africa and with little profit. The evolution of the means of production had not yet united the world (Dehio 1948-1963: 179-180).

The evolution of the means of production and its impact on the ideological sphere helped first the emergence of the Napoleonic hegemonic attempt and then of the Restoration and international solidarity, as the condition of internal stability. However, the continental states felt the pressure of their small size and the evolution of the means of production and the new ideologies pushed towards internal revolution or international war (Dehio 1948-1963: 183-190). A declining French state could not recur to war to sustain itself; this brought internal revolution, first in 1830 and then in 1848 when it also spread out in many places exploiting either the idea of class or of nation (Dehio 1948-1963: 196-200). Until international solidarity endured, the European scene was quiet, and the latent Anglo-Russian conflict could be seen as the main theme of the XIX century. Britain managed to avoid Russia reaching the Mediterranean through an alliance with Turkey, France and Austria. In the meantime Latin America, helped by Britain and the USA successfully fought against Spain and France. Also Russia left America by selling Alaska. The Monroe doctrine spelt the USA hegemony over the two Americas and its aspiration to a gigantic insularity, sanctioned by the expulsion of European powers from America. Only Britain kept Canada. The Canadian borders were fragile and the USA could probably overtake British forces there. However, the British control of the sea could also seriously damage the USA. Therefore the two powers did not confront themselves (Dehio 1948-1963: 191-196).

The decline of France and the Russian fear of revolution, which pushed her foreign policy away from Western Europe, implied a decreased pressure on the German area and allowed Prussian military expansion and the German national unification. This was also

helped by the spreading nationalist ideology and by the industrial revolution, which favoured an area rich of coal, iron and heavily populated such as the new German state (Dehio 1948-1963: 210-223). German unification created a new great power, and this brought renewed pressure upon it. France hoped to get back Alsace-Lorraine, and Russian nationalism and pan-Slavism found an obstacle in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The real problem however was that the lateral powers, Britain and Russia were world powers, and the European states, even Germany, were too small. It was impossible to stop the evolution of the means of production, and either domestic change or external conquest was necessary. German industrial development could provide prosperity to avoid internal revolution, but required large territories to express all its potential and keep momentum (Dehio 1948-1963: 224-232). Even if the German foreign policy aim was probably only to be on equal footing with the world powers, this really implied acquiring European hegemony. This was the result of the process of dwarfing of Europe which made the European state system obsolete (Dehio 1948-1963: 12-15, 210, 225-226, 228-233, 241-242, 253-257; 1955-1959: 20-21, 34-35, 127-128).

This account may seem just an analytical cover to hide German nationalism and expansionism. However, also non-German observers reach the same conclusions. Einaudi explicitly claims that "whatever the social regime which states adopt, they will be forced to conquer their *vital space*. The idea of vital space is not the result of German or Hitler's perverse imagination" (Einaudi 1945-1986: 41; my translation, italics in the original). He suggests that the evolution of the means of production and particularly the communication and transport system made the world more interdependent and required larger units to be properly exploited (Einaudi 1945-1986: 40). The two German attempts to unite Europe by force were the results of this development. Thus the proper alternative was not the rescue of the nation-state, but the federal union of Europe by peaceful means (Einaudi 1943-1986: 75-79; 1947a-1986: 45-51; 1947b-1986: 163-165).

Toynbee offers a very similar analysis too. He points out the importance of "the release and emergence of two elemental forces in European social life – the forces of industrialism and democracy, which were brought into a merely temporary and unstable equilibrium by the formula of nationalism" (Toynbee 1948: 103). Looking at the event which followed the industrial revolution he suggests that "it immediately became apparent that a community built on the geographical scale of Great Britain, and possessing the cohesion and solidarity which the political institutions of representative government on the national scale had already given to Great Britain before the close of the eighteenth century, was the minimum unit of territory and population in which the industrial system could be

operated with profit. The spread of industrialism from Great Britain across the European continent was, I should say, one of the main factors that produced the national unification of Germany and Italy – two notable political consolidations of territory and population in Europe which were completed within a century of the Industrial Revolution in England. About the year 1875, it looked as though Europe would find equilibrium through being organized into a number of industrialised democratic national states-units of the calibre of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, as they existed from 1871 to 1914. (…) this expectation of equilibrium, on the basis of the national unit, was illusory. (…) the European national state – of the dimensions attained by France and Great Britain in the eighteenth century and by Germany and Italy in the nineteenth – is far too small and frail a vessel to contain these forces. The new wines of industrialism and democracy have been poured into old bottles and they have burst the old bottles beyond repair" (Toynbee 1948: 114).

Toynbee's analysis of the causes and timing of this process is enlightening. Industrialism helped to bring about nationalism, which initially included the "threshold principle" (Hobsbawm 1990: 31-42, 102 and already discussed in chapter four). These two forces helped to bring about the German and Italian national unification, which can be considered as late results of the first industrial revolution. To exploit the productivity allowed by the technology of the time, the nation-state seemed the minimum, and also the appropriate unit. However, the second industrial revolution changed this and made a continent-wide market necessary (Barraclough 1967-1990: 39-50, 95-103). The concept of "vital space", the German expansionist policies, and also the European unification process after the Second World War, can all be related to this development.

The evolution of the means of production was at the basis of the dwarfing of Europe and of the international systems change which created the world state system. The two world wars only speeded up the process: "the dwarfing of the European powers by the United States and the Soviet Union would have happened, no doubt, in any case in course of time. It is, I should say, an inevitable ultimate consequence of the recent opening-up of the vast spaces of North America and Russia, and the still more recent development of their resources by the application there, on a massive scale, of technical methods partly invented in the laboratories of Western Europe" (Toynbee 1948: 129). Hence the need for Europe to adopt a federal system, the only one which can extend democracy over large territories and populations (Toynbee 1948: 115). Furthermore, he maintains that "the dwarfing of Europe is one of the most striking new features. The Europeans of to-day, like the Italians of the sixteenth century of our era and like the Greeks of the third century

B.C., are well aware of their peril. They fully realize how serious it is; and they understand – at least in a general way – what it is that they have to accomplish in order to ward this danger off. Ever since 1914, Europeans have given much thought to the problem of European union; and, though the publicists may have led the way, the men of action – in industry, in finance, and even in diplomacy – have also been at work on the problem" (Toynbee 1948: 120)[172].

This analysis suggests that the First World War was already showing the dwarfing of Europe and the coming about of a new international system. This also helps to explain the failure to establish a peaceful order after that war: "as the military decision had been brought about by the United States, the new peace settlement could be a lasting one only if it drew inspiration from, and were guaranteed by, the United States; only if the actions on both the narrow and the broad stage, which during the war had at first been linked under Britain's leadership, remained integrated in peace under American leadership" (Dehio 1948-1963: 243; similar considerations in Kennedy 1988-1989: 357-358). Toynbee also shares this view: "this speeding-up of the transfer of material power from the older powers of the inner ring in Europe to the younger powers of the outer ring in America and Asia is as awkward for the Americans as it is for ourselves. The Americans are homesick for their comparatively carefree nineteenth-century past. At the same time, they realize, far more clearly, and also far more generally, than either they or we realized after the War of 1914-1918, that it is impossible to put the clock back to a comfortable pre-war hour. They know that they have got to stay out in the world now, however much they may dislike the bleakness of the prospect" (Toynbee 1948: 129-130).

The American turn towards isolationism reflected the illusion – apparently cultivated by most of the people of the world – that it was possible "to put the clock back to a comfortable pre-war hour" (Toynbee 1948: 130). Russian and American isolation allowed German people to believe that a second hegemonic attempt may have been successful (Dehio 1948-1963: 12-15, 253-256). This was helped by the consequences of American isolationism: the coming back of France as a great power unable to defend itself and thus willing to impose a punitive peace-Treaty. The division of Europe when a European market was necessary, together with the autarchic policies adopted in most countries and American isolationism helped to bring about the economic crisis (Dehio 1948-1963: 247-249; also Polanyi 1944: 20-30). The German economy suffered the most in

[172] On the history of the idea of European unity since the late nineteenth century see Pistone (ed) 1975; Pinder 1989 and 1990; Majocchi 1989; Bosco (ed.) 1991; Cressati 1992; Malandrino (ed) 1993. In the interwar period, to which Toynbee refer, particularly important were the writings by Naumann 1915; Agnelli and Cabiati 1918; Einaudi 1918-1986; Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926; Lothian 1935; Robbins 1937 and 1941.

the interwar period: "under William II, confidence and concern had combined to make the German people regard it as possible, or even necessary, to grow out of their tight confinement. Now the hardship of actual destitution emphasized that concern" (Dehio 1948-1963: 253-254). The decline of a continental power and the development of the means of production combined to favour an internal revolution sustained by the nationalist ideology and employing all means to mobilise all national resources in view of a now explicit hegemonic attempt (Dehio 1948-1963: 253-260).

The second German hegemonic attempt was defeated thanks to the coalition of all world powers, and brought the exhaustion of British power. The interwar period and the Second World War proved that "to put the clock back to a comfortable pre-war hour" was a very dangerous illusion not to be repeated. Therefore the two world powers would not retreat into isolationism, and the European nation-states would not be great powers anymore: "today it seems to us that the great game of the modern era, which kept Europe, and ultimately the world, breathless with suspense, has been played to a finish. This becomes abundantly clear if, while observing the fate of the dominant power, we examine what happened to the perennial antagonist of any such power, the European system of states. Doubtless, it experienced a last triumph as it helped once more to prevent one of its members from suppressing the freedom of the others. But this triumph cost the system its life, just as the Reich, the assailant, paid for its defeat with its existence. It was as if the two men fighting a duel had run each other through at the same time" and "this time the European states were unable to re-erect their free system. They broke up into two groups, each assigned as a sphere of interest to one of the giant world powers. This division into a Western and Eastern sphere had been in the making since the eighteenth century, but had now acquired a fresh meaning: loss of independence" (Dehio 1948-1963: 263-264 and 265). The death of the European state systems was also the final signal of the emergence of the World states system. After the Second World War the units of the system were the two continent-wide superpowers. Their geographic and demographic dimension was not comparable to the former great powers, the European nation-states. That was a clear example of international systems change.

The bipolar world is not just an international system in which the great powers have been reduced to two. It is also a new world state system in which the significant units have changed their nature. States which previously could be great powers now cannot. The geographic and demographic dimension required to be a great power has changed. The fact that the two great powers of the new world system are called "superpowers" is just an expression of this change, and an attempt to hide the fact that the former European great

powers have lost their status and role in the international system. They have lost their independence and can only pretend to be sovereign. The very partition of Europe into two spheres of influence shows this clearly. The status conceded to France and Britain within the UN cannot conceal their weakness. Even the integrative steps taken in Western Europe were sponsored by the USA through the Marshall Plan: "but is 'union' the right name (…)? Would not 'partition' be a more accurate word? For if Eastern Europe is to be associated with the Soviet Union under Soviet hegemony and Western Europe with the United States under American leadership, the division of Europe between these two titanic non-European powers is the most significant feature of the new map to a European eye. Are we not really arriving at the conclusion that it is already beyond Europe's power to retrieve her position in the world by overcoming the disunity that has always been her bane? The dead-weight of European tradition now weighs lighter than a feather in the scales, for Europe's will no longer decides Europe's destiny. Her future lies on the knees of the giants who now overshadow her"; this meant that "on the morrow of the Second World War, the dwarfing of Europe is an unmistakably accomplished fact" (Toynbee 1948: 124 and 125).

The Europeans, just as the Greeks and the Italians earlier, have not been able to face the challenge posed by the emergence of new political units of a much larger magnitude "even under the supreme incentive of self-preservation" because "they could not escape from the toils of their own great traditions" (Toynbee 1948: 118 and 119). Looking at this issue it is possible to judge the strength of ideology. The European political tradition ultimately rests upon the dogma of absolute national sovereignty which found its most widespread expression in the nationalist ideology. The recognition that the nation-state was too small to be a viable economic unit after the second industrial revolution was implicit in the widespread idea of "vital space". Still in 1918 Europe was divided into more states than in 1914. Also the tendency towards the unification of the world was recognised and was given a first answer through the League of Nation and later on through the United Nation (Toynbee 1948: 115, 128). However these organisations did not question the dogma of national sovereignty and remained essentially loose confederations (Toynbee 1948: 135-136). Einaudi immediately recognised the intrinsic weaknesses of the League of Nation and suggested instead the creation of the United States of Europe (Einaudi 1918a-1986; see also Agnelli and Cabiati 1918).

Although the need for larger economic and political units was recognised, nationalism won the ideological battle, with all its economic, political and military consequences. Furthermore, nationalist movements were able to seize power and promote expansionist policies based precisely on the recognition of the too limited dimension of the

nation-state and the ensuing need to acquire new territories and population to provide the nation with its "vital space". Einaudi identified the link between absolute national sovereignty, the idea of vital space, autarchic policies, and war (Einaudi 1918b-1986). The German attempt to unify Europe by force, and thus to accomplish a system change failed, but that change was accomplished anyway with the dwarfing of Europe.

The analysis of the life and death of the European state system proposed so far is very different from the traditional view of European modern history, and pays attention to different factors and events. This is due to the fact that it focuses on international systems change. It is an interesting perspective since it highlights some aspects of the history of the European state system which are otherwise often overlooked. Furthermore, it seems to strengthen the theoretical suggestions presented in chapter five.

International system change is linked with the long-term evolution of the means of production. This appears both on a military and economic perspective. On the one hand the impossibility to master space and time through adequate communication and transport system at certain times have been used to account for the failure of hegemonic attempts which could dispose of a powerful ideology, and had created a favourable situation of power such as the Napoleonic one. Technological progress allowed Germany to defeat Russia during the First World War, or at least to provoke an internal crisis which brought a revolution and the following isolation of the Soviet Union. However, the war intervention by the USA, which were essentially out of reach for Germany, spelt the end of the hegemonic attempt. At the same time the evolution of the means of production and particularly the second industrial revolution required larger economic and political units to express all its potential, and in the long-term this allowed a great strengthening of the continent-wide states (Dehio 1948-1963: 13-14, 96-97, 101-102, 130-131, 187-188, 194, 225-226, 229-232, 247-253, 264; Toynbee 1948: 114-118; Barraclough 1967-1990: 39-55). However, the retreat of the USA, and the USSR isolation and consolidation, created an unstable power situation in Europe and in the world, and helped to bring about the economic crisis and the Great Depression (Dehio 1948-1963: 12-14, 243-246, 248-250; Toynbee 1948: 110-113; Robbins 1937: especially ch. XI). Finally, the Second World War signed the end of the European state system and the clear emergence of a bipolar world state system, in which the remaining two great powers had both a continent-wide dimension.

The situation of power – including geopolitics, alliances, foreign policies – is a crucial determinant of the time and speed of change. Dehio notices the importance of British insularity, and also its erosion by the evolution of the means of production.

Similarly, he takes note of many recurrent strategic features in different hegemonic attempts. As Toynbee and Barraclough point out, the dwarfing of Europe was the result of a long process which was speeded up by the two World Wars (Toynbee 1948: 129-130; Barraclough 1967-1990: 30-31). After the First one an international systems change was already taking place, although the American isolationist choice, and the Soviet diplomatic isolation made the recognition of this new situation more difficult. This prevented the emergence of a new stable order, and allowed for a new German hegemonic attempt, also in the face of its worsening economic situation.

Ideology played a different role in various hegemonic attempts. However, in the coming about of international systems change the dominant ideology was nationalism. At first this was a progressive force linked to the evolution of the means of production and particularly to industrialism. Thus it helped to establish larger territorial units, such as Italy and Germany, more able to exploit the new technology. However, after the second industrial revolution, nationalism prevented further adaptations. Confronted with the fact that larger economic units were necessary to exploit the new means of production, the nationalist ideology favoured two counterproductive courses of action: autarchic policies, which brought misery, and military conquest to acquire the "vital space" (Einaudi: 1918a-1986, 1918b-1986, 1945-1986; Dehio 1948-1963: 15, 159-160, 256; Toynbee 1948: 119-120; Robbins 1937: especially 324-327). Nationalist economic and foreign policies did not bring greater prosperity, security and power, but a new hegemonic war, which diminished the role of the European states in the international system. Those who were able to identify the change which was taking place developed the basis of the federalist ideology, precisely looking at that change and at the following course of action the Europeans should have taken to reach unity and maintain their position in the new world state system[173].

The analysis of the elements of the tripartite framework discussed in this research provides the basis of this account of the European state system life and death, that is the transition to the world state system. This shows at least the usefulness of this framework to

[173] I am not claiming that all the authors considered in this chapter or elsewhere in this research were federalist. Only a few of them – Robbins, Einaudi, Albertini and Montani - were members of federalist movements. Although the normative aspect is not their main concern, Seeley, Polanyi, Toynbee, Dehio, and Gellner suggest at least briefly the need for a united Europe - preferably on federal term, considered as the only one suited to combine unity and diversity and to extend democracy over such a vast territory - or for a form of world government endowed with sovereignty (Seeley 1871-1989; Polanyi 1944: 22; Toynbee 1948: 115-116, 120-125; Dehio 1955-1969: 129-135; Gellner 1994: 78-80; and 1997: IX-X; interesting analyses of the federalist views of these authors are in the section "Federalism in the history of thought" of the review The Federalist, and particularly in the articles by Majocchi 1988 and 1989; Pinder 1989 and 1990; Mosconi 1993). From their analysis of the situation the only reasonable normative proposal was a federalist one. Furthermore, each of them polemizes against nationalist influence on their scientific disciplines. The claim that nationalism prevents the view of certain facts which did not fit with its ideological preferences is logic in Gellner's analysis of nationalism, but is present in the works of the other authors too (Seeley 1895-1911: lecture I; Robbins 1937: 324-327; Toynbee 1948: V, 5, 83, 150-155; Dehio 1948-1963: 7, 15, 159-160).

recognise an international systems change which has already taken place, but which has been essentially overlooked both by the public and by the academic community. Although this recognition was made long ago by the authors discussed in this chapter, the IR literature has basically considered the emergence of a bipolar world only as an example of international systemic change, that is a change in the hegemon(s). This suggests the importance of this recognition and of the theoretical framework which makes it possible. An analysis of the implication and consequences of that international systems change would provide IR scholars a new wide research area. It would also imply a thorough discussion of the nationalist ideology and of the nationalist assumptions built in many IR theories, especially within the realist school of thought. Eventually it may bring to normative prescription in relation to states foreign policy rather different from those often drawn by IR researches.

6.3. From the world state system to globalization

Many of the authors discussed so far identified both the coming about of a new world state system, and a tendency towards world unification (Einaudi 1943-1986: 75-79; Dehio 1948-1963: 11, 179-180, 234, 249, 266-267; Toynbee 1948: 39-41, 62-96, 99, 115-117, 136-137, 158). This second tendency is much discussed today as "globalization". Indeed the factors which brought about the two phenomena may be the same. First, the evolution of the means of production offers communication and transport systems which make the world shrinking (Camilleri and Falk 1992). This evolution requires larger markets to express its full potential and brings with it an increase of economic interdependence and the creation of a global market. Second, this evolution impacts on the political sphere through nuclear weapons and the possibility of the extinction of mankind through war. This meant a qualitative change in the political interdependence which allowed the functioning of the balance of terror, the strengthening of the peace movement and the development of the World Federalist Movement, which aims at the establishment of a world federation to ensure peace. This can be seen as the fulfilment of Kant's prediction that the establishment of peace would become a priority in people's minds only when war became so destructive to be unbearable (Kant 1798-1991: 189-190). In relation to the process of adaptation to these changes nationalism and federalism still confront each other proposing a form of global governance not impinging upon national sovereignty, or a form of global government based on the refusal of the dogma of absolute national sovereignty.

The following discussion will use Rosenau and Montani's insights to look at the globalization process from this perspective.

The link between the evolution of the means of production and of the dimension of the market discussed in chapter three is applied by Montani to the contemporary globalization process. Just as Rosenau links the globalization process with the evolution of the mode of production and the post-industrial transformation (Rosenau 1997: 83), so Montani claims that globalization is the process of creating a world "internal" market in response to the emergence of the scientific mode of production (Montani 1989; and 2001: 7-8, 46-47). More precisely he considers globalization, or the creation of a global internal market as "a specific spontaneous order. It is the international spontaneous order generated by the transition from the industrial to the scientific mode of production" (Montani 1999: 83 my translation). It is a process not planned by any single agent or state. And it produces a supranational order, which does not depend on the consent of the states, but is often able to impose them its logic (Montani 1999: 33; and 2001: 7-8, 46-48)[174].

This new contemporary mode of production is characterised by the dominant role of knowledge and science as a factor of production (Montani 1999: 83). The on-going technological innovation requires scientific knowledge and information to move freely and rapidly around the globe. The new information technology reduces the time needed for the transactions and allows people all over the world to communicate and deal with each other. The increase in productivity, linked to these technological developments, allows firms to produce for customers in a different location of the world and pushes towards the creation of a global market[175]. The flow of information stimulates movements of capital and people, in search of the best condition for their employment. This view rests on the consideration of the current period as a scientific revolution which changes the mode of production just as the industrial revolution did, and also brings about very significant social consequences (Montani 2001: 47-48)[176].

The combination of all these elements produces three basic trends in the most advanced societies: "the de-proletarization of society; the de-nationalization of the economy; the de-militarization of international relations" (Montani 1999: 30-36, my translation). The first is due to the growing prosperity and productivity which, together

[174] Discussions of the constraints globalization poses to the nation-states can be found in the literature on globalization. See for example Keohane and Nye 1977; Soroos 1986-1989; Rosenau 1992 and 1997; Camilleri and Falk 1992; Dunn (ed.) 1994; Rhodes 1996; Clark 1997; Evans 1997; McGrew (ed.) 1997; Beck 1997-2000.
[175] Many interesting examples are discussed in Beck 1997-2000.
[176] This view underlies also other authors' works. For instance Rifkin identifies new social relations characteristic of globalization and exemplified by the idea of the shift from property to access (Rifkin 2000). Although this line of argument is very interesting, it refers mainly to the relations of production and is not specifically relevant in regard to international systems change, hence it is not discussed in detail.

with pluralistic democracy, is considered the basis of the welfare state. The second is the result of the emergence of a world internal market which makes national economic intervention less effective if not counterproductive[177]. The de-militarization is due to the destructiveness of war linked to the technological level and the following destructive capacities of contemporary weapons (see also Shaw 1997). This makes a new hegemonic war rather irrational. This helps to explain the collapse of the USSR without attempting to externalise its crisis, that is without recurring to an external war to keep some internal cohesion. This poses a serious challenge to international realism and Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war as the main instrument for international systemic change – although it is possible to claim that the Cold War has been a hegemonic war.

However, it should be noticed that the creation of a world internal market is for the time being partial and uncontrolled. The freedom of movement of goods is only partial. The richest countries tend to protect their agricultural goods while demanding the opening up of the poorer countries markets to the industrial goods. The free movement of capital is probably the only one almost completely achieved – and the establishment of a fully and instantaneously integrated world financial market is clearly related to the development of the new Information Technology (Montani 2001: 42). The freedom of movement of this one factor of production is enough to create serious problems to many countries. The financial crises of 1992 and 1997-1998 are just two recent examples. The second is particularly important as it hit countries with a growing economy in which both the stock-exchange boom and fall could be largely attributed to speculative measures (Krugman 1999).

What is far from being achieved is the freedom of movement of labour. However, this is an essential factor of production, without which the functioning of the market is seriously impaired. Polanyi's analysis of the advent of the industrial revolution and the market-economy is enlightening in relation to this issue. Polanyi points out that a number of faults in classic economic theory were due to the fact that they were first conceived to explain the reality of the English economy at the time of the first industrial revolution. Classic economists considered it as a market-economy, even if it was not yet, precisely for the absence of a labour market. The obstacles were mainly two: the prohibition for workers to move freely to look for the highest wages on the market; and the Speenhamland Act, which provided a subsidy for wages and brought to the impoverishment of the working

[177] This view is common and recurrent in many studies which examine the constraints imposed on the states by the globalization process. Montani offers a useful analysis in relation to the main instruments of national governments to intervene on the economy and particularly about fiscal and monetary policies (Montani 2001: 120-131).

class. Only when a labour market was created, trade unions were permitted, and workers were franchised, a proper market had been created (Polanyi 1944 is mainly devoted to this analysis).

This short consideration points to the role of the state in sustaining and regulating the market, which also liberal thinkers such as Robbins (1937: ch. IX) recognise. Hence it is astonishing to see today self-proclaimed liberal from the richest countries arguing against the free movement of workers and of agricultural products and pretending that a global market regulated in favour of the richest is a neutral or unregulated market. Indeed, the market can be a useful, maybe even the best, instrument to ensure the allocation of goods and an exchange of information about production, as Hayek suggests. But for this to be true, it needs at least to comprise all factors of production, and at most to be tempered by social legislation, just as national markets were tempered by the provisions of the welfare state.

The creation of a – even partial - global market justifies Rosenau's view of globalization as a process of social integration (Rosenau 1997: 80; also Gallino 2000: 8 and following), which takes the form of economic interdependence, but also of political interdependence linked to the emergence of global problems, from nuclear security to environmental issues. This creation of a world community of risk was a consequence of the atomic bomb (Einaudi 1948a-1986; Toynbee 1948: 39-40, and especially 127; Polanyi 1977: Introduction; Beck 1997-2000). Increased economic and political interdependence ultimately challenges the nation-state and absolute sovereignty, although most authors are prisoners of both at a theoretical, psychological, and ideological level (Rosenau 1997: 221-223). The creation of a global market undermines the national welfare state. Thus the globalization process met two different kinds of resistance. In the ideological sphere nationalism is a powerful obstacle, since for a long time people have used the category of absolute national sovereignty to think about the world in both analytical and normative terms (Camilleri and Falk 1992: especially chs. I-III). In the material sphere there are groups which may think to be better off with the previous system and would resist change (Rosenau 1997: 83, 96, 158, 221-223). Therefore the resilience of the nation-state should not be underestimated. On this ground Rosenau criticises the suggestion that the region-state may overcome the nation-state (Ohmae 1993). This view underestimates history, identity and path-dependence and thus the continuing relevance and resilience of the nation-state (Rosenau 1997:165). Still the emergence of micro-nationalism is significant. The weakening of the nation-state by the globalization process opened the way for the

renewal of local identities which had previously been oppressed and/or overshadowed by the nation-state.

Following this analysis Rosenau accepts the coexistence of the tendencies towards unification and fragmentation. Significantly, the first tends to be peaceful, while the second often turns to violence, because the first is "forward-looking" while the second is caused by frustration and despair with the changes taking place. The violent protests against the globalization process may recall the Luddite protest against industrialization. This similarity is particularly striking, because also the globalization process is due to the evolution of the means of production. Fragmentation is linked to the psychological response to this change and a psychological need to stick to old identities. However, as the Luddites could not stop industrialism, it is unlikely that nationalism and micro-nationalism will stop the globalization process. The unification tendency seems stronger, because in the long-term the mode of production tends to prevail and the ideology tends to adapt to the new reality (Rosenau 1992a: 2-3; 1992b: 280-281; 1997: 79-83, 95-96, 121, 147, 158).

There is the need for a new ideology to combine these two trends. Globalization and localization are not necessarily one against the other, also because they have the same causes and can reinforce each other (Rosenau 1997: 86), since often they find a common enemy in the nation-state and exclusive sovereignty (Rosenau 1997: 84-85, 154, 217). For instance in Europe what is quite evident is a double tendency towards the decentralization of certain competences and powers from the nation-states to regional and local authorities, but also to the supranational level, to the EU. The processes of federalization, devolution, decentralization, regionalization which have taken place or are taking place in countries such as Spain, Belgium, Italy, France, and Britain are very significant. At the same time the recent creation of the European Central Bank and of a single – not just common – European currency clearly exemplifies the tendency towards unification as well. From this perspective federalism seems well-suited to combine unity and diversity and sustain both trends together.

It is interesting to consider briefly the confrontation between federalism and nationalism at the different levels. What the situation requires is the end of the concept of absolute national sovereignty with its corollary of only one level of government endowed with ultimate decision-making power on all issues. The basic feature of federalism is precisely the possibility to have different levels of government independent but coordinated, according to Wheare's classic definition (Wheare 1963-1980: ch. I). Significantly, it is possible to recognise two debates about a multilevel system of government, and a multilevel system of governance. The debate within the states in relation

to the process of localization is based on the idea of a multilevel system of government, in which competences and powers are given to democratically elected regional and local authorities. At the global level the nationalist influence manifests itself in different ways and prevents a parallel discussion. On the one hand by depicting the federal system as a centralised one at supranational level, while considering it a decentralised one when discussed within the domestic context[178]. On the other hand through the concept of global governance[179], which identifies an aim but not the means to achieve it. In other words, this concept expresses the need for the world to be governed, but it does not say anything about the means except in a negative sense: the refusal of the concept of government (Montani 1999: 38-39 and 89-91; 2001: 39-41 and 131-134). Rosenau discusses many different definitions of "global governance" and concludes that the only crucial common element is the exclusion of international government – meaning supranational government (1992: 7). He also suggests that governance is the gender-concept of the species of international regimes (1992: 8-9). In the last two senses "global governance" is a new form of the old internationalist ideology which hopes to govern the world without overcoming national sovereignty (Montani 1999: 38-39).

Governance theorists admit the need for governance but refuse the democratic instrument employed so far: the government. The first is an analytical operation: the identification of a need on the basis of the analysis of a given situation characterised by global problems which cannot be solved at national level. The second is a normative operation: the choice of the instruments to answer that need. To speak of world governance or government is a normative choice which cannot be concealed as an analytical operation.

The concept of global governance reflects the current international power situation. The point is that the creation of some form of global governance may be the minor resistance path towards short and middle-term solutions to the problem of managing the world, but it is unlikely to be a long-term solution. This concept does not confront the issue of legitimacy - and of democracy, since democracy is almost universally seen as the

[178] This extraordinary use of the word federalism is particularly interesting in the debate about the future of the EU. Nationalists describe the EU – and/or a future European federation – as a centralised bureaucratic super-state, threatening the national way of life. There is little evidence to sustain such a picture of the EU, since its budget is 1.27% of its GDP and its bureaucracy is about the size of the civil servants of the Rome municipality. A report of the European Commission on this issue suggests that even a fully-fledged European federation would require an increase of the budget to about 4-5% of the GDP. Considering that European nation-states often have a budget of about 40% of their GDP, the possibility to describe the EU - and/or a future European federation - as a highly centralised bureaucratic super-state can only be the result of strong ideological bias.

[179] This concept is now at the centre of a wide political and academic debate (see especially Rosenau and Czempiel (eds.) 1992; Falk 1995; Held 1995; McGrew (ed.) 1997, Paolini, Jarvis and Reus-Smit (eds.) 1998).

only legitimate political system. Democracy so far has found in the concept of government one of its main instruments, as it is often defined precisely as the possibility to elect – directly or indirectly - the rulers and to keep them accountable. Furthermore, democracy would suggest that all those affected by the decisions of those rulers shall have the right to participate in the election, that is to have a say on the decisions which affect their lives. It is precisely on the basis of this notion that many scholars are searching for a new model of cosmopolitan democracy recognising the limits, if not the agony, of national democracy (Archibugi and Held (eds.) 1995; Falk 1995; Held 1995; Axtmann 1996; McGrew 1997a and 1997b; and Archibugi, Held and Köhler (eds.) 1998).

To combine global governance with democracy and multiple identities and loyalties (Rosenau 1997: 247), it seems necessary to identify a multilevel democratic system of government, or a multilevel federal state. The inability to accept the idea of supranational government force authors to demand democratization where it is not possible, for instance in the civil society and NGOs (Rosenau 1997: 404-410; Thompson 1997). It is interesting to note that these authors do not ask to make national industries more democratic. There is no need to democratise national industries if there is a democratic government at the national level. Similarly today there is really no way to democratise multinational corporations, and make them accountable – notwithstanding the problem of identifying to whom they should be held accountable. There is no surrogate in the global civil society for the lack of supranational democratic political institutions.

The point at stake is if the globalization process, that is the creation of a world internal market, will be characterised by the relative lack of supranational – and democratic - institutions like in the XIX century, or by their presence like in the European unification process[180]. The creation of the WTO, the protests against the G8 and some international organisations, the demand for a UN Economic security council (Haq 1998) and for the democratization of the UN and other international organizations (Falk 1998; Sakamoto 1998; Viviani 1998; Levi 1999, 2000, and 2001), all signal the growing debate about the forms of global governance, and the means to govern the globalization process. Eventually, the emergence of a global civil society will require the identification of its interlocutor. The

[180] Supranational institutions are not necessarily democratic. But international institutions are necessarily undemocratic as they are based on the recognition of national sovereignty and thus on the principle of consent of all states or of the value of an agreement only for the contracting parties. The principle of direct representation and majority is not part of the "international" concept itself (Bull 1977-1995: 65-66). Therefore the supranational character is a necessary pre-requisite for any democratic institution above the national level. It could be objected that the EU system comprises qualified majority voting within the Council of Minister– which is an intergovernmental institution. It should be noticed however that every time this happens there is a role for the directly elected European Parliament in that decision. In other words when qualified majority voting applies, the Council works precisely as the Second Chamber – which represents the member states - of a federal system, just as the *Bundesrat* for instance.

very concept of civil society implies the state, as it is built in opposition to it. As Gellner points out "civil society is in effect society minus the state" (1988: 206). But as realists from Hobbes onwards know very well, civil society without a state cannot avoid fighting. The state is precisely the mechanism which transforms a plurality of people in a society, since "a society *is* a group of people, endowed with a mechanism which inhibits pre-emptive escalation of conflict" (Gellner 1988: 178). This is precisely the role of the state as Kant perfectly highlighted in relation to both the (nation-)state and the supranational or cosmopolitan state (Kant 1795-1991, and 1797-1991).

The creation of supranational democratic institutions would thus offer an interlocutor to the global civil society, and would be the instrument for its peaceful collective action. In the meantime, the latter has got only the chances to protest against the non-democratic organizations which try to govern the globalization process such as the G8, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank. All these institutions are far from representing the whole world population and interests (Cox 1997; Kothari 1998). The IMF is even run as a private organisation in which the voting system represents the money put into the company: each state votes according to its "shares". But the impact of their decision on countries and people who are not share-holders may be immense. These people have no say in decisions which influence their lives. Just like in the past national democracy advanced on the basis of the maxim "no taxation without representation", today global or cosmopolitan democracy may adopt the maxim "no globalization without representation" (Levi 2000). The point is that either each citizen has a chance to count through collective democratic institutions, or it has to resolve to force to be heard. The two main instruments of political activity in human history have been the vote or force, i.e. revolution. There is a third possibility, to use the pen and try to diffuse ideas and offer suggestions to the governments as Kant proposed (1784b-1991). But this possibility is available only to an elite, and certainly not to an illiterate or to a poor citizen, maybe living in a remote area of the world. Furthermore, the absence of supranational democratic institutions prevents even the minimum level of solidarity required by the functioning of the market (Polanyi 1944: 126-133).

Whatever the best institutional solution to ensure the collective democratic control of the globalization process, the problem which Rosenau has confronted ultimately revolves around the issue of globalization being a process of international systems change. If the second industrial revolution has ultimately brought about the world state systems in which only continent-wide polities can be great powers, is the scientific mode of production going to make world unification necessary? The literature on globalization

points out the advantages and disadvantages linked with this process. Most authors recognise the tension between this process and the basic political units in which the world is divided. Many consider the regional integration processes as an answer to this tension (Johnson 1991; Fawcett and Hurrell (eds.) 1995-1997; and Telò 2001). Rosenau suggests that European integration and the other regionalization processes recall the formation of the nation-state and are the result of an international systems change (Rosenau 1997: 162).

Looking at the globalization process from the perspective of international systems change through the theory developed in this research a few considerations can be proposed. First, the regionalization processes can be seen as the adjustment to the international system change which had become clear after the Second World War . The situation of power characteristic of the bipolar world was not favourable to integration process but in western Europe. The USA initially favoured European economic and political integration for many reasons. Prosperity was needed to consolidate the democratic and capitalist domestic regimes of the European allies, and also to allow them to contribute at least partially to their own defence. Political integration would have been useful in this respect, but failed, and NATO sanctioned the American protectorate and hegemony on the area (Kehoane and Hoffman 1991: 5). Elsewhere, there was not a direct risk of military confrontation and the old policy of *divide et impera* was pursued by both superpowers. Only later the economic success of European integration and the evolution of the international situation of power allowed for other regional integration processes. The end of the bipolar world has favoured a re-launch and a proliferation of this kind of processes (Johnson 1991; Fawcett and Hurrell (eds.) 1995-1997; and Telò 2001).

The possibility to overcome the world state system through world unification, of which the globalization process would be the first signal, is much more remote. The evolution of the means of production and the gradual creation of a global market push in that direction. However the situation of power is certainly not favourable. Even if the decline of American hegemony was to prove irreversible[181], the hegemon is still trying to consolidate a unipolar world. The American refusal of the International Criminal Court and of the Kyoto Agreements is coherent with this design. And there is no chance of a shift in

[181] The most striking example is its financial position in relation to the world. Toynbee and Kennedy stressed the crucial importance of the shift of financial power after the First World War, which symbolised the system change taking place: the USA moved from being the greatest debtor to the greatest creditor (Toynbee 1948: 110-113; Kennedy 1988-1989: 358-366). The hegemons have always provided the public goods needed to maintain a viable international financial system. Nowadays capital inflow to the USA is much greater than its outflow. The American economy is based on high domestic consumption which is financed from capital coming from abroad. The increase of productivity in the USA only partly justifies this trend. Furthermore, in the long term, this is an unsustainable tendency. In a world in which income inequalities are growing and a significant part of mankind strives with famine and diseases capital flows cannot favour the most powerful state in the long run (Triffin 1992).

American policies unless another powerful actor is able to gather a broad global consensus. The EU seems able to play this role in those areas in which it has acquired enough power and its supranational institutions cannot be paralysed by national vetoes. The creation of the WTO and its limited supranational powers in relation to trade disputes follow from a European initiative which took time to overcome American opposition. However in the political and military spheres the EU has no power on the international scene. When the USA alone have to take responsibility there is no reason for them to accept collective decision and action. However, this may change. The terrorist attack of September 11th made the American people feel that in a globalized world even American insularity has been eroded. And many people now seem to establish at least a weak link between phenomena such as terrorism and the desperate situation of a large part of the world population. The need to cope with this kind of global problem may acquire a higher priority on the global political agenda. The growing interdependence and complexity make hegemony more difficult to be sustained (Rosenau 1992b: 292-3) and may bring the USA to support some more cooperative forms of global governance.

For the time being, however, the international situation of power seems unfavourable to the overcoming of the world state system. Global problems are not yet felt as urgent crisis by the governments and people of the richest area of the world. In the ideological sphere, nationalism is still the dominant ideology although the debate about federalization, decentralization, regionalization, supranational integration, global governance, multilevel system of government shows that the dogma of absolute national sovereignty, on which nationalism ultimately rests, is questioned and challenged.

The tension between the creation of the global market and the lack of a global democratic political institution exists and is perceived by the public opinion. This tension may open a window of opportunity for a new international systems change. But for this to occur a favourable situation of power needs to develop. Some authors suggest that only after the regional integration processes will have succeeded in creating a limited number of powerful international actors, it will be possible to find a cooperative form of world government. The suggestion to represent in the UN Security Council the great regions of the world presupposes such a development – without this premise the small countries of each region are the main opponents of a big one becoming a permanent member of the Council (Falk 1998; Viviani 1998; Levi 1999 and 2001). For the time being, the erosion of American hegemony and the instability of the unipolar world is far from creating a new world order.

It is interesting to look at this process from a Kantian perspective. Kant recognised that the establishment of peace required the overcoming of absolute national sovereignty considered as the "lawless freedom" of savages (Kant 1795-1991: 102). As a "moral politician" Kant combined "moral principles" and "political expediency", virtue and prudence (Kant 1975-1991: 118). Thus he identified both the ultimate solution of the problem "*in thesi*", that is a "*world republic*", and also "*in hypothesi*" its "negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding *federation*[182] likely to prevent war" (Kant 1795-1991: 105).

Kant also highlighted many of the historical conditions necessary to reach the goal. As pointed out in chapter two, although different IR traditions refer to one of the three definitive articles of *Perpetual Peace*, they should be considered together. If Kant thought one was enough he would not have written the other two. The first definitive article indicates that only republics – which today would be called liberal democracies - can decide to give up their lawless freedom, i.e. their sovereignty, to re-acquire it together within a wider democracy. The expansion of democracy throughout the world, especially after 1989, is a much discussed and widely recognised trend. This process also implies that one of the conditions for the establishment of a cosmopolitan republic is getting closer.

Kant also recognised that it is unlikely that many democracies at the same time will make a federal pact and favours the idea that someone should start to "provide a focal point for federal association among other states" (1795-1991: 104). This applies both to the regional and the cosmopolitan level. At the regional level the European integration process provides a useful example, since after the Second World War it started with the establishment of the Council of Europe, which included a large number of states but had no supranational features and it was necessary for six countries to go ahead to establish the European Coal and Steel Community, and then the European Economic Community. Other attempts at economic integration not sustained by supranational institutions, such as the British-sponsored European Free Trade Area, were much less successful and its members gradually apply for membership of the EEC and then EU, which currently has fifteen member states and is undergoing a new process of enlargement. Also single integrative steps within the integration process have often been achieved thanks to the willingness of some countries to go ahead, as the European Monetary Union shows.

At the cosmopolitan level, it is possible to conceptualise the processes of regional integration as useful starting points. The European unification process is the one closest to

[182] Kant uses the word "*Bund*" which should rather be translated as "confederation" (on Kant's use of these words see Marini 1998).

the creation of a federal republic[183] "by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace" (1795-1991: 104). This inclination is linked to the fact that for a polity structured as a multilevel system of government, which has necessarily overcome an exclusive and absolute concept of sovereignty to apply the subsidiarity principle, it is difficult at least in principle to contest the opportunity to create a new cosmopolitan level of government to address global problems. And it is easier to create a cosmopolitan federation among a small number of large continent-wide federations than among hundreds of small states. This appears clearly also in the contemporary debate about the reform of the UN Security Council already mentioned.

Finally, Kant suggested that people would approach this issue and support this project only when war would get so destructive to be unbearable. Nuclear weapons, and their spread, make the world a community of risk and contribute to the establishment of this condition. Furthermore the technological level which allowed the invention of nuclear weapons also produces other global problems (Soroos 1986-1989) – such as the environmental one (Goldblatt 1997) – which require global solutions, that is cosmopolitan decisions and actions. The globalization process, the creation of a world market, is a process of global social integration which may favour the creation of democratic global institutions, as the social integration provided by the creation of the market at national level ultimately favoured the establishment of democracy at national level. Furthermore, the communication technology allows people to know what happens in other parts of the world and make effective Kant's idea that the violation of right in one place is felt everywhere. The signing of the Treaty to establish a permanent International Criminal Court endowed with an independent prosecutors for crimes against humanity points in that direction. The Treaty has just reached the sixtieth ratification needed to enter into effect.

From this perspective it is possible to look at the present situation like Toynbee looked at the national unification processes of the XIX century. The Italian and German unification were the late result of the first industrial revolution which required at least national units to be viable. The European integration process - and the other attempts at

[183] It is worth noting that for decades the words "federalism", "federation" and "constitution" have been taboos in the political debate about European integration. The British government would not sign the Maastricht treaty if the reference to federalism inserted in the draft by the Belgian presidency was not abolished. Now many heads of state and government speak about a European federation, and/or a federation of nation-states. Furthermore, there is a wide consensus in favour of a European constitution, and a representative Convention with a broad mandate has been set up - following the one which drafted the Chart of Fundamental Rights of the EU - which is likely to draft a European constitution, as its members from the European Parliament have already clearly asked. It is clear that Constitutions establish states and regulate the relationship among citizens (Castiglione 1995: 62-76; 1996: 6, 9-10), while Treaties regulate the relationship among states - this was the argument used against the Convention by a French nationalist such as Chevenement (Le Monde 14th december 2001). The EU has embarked in a openly constituent process which is likely to significantly enhance its supranational character and which may even create a European federation.

regional integration – can be seen as the late results of the second industrial revolution, which required continent-wide economic and political units. The emergence of the post-industrial or scientific mode of production which sustains the globalization process may with time bring about the creation of both a global market and global democratic institutions, which may take the form of a cosmopolitan federal republic.

All this does not overturn the doubts expressed earlier about the possibility to establish anytime soon a cosmopolitan federation. However it is useful to show that world federalism was an utopian project, in Engels' definition of far from reality, when it was first suggested, but may be becoming a utopia in Mannheim's definition of a force to change reality. The historical conditions in which such an idea may spread out are slowly and gradually coming about. They are not there yet, but significant steps in that direction have been made.

The "moral politician" must combine the knowledge of the long-term solution with the political expediency needed to bring it about gradually, exploiting the opportunity history offers and avoiding major set backs which would make the final goal more distant. From this perspective also Kant's ambiguity in relation to the institutional means may have contemporary relevance. Just as the processes of regional integration take time the same is probably going to be true for cosmopolitan integration. New forms of global governance may provide steps in the right direction if it is kept clear that they can provide only a transitory institutional solution to the global problems until a proper democratic cosmopolitan framework is established.

CONCLUSION

This research tries to offer a contribution to the development of a theory of international systems change, by proposing a framework of analysis to study this kind of international change. This can be considered as a first step towards the proper development of a theory. The task is indeed a difficult one and has received little attention in the IR academic debate. For this reason I have relied on insights developed within different academic disciplines by scholars who address this issue or similar ones and who hint at the tripartite framework proposed here. This was one of the difficulties: to create a coherent framework to exploit the heuristic tools developed by different schools of thought within different academic disciplines to study a complex process such as international systems change.

It is precisely the complexity of the object of study which brought to the first methodological conclusion: the impossibility to consider it through the analytical categories developed by only one tradition of thought. Looking at each of them from the perspective offered by the others it is easy to realise both their heuristic value and limits. Mannheim points out that to criticise one theory also means to start developing a new one (Mannheim 1953: ch. II §7). Also the opposite is true: to develop a new theory it is necessary to be unsatisfied with the existing ones, that is to have criticised them thoroughly. Even if chapters two, three and four, focus each on one sphere of activity and on one tradition of thought, to look at them together is also useful to identify the limits of each one.

From this argument follows the need to develop a framework theory, or at least a framework of analysis to study international systems change. The one proposed in this research tries to offer some indications on how to employ the heuristic capabilities of the *raison d'état* theory, the mode of production and ideology. This research provides few original insights in relation to each of these concepts. The main refinements of each category are drawn from other authors who have focused on one or another category. If this research has any originality, this lies in the attempt to exploit those analytical tools together in a complementary way to study international systems change, building on Gellner's previous identification and application of a similar framework of analysis in relation to the internal development of societies.

The attempt to clearly identify the analytical tools to be employed together also brought me to adopt a quite unusual view of each of them. Often the great authors of one

school of thought are those who offer a systematic theory to study the greatest possible number of issues, or indeed the whole international reality, or the whole human history from a given perspective. According to Habermas, Marx considered historical materialism not as a heuristic theory, but rather as a theory of social evolution (Habermas 1976-1991: 130). Morgenthau (1948-1985) proposes a realist theory to account for the whole of international politics. Waltz suggests that his neo-realist theory accounts for certain basic, structural aspects of international politics, but he simply entitles his book *Theory of International Politics*. Precisely for this reason they are not suitable for this research. They underestimate the insights of other theories and overstretch the heuristic value of their own to cover too wide an object of study.

On the contrary I tried to identify those aspects of reality which each of the theories considered is best able to account for. This appears very clearly in my use of some concepts taken from the realist tradition and particularly from the *raison d'état* theory. Thus I employ the concept of international anarchy, but, unlike Waltz (1979), I also consider the units of the system and not just its structure. I value the sophistication of classical authors able to identify when international and domestic politics influence each other. Dehio effectively conceptualises the externalisation of domestic crises through expansionist policies and domestic Caesarism as an answer to difficult international situations (Dehio 1948-1963: 68-70, 99-100, 137-141, 195, 227, 254-255, 259). It may seem a matter of common sense to believe that an international crisis can influence domestic politics and that a domestic crisis can influence international politics; still Waltz's neo-realism excludes the second option. The classic authors of the *raison d'état* theory provide useful insights which can be distinguished from their normative views – which have been the main reason for the little attention they received by contemporary IR scholars, and which I refuse too. However, I value the analytical core of their thought, especially as it emerges in Dehio's works to which I have frequently referred.

Great attention was also given to the refinement of the concept of the mode of production along an unusual line of argument. Marxist authors mainly focus on the relations of production, both in their analysis of domestic politics and of international relations (see for instance Cox 1987). On the contrary I have adopted an essentially realist view of international relations and I have paid much attention also to the concept of the means of production and to the different qualities of these two aspects of the mode of production. Furthermore, the Marxist tradition often adopts some form of historical determinism, which cannot be shared. Thus an analysis of the assumptions from which that determinism stems, and of both components of the mode of production was necessary to

identify the analytical core of historical materialism. Significantly, the main insights were provided by authors who considered historical materialism just as a heuristic device, and who cannot be really classified as Marxists, such as Polanyi, Montani and Gellner.

This examination of the analytical core of historical materialism brought a few indications in relation to its use. The mode of production – as a composed concept – is useful in the comparative analysis of different societies in static terms, since at any given time any society is characterised by both a technological level and a form of integration. However, there is no necessary relationship among the two. Different forms of integration can be associated to a given technological level, although one of them can be more appropriate under given conditions. Barraclough suggests that the market-economy combined with a democratic political system is generally more efficient than a communist one in exploiting the industrial and scientific stage of the evolution of the means of production, but the communist one is more efficient in bringing about a swift change from an agrarian or commercial stage to the industrial one (1967-1990: 222-224). Polanyi's detailed comparative studies of modern and ancient societies suggest to identify a limited number of forms of integration – reciprocity, redistribution, autarchy and exchange – which cannot be considered as stages of development. On the contrary, given the cumulative character of technological progress, the development of the means of production can be considered in evolutionary terms. Furthermore, the stages of development of the means of production can be conceptualised as spontaneous orders. I have also accepted Montani's proposal to consider them as spontaneous and transitory orders which require the establishment of appropriate political institutions to be consolidated. The analysis of the impact of this evolution on productivity and interdependence since the industrial revolution and within a market system suggests the opportunity to create a global market to fully exploit it. This poses the problem of the political institutions required to establish and maintain a market-system as recognised by even many liberal economists. This short summary of the main theoretical conclusions about the analytical core of historical materialism shows the complexity of the task confronting the researcher in the choice of the analytical categories to study international systems change.

I employ many of Mannheim and Ricoeur's insights in relation to the concept of ideology – and generally I draw inspiration from their reflections on the sociology of knowledge together with contemporary social constructivist authors – although I mainly use Gellner and Albertini's works to identify various characters of political ideologies and their role. Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia has not been completely

accepted, since it seems more useful to consider the evolution of ideologies in relation to the social and historical conditions. Thus most political ideologies begin as utopias. They are able to mobilise support and action to change the world, and once they achieve, at least partially, their aim, they help to legitimise and consolidate the new order. It seems useful to accept Albertini's suggestion to identify three aspects of each political ideology in relation to its main value, the preferred institutional structure, and the historical and social condition in which such a structure can be established. This also shows the progressive development of most ideologies. The identification of a value is possible much earlier than the definition of the institutional structure best suited to assert it in practice. Similarly, the establishment of that structure requires the recognition of the conditions for its establishment, or simply the historical occurrence of those conditions and the opportunity to exploit them. Particularly important for the study of international systems change is the distinction between the ideologies concerned with the domestic order and those focused on the definition of the proper or best political unit. This second category is often not recognised, but is the most relevant for international systems change. The creation of continent-wide states, or the establishment of a global government, require the refusal of the dogma of absolute national sovereignty. The link between this idea and nationalism – which is the dominant ideology in relation to the definition of the proper or best political unit – suggest that the ideological struggle between nationalism and federalism is the crucial one in relation to international systems change.

All this shows that even if the basic structure of the framework of analysis may seem simple, its development requires a significant degree of sophistication in identifying the heuristic abilities and limits of the analytical categories employed. The analysis of the interaction between the three spheres suggest that it is impossible to define once and for all the sequence or the dynamic of change. However, in relation to overall international systems change – that is not limited to an area of the world, but affecting the whole international system – it seems plausible to suggest the relative prevalence of the evolution of the means of production in the long-term, of ideology in the middle-term, and of the situation of power in the short-term. Even if a systems change occurs somewhere and a new kind of political unit is established – for instance the creation of the USA and the overcoming of the Thirteen Colonies absolute sovereignties - this may not imply a general systems change. Only if the evolution of the means of production gives to that kind of polity a significant advantage in relation to the other political units, will international systems change take place. In other words, only in this case this new organization will be necessary to remain or to become a great power. For this reason, in the long-term it is

possible to assign this category a tendency to prevail. However, the dominant ideology and the situation of power may prevent an adjustment to the new situation, as Toynbee suggests (1948: 118-119).

I hope that the attempt to use the framework of analysis to consider some aspects of modern history and particularly the birth of the world state system has shown the contemporary relevance of studying international systems change. It is interesting to note that many of the authors to whom I refer lived through the Second World War. Trying to understand how the world was changing, they realised that an international systems change was taking place. Mannheim suggests that during crises it is possible to change the world, but also to advance the knowledge of the world (Mannheim 1953: ch. III §2). Unfortunately, even during crises there are often few people – even within the academic community – ready to face and recognise the changes taking place, if this requires a radical revision of much of our political common sense. This was the case for the birth of the world state system. To recognise this kind of change implies that the European nation-states entered a historical crisis and that they became too small to play a significant role in the international systems. Although this was clear, it was, and still is, difficult to accept for many people. The debate about, and the resistance to, the European unification process, shows how strong the nationalist ideology still is, and how much it influences international reality. Notwithstanding the impact of the European Union on its member states and citizens, it is not unusual to hear about the need to maintain national sovereignty on certain issues, or the national veto on certain decisions. Just like if the EU member states after the Second World War were something significantly different from the American sphere of influence in Europe, as opposed to the Soviet one (Toynbee 1948: 124-125).

If the emergence of a bipolar world represented not just a systemic, but also a systems change, this is probably going to have a long-term impact which goes beyond the end of the Cold War. One characteristic of any international system is its high level of interdependence. The creation of the world state system suggests that a high level of interdependence was reached, due to the possibility to think the end of mankind through a nuclear world war. This is one of the structural problems connected with the post-industrial stage of the evolution of the means of production. The possibility to destroy mankind by violent means and the possibility to destroy the natural environment beyond repair are probably the most important challenges which unite the world, although there are also other global problems in relation to famine, health, and poverty (Soroos 1986-1989 and Falk 1995). Furthermore the creation of a global market goes on, although an internal global market has not yet been established - and may never be if appropriate global political

institutions are not set up. All these complex events are often subsumed under the name of globalization.

The problem today is to identify how to face this new situation and its challenges. The study of international systems change can help, as it highlights some important features of this situation. First, it is linked to the evolution of the means of production and cannot be changed – everything remaining equal - without a reversal of this evolution. This is unlikely to come about without a major catastrophe taking place. At the same time without significant changes in other spheres a major environmental catastrophe may be approaching, at least in the long-term.

Second, most existing polities are too small to exploit at its best the technological level acquired. Hence they are also unable to play a significant role in the international system as they do not dispose of the necessary economic, and then military power, since the latter depends more and more on very expensive advanced technological research and investments.

Third, to conceptualise the changes most suited to cope with these challenges a major ideological shift is necessary. The idea of absolute national sovereignty is linked with nationalism, the dominant ideology in relation to the definition of the proper political unit, and sustains the existing polities and international system (Bull 1977-1995: 8, 65; and Mayall 1990-1993: 145). The creation of continent-wide states overcoming existing nation-states implies the overcoming of that ideology in its current form.

Interestingly, the spread of federalism which may help to establish new larger polities, and eventually, a cosmopolitan government, would still not spell the end of ideological struggle. The old one between liberalism and socialism would find a new dimension in confronting the global problems disposing of a new institutional apparatus suited to cope with such problems. Many authors discuss the crisis of ideologies, and the transformation of politics into administration. Mannheim (1953: ch. IV §4) denounces the disappearance of their utopian elements, that is the wish and attempt to change the world. Ideologies try to change the world by facing fundamental problems of their ages. The contemporary challenges are global and cannot be faced at the national level. No wonder that political leaders and parties that win the election and gain power in one state get involved in administration rather than politics. As Mannheim points out, politics is about tackling the problems of today to organise the future: a task which nowadays can only be dealt with at supranational level. The ideologies concerned with the best domestic order are still prisoners of nationalism: their supporters are satisfied with the establishment of their main value at the national level. The task in front of them is to establish those values –

which generally they consider as universal ones – at the global level too. To this purpose the establishment of supranational democratic institutions is a necessary step.

Studying international systems change through categories which come from schools of thought which can hardly be considered federalist brought to an analysis of the international situation which suggests to adopt a federalist normative perspective. This is what happened to many of the non-federalist authors considered, such as Seeley, Dehio, Toynbee, Polanyi, Hayek, Gellner. They were conservative, liberal, and socialist but their analysis of the international situation suggested them federalist prescriptions, even if these were not the focus of their works. I agree with them that the challenges involved by the birth of the world state system and the globalization process ultimately require the enlargement of democracy beyond the nation-state at the supranational and cosmopolitan level.

Kant (1798-1991: 189-190) suggested that mankind would bother about establishing peace only when war would become too destructive to be bearable. That time has probably come. A new hegemonic war would be in nobody's interest. Kant's insight about the need of cosmopolitan institutions to establish peace has now been matched by the historical conditions in which such an idea can spread out. This does not mean that a cosmopolitan democratic system of government is necessarily going to be created soon. The analysis of the three spheres of human action suggests that the international situation of power is still not favourable to such a development. However, the unification processes in Europe and elsewhere can be seen as steps towards the overcoming of international anarchy in certain areas and the abandoning of the dogma of absolute national sovereignty and the nationalist ideology. If the nation-state is right in sharing sovereignty to handle common problems, why should not the new continent-wide states do the same to face the global problems which characterise the contemporary world? Once the idea is established somewhere, it is easier to re-propose it elsewhere too – the establishment of the Soviet Union provides a useful example from this perspective (Barraclough 1967-1990: ch. VII). The more urgent will the global problem become, the more chances there will be that people will be ready to try new ways to solve them, just like it happened with war in Europe. Only after the Second World War was it possible to start the unification process – and thanks also to other favourable conditions. It is impossible to predict the future. But it is a duty to analyse the present and to face the contemporary challenges to ensure mankind a future. Any attempt to study international systems change can be a contribution to this task.

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