

In This Issue

Enacting the Lisbon Treaty for CSDP
Page 1

Setting Up the EEAS
Page 4

ESDP and the Swedish EU Presidency
Page 11

NATO Watch
Page 12

CSDP Logistics and NAMSA
Page 13

EU and Early Warning
Page 16

CSDP and EU mission updates, table and chart, December 2009
Page 20

Events

WIIS evening
Page 10

CSDP MAP launch
Page 23

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ISIS Europe news

Enter the Lisbon Treaty - 1 December 2009 and congratulations on Mr Van Rompuy's selection as the EU's new President. This ESR hence concentrates on elements of this historic occasion. The lead article outlines elements for scrutiny of the Lisbon treaty for the now called Common (formerly European) Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). We feature an in-depth article by ISIS staff on the new European External Action Service under the new HR/VP Baroness Ashton. We also have a write-up of her first presentation at the AFET Committee of the European Parliament here (www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=epu#updates see also this page for our regular EP updates). Other articles include an overview of the Swedish EU Presidency, a review of the EU's early warning (conflict prevention) instruments by Barbara Nicoletti and Lt. Col. Manuel Cabaleiro of the incoming Spanish EU Presidency writes on asset sharing between NATO and the EU. Finally our regular CSDP and EU Mission Update (with an Afghanistan feature as part of the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership, CSDP MAP.

*The new **CSDP MAP** webportal will be launched at 18H on Monday 18 January 2010 in Brussels and we invite you to join us (see notice in this ESR no. 47, p23).*

Enacting the Lisbon Treaty for CSDP: Bright lights or a tunnel?

Brussels is a flurry of events from all corners on the significance and confusion over implementing the Lisbon Treaty and introducing the Spanish EU Presidency. But what is really happening behind the scenes and rhetoric of speakers on panels? This quick overview gives some questions and directs readers to in-depth articles on related themes in this edition of European Security Review.

Enter the Treaty

Enter the Lisbon Treaty and the new structural reforms and many have been on tenterhooks for their own job positions and stability – let alone continuing work on EU stability in crisis prevention and management. There are naturally Member State interests (particularly of the larger states) which is inevitable. However, what is

really at stake is a make or break situation of the potential shift towards de-pillarisation of the EU institutions. An article in this edition¹ looks at the European External Action Service (EEAS) and analyses the structures and accountability with the EU system. However, some main points to consider overall for the shift from ESDP to C (Common)SDP are the following.²

¹ Mauri, F. and Gya, G., 'The EEAS: Laying the Basis for a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy?', *European Security Review* no. 47, ISIS Europe, December 2009. <http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=reform>
See also Avery, G. & Missiroli, A. (eds), *The EU Foreign Service: How to build a more effective foreign policy*, EPC Working Paper N. 28, European Policy Centre, Brussels, November 2007. http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%2028%20The%20EU%20Foreign%20Service.pdf

² For an analysis of the technical aspects that the Lisbon Treaty introduces to EU security and defence (CSDP) and foreign and security policy (CFSP), see: Dagand, S., 'The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP', *European Security Review* no. 37, ISIS Europe, March 2008. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf; also Gerrard Quille, *The Lisbon Treaty and its implications for CFSP/ESDP*, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, European Parliament, February 2008. <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/feb/ep-esdp-lisbon-study.pdf>; and Christian Moelling, 'ESDP after Lisbon: More coherent and capable?', *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 28 ETH Zurich CSS, February 2008.

People and a legal personality

The new High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Baroness Ashton, brings interesting facets to the fore. She brings gender balance finally to one of the top EU positions. She has no foreign policy experience some critiques say, but on the contrary, she has international trade and nuclear disarmament savvy. These are two areas that need more focus in the current EU agenda in security and defence policy – and the EU can help to take a lead in this.³ Towards a nuclear free world is something that luminaries such as George P Shultz, William J Perry, Henry A Kissinger and Sam Nunn gave weight to in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008.⁴ Indeed, Ashton may well have a new perspective on Iran to remove the impasse (although whether it will be the Eu President Van Rompuy to lead this or the HR/VP would be a question). What is probably most important in the challenging role is the ability to adopt strong organisational change theory and perspectives in order to blend the pillars. So it can be viewed that Baroness Ashton has the potential to bring a unique background and a fresh perspective. Dare to be different and use courage and reason - *sapere aude*.

As to her supporting staff, there are the natural Warring Parties between the 27 EU Member States for the 1/3 of seconded positions and to add to the battle, all (fonctionnaire and seconded) will be a ‘diplomatic’ service – hence temporary. Thus the EU needs to listen to commentary on the need for ensuring staff security in career development and seriously engage in planning for a long-term career structure across the EU institutions in Brussels and the field.

Structure and Tasks

The efforts to restructure the EU staff that work on external relations – the EEAS - are interesting and much can be ascertained between the lines. Firstly, the HR/VP seems set to stay positioned in the Berlaymont building – which currently houses the Commissioners. This would make sense as a Vice-President of the Commission and calls for better cohesion between the Commission and the Council. It is also significant as the powers of the Commission to make proposals in CFSP have now been transferred to the HR/VP. The

http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/46839/ipublication_document_singledocument/9BDF5F23-3BC5-49A6-9DDA-F9CB1414FBC0/en/28e.pdf

³ See Thomsen, Vibeke, ‘President Obama: A Leader for European Nuclear Disarmament?’ *European Security Review* no. 46, ISIS Europe, October 2009. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_328_esr46-nuclear.pdf

⁴ <http://www.cnduk.org/index.php/campaigns/global-abolition/toward-a-nuclear-free-world-editorial-2008.html>

organigramme structure (see below our article on the EEAS⁵) again shows a slight crisis between planning (preparation) and coordination (implementation), with some facets of integration (the Commission Crisis & Peacebuilding structures, the EU Personal Representatives and horizontal aspects of Crisis Management), all being a question mark. In addition, the HR/VP will need to ensure the considered inclusion of the extended tasks set out under Lisbon, namely joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and counter-terrorism. Interestingly, the latest debate is over who would chair the Political and Security Committee (PSC), as it was seen that the HR/VP would take this role over from the 6 month EU Presidency role of a Member State. But now it seems likely that a separate PSC Chair will be appointed within the HR/VP’s offices, a likely candidate would be a former PSC Chair with experience of the proceedings that would become an EU official.

Acknowledging that structuring a service of around 2000 people naturally needs some organisational divisions, a concern should be raised as to how the EU is combining (or not) civilian and military approaches. Notably, a major state attempted to keep the EU Military Staff (EUMS) out of the EEAS structure, this has not happened, which is crucial, as the expertise of the EUMS is vital. Furthermore, the EUMS has developed a liaison officer at the UN HQ in New York (since December 2008) – which has brought essential coordination of communication together – extremely timely for both the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EU NAVFOR Somalia missions.⁶ Some Member States are interested in the EU having a stronger “force” (in the San Tzu sense) militarily. However, on a divisive note, what seems to be occurring is a reaffirmation of division of the EU, with the new coordination department of the EEAS – the Crisis Management and Planning (or perhaps ‘Peacebuilding’) Directorate (CMPD)⁷ - having a military drive – to the exclusion of mediation, SSR, gender and longer term peacebuilding ‘instruments’, which some players are pushing back to the remit of the Commission.

⁵ Mauri, F. and Gya, G., ‘The EEAS: Laying the Basis for a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy?’, *European Security Review* no. 47, ISIS Europe, December 2009. <http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=reform>

⁶ Colonel Sverker Ulving (SE). See *Impetus - Bulletin of the EU Military Staff*, No. 8, Autumn/Winter 2009, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Impetus%208.pdf> p22.

⁷ Note that this has emerged from the former Civilian Military Planning Directorate that was established in 2009. See Gya, G., ‘Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP’, *European Security Review* no.43, ISIS Europe, March 2009. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_254_isis-briefing-note-2009-1-civ-capabilities.pdf and Blair, S., ‘Towards Integration? Unifying Military and Civilian ESDP Operations’ *European Security Review*, no. 44, ISIS Europe, May 2009 http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_272_esr44-civmil-integration.pdf

Considering that there are 14 (soon to be 15 or 16) ongoing CSDP missions and 12 of these civilian - with most dealing with SSR and related gender perspectives, justice perspectives and bordering the actions between crisis response and development - this may turn out to be an opportunity lost.

Training and Logistics

Strengthening the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) as a concrete establishment to provide harmonised EU training is particularly important with such organisational transition as well as for the newer EU Member States. The virtual ESDC (which was strengthened at the end of 2008 during the French EU Presidency) has provided modules which are allocated (albeit ad-hoc) to Member States or Member State agencies to conduct the training. However both military and civilian harmonised training could wholly benefit the EU's transition under the Lisbon Treaty, and indeed, the Treaty calls for a stronger training capacity for the EU.⁸

Logistics need to be considered beyond the politiqué, taking this opportunity of change and re-definition of both the EU and NATO role. The EU must enhance its military capability – with full exploration of recourse to other assets (see our article in this issue by Lt. Col. Cabaleiro on using the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency⁹). NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also argued that EU-NATO political and military cooperation "makes sense".¹⁰ The EU must also develop capacity to cohere the transition from its military to civilian missions – Concordia to Proxima in FYRM; and EUNAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) to the upcoming EU civilian SSR missions in Somalia. (See the outline of C(E)SDP missions here: www.csdpmap.eu). The coming into effect of Lisbon also means the road towards the establishment of permanent structured cooperation (ToL, Article 28 E), to have ready-to-go capabilities with a core group of Member States contributing as the Treaty notes to "fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments".¹¹ Whether this creates a "two-

⁸ See forthcoming article: Giji Gya, 'Could EU-level troop training forge a more coherent military instrument for CSDP?' *Europe's World*. 2010.

⁹ Lt. Col. Manuel Cabaleiro Larran, 'CSDP Logistics: Can NAMSA Help?' *European Security Review* no. 47, ISIS Europe, December 2009, http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_357_esr47-csdp-namsa-logistics.pdf

¹⁰ "NATO boss Rasmussen calls for stronger security cooperation with EU", *European Parliament*. 18 November 2009, www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/public/story/20091113STO64420/20091113STO64420_en.pdf

¹¹ See study done under the former ISIS Europe led agreement with the European Parliament SEDE Subcommittee: Yves Boyer and Julian Lindley-French, *Euro-Interoperability: the Effective Military Interoperability of European Armed Forces*, European Parliament, November 2007, http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_71_pe-

speed" CSDP as some critics have noted, will be under scrutiny.

Accountability

The European Parliament extends its role over the High Representative due to its (now given) consent on the appointment of the HR/VP and in her dismissal through the censure procedure for the whole Commission. Beyond this, the EP retains the right to be informed on CSDP – and one of Ashton's first acts was to undergo questioning in the AFET Committee.¹² But the EP has gained no further 'powers' of scrutiny beyond control of the budget for civilian missions. Although one expert writes that it is supposed that Baroness Ashton "will become a more regular visitor (article 21) to the European Parliament where he/she will "regularly consult" the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP and CSDP "...and inform it of how those policies evolve".¹³ The Lisbon Treaty also sets out that "The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy including the common security and defence policy."

One other possible advancement for greater involvement of the EP in CSDP could be the suggestion of 'Liaison groups' such that CFSP actions take into consideration "the Parliament's resolutions, reports and other findings" such that it "allows the relevant inter-parliamentary delegations to be more closely involved in EU foreign policy".¹⁴

Show me the money

After consultation with the European Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty also lays foundations for quicker access to budget for CFSP (ToL, Article 28, paragraph 3). This includes a start-up-fund following the logic of the Athena mechanism, for contributions of Member States' for tasks not under the EU budget (e.g. military

[the%20effective%20interoperability%20of%20european%20armed%20forces.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_357_esr47-csdp-namsa-logistics.pdf)

¹² Filippo Mauri, *AFET Committee Update*, 2 December 2009, ISIS Europe, <http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=epu#updates>

¹³ Quille, *op. cit.* p5.

¹⁴ Duke and Keukeleire further write: "As suggested in the ESDP area, a Liaison Group's function would be to take special responsibility for developing a more intensive, dynamic, coherent and (pro)active common policy on a specific area or issue. This would be done through its support for the preparation, elaboration, implementation and follow-up of EU policy, and the intensification and pooling of the individual efforts and assets of a Liaison Group's members." p.52. Duke, S. and Keukeleire, S. "Liaison Groups and EU foreign policy", in Avery, G. & Missiroli, A. (eds), *The EU Foreign Service: How to build a more effective foreign policy*. *Op.cit.*

crisis management, defence related spending, or procurement of military/defence-related goods by third states). This is welcome, but also raises the point of the actual EU budget of only €243 million for CSDP missions under CFSP (2007-2013). Comparatively, the EU Commission has at its disposal €8 billion for external activities. How these budgets will be used under the EEAS will be something to follow.

End of the tunnel

It could be viewed that Brussels is a little in crisis during its transition and 'organisational change' with question marks in many areas. However the EU has always evolved through crises and the current chaos may just forge something coherent.

By Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe

The Setting Up of the European External Action Service (EEAS): Laying the Basis for a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy?

This article will analyse the decisions taken insofar by the Council on the setting up of the EEAS and the remaining grey areas. In particular it will be questioned as to whether the new aspects that will (or most likely) feature the new diplomatic service (the design is still nebulous in some parts) will efficiently support the new High Representative/Vice President Ashton to fulfil her mandate and consequently enhance the coherency of EU foreign policy.

Introduction

At the European Council held in Brussels on 29-30 October 2009, the EU leaders endorsed a document¹ containing the outlines of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the new diplomatic corps that will assist the new double-hatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Baroness Catherine Ashton. This text – the Swedish Presidency report on EEAS prepared and agreed by Member States Ambassadors in the Coreper meetings preceding the summit – will serve as a guideline for the proposal that the HR/VP has to make on the setting up of the EEAS.

The new HR/VP will be then “responsible for harmonising and coordinating the EU’s external action between the Commission and the Council”.² Although she has been criticised as not having a background in foreign affairs and security, the new HR/VP can bring to the role her experience as EU Trade Commissioner and her knowledge on nuclear disarmament. The connection between trade and security and the increasing attention to nuclear issues are two areas on

which the EU should focus. In particular the fact that she has worked within the Commission College and knows the complex EU mechanisms puts her in a better position to fulfil her difficult mandate than any other figure with no experience in the EU institutions. The European Parliament seemed to be quite satisfied with the appointment because Ashton as an ex-Commissioner represents a continuity of the Community method and already demonstrated to take into account the consultative role of MEPs.

Background: the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP

After several obstacles that seriously undermined its implementation – the last ones collapsed on 3 November with the ratification of the Treaty by Czech President Václav Klaus – the Lisbon Treaty finally entered into force on 1 December 2009. In the area of EU external action, the treaty sets out the creation of two new posts: the Permanent President of the Council (accepted by the former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy in charge for 2 and half years) and the double-hatted HR/VP, both appointed on 19 November 2009. These two new roles must ensure coherence in EU foreign policy, at least reducing the current fragmentation of representation of the Union on the international scene. In particular the new HR/VP will emerge as the main personality for external affairs, taking charge of the functions previously exercised by the 6 month rotating Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP (formerly Javier Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (formerly Benita Ferrero-Waldner). According to Articles

18 and 27 of the Treaty, HR/VP Ashton will conduct Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) by making proposals and presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council as well as representing the EU for matters of CFSP and political dialogue with third countries and

¹ Council of the EU “Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service”. Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf>

² Dagand, S., “The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP”, *European Security Review* No. 37, ISIS Europe, Brussels, March 2008. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf

international organisations.³ In addition, in order to reduce the inconsistencies associated with the complex pillar system (the dualism between Community and intergovernmental aspects of EU foreign policy), Ashton will also occupy the position of Vice-President of the Commission. Thus the HR/VP will not only be responsible for CFSP “as mandated by the Council”,⁴ but she will also coordinate the work of the Commission DGs with external responsibility. Through this personal union of two functions, the new chief of foreign policy (on paper) can ensure greater consistency of the Union external affairs by bringing together the new crisis management operations carried out by the Council (CFSP) with the traditional external policies located under the Commission remit (aid, trade, enlargement, development).

However it appears clear that the HR/VP will be a very difficult job. Many experts considered it impossible and pointed out that Ashton needs to be a “superhuman gymnast”⁵ to deal with her numerous and challenging tasks. In theory the HR/VP should not only make proposals for CFSP and chair the Foreign Affairs Council but she should also be able to attend Commission meetings every one to two weeks. Critical voices add that Ashton would inevitably need to prioritise her work, leading her to privilege some aspects (intergovernmental and generally large states’ demands) at the expense of others (Community projects). The EEAS, the new diplomatic corps, will be set up to assist the HR/VP in fulfilling her mandate.⁶ It is indeed relevant to see which features and procedures this new entity will cover, how it will be structured and whether it will take in consideration accountability aspects.

The EEAS

Besides the HR/VP and the President of the Council, the Treaty of Lisbon sets out the creation of the European External Action Service. This will be an entity autonomous from the Commission and the Council, formed not only by personnel coming from both institutions (Commission DGs and Council Secretariat) but also 1/3 of the EEAS will be seconded staff from national diplomatic services. At present there is discussion of a size from 2000 up to 7000 (the latter being the maximal size that also would include the 123 EU Delegations around the world), but the

debated size is more likely to be towards 1500-2000. However the new service will start small and grow gradually. It will be fully operational in 2012 and will be subject to review in 2014.

With its “sui generis” nature,⁷ the EEAS is created to overcome the pillar structure and lay the basis for a more coordinated and coherent EU foreign policy. Thus the EEAS will be responsible for both CFSP and community matters to enable the double-hatted HR/VP to fulfil her difficult mandate.

The Structure

Crisis Management Structures

Regarding the structure in support of the Common Security and Defence Policies (CSDP, formerly ESDP),⁸ the 10 page Presidency paper reports that the EEAS will inherit the same organisation and chain of command from the Council Secretariat. The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EU Military staff (EUMS) will be attached directly to the HR. The Situation Centre (SitCen) – the Member States Intelligence sharing hub – will also be part of the service, as will the elements of the Commission Crisis Response and Peacebuilding unit – however placement of the latter is still unsure (see diagram).

However the structure could have been streamlined to increase in efficiency. The chain of command is still particularly complex – the CMPD, CPCC and EUMS are all attached directly to the HR/VP but not unified in a same chain – and could have been simplified to better assist the HR/VP. It is still unclear where the HR/VP Personal Representatives – if they are to continue - will sit in the EEAS. Experts presupposed that the easiest solution is to have one deputy for each single “hat”. It is then probable that one will stay in Commission and the other will cover the intergovernmental dimension. Regarding her position, Ashton declared that her office will be in the Commission.⁹ At present it is too early to interpret this decision as a pledge for privileged attitude towards Community dimension.

³ Council of the EU “The High representative for Foreign affairs and Security Policy/the European External Action Service”, November 2009. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf.

⁴ Art 18(2) TEU.


⁵ Avery, G., “The New Architecture for EU foreign Policy”, in Avery, G. et al. (eds.), *The people’s project? The new EU Treaty and the prospects for future integration*, Challenge Europe issue 17, EPC, Brussels, December 2007, p.20.

⁶ Article 27(3) TEU

⁷ Council of the EU “Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service” (Point 16).

⁸ For an analysis of CSDP, see the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership www.csdpmap.eu – to be launched in January 2010.

⁹ Declaration during AFET Committee meeting, European Parliament, Brussels, 2 December 2009.



Geographical desks

The new geographical desks (combined from competencies of the Commission (DG Dev, AIDCO, Trade) and Council) will be incorporated in the EEAS to feed into the Integrated Planning Division and the CSDP Development section (see diagram). Thus the new diplomatic service could produce Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and assist Ashton in defining priorities for external action. The duplication of desks, which resulted from the aforementioned division of labour between the two main EU institutions, will be eventually eliminated. Thus the single desk principle will draw closer Council and Commission, enhancing the coherence of the EU foreign policy machinery. However, the CMPD might also have geographic desks – with specific crisis management competency - but this should not duplicate the work of the new EEAS geographic desks which will have overall responsibility for relations with the countries under their remit.

The set of tasks that these desks should perform has not been clearly defined. In particular it is has not been determined whether these desks would hold a comprehensive approach and be responsible for the programming of all aspects of the external action (from security to development). The Presidency report only points out that the “single geographical desks should play a leading role in the strategic decision-making”.²⁴ These competences will likely be decided by the HR/VP Ashton, who has to submit her proposal for the organisation of the EEAS by the end of April 2010 at the latest. On the contrary what already appears to be clear is that enlargement, aid and trade will remain fully competence of the Commission.

Regarding the possibility of tasking the EEAS with development programming, NGOs and officials operating in the developing sector have been firmly contrary. Fearing that the development objectives as poverty eradication would be set aside by other political priorities, they insist that the development and long term assistance should be separated from security policies. MEP members of the Development Committee also objected to the possibility of fully integrating Development into the EEAS. In their Opinion on the institutional settings of the EEAS drafted by the rapporteur MEP Eva Joly (Greens), they called for the development cooperation to be an autonomous policy area that needs to continue to be carried out fully by DG Development in the Commission.²⁵

²⁴ Council of the EU “Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service” (Point 9).

²⁵ Opinion of the Committee on Development on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service.

However, the increasing complexity of modern crises requires a comprehensive approach in crisis management operations. Sudan and Afghanistan are typical examples. If the EU wants to be a credible and influential actor on the international stage, it has to improve the coordination between CFSP and long term development assistance policies. The EU has a wide range of tools (EU is the world largest aid donor) but has not proved to be able to combine its two dimensions (intergovernmental and community) in an effective way. If the two dimensions are kept separate the effects of EU foreign policy are destined to remain limited.

Therefore the EEAS represents an opportunity to improve the current situation. The inconsistencies cannot be overcome simply through the personal union of the HR/VP. It is also necessary that at least tighter cooperation channels between the diplomatic service and Commission DGs with external responsibilities are established, if the EEAS will not be tasked with long term assistance and development programming. Only in this way it would be possible to do a step ahead towards a more effective coordination and synergy of the EU external policies.

Thematic desks

The EEAS will be provided with thematic desks, also fed into the CMPD (see diagram) to focus on specific topics that are particularly relevant for EU foreign policy. As for geographical desks, including desks with similar themes from the Council and Commission will help to eliminate duplication. This could be a very positive aspect because in the past overlapping competences were the causes of several territorial infighting between the two institutions, such as the ECOWAS case on the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in 2005. Therefore the EEAS seems to bring more clarification and at least reduce the scope for turf wars between the Council and Commission.

However, so far it has not been specified which themes the EEAS would cover. Several rumours raised concern about the possibility that important civilian aspects such as mediation, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and gender perspectives may be sidelined. This would be particularly damaging for the preparation of CSDP missions, which insofar have demonstrated a strong civilian focus (21 out of 27 ESDP and EU missions have been ‘civilian’). To disregard civilian aspects would mean to ignore the specific nature of CSDP.

Available at:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-430.270+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN>

Ideally the EEAS should not comprise only thematic desks such as weapons of mass destructions (WMD); counter terrorism; SALW; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, organised crime and drug trafficking. Equally SSR; Gender and Security; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); human security and human rights specialized desks should also be part of the service. In this way the EEAS could cover all security threats, crisis management, peace building and conflict prevention policies.

The Instruments – who and how?

The EEAS will be involved in the entire programming chain and preparation for strategic direction of the EU's policies on external action, thus playing a decisive role in enhancing the coherency of EU foreign policy. Current to the debate is how the HR/VP will orientate her priorities, thus the political aspects (whether mainly influenced by the States (inter-governmental) or Commission) will be at play.

To overcome the pillar division in crisis management, the preparation for CDSP/CFSP and the Instrument for Stability (IfS – but just the Article 3 Exceptional Assistance Measures and Interim Response Programmes²⁶) – the more immediate-term responses - will be undertaken by the EEAS. The technical implementation for the IfS will be left to the Commission (entitled of the budget) and for the CSDP responses, will be the Council Secretariat. The EEAS will also play a leading role in programming of the longer term geographic and thematic cooperation instruments, how and who will be doing what is still to be decided, as the Presidency Paper states, “the specific division of labour for programming of geographical and thematic instruments...between the EEAS and Commission services will be determined before the end of 2009”.²⁷ Equally the preparation of the three other instruments - the African Peace Facility, the Consular Cooperation budget line and the Electoral observation budget line - should be in the EEAS remit to facilitate their integration in the EU external action.

²⁶ Also in the IfS are Art.4 measures of assistance in context of stable conditions for cooperation.

²⁷ The geographic and thematic instruments being: the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Development Fund, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Instrument for Stability (namely the Article 4 measures of assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation). Council of the EU “Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service” (Point 9).

However, the envisaged division of tasks between EEAS and Commission seems to be problematic for short-term crisis management measures, namely missions financed from the CFSP budget and the short-term component of the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Since they are used for rapid response in situations of crisis, their success is inevitably linked to the rapid capacity of delivery (up until now the instruments were managed within DG Relex). In this particular case, the separation between preparation and implementation among two different entities is not without counter-indication because it will inevitably slow down the capacity to act quickly and flexibly.

The instruments aforementioned allocate significant funds, becoming meaningful tools if effectively combined with other external policies. Hence lies the question of how the rapid Commission Crisis Response structures (the IfS immediate response mechanisms Article 3, the crisis platform, the crisis room etc.) will be integrated into the CMPD or not – if integrated, thus affecting the aim of increased coherence, if not, merely repeating the former second pillar structure.

A solution would be to create a hybrid office in the EEAS with Commission officials, so that they can work jointly with EEAS staff. In this way the passage from preparation to implementation remains in the same unit and will not suffer any delay.

Staff seconded from diplomatic service of EU Member States

Besides EU officials, the EEAS will also comprise staff seconded from the diplomatic service of Member States. This represents an attempt to reduce the rivalry and diffidence between EU officials and national diplomats, eventually strengthening cooperation and creating an added value. The involvement of national diplomats would not only enrich EU foreign policy with national expertise and diplomatic preparation but would also contribute to bringing closer together European and national dimensions. However, since national diplomats would return to their countries after a stint at EU level as “temporary agents”, it remains to be seen to which extent they would combine national prerogatives with the EU common interest. Indeed, there may be a lack of will for EU Member States, particularly smaller States, to send their best or for people to find incentive for a short-term period. Hence, one commentary suggested a system of diplomatic circulation, through an ESDP fellowship, offering a five-year “mini-career”, including an assignment in an ESDP mission, secondment to other EU institutions, a year at a military academy and then

a job in the Council Secretariat.²⁸ In sum, overall it is a question of perspectives (some States are still Euro-sceptical) and political will that can be answered only in the long run.

The number of secondments has not been revealed. It is related to the final size of the service since national diplomats will account for 1/3 of total strength. The most debated number should be around 500, with large states providing 50 and small ones around 10. It is highly likely that national diplomats will occupy top positions in key structures (i.e. Union Delegations) according to the strategic interest of their country of origin. This inevitably would make EEAS lean towards the intergovernmental dimension.

Union delegations

The 123 Commission Delegations abroad will be included in the EEAS under the authority of the HR/VP, becoming EU Delegations. As foreign ministries are provided with strategic information by national embassies abroad, Ashton will also have her staff on the ground to act as her eyes, ears and spokespeople in third countries. These delegations might send the HR/VP detailed reports on the regional state of affairs, providing expertise and allegedly enhancing the capacity of the foreign policy chief to conduct a more coherent EU external action. This would represent a step ahead, as Solana, unlike Ashton, did not have this vast and valuable source of information at his disposal.

Contrary to these rosy perspectives, some experts and critics point out that EU delegation staff, which up until now have mainly been tasked with trade portfolio and management of financial assistance for Community projects, will lack the necessary diplomatic professionalism to produce good reporting on political and security matters.²⁹ As CFSP has been and will continue to be an intergovernmental area, Member States are reluctant to relinquish their powers to EU officials and want their national diplomats to take the lead in these policies. Consequently it can be envisaged that national diplomats will most likely be appointed to the top positions³⁰ – head of delegation, deputy etc. – strengthening the intergovernmental dimension of EU foreign policy in the representation with third

²⁸ Korski, D. And Gowen, R., *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities*. European Council on Foreign Relations, London, October 2009. <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/civilian-crisis-report.pdf>.

²⁹ Missiroli, A., "A Tale of two Pillars – and an Arch", in Avery, G. & Missiroli, A. (eds), *The EU Foreign Service: How to build a more effective foreign policy*, EPC Working Paper N. 28, European Policy Centre, Brussels, November 2007.

³⁰ Paul, J. "EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon", CAP, Munich, June 2008.

countries. In this respect there's the danger that the nominees will be characterised by realpolitik considerations - with Member States competing on posts strategically relevant for their national interest – and the risk that national diplomats turn out to be just an extension of their governments at the detriment of the Union common view.

However, the EU Delegations will be able to resolve the problem of "local presidencies". Before their creation, it has been up to the national embassy of the Member State holding the Presidency to represent the EU for CFSP in a third country. In the case the Member State had no in-country diplomatic representation, it had to rely on others to fulfil its role, creating confusion and reducing the EU capacity to exercise influence on local governments. Thus the creation of EU Delegations ensures global representation and continuity of action, enhancing the visibility of EU external affairs.

Accountability

As a modern diplomatic service and expression of European democratic values, it is crucial that the EEAS will be set up according to accountability aspects. Last October the European Parliament passed a resolution on the setting up of the EEAS (based on the report of the Constitutional Affairs Committee by Rapporteur MEP Elmar Brok (EPP))³¹ including opinion from the AFET Committee (Rapporteur MEP Annemie Neyts (ALDE)).³² This report explicitly asked for the anchoring of the diplomatic service to the Commission, so that MEPs could preserve their budgetary powers. However, the request was not taken into account by the Council, which decided to provide the EEAS with a "sui generis" status.

However this decision does not entail that MEPs will not have powers vis-à-vis the EEAS. Rather it seems that all Member States agreed that the service should be financed from the EU budget.³³ If this will be the case, the MEPs will still be able to hold their budgetary powers, ensuring the accountability of the

³¹ Report of the Committee on Constitutional affairs on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2009-0041+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>

³² Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-428.281+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN>

³³ Avery, G., "Europe's foreign service: from design to delivery", Policy Brief, EPC, November 2009.

diplomatic service. In this regard, MEP Franziska Brantner (Greens) maintained that the key is not the collocation but the accountability aspect of the service.

Conclusion

The EEAS will bring improvements in the framework of EU foreign policy. The principle of single desk in geographical and thematic areas and the inclusion of Commission delegations will benefit the EU external action in terms of coherence and visibility. The secondments of national diplomats will bring expertise and diplomatic professionalism and strengthen the ties between EU and Member States in foreign policy.

Tasked with both CFSP and Community matters, the EEAS (in theory) has a good potential to build a bridge between Council and Commission. However it still remains to be seen whether the EEAS will enable the double-hatted HR/VP to better coordinate Community and intergovernmental policies and eventually enhance the coherency of EU external action. In this respect, it is crucial – as it was explained in the case of geographical desks of EEAS – that at least effective channels of cooperation will be established between the Commission and the diplomatic service if the latter will not be responsible for the programming of development and preparation of Community instruments. But, if bureaucratic resistances and instinct of conservation of competences prevail, the EEAS will be just another entity in the complex EU external action machinery.

*By Filippo Mauri, Programme Officer
with Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe*

**For more background information
on EU institutional reform see:**

http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_355_isis-lisbon-release1-dec-09.pdf

'The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP'
March 2008.

Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP'
March 2009.

'Towards Integration? Unifying Military and Civilian ESDP Operations' May 2009.

'Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?', October 2009.

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WIIS (pronounced 'wise') is dedicated to increase the influence of women in the field of foreign and defence policy by raising their participation, numbers and visibility.

WIIS has thousands of members — women and men — in 47 countries from academia, think tanks, the diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, the military, government, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, the media, and the private sector. Members work on and are interested in diverse issues affecting international security, ranging from non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to terrorism, human rights, sustainable development, environmental security, and conflict resolution.

WIIS Brussels - over 1500 members and growing - holds monthly evening meetings to bring women from a wide range of institutional settings together to discuss issues of common concern in an informal setting.

ESDP and the Swedish Presidency

As the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union is coming to an end, it is now time to assess Stockholm's work in the field of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Overall the results are positive and the Swedes pro-activity is what will one remember when thinking of this Presidency.

On 1 July 2009, Sweden took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. It can be said that most of the EU staff had been looking forward for the change of Presidency since the Czech EU Presidency¹ had shown some difficulties in holding the reigns of the EU during the six previous months. It was with a significant preparation and enthusiasm that the Swedes undertook the role of Presidency.

This Presidency's work on ESDP can be described as thorough and realistic. Presidencies inherit an ongoing dossier, and the Swedes took it on easily, since they had started preparatory work well in advance. The Swedish Foreign Ministry already began to engage the Council Secretariat in June 2008 to deepen its staff knowledge of ongoing ESDP issues and to decide what would be Sweden's priorities when the time would come. Presidencies do not benefit of much leeway on being innovative, and the Swedes followed the programme of the French, Czech and Swedish Presidency Troika agreed on 30 June 2008.² However, occupying the Presidency position provides countries with the advantage of being the agenda setter. The items put on the agenda generally represent the countries strategic interest and in Sweden's case, the emphasis was put on the EU Battlegroups (BGs), maritime surveillance capability, civil-military cooperation and civilian capability development. Historically, Sweden has been a fervent supporter of the EU crisis management tools and has been a significant contributor to the Union's missions since the birth of ESDP, 10 years ago. This explains the set of priorities Stockholm chose. As mentioned above, certain items of the agenda are predetermined, but comparative to the Czechs, the Swede's involvement in ESDP development seemed more ambitious and has been more active and determined.

Improving the flexibility and the employability of the European Battlegroups has been a focus of the presidency. Sweden has been one of the Member

States most dedicated to the establishment and the use of the BGs. The BG concept has played a key role in the transformation of the Swedish armed forces.³ The Swedes put forward the fact the EU's BGs had been ready for deployment for a number of years but had never been used. Stockholm therefore called for the BG deployment concept to go beyond the scenario of rapid response. The Swedes proposed to use them as gap filler in the case of personnel and capability shortage in existing operation. Cohesion of the Member States on this issue has proved hard to build. Member States with a less pronounced interventionist culture would rather see the BG concept unchanged while others see the BG as perfectly viable tools which should be used when necessary and which concept should be broadened. On the other hand the Swedes managed to build consensus on the issue of employability of the BGs. The Member States agreed that emphasising coordination and interoperability among armed forces were essential features of functioning BGs. Furthermore, Stockholm encouraged the Member States to further discuss the pooling of capabilities. Work undertaken on the BGs by the Swedes was not orientated to completely re-invent the deployability of BGs but to foster reflections on the concept and to raise awareness of its relevance.

Sweden pushed civil-military cooperation on the EU agenda. The focus was not put on the overall EU CivMil architecture - a more political and sensitive topic - as was done during the French EU Presidency. Instead it was on the CivMil capability development side and on finding synergies between the two spheres, which can be argued, is rather less complicated to federate the Member States on, but remains nonetheless necessary. The Presidency pointed out the benefit of deeper CivMil practical coordination and cooperation to overcome present duplication. The Swedes have put forward their work on maritime surveillance in the Baltic Sea (where regional Member States collaborate among each other as well as with civilian actors) as an example for the EU to follow.

On the issue of capabilities and according to their traditional civilian optic in crisis management, the Swedes have pushed forward the development of civilian capabilities. The emphasis was on capability development initiatives such as pre-deployment trainings which are already in place in Sweden and other countries such as Denmark and Germany. The

¹ See Herz J., "The Czech Presidency, ESDP and Missed Opportunities", *European Security Review*, No. 45, July 2009. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_295_esr45-czech.pdf

² Council of the European Union, "18 Months Programme of the Council", document 11249/08, 30 June 2008, http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/ProgrammePFUE/rio_EN.pdf

³ Sundberg A., Nilsson C., "Swedish Presidency and ESDP", ARI 156/2009 - 16/11/2009, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari156-2009

initiative called for the Member States to develop national civilian recruitment and training systems in order to raise the level and the amount of personnel deployed in missions, which in turn increase the efficiency of the EU missions. The work done on civilian capability development is very fragmented as it is a multifaceted topics, and what was achieved by the Swedes on this particular aspect of the question has proved groundbreaking as the issue had never been properly addressed by previous Presidencies.

In addition the Presidency carried forward previous work started on SSR. The modalities for the deployment of experts and for training and related activities have been completed, enabling the creation of an EU community of experts familiar with SSR questions as a whole and sharing a common approach to SSR. The Presidency has also developed the EU Guiding Framework for SSR Assessments, providing the EU institution with a tool of planning and analysis for future missions. It has to be underlined that document has integrated substantially Gender and Human Rights dimensions, dimensions which have been incorporated in the majority of the Presidency's work.s far as the diplomatic corps of the Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU is concerned, the work done has been exemplary. Members of the

Council Secretariat felt that the personnel present in Brussels were really in command of the Presidency which was not necessarily the case during the French EU Presidency where the Brussels staff seemed to be more messengers passing on Paris' words. As previously mentioned, the preparatory work of the Swedes has been thorough, from time to time even too much. Indeed members of the Council Secretariat felt the need for a bit more independence. The PSC team is said to have delivered one the best jobs of all time, directing meetings very intelligently, dynamising debates and pushing for conclusions to be made.

The Swedes did very good job, but it must be remembered that they did not face major crisis, as the Czechs or the French were exposed to. This is not say that the positive judgement made on the Swedes should be levelled down, but the reactions of Presidencies in adversity can affect one's judgement. It has been the case for the French with Georgia and for the Czech during the crisis in Gaza.

By Johann Herz, Programme Officer at ISIS Europe

⁴ See ZIF Website <http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/home.htm>

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In this article, Spanish Lt. Col. Cabaleiro Larran, former EU Military Staff, argues for the use of NATO's Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA¹) as a source of logistics asset sharing for Common (formerly European) Security and Defence Policy. This is a timely premise, as one of the challenges for the EU entering into the Lisbon Treaty, is military capabilities², and hence any proposal should be looked at carefully.

Indeed, NAMSA is involved in small arms, UXO and landmine destruction in the Balkans and Eastern Europe through the Partnership for Peace Trust Fund and has done good work there. Whilst it makes sense, as a general principle, for the EU to share NATO assets (as it does through the Berlin-Plus agreement), there could be specific problems in such a relationship. For example the reluctance, for a variety of reasons, of other NATO non-EU states allowing easy access by the EU to NATO assets, may also apply to the EU contracting NAMSA's services. The EU (or some Member States in particular) may feel that the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with (albeit limited) military capabilities, requires a degree of independence in logistics as well. That aside, all possibilities should be explored and below, Lt. Col. Cabaleiro – with EU logistical experience – explains the technicalities.

“Amateurs talk Strategy. Professionals talk Logistics”, General O. Bradley.

Introduction

During 2001-2004 the development of the EU-NATO relationship became a keystone in the building up of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP). Thus, this time the EU Military Staff (EUMS) financial and logistics departments participated in several meetings with NATO HQs and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) counterparts. Two contacts with staff of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) took place. The first at the end of 2001 on the KO premises, aimed at creating an initial approach for the activities performed by each party. Three years later, in mid-June 2004, an EU team visited Capellen (Luxembourg) in order to gain an insight into NAMSA's role in the context of the NATO's Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) mission. As such, the EU-

¹ <http://www.namsa.nato.int>

² See Johann Herz, 'Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?', *European Security Review* No. 46, ISIS Europe, October 2009. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf

NATO strategic partnership has experienced substantial progress in the areas of Command and Control (C2), Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and Intelligence. Nevertheless, no significant steps forward have been made regarding logistics matters.

Considering international cooperation in logistics that NATO can provide, renewed impetus – paraphrasing the name of the EUMS magazine – could be given in order to explore grounds for reciprocal productive understanding for EU-NATO capabilities sharing in this area.

The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)

NAMSA was created as the NATO's principal logistics support management agency in 1958. NAMSA's activities are overseen by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO). Through its Board of Directors (BOD), NAMSO guides NAMSA's policy and supervises its implementation. NAMSA is not a contractor, it is a contracting agency. It is also a non-profit-organisation, being ruled by the “no profit-no loss” principle (see Figure 1):


The main areas of Agency's involvement are:

- Supply
- Maintenance
- Procurement
- Warehousing and Transportation
- Contract Management
- Engineering and Technical Support

Most of these services are outsourced. NAMSA's main role is in consolidating nation's requirements, centralizing logistic management activities, conducting international competitive bidding with balanced distribution of production among NAMSO member countries and controlling the price and quality of the supply, maintenance and repair services rendered to customers.

NAMSA has a Supplier Source File with over 10,000 suppliers registered. The value of services granted in 2008 came to 1.1 billion € and its financial statements are certified by the International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN).

Figure 1



Under the authority of a General Manager, NAMSA is organized into four Directorates:

- The Logistics Programmes and Operations Directorate with its customer-oriented units, the Programme Management Offices (PMOs), the Transportation and Warehousing Division and the Southern Operational Centre (SOC).
- The Procurement Directorate.
- The Finance Directorate.
- The Resources Directorate.

NAMSA's primary customers are the individual and joint material commands of the Armed Forces of the 26 NAMSO nations. Other clients are NATO Military Authorities (such as SHAPE), NATO Agencies (such as NAHEMA¹) and other multinational armaments organizations (such as Organisation for joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR)²). Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries can also be customers, provided they have signed a MoU and a Sales Agreement with NAMSO. NAMSA has also taken the lead in several demilitarization projects, having already collaborated in this field with the European Commission³.

¹ NATO Helicopter for the 1990s (NH90) Design and Development, Production and Logistics Management Agency.

² The Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR) was established by an Administrative Arrangement on 12th November 1996 by the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Its aim is to provide more effective and efficient arrangements for the management of certain existing and future collaborative armament programmes.

³ CFSP/2003/001/ALB-MUN-DESTR and Agreement No. 117 NAMSO-EC (Albania I).

In most cases, customer states form Weapon System Partnerships (WSPs) or Support Conferences to maintain their equipment through NAMSA. Alternatively, a nation may request services directly from NAMSA, either by using the Random Brokerage service or by accepting a specific Sales Agreement (SA) or Service Level Agreement (SLA).

Food For Thought

It is useful to raise a series of questions regarding the potential of NAMSA, to ascertain the feasibility of technical provision to the EU.

Could NAMSA's experience in mission support be a significant enabler for EU-led crisis management operations? For the past five decades, NAMSA has provided, and continues to provide, vital logistics support services for NAMSO member states and NATO itself. Since 1995 NAMSA has played a key role in supporting troops, infrastructure, transportation – including Strategic Airlift and Sealift – and technical aspects to NATO-led missions. Moreover, it has been designated as a Host Nation for NATO Response Force (NRF) deployable HQs.

Would the legal aspects in both sides mean a hindrance to cooperate on logistics matters? The

CFSP/2004/029/ALB-MUN-DESTR and Addition to Agreement No.117 NAMSO-EC (Albania II).

CFSP/2006/010/UKRAINE SALW and Agreement No. 115 NAMSO-EC (Ukraine).

NAMSO Charter states that advance approval by the North Atlantic Council shall be given before NAMSO concludes any agreement or contract with any International Organisation. On the EU side, on the basis of the Berlin Plus arrangements, the Council Decision launching the operation should reflect the approval to approach NAMSA.



NAMSA provides support to navies through its LG Programme (Port Services)

What should be the relationship between NAMSA and the main ESDP stakeholders, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the OCCAR? NAMSA is oriented to Consumer Logistics, i.e. it is not an acquisition agency and is constrained to providing support in terms of spares and services.

EDA and OCCAR work in the domain of Production Logistics. The first one, in the Conceptual/Definition phase and the second one, in the Development/Production phase.

In the Capability Development Process, EDA would define and harmonise capability needs on one hand and assess current assets and systems on the other. Confronting these two data, EDA would identify the EU's future defence requirements and the existing gaps. By setting priorities and by investigation and demonstration of technologies, EDA would lead the establishment of a collaborative programme. Such collaborative programme should be entrusted to OCCAR, who would be tasked to manage it throughout the system life cycle. Then, under the MoU signed between NAMSO and OCCAR, NAMSA would become a complementary partner for the final phases: In-Service Support (mostly, in its areas of expertise i.e., maintenance services and items supply) and Disposal.

The OCCAR "In-Service Support (ISS) Catalogue of Services" launched in October 2008 and the creation, in April this year, of the EDA "Third Party Logistic Support (TPLS) Platform", seem to have mixed up this ideal scenario. In the same way that NATO and the EU have set up dialogue and flow of information with regard to commitments on capabilities to avoid

overlapping and duplication, it would be advisable to structure mutually beneficial working panels and interfaces among these three agencies.

Could the recourse to NAMSA be a means to put best value for money on the common costs of EU-led military operations? In view of Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP, NAMSA could represent relevant benefits and savings for most of the common costs borne by ATHENA as well as for the Nation Borne Costs⁴.

In accordance with applicable NAMSO Directives, NAMSA is able to provide other specialist services in areas such as Random Brokerage, Port Services, Transportation and Warehousing, e-Logistics, to mention a few. So, most of the operational common costs borne by ATHENA could be obtained through NAMSA. SOC in Taranto and facilities in Capellen may also offer a solution for the final destination of the equipment financed in common in case it was decided by the EU to store and preserve it by ATHENA.

Is there any documentary evidence on both sides – NAMSA and the C(E)SDP bodies – where the willingness of an eventual collaboration in Logistics support is embodied? NAMSA's own vision for 2018⁵ imagines "close cooperation with the European defense authorities, with formal agreements in place to enable the EU to draw on NAMSA's services". Similarly, the EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led military operations⁶ endorsed by the EUMS on the 19 June 2008 declares that "in case of recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities for EU-led military operations, NAMSA might be considered as a contracting agency, if appropriate".

Conclusions

To conclude, it is seen that NAMSA is a specialised NATO Agency with proven experience and demonstrated adaptability in the field of the logistical support to military operations of all kinds. There is not any legal impediment for a likely NAMSA back up in EU-led crisis management operations, either military or civilian. Furthermore, some documents on both sides state the willingness for an eventual collaboration.

In order to avoid possible duplicities and to reach the best effectiveness in the distribution of tasks, a

⁴ Accommodation/lodging; messing, food, water; laundry; electricity; garbage removal; crew's welfare; petroleum, oil and lubricants for vehicles; maps and medical care.

⁵ Brochure on NAMSA 50th Anniversary (1958-2008), page 53.

⁶ Document 10963/08 COSDP 555, page 27.

hypothetical framework for a future relationship between EDA, OCCAR and NAMSA should be studied. The EDA could specialise in the definition of the EU military capabilities that are needed, OCCAR could take responsibility for the development of the respective program and, whether convenient and suitable, NAMSA could be in charge of the last life cycle phases, i.e. in-service support and disposal.

The EU, in case of deciding a possible logistical recourse to NAMSA, should also analyse the potential savings that could be obtained in the common costs borne by the financial mechanism ATHENA and in the so-called Nation Borne Costs.

*By Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Cabaleiro Larran,
Spanish Navy, Naval Logistics Support Command
(Former EU Military Staff)*

EU and Early Warning – Prevention Progress?

With the advent of the External Action Service aiming to cohere EU responses, in this article, Barbara Nicoletti reviews the EU's history in developing an early warning capacity and assesses where it lies today. The EU sees early warning as a main facet in its conflict prevention framework, as emphasised by the report on the European Security Strategy in 2008. The Commission particularly has undertaken extensive consultation and dialogue on early warning. The EU needs to continue to build on this work and address the challenges in early warning sources and institutional engagement with populations vulnerable to conflict.

The EU background in Early Warning

On 17 November 2009 the External Relations Council meeting celebrated 10 years since the creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).¹ The strengthening of the EU's early warning capacity has been acknowledged as one of the actions to be undertaken in order to improve the consistency of EU external activities. But what is the scope of EU early warning capacity, and where is it heading?

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the prevention of violent conflicts will be one of the explicit objectives of EU external action.² However, the delay of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, has not impeded the EU's engagement in conflict prevention through a series of instruments and activities.³ Well before the preparation of the new Treaty, and in the context of the changing environment

of the mid-90s, the EU had begun to develop the conceptual, political and institutional framework for making the prevention of conflict a distinctive characteristic of EU engagement on the world scene. This process led to the adoption of founding documents such as the EC Communication on Conflict Prevention and the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict in 2001,⁴ and it is this framework that has set the guiding principles for EU action for the prevention of conflicts both at the level of Community and Common Foreign Security Policy/ESDP.

Since the beginning of development of EU policy for its conflict prevention capacity, the EU has included early warning systems (EWS) within its preventive toolbox, hence indicating the efforts towards a comprehensive approach. Although less popular as a concept than conflict prevention, early warning is the essential prerequisite for the planning and implementation of effective conflict preventive activities. Initially associated with the only issuing of warning signals about an impending escalation of conflict, EWS have quickly developed into comprehensive instruments aimed at ensuring that early-warning-to-early-action-processes are implemented. Today's early warning is called to encompass different activities ranging from the collection of information to its interpretation, in order not only to anticipate conflict events but also, and especially, to suggest the most appropriate policy options to prevent their outbreak. Early warning has thus become of great interest to policy makers that ask for practical instruments to enable appropriate preventive interventions.

¹ Note that with the advent of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, ESDP becomes Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

² Art.21.2.c of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

³ Perez, J.N., *Conflict Indicators developed by the Commission – The Check-list for root causes of conflict/early warning indicators*, in Kronenberg V. and Wouters J. (eds), *The European Union and Conflict Prevention. Policy and Legal Aspects*, TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2004.

⁴ Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention of 11 April 2001, COM(2001) 211 final. EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, adopted at the Göteborg European Council (15-16 June 2001) - See Presidency Conclusions from the Göteborg European Council (point 52). Implementation reports have been presented annually to the European Council since June 2002 when the first Presidency Report 9991/02 on the Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, was presented at the Sevilla European Council.

EU policy development for early warning

The importance of conflict early warning has been well acknowledged in both the EC Communication and EU Programme on the prevention of conflict. On the one hand the Commission Communication recognises that “an early identification of risk factors increases the chances of timely and effective action to address the underlying causes of conflict”⁵ and individuate the development of conflict indicators as the instrument for selecting countries with conflict potential. On the other hand, the Council EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which represents the Member States’ “political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU external relations”, includes the “improvement of early warning, action and policy coherence” as one of the implementing tools.⁶ From an institutional point of view, bodies with specific early warning responsibilities have been created over time within both the EU Council and the Commission. Early in 1999, the early warning capability of the EU Council Secretariat was inaugurated with the creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), later renamed the Policy Unit, whose task, according to the Amsterdam Treaty, is “to monitor and analyse CFSP-relevant development, provide assessments of the Union’s foreign and security policy interests and identify areas for future CFSP attention, provide timely assessments and early warning of international events and produce policy options and recommendations”.⁷ In 2003 the Council Secretariat’s Joint Situation Centre was created with a more operational focus, with the task of monitoring and assessing events and situations worldwide, concentrating on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD-proliferation, and, since 1 February 2005, counter-terrorism. At the European Commission level, the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit – now the Unit for Crisis Response and Peace-building in the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex) - was created in 2001 to serve as the focal point and driving force for conflict prevention activities of an European Commission ever more determined “to play a more proactive role and to enhance the impact and consistency of the different Commission’s [...] initiatives in this area”.⁸ The Unit began its activity by developing the EC check-list for root causes of conflict/early warning indicators⁹ that,

⁵ European Commission, *supra* note 3.

⁶ EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, *supra* note 3.

⁷ Declaration n. 6 on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

⁸ Perez, J.N., *supra* note 2.

⁹ In the Commission’s view such indicators help identify potential conflict at an early stage by looking at issues such as the balance of political and economic power, the control of the security forces, the ethnic composition of the government for ethnically divided

together with regular reporting from EC delegations and desk offices from countries of concern; open source information via the Commission Crisis Room and the ECHO’s disaster monitoring system, constitute the EC tools for monitoring and early warning.¹⁰

More recently, the 2008 Report on the European Security Strategy, building on the 2003 European Security Strategy recognition of the need for developing “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”, clearly identified conflict early warning as one of the conflict prevention tools that need to be reinforced.¹¹

Shaping the debate on the future of conflict early warning

Besides growing political and institutional commitment to conflict early warning, the EU, and more precisely the European Commission, has recently been very active in shaping the debate among the different actors who have a role in the early warning to early action process, from academia to national and international policymakers to civil society organisations. Being already on the side of conflict early warning advocates, the EC has been focusing its attention on how to ensure that conflict early warning contributes to the evidence base of conflict prevention decision-making. The EC anticipated Lund’s point of view on the need for communicating conflict prevention and its significance, since “if one does not believe an activity exists, one does not consider it an option or devote resources to it”.¹² Since 2005, every 2 years the EC has invited to Brussels the international community of policy makers and practitioners in conflict prevention and crisis response to examine and learn from responses to crises and security threats.

Following the 2005 conference “*From needs to solutions: enhancing civilian crisis response capacity in the EU*” and the 2007 conference ‘*From Early Warning to Early action*’, involving diplomats, officers, practitioners, scholars and advocates, representing all facets of the network of European crisis responders, the June 2009 conference explored what works best and as it was titled, what is “*Making the difference*”, with a view to identifying effective approaches to the strengthening of crisis response

countries, the representation of women in decision-making bodies, the potential degradation of environmental resources and so forth.

¹⁰ Perez, N.J., *supra* note 2.

¹¹ Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World – S407/08, 11 December 2008.

¹² Lund, M.S., Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice, in Bercovitch, J., Zartman, W., Kremenyuk, V. (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution Handbook, Sage Publications, London, 2008.

capacities.¹³ Within this context, the 2009 conference reinforced the need for effective early warning tools, i.e. able to both provide the context-specific knowledge of the impending crisis and present policymakers with a range of implementable preventive options, and some of the major challenges within this field have been identified by international experts and practitioners.

In particular, two aspects seem to have the potential for significantly affecting the future developments in both the theory and the practice of conflict early warning. First of all, the relationship between information on impending violent conflicts – both in terms of its availability and use – and the implementation of preventive response is not straightforward. On the one hand there exist the moral and ethical challenges raised by the use of open information for the purposes of closed-source intelligence early warning systems. Open source information, provides transparent, decentralised, collaborative and human–security centred early warning systems – that are usually applied for humanitarian assistance and minority protection objectives. The challenge here is lies in the fact that this type of information and early warning system are often used for closed and secret, de-centralised, compartmentalised purposes and mainly focussed on states’ security problems early warning systems.

On the other hand, there are the effects on the implementation of timely and appropriate conflict prevention responses of the ever more frequent and unstructured reportage of crises, made available by the general public through instantaneous wireless communication tools. With this ‘system’, there is no time to build up the ‘situational awareness’ that is needed to both define response scenarios to the crises and have the needed political backup. Thus, the chances are very high that responses are orientated towards public emotionally–driven expectations and hence undermine the legitimacy of early warning and response systems.¹⁴

The second aspect is related to the emerging European position in the context of the current debate on third generation early warning systems as people–centred systems. ‘Third generation’ EWS have developed from recent calls by international early warning experts for a new type of early warning and response system “whose monitoring and analysis is both conducted

within a conflict region”¹⁵ and that “empowers individual and communities threatened by hazards to act in sufficient time and in an appropriate manner, so as to reduce the possibility of personal injury, loss of life, damage to property and the environment and loss of livelihoods”.¹⁶ According to this approach, the population of crisis–affected countries/regions would obtain ownership of early warning systems, from monitoring to analysis of context–specific threats to the use of the available tools and methodologies for mediating, resolving and transforming confrontations “where people in the communities play a main role”,¹⁷ particularly non-military confrontations.

Even though the EU aims to engage with populations vulnerable to conflict, as it sees this “both as an aim to be promoted in and of [themselves], as well as a means through which the Union can pursue more effectively objectives such as the promotion of peace and the protection of human rights”,¹⁸ civil society organisations cannot pursue early warning roles on behalf of international actors, especially if the latter are not able to protect them. Collecting information, establishing networks with the parties who have a stake in the conflict, and being the initiators of actions for mitigating tensions or preventing the outbreak of violence can be dangerous and contentious within political systems closed to any active role played by civil society. Without denying the value of certain confined experiences of early warning systems built around conflict–affected societies and groups (like the Foundation for Co–Existence (FCE) experience in Sri Lanka), early warning practitioners have been proposing a population–centred human security approach to early warning¹⁹. Such a proposal would mean to first consider violent conflict, traditionally seen as the only threat to be prevented by early warning mechanisms, as one among more recently emerged threats to international peace and. While traditional direct violence remains the objective of immediate and operational prevention, the complex reality faced by contemporary societies with regard to human security forces us to attentively consider non–traditional structural violence. This contemporary form of violence results from the human suffering and social and communal deterioration, that is ignited by the

¹³ The Conference “Making the Difference: Strengthening capacities to respond to crises and security threats” was held on 3rd and 4th June 2009 in Brussels.

¹⁴ Conference “Making the Difference: Strengthening capacities to respond to crises and security threats”, Recommendations from the panels of the Conference, p.10.

¹⁵ Rupesinghe, K., *Introduction*, In Rupesinghe, K. (ed.), *Third Generation Early Warning*, The Foundation for Co-Existence, Colombo, 2009.

¹⁶ International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, 1997.

¹⁷ Rupesinghe K., *supra note* 14.

¹⁸ Marchetti R., Tocci N., *Redefining EU Engagement with Conflict Society*, SHUR Working Paper 04/09, July 2009.

¹⁹ FCE is here mentioned as an example of third generation early warning systems that see the active involvement of the specific population affected by the conflict in the planning and implementation of early warning mechanisms and preventive actions. A population-centred human security approach makes reference to the inclusion of specific human security indicators that are peculiar for the population affected by the conflict.

systematic denial of the basic human needs of individuals and communities.²⁰

Such a human security-based approach to early warning and early response should ideally be complemented by a multi-stakeholder method for the joint involvement of local, national and international expertise, not as “in an interdependent system [where] different actors perform different tasks, but as in a “relay run”, all parts of the team have to work harmoniously together”.²¹

Another aspect that appears to be less regarded in the EU-led debate on early warning, is the inclusion of women’s rights and gender perspectives as a priority. The inability to include men and women equally in conflict prevention and early warning activities, as well as being cognisant of the different effects on; behaviour and needs of men, women, boys and girls, not only has consequences in terms of the excess suffering of women in violent conflicts, but also constitutes a missed opportunity for making conflict prevention strategies able to address the many socio-economic, cultural and political factors in a violent crisis.

As rightly pointed out by the OSCE/ODIHR brief on gender and early warning systems,²² the application of a gender perspective within early warning systems can be realised through a combined strategy: having women involved in conflict early warning systems – from the provision of information on conflicts to the planning and implementation of preventive responses; and recognising women as equally holding those social, economic cultural and political rights whose denial and violation has to be systematically taken in to account by early-warning-to-early-action processes. Although the EU is probably cognisant of these facts, recourse to include gender perspectives in EU conflict prevention policy is still lacking.

Conclusion

The EU has created good policy – albeit lacking in some aspects – and undertaken massive efforts in consultation and dialogue with stakeholders on its

²⁰ Schnabel A., *Improving Early Warning and Response Systems: Learning from Human Security, Preparing fro Climate Change*, in Ricci, A. (ed.), *From Early Warning to Early Action? The debate on enhancement of the EU’s Crisis Response capability continues*, European Communities, Luxembourg, 2008. See also Schnabel, A. and Krummenacher, H., *Towards a Human Security-Based Early Warning and Response System*, in *Facing Global Environmental Change*, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2009.

²¹ Schnabel, A., *Improving Early Warning and Response Systems: Learning from Human Security, Preparing fro Climate Change*, *supra* note 18.

²² “Gender and Early Warning Systems –An Introduction”, OSCE/ODIHR 2009, available at <http://www.osce.org/item/41377.html>.

conflict prevention framework. Also, it has been successful in both raising the public interest around conflict prevention and its instruments – early warning included – and involving the practitioners’ community in its efforts for bridging the gap between early warning and early action, that is the ultimate goal of prevention. On this front, what still remains to improve, is the combination of the Commission and Council’s efforts – that in theory should occur under the new External Action Service. In fact, whereas initiatives undertaken by both the Commission and the Council for strengthening their own conflict prevention toolbox have demonstrated success, the lack of a coherent coordination strategy risks minimizing seriously the impact of EU preventive policies in the field.

*By Dr. Barbara Nicoletti,
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MultiPart investigates whether, how, and under what conditions multi-stakeholder partnerships can positively impact on human security.

Thus facilitate non-violence and long-term peace, providing a productive framework for relations between local actors and external actors, including third party mediators and international organisations.

MultiPart explores therefore opportunities to directly impact on partnerships that are evolving in post-conflict societies and, by translating its findings into policy recommendations, to contribute to enhancing the role of the EU in conflict prevention and resolution as well as in fostering the rule of law.

**The November 2009 newsletter
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CSDP and EU mission updates - December 2009

*Our regular update of ESDP (now CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy) and EU missions shows no new missions from our October update. However, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) has approved the crisis management concept for a possible SSR mission in Somalia. There are currently 14 ESDP and EU missions in operation (giving a total of six in the Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa). This article provides an update to our October 2009 overview of past, current and planned missions. Please see previous updates for introductions to the missions. This update features a longer analysis of Afghanistan and also includes a graphical outline and listing of missions in the chart and table. ISIS updates these charts regularly as part of the **CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership** www.csdpmap.eu*

Military

EU NAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) - 8 December 2008 to 13 December 2010

The EU Mission continues to escort ships of the World Food Program, and has to date allowed the provision of 300 000 tonnes of food to be delivered in Somalia.

Through the establishment of the Maritime Security Centre (MSC), the EU mission provides protection to merchant ships. The MSC website allows commercial vessels to register to the programme and receive information on pirate activity and the MSC helps to coordinate the escort service to these ships which is provided by Atalanta. In this case the EU mission is an example of best practice in Civ-Mil coordination. Thus far, only one out of all the ships subscribed to the MSC has been captured.

Deterring, disrupting and arresting are the objectives of the mission. Agreements with the Seychelles and Kenya have been signed for the incarceration of pirates captured allowing Atalanta to go beyond its deterrent and disrupting powers over pirate activity. In addition, the agreement signed with the EU and the above mentioned countries include a human rights clause for the detention of pirates.

Since mid-July the number of attacks has diminished, due to the increase of merchant ships registration to the MSC; the increase in military presence in the region (Atalanta and other actors); and the increase coordination among the players involved in anti-piracy activity. The later aspect has been reinforced by the creation of the Mercury System which allows data

sharing among the different actors. Data sharing among armed forces is very rare and illustrates well the amount of cohesion there is among different countries and International Organisation in fighting piracy.

The EU is discussing preparations for a CSDP mission on SSR in Somalia (see *Upcoming Missions*).

EUFOR Althea/BiH - 2 December 2004 to 21 November 2010

Following the UN Security Council adoption of resolution 1895, the mission's mandate has been extended for a year and as of 4 December, Major General Bernhard Bair took position as Force Commander of the operation. Following the meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board in Sarajevo on 18 and 19 November 2009, which decided not to close the Office of the High Representative (OHR) bureau, the EU mission is remaining present in BiH. Planning over its future form of the mission continues in the Council.

Next June, Spain will withdraw its military presence (304 troops) from the EU mission (as France and the UK have done previously), reducing significantly the amount personnel which should be present on the ground. Currently personnel deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 2014 troops out of 2500 and Spanish withdrawal will reduce it further to 1710. Following the announcement of this withdrawal, the OHR announced it would undermine the mission's ability to continue to achieve its mandate. This decision comes after significant debates among Member States over ongoing presence on Bosnia and Herzegovina after a very long presence in the country. Divisions among Member States remain on when to pull out from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Civilian /Military SSR

EUSSR Guinea Bissau - 12 February 2008 to 30 May 2010

The mission has been subject to a technical extension of 6 months. This period will be dedicated to political discussion with the government of Guinea-Bissau to establish common ground on a potential extension of EU presence in the country and on a change in mandate of the mission. A technical assessment over the SSR mission will be provided early in 2010 to determine the future of EUSSR Guinea Bissau.

EUSEC DR Congo - 1 July 2007 – 30 September 2010

EUSEC is currently working on the integration in the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNPDP) the armed group led by Laurent Nkunda which fought the Congolese government earlier this year. Their integration of the CNPDP has proved difficult and too fast tracked, with chains of payment within the FARDC being flawed, resulting in ex-soldier of CNPDP not being paid. EUSEC is currently working on helping to establish a transparent and effective chain of payment. The EU mission continues its effort in addressing impunity, as well as sexual and gender based violence committed by the FARDC and paramilitary groups.

Civilian SSR

EUPOL RD Congo - 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010

The mission continues to work on fighting sexual violence and impunity and has deployed two extra teams composed of gender advisor and prosecution experts to address this. The team will work country wide, but will focus on areas in the east of the country – namely Goma and Bukavu - where sexual violence is more prevalent. The mission is also preparing two “multifaceted units” with 3 specialists each on prosecution, gender and justice – to be deployed in North Kivu and South Kivu for a period of 6 months-1 year. The Council is currently calling for Member States to provide experts, but may have to outsource to find personnel.

The mission continues to coordinate its work within the Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police and has recently submitted to the Congolese National Assembly a draft Organic Law for the Police, aiming to enhance policing procedures and standards.

EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories - 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010

The work done by EUPOL COPPS in areas of police and criminal justice is very well received by the Member States, which would like to re-enforce the mission by changing its scope and mandate to incorporate a broader rule of law reform dimension. However such modifications require agreement from the Israeli government and considering the current political Israeli-Palestinian relations, such modifications remain very unlikely.

The mission continues to work on the establishment of a Civil Policing Model and Community Policing. In late October the mission ran a crime scene

investigation training involving eight senior civil police crime investigators and eight prosecutors specialised in dealing with major crimes which aimed at building synergies between the judicial and the police sector.

EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina - 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2010

Recent decisions made on EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests that the mission will now focus on organised and corruption within the Bosnian police. This shift in focus of the mission entails a replacement of current personnel by experts on organised crime and a potential downsizing of the mission in terms of staff.

On the issue of corruption within the police force, EUPM continues to collect data for a report determining the status of organised crime and establish the level of penetration within the police force.

Civilian

EUJUST LEX Iraq – 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010

The Brussels based mission has now established pilot schemes on the ground in Iraq. These schemes mainly focus on the prison system by providing training to high level staff.

Training is provided on penitentiary administration, juvenile justice, domestic violence and forensics. These projects are still at a nascent phase. Potentially the training mission might grow in size and ambition, this would in turn potentially permit a proper evaluation of the training by assessing whether the mission’s training given to the high level functionary trickles down in the institutions. However, growth of in-country activity remains linked to the security situation in Iraq, which until now still remains unstable.

EULEX Kosovo – 15 June 2008 to 15 June 2010

In the past months, the EU mission has deepened its ties with Serbia on policing and border controls. The Police Protocol Agreement has begun implementation and cooperation with Serbian police has also started. This agreement provides for cooperation on fighting organised crime and the trafficking of drugs, people and weapons. There is now a common understanding between EULEX, the Kosovar and Serbian Governments that such agreements are mutually beneficial. However, such collaboration led to brutal protest by the Vetevendosje (Self Determination) movement against EULEX in August. This raised questions over how the Kosovar population was

viewing the EU mission. EULEX intelligently kept a low profile on Vetevendosje's actions since it would have only given the group more visibility. Instead the EU mission continued a well targeted and effective publicity campaign directly aimed at the Kosovar population rather than at the political sphere, using similar communication techniques as the Self Determination group.

EULEX established a Human Rights Review Panel which provides individuals and bodies outside of the mission a platform to question the mission's activity. This panel will be constituted of three EU representatives, one from the mission itself and two external to EULEX. The panel will be used as a channel for the hearing of external sources (complaints, suggestions etc), which will in turn be processed and transformed into recommendations to the Head of Mission. This is a significant step in showing the openness of the mission as well as ensuring a greater level of accountability.

Border

EUMM Georgia – 15 September 2008 to 15 September 2010

The latest tension between Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia occurred on 25 October when 16 Georgian nationals from the bordering village of Gremiskhevi next to South Ossetia were arrested by Russian Border Guards whilst cutting firewood in the vicinity of the Administrative Border of the break away region. EUMM urged the involved parties to settle the situation by using the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism which has been established for these kinds of scenarios. The 16 men were later on released after being trailed for illegal crossing and lumbering in the South Ossetian territory.

The EU mission still cannot access the break-away regions and relations between South Ossetia and Abkhazia with the monitoring mission remain hostile. It can however be argued that progress has been achieved at the personal level (between the regions officials and the Head of Mission), this seems to be even more the case with Abkhazi, where officials are sensibly more open to the EU Mission. The process of confidence building remains slow, but not stagnant.

EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova -1 December 2005 to 30 November 2009

No changes since last update.

EUSR BST Georgia - 1 September 2005 to 28 February 2010

No changes since last update.

EUBAM Rafah -_1 January 2006 to 24 November 2009

The mission has been extended to 24 May 2010. No changes since last update. The mission is still on hold pending the political and security situation.

Upcoming Missions

EU SSR Somalia

On 17 November the Council approved the crisis management concept (CMC) for a possible SSR mission in Somalia. This proposed small scale mission will be set up in parallel to the EU-led maritime operation, EU NAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta). It thus confirms the EU's support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) and for stability in the region. This proposal comes within a broader effort to support the Somali Federal Transition Government. It may also bring existing initiatives into line by combining experience gained by the training mission organised by France in Djibouti and the work carried out by Uganda under the training programme set up by AMISON. In the coming weeks, the EU will send personnel in Uganda and Kenya for further preparatory work on support to the AU mission.

As adopted, the CMC calls for an operation to train 2000 troops for the Somali security forces. Factors to take in account on the potential mission are: to ensure a functioning chain of payment; ensure ownership and allegiance of the trained security force to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia; to attempt to prevent the use of child soldiers, as age identification means are nearly inexistent. The scope of the mission will remain simple as it will solely involve the training of troops and the deployment of Non-Commissioned Officers rather than more complex Security Sector Reform work done like in the DRC requiring high level military staff which are scarcer.

By Johann Herz, Programme Officer at ISIS Europe

Feature: Afghanistan

EUPOL Afghanistan - 30 May 2007 to 30 May 2010

The election of the 20th of August was marked by record high violence and widespread fraud. This failure has delivered a critical blow to the legitimacy of the Afghan Government and to the international presence in Afghanistan.

President Obama's strategy for Afghanistan consisting in an increase of troops and personnel shows a new resolve of the US to break the Taliban momentum. President Obama also calls for its NATO allies to contribute in any way possible in providing resources (military or civilian) to turn the table in Afghanistan. At the EU level, the Member States are reticent to further commit. They are unwilling to send more troops in Afghanistan as they face a lot of pressure from their respective population to not do so. This is also the case for civilian capabilities and is reflected Member States failure to meet their commitments to civilian missions. This is the case for EUPOL Afghanistan where personnel requirements still have not been filled. Out of the 400 staff the mission should consist of, only 290 personnel are deployed.

There exist however different facets to this problem, one being the domestic implication of sending personnel, needed within the Member States, abroad. The second one is the launch in the spring of 2009 of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A). The latter factor is important in understanding the capabilities shortage faced by EUPOL. The NTM-A is NATO's attempt to establish a comprehensive training initiative for military and police. The NTM-A has been received by the EU and NATO Member States as a pragmatic and straight to the point initiative to deal with the issue of police training. This in turn might influence EU Member States to rely more on the NTM-A rather than EUPOL as apparatus for police training. The lack of the Member States' confidence in EUPOL is also due to the fact that EUPOL is not well understood by the public and has failed to maintain a high political priority.

EUPOL does indeed face difficulty, but its mandate and work is highly recognised and valued on the ground. As far as relations are concerned, the Afghan Ministry of Interior welcomes the work done by EUPOL and the mission should get credit for what it has achieved in the areas it focuses on, but certain sources underline the frustration of the Ministry of Interior at the lack of robustness of the EU mission. This is again a direct factor of the personnel shortage. In the case of EU-NATO/ISAF relations, there seems to be good will between the two institutions to communicate and work together, liaison officers have been established for that purpose, but it still seems that communications remain problematic. This is partly due to the different approach both bodies have on police training. EUPOL provides a qualitative and long-term training, incorporating the gender and human rights dimensions. Whereas NATO opts for a more militarised counter insurgency form of training. The model is short term and aims at putting boots on the ground, furthermore it does not involve domestic violence training and human rights policing.¹ Although the incoherence of the different models of training have been reduced through time, it is important that these oppositions do not become obstacles to the establishment of a comprehensive and coherent police training programme.

On 4 November, five British soldiers were killed by an Afghan policeman, which underlined potential infiltration of the Taliban in the police force. This incident also raised again the questions of security of unarmed civilian personnel involved in police training. Vis-à-vis security provision, EUPOL has not been able to establish an agreement with NATO/ISAF, it instead relies on bilateral agreement with EU Member States Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). However agreements with US and Turkey led PRTs are very unlikely to be concluded² and therefore limits EUPOL capacity to deploy everywhere. In such dangerous conditions, the small protection umbrella which EUPOL benefits from entails a further obstacle to fulfilling its mandate.

¹ Peral L., "EUPOL Afghanistan", in Grevi G., Helly D., Keohane D. (Eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy – The First Ten Years*", European Union Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), page 333

² Gross E., "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's contribution", *Occasional Paper*, 78 April 2009, European Union Institute for Security Studies, page 31

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ISIS Europe and Partners will launch the **CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership (CSDP MAP)** web portal at

18H on 18 January 2010

At Congresplein 1, 1000 Brussels
Belgium

Invitations will be issued soon
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ISIS Europe established CSDP MAP in 2008 (then ESDP MAP), which has been designed to fill a gap and a niche by collating think tank, research institute, NGO, government and EU institutional work on CSDP into one-place. CSDP MAP now has 18 partners across Europe [[ISIS Europe](#); [CICS Bradford University](#); [Clingendael](#); [CMI](#); [ECFR](#); [Egmont](#); [EPC](#); [FRIDE](#); [Fundacion Alternativas \(OPEX\)](#); [DCAF](#); [GRIP](#); [IRIS](#); [IFSH](#); [IAI](#); [Noref](#); [SIPRI](#); [UNIDIR](#); [ZIF](#). Observer: [ICG](#)] and growing.

CSDP MAP is particularly important with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009.

The Partnership is currently developing a web-portal to link to mission updates, research, lessons learnt and policy advice, which will be at www.csdpmap.eu.

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ISIS Europe

Table 1 – Completed missions: There will be 13 completed CSDP and EU missions as at December 2009 (see below and chart for further details. Future updates available from www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding).

Region	Military	Civil-Military assistance / Military coord. support	Civil Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- Artemis DRC - EUFOR RD Congo -EUFOR Tchad/RCA	- Support to AU AMIS Sudan - EUNAVCO Somalia	- EUPOL Kinshasa					
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- CONCORDIA fYROM		- EUPOL Proxima (fYROM) - EUPAT (fYROM)	- EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)			- EUMM Western Balkans	- EUPT Kosovo
Asia							- AMM Monitoring Mission	
Middle East								

Table 2 – Ongoing missions: As at December 2009, there will be 14 active CSDP and EU missions (six in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa) see below.

The breakdown is: 2 military; 12 civilian. Of the civilian: 11 are SSR missions (1 SSR, 4 police reform, 1 defence reform, 1 justice reform, 2 border assistance, 1 integrated), 1 is border support and 1 is monitoring. Total of completed and ongoing missions now reaches 27.

Region	Military	Military coordination support	Civil Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- EU NAVFOR Somalia		- EUPOL RD Congo		- EUSEC RD Congo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau			
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- EUFOR Althea BiH		- EUPM BiH - EULEX Kosovo			- EUSR BST Georgia - EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova	- EUMM Georgia	
Asia			- EUPOL Afghanistan					
Middle East			- EUPOL COPPS Palestine	- EUJUST-LEX Iraq		- EU BAM Rafah		

Chart of EU and CSDP missions to date, December 2009

